One of the main reasons behind this inability to buy corn was the increasing burden of tax. From the 1580s, Europe moved into an era of greater international hostility, with wars occurring more frequently and becoming increasingly costly to fight. As each country's military capacity increased, others had to follow in order to compete, and a form of arms race developed in which the size of armies rose dramatically. The Spanish army, which in 1550 had stood at 150,000 men rose to 300,000 by the 1630s, the French increased from 50,000 to 150,000, and the English from 20,000 in 1550 to 70,000 in 1650. "The only way to pay for all this was through higher taxation: in Spain taxes increased fivefold under Philip II, in France the tax burden quintupled between 1609 and 1648. Fiscality since it tested the capacity of both rich and poor to contribute to the unprecedented demands of the state, became the crucial ingredient of crisis."
The increased tax burden affected industry in Europe in much the same way as it affected agriculture, by taking money out of the private market and channelling it through the public sector. Manufacturers who had previously catered for private domestic markets found that the state had taken the money from their customers who were now understandably more anxious to feed themselves than to buy industrial products, undermining the whole basis of the traditional industries. The state, and in particular the military, became the major buyer in the market, but was interested in war industries rather than those which had served domestic demand. This shift of demand seriously destabilised national economies, causing unemployment at a time when money was short as a result of a depressed agricultural market and high taxes, and caused a further fall in living standards. The best available evidence for industrial change in the first half of the seventeenth century concerns the important cloth industry, which although confirming severe industrial difficulties in some areas of Europe, far from conclusively shows a general industrial crisis. All areas suffered some problems, the most severe coming in the traditional Mediterranean centres, but the industry of England and the Netherlands hardly saw any decline at all, England's production actually increasing on the strength of the new draperies. In addition, decline in the urban centres came at the same time as an increased tendency to 'put out' work to rural industry, the increase of which went largely unrecorded.
International trade, like industry, was characterised by a shift in balance away from the traditional centres to England and the Netherlands. Spanish trade with the Americas which had been so strong in the sixteenth century hit major problems in the first decades of the seventeenth, while Baltic trade was certainly not booming. These weaknesses were seized upon by the Dutch and English merchants though, who moved into the gaps left by the declining powers. While the change in the balance of European trade was unsettling (the new merchants did not instantaneously move into the vacant markets), it would be hard to say that there was a general crisis in European trade when there were countries whose traders were witnessing the dawn of a golden age. Trade crises tended to be local, and even for those areas with the greatest problems such as Spain the century was not one of unfailing decline.
The overall economy of Europe during the first half of the seventeenth century did see a number of problems which in many areas combined to make up a local crisis. The climatic change, which affected Europe more-or-less evenly, affected demography and to a lesser extent agriculture to varying degrees (although all areas suffered, some were harder-hit than others), and it would be hard to identify a general European crisis in trade and industry when there were countries which saw little if any decrease in trade volume and industrial production. It should be said, however, that the patterns of the early seventeenth century were in marked contrast to the 'golden age' of the previous century, and with the slowing down or reversal of economic growth, discontent was bound to be aroused among people who expected to see the continuation of the good times. "...Revolutions do not usually erupt during a long period of a declining standard of living but rather at the end of a period of a rising standard which, for whatever reason, has just begun to decline." Whether there was a general economic crisis or not, economic difficulties and high taxes created a level of discontent which political revolts could feed off.
These underlying factors have been seen as coming to a head with the political crises of the 1640s which shocked the world and were seen at the time as being the expression of a single great crisis. Jeremiah Whittaker in a sermon in 1643 said, "These days are days of shaking, and this shaking is universal." The clustering of the revolts across Europe and their coincidence with underlying problems suggest both that the revolts are likely to be linked and that they are the result of Europe-wide trends. However, the timing of the revolts could just be coincidence: "...it is open to question whether our persistent search for 'underlying social causes' has not led us down blind alleys...Political disagreement may, after all, be no more and no less than political disagreement - a dispute about the control and the exercise of power." It is also questionable whether the early seventeenth century can be called a time of crisis simply because of the volume and seriousness of revolts. "...If, in England, dysfunction began to appear in 1529 when was there a period of equilibrium, which one would have to assume to have been at least reasonably long to contrast with the hundred years of dysfunction? The fifteenth century, the age of the great defeat in France and the Wars of the Roses? the fourteenth century, with the Black Death, its popular rebellions and the deposition of two kings? In between the disasters there were some relatively short periods of calm and equilibrium. But why should they have any greater claim to be the norm than the rather longer periods of unrest and confusion?"
It is also hard to find any common threads which run through all of the major revolts in Europe, and any attempt to generalise is bound to lead to the inclusion of exceptions to the rule. In the very broadest terms, the growth of absolutism coming into conflict with local powers can be seen as the rule for many of the rebellions, but their courses and the issues which were fought over of course vary from country to country. In England, the king's encroachment on vested interest in the areas of religion, finance and foreign policy caused open constitutional debate in Parliament where the tensions between the centralising king and the conservative local powers developed into war. Likewise, the Fronde in France was a reaction to royal centralisation fought over issues like the sale of offices, the introduction of the intendants, and the increases of the taille. Castile's economic weaknesses at a time of war caused it to shift its burdens onto the shoulders of its subject provinces, a move which Portugal, Catalonia and Naples were unwilling to accept. In the Netherlands, conflict arose over the Prince of Orange's right to control the army, while Poland was driven into chaos as a result of attempts to suppress the autonomy of the Cossacks. An exception can be found in the case of Sweden, which saw a genuine peasant's revolt, but overall, this broad model can be seen to work across Europe. It is, however, "...not even theoretically possible to construct a comprehensive theory or model for the revolutions of the seventeenth century."
There was no general economic crisis in Europe in the seventeenth century, a time which can be characterised by local crises and a general slowing down of the expansion of the previous century, but above all by a shift from the declining Mediterranean world to the emerging northern powers. The nearest to a general economic crisis which Europe saw was in agriculture, and this was an important issue given the number of people who made a living from the land, and caused a great deal of discontent, but both trade and industry saw a change in balance more than a universal decline. The European economy, however, was not growing fast enough to keep pace with the demands of states for money to pay for armaments, and it became necessary to assert greater state control over the countries in order to secure the necessary revenue. This move towards absolutism grated with a society based on many centres of loyalty and traditional local interests, giving rise to political tensions which frequently developed into reactionary rebellion. Any more specific model, though, would not stand up to detailed examination, and the question remains whether these events amount to a general crisis. While there is a broad theme in the revolts of conflict between the state and the 'country' which might be termed a general political crisis, it is hard to link this to any general economic crisis. Increased fiscal pressure from the government as a result of inadequate revenue seems the only link, and while this might work in the case of somewhere like Spain where there were severe economic problems, it is hard to believe that countries such as England or the Netherlands, on the verge of an economic golden age, found money hard to come by simply as a result of a depressed economy. Economic and political problems were not necessarily connected, and the economic crises were local, not general. Many of the political crises do seem to share the theme of a state versus country conflict, but took varying courses, and without the underlying theme of economic crisis, seem to be little more than an outbreak of rebellions which were hardly a new phenomenon in Europe.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
T. Aston (ed.), Crisis in Europe 1560-1660 (London 1965)
H. Kamen, European Society 1500-1700 (London 1984)
H. G. Koenigsberger, Politicians and Virtuosi (London 1986)
G. Parker, Europe in Crisis 1598-1648 (Brighton 1980)
G. Parker & L. M. Smith, The General Crisis of the Seventeenth Century (London 1985)
G. Parker & L. M. Smith, The General Crisis of the Seventeenth Century, p. 8
G. Parker, Europe in Crisis, p. 23
N. Steensgaard, 'The Seventeenth Century Crisis' in G. Parker & L. M. Smith (eds.), The General Crisis of the Seventeenth Century, p. 29
G. Parker & L. M. Smith, The General Crisis of the Seventeenth Century, p.9
N. Steensgaard, 'The Seventeenth Century Crisis' in G. Parker & L. M. Smith (eds.), The General Crisis of the Seventeenth Century, p. 43
G. Parker, Europe in Crisis 1598-1648, p. 70
H. Kamen, European Society 1500-1700, p.236
H. G. Koenigsberger, Politicians and Virtuosi, pp. 158-159
H. Kamen, European Society 1500-1700, p. 234
J. H. Elliott, 'Revolution and Continuity in Early Modern Europe', in G. Parker & L. M. Smith, The General Crisis of the Seventeenth Century, p. 119
H. G. Koenigsberger, Politicians and Virtuosi, p. 159
Ibid. p. 167
