One of the ways in which ballot papers were spoiled was by writing in such names as Mickey Mouse and Donald Duck, or the names of characters from popular Chinese novels.
Sometimes names written in more obviously political: "At a Mechanical Technical School, the invalid ballots contained the names of Fang Lizhi, Liu Binyan (journalist and dissident who has since had to leave China for exile in the US) and Wang Ruowang. In other districts, people wrote words which expressed their dissatisfaction openly."
Rather than dispersing after casting their votes, people stayed to hear results, reportedly applauding and laughing when names of Fang Lizhi, Mickey Mouse et al read out.
Elections in factories also disrupted - in some cases workers had to be forced to cast a vote by being threatened with fines if they didn't.
Demonstrations held by students of Science and Technology University in Hefei, Fang Lizhi's university, to protest against Party interference in elections; soon spread to Shanghai.
Head of Party, Hu Yaobang, took conciliatory line with students, but CCP conservatives favoured crackdown. Crucially, Deng Xiaoping himself said "bourgeois liberalization" had clearly gone too far - authorized local Party authorities to end demonstrations, which they did.
Hu Yaobang took responsibility for demonstrations; resigned as Party head mid-January 1987. Subsequently became hero for student demonstrators in 1989, because believed sympathetic to earlier demonstrations. Earlier in career had been Communist Youth League official, so seen as "student's friend".
NB: hardly any worker involvement in 1986-7, despite beginnings of late-80s strike wave coinciding with it. CCP successfully spun the protests to workers as the whinging of an already privileged group (nobody really likes students), dissuading them from making common cause this time.
No further mass demonstrations on democracy issues until 1989, but discussion of political reform continued, e.g. in various "democracy salons", often on university campuses. Wang Dan, later a student activist in 1989, involved in a prominent one at Beijing University.
Discussion encouraged by development of political reform in many Eastern European countries and in Gorbachev's Soviet Union - some ruling parties even giving up monopoly of power to compete with legalized opposition parties.
One of Wang Dan's early essays hailed these developments as the future of all socialist countries, and stressed the need to struggle for such change from below. Invoked the spirit of 1956 - the Hungarian and Polish uprisings and China's own 100 Flowers.
1989 was a year of anniversaries - 70 years since May Fourth, 40 years since the PRC was founded, 200 years since the French Revolution, 10 years since Wei Jingsheng had been imprisoned (Fang Lizhi and others called for his release as a suitable way of marking all of these). Plans were afoot among student activists for some sort of protest to mark the May Fourth anniversary - the most appropriate one for a student challenge against an illegitimate government not seen to be serving the best interests of people or nation.
But in fact didn't have to wait that long. Overtaken by events, as a massive popular protest movement, millions strong, of a kind which should not have been possible in the PRC, broke out and found just enough political space in its first few days of existence to gain unstoppable momentum. Even though nobody involved in it had this aim, it almost brought down the CCP government in China. It was the biggest shock they'd ever had, and this accounts for much of their more recent treatment of even mild expressions of dissent: they do not intend to be surprised this way again. But the death of a leader is a dangerous time in China, and no-one can control when it happens.
3 Outbreak and course of the 1989 Democracy Movement
Hu Yaobang died on 15 April 1989, and in doing so launched the 1989 Democracy Movement. Hu's reputation among students crucial: widely believed to have opposed campaigns against bourgeois liberalization and to have supported student calls for more democracy.
Demonstrations ostensibly to show respect for Hu, but quickly developed into large-scale movement criticizing CCP for corruption, mismanagement, failure to establish democracy. Parallel with death of Zhou Enlai sparking off April Fifth Movement. Posters read: "Those who should have lived, have died. Those who should have died, still live" - meaning Deng should have died, not Hu.
Very large demos not only in Beijing, but in cities and towns all over China; biggest over a million strong. In Beijing, student demonstrators occupied Tiananmen Square from end-April to early June; marches through city applauded and supported by nearly all urban citizenry.
- The movement's participants: Students and workers
Two main groups: students and workers.
The students perhaps a proto-elite, supporting reform faction in leadership (led by Zhao Ziyang) more and more as movement went on. Few intended "democracy" to include ordinary Chinese people; often scornful of workers' and (especially) peasants' ability to play any political role. Also wary of encouraging, even allowing, workers' participation in movement in case it provoked early crackdown. Demanded end to official corruption, control of inflation, increased political role for themselves.
Student groups troubled by concerns about personal prestige - several different people styling selves "Commander-in-Chief of Tiananmen Square", for example. Besides food and other supplies from fellow-citizens, students also received cash donations, and ironically, there were complaints of corruption - money disappearing or being spent against rules; a cause of disputes within student ranks. Fed government's propaganda against movement.
Workers much more sceptical of all top leaders (Zhao Ziyang a particular target of criticism for family's wealthy lifestyle, especially golf habit). Workers resented fact that those students who did show interest in workers' movement wanted to lead it.
Unwilling to accept subordinate role or student dominance over workers' organizations. Shop-floor organizational efforts hampered, especially after martial law, and kept out of Tiananmen Square itself by students until last days of occupation of Square.
But did form independent unions which also had political function - intended to give workers collective voice in national and local decision-making as well as protecting interests at work.
Many worker activists followed fortunes of Poland's Solidarity throughout 1980s; still thought Solidarity an example to emulate. Solidarity finally legalized 17 April 1989, two days after Hu Yaobang's death, and this event mentioned in many speeches made in early days of movement.
Workers' groups anti-hierarchical, avoided positions of authority, titles - strong direct-democracy tradition of Poland's original Solidarity.
Workers "targeted the system" from beginning in movement, whereas many students seemed to aspire to join system and reform from within. Thus a lot of bad feeling within two groups, and students only abandoned insistence on keeping movement "pure" towards end, when numbers occupying Tiananmen Square dropping and students felt vulnerable enough to need support and protection of teams of worker-pickets. Earlier vetoed several calls for a general strike.
Workers' organizations kept illegal by authorities' refusal to register them, cf. DWM.
Workers' language also distinguished them from most students: talked about Party's exploitation of them, called elite in power a "bourgeoisie", and in one leaflet even quoted Communist Manifesto of 1848: Workers of the world, unite! We have nothing to lose but our chains, and a world to win!'
- The course of the movement in Beijing and around the country
Events of movement in Beijing and other cities (all major Chinese cities and some smaller ones). Very large demonstrations causing Party concern, especially as occupation of Tiananmen Square continued during Gorbachev's visit in mid-May.
April 15 – death of Hu Yaobang, allegedly while in heated row with CCP conservatives. Followed by days of activity, especially in Beijing, where tributes, wreaths etc. and criticism of rest of CCP leadership placed around Monument to People’s Heroes in Tiananmen Square. Until after Hu’s funeral, leadership couldn’t do much about it – had to allow mourning for top leader.
50,000-strong demo in Tiananmen Square on 22 April, day of memorial service – large police/army presence. Demos in Changsha and Xian turn violent.
After memorial service, university students in Beijing and elsewhere began class boycotts. People milling around in Tiananmen Square reading posters and talking have already begun to form groups – many worker-activists later in workers’ autonomous federations (WAFs) met this way. Protest could usually be compartmentalized by authorities into individual work-units, but circumstances in which 1989 movement began cut across those divisions.
April 26 People's Daily editorial condemning "turmoil" – first official reaction, and used term “counter-rev. turmoil”, which made participation potentially a very serious (capital) offence. Rank and file students given way out, though – article talked about most students meaning well and only wanting to pay respects to Hu being led astray by small minority with evil intentions.
Repudiation of editorial became major demand of demonstrators, especially hunger-strikers from May 13, who demanded that movement be recognized as patriotic and democratic. Generally met with outrage and gave impetus to movement.
Late April – early May – demos growing in size, and reported in Chinese press, with pictures, so people can see level of support. Demonstrators applauded in streets and given food, drinks and donations by bystanders. Autonomous student unions and workers’ unions set up. Calls by student leadership for dialogue with Party.
Hunger strike has tremendous emotional impact on public in Beijing – great support and sympathy for students (despite fact that several were interpreting “hunger strike” fairly broadly).
May 14 – agreed dialogue session between Party and student leaders to be broadcast live on TV. Dialogue goes ahead, but when it isn’t on TV, crowds from Square storm the venue and end the meeting in disarray. Another attempt on May 18 fails when Premier Li Peng monopolizes session with lecture to students.
More radical leadership (e.g. Chai Ling) now of student movement – moderate figures like Wu’er Kaixi and Wang Dan have less and less influence, though still make attempts to get students occupying Square to agree to orderly withdrawal.
May 18 – Gorbachev leaves. ACFTU donates 100,000 yuan to students – first official gesture of support. Reported that ACFTU also agreed to back a general strike call by autonomous unions – very significant if true. But student leaders repeatedly vetoed calls, and when they finally supported general strike, in early June, too late.
Martial Law declared immediately after Gorbachev's visit ended - early hours of May 19.
Revealed in January 2001, when Tiananmen Papers published, that the Politburo Standing Committee had been split over whether to declare martial law or continue negotiating with students (Li Peng and Yao Yilin for, Zhao Ziyang and Hu Qili against, Qiao Shi abstained).
Decision then referred to “Eight Elders”, including Deng Xiaoping (old guard kicked upstairs to Central Advisory Commission in mid-80s drive to have proper retirement procedures in CCP - Chinese House of Lords). Contrary to reports/rumours at the time, Deng actually not one of the most gung-ho or bloodthirsty about martial law, and particularly anxious that nobody should be killed in Tiananmen Square itself. Others less squeamish (especially retired General Wang Zhen, who thought death was too good for the protesters).
And it seems to have been Li Peng, the most criticized leader and one the movement really did want to depose (the movement never called for the overthrow of the whole Chinese government), who pushed for martial law. He skilfully played on Deng's and the other old leaders' fear of Red Guard-style street politics and the possibility that they'd all end up under house arrest unless the movement was swiftly crushed.
Zhao Ziyang, the only leader who really was on verge of being deposed and put under house arrest, by his colleagues, not the students or workers, made a last, tearful visit to the Square, urging students to leave and preserve themselves to fight another day. But this and all subsequent attempts to clear the Square failed. Those who wanted to leave would just go, so there was always a majority to vote to stay when shows of hands or voice votes were taken.
Once martial law had been declared, participants and citizens took measures to forestall military intervention, setting up barricades, explaining to soldiers that what they'd been told about "counter-revolutionary uprising" was lies, that it was patriotic, democratic movement supported by whole of urban citizenry. So first attempt at military intervention stopped in tracks by number of people congregating at road-junctions into centre of Beijing - human wall which army, this time, unwilling to force its way through. Took 24 hours of tense stand-off before army told to withdraw.
But decisive military intervention probably inevitable, despite apparent disagreement among top Party leadership over how to deal with movement, and despite rumours that some of army didn't want to be involved in suppression. (Not surprising if true – not the kind of job professional soldiers like to do, especially where some may sympathize with movement they’re to put down, as some soldiers did in 1989.)
Easy to assume after the event that it was obvious the DM would end in a violent crackdown and that the people who chose to stay in Tiananmen Square and in the streets leading to it that night should have known what to expect.
But take one example - a Hong Kong pro-democracy activist and freelance reporter arranged to meet Wang Juntao (one of the "Black Hands" subsequently blamed for the movement by the Chinese authorities) at half past two on the afternoon of 3 June at a particular place on the Square. Both arrived on time at the appointed spot, but Wang Juntao asked if they could take a rain check for 24 hours as he really needed to be somewhere else, the reporter said that actually that suited her better as well, and so they agreed to return to that place on the Square on the afternoon of 4 June.
And needless to say, they didn't - the Square by then was strewn with the remains of tents crushed under tank tracks, burnt-out buses and APCs, and the whole area was being patrolled by jumpy and sometimes out-of-control soldiers who were still loosing off shots at passers-by.
The point is that even these two, politically experienced, astute and finely attuned to changes in the political atmosphere in China, had no idea that the final crackdown would begin barely twelve hours after they spoke, or that it would take the form it did. After the first attempt to move troops in to clear the Square on May 19-20th had been successfully blocked by millions of Beijing citizens, it was not only possible but easy to convince yourself that the government would never order the army to open fire and drive over unarmed people, and that the army would never obey such orders anyway.
It was certainly easier than imagining the alternative. Many of those who lived to tell the tale recall how they couldn't believe that the army really had opened fire on them, with live ammunition, until the moment when their friends started to fall, dead or injured, beside them. And their reaction when they did realize was not what we might expect to be the obvious one - to run for cover - but a furious outrage which seems to have overridden fear, and which sent waves of demonstrators back towards the guns again and again armed with little more than rocks, pieces of wood, and the occasional petrol bomb.
Planning of suppression, however, can easily be traced in hindsight. Deng used delay from Martial Law to June 3rd to bring into line commanders of all military regions in China - to make sure could rely on armed forces for concerted, nationwide crackdown, not just in Beijing.
Final military intervention began night of June 3rd - much more experienced troops than earlier conscripts used, loyalty assured, moved in with tanks, armoured personnel carriers, smashing through barricades set up on all road junctions approaching Square. Still quickly degenerated into chaos, though, as parts of force lost contact with commanders and found selves under attack.
Demonstrators fought back, outraged that "People's Army" would fire on unarmed people. Massacre through the night; armed mopping-up operations for some days after in Beijing. Shots still being heard ten days after Square was cleared. Man with tanks in Beijing was on 5 June.
No clear casualty figures, but in Beijing on June 3-4, probably 1-3,000 dead. High proportion of dead to injured – head and chest injuries, typically. Doesn’t include outside Beijing, or those subsequently executed with or without benefit of trial first. Some still just "missing" - never seen after that night, but not on official lists of dead.
Most deaths occurred on the major roads and junctions leading to the Square, not in the Square itself. CCP still denies any deaths in Square, but news footage proves there were some (on Chang'an Avenue at top of Square, at least).
A few hundred people huddled round the Monument to the People's Heroes in the centre of the Square were the last to leave. Lecturer and literary critic Liu Xiaobo and Taiwanese singer-songwriter Hou Dejian took a voice vote, asking crowd to shout alternately "Stay!" or "Go!", depending on what they wanted to do. Liu and Hou say they figured those who wanted to stay would shout loudest. So when both sounded about equal, they took that as a small majority for leaving, and went over to army commanders waving a hastily-made white flag and negotiated their final exit through the southeastern corner of the Square, at gunpoint.
Moderate student leader Wang Dan, now in exile in US, has spoken of his sense of responsibility for the deaths on June 3-4. Led several attempts to get students to agree to clear the Square, but by mid-May had lost influence to more militant leaders like Chai Ling. Says he did not expect movement to end the way it did, and if he'd known how many would die, would not have led students to the Square in the first place.
5 Aftermath
Outrage at massacre gave renewed impetus to movement in other cities. In Shanghai, Guangzhou, Xian and many other cities, strikes (including calls for general strikes) in days following massacre; main streets, bridges, railway lines barricaded. But suppression continued through June and July 1989 - group after group declared illegal, members rounded up. Local military and government ready for operation.
Different handling of workers and students: students offered way out, Party claiming not to be targeting patriotic, well-intentioned but naive students "led astray", offered chance to repent errors – only “ring-leaders” targeted (21 most-wanted list). China couldn't afford to lose whole educated generation - desperately needed their skills. Bad enough that many allowed to study abroad never came back.
Workers' organizations, individuals much more likely to be condemned as criminals, hooligans; more likely to be imprisoned or executed. True of all Chinese political movements since 1949. Arrested workers shown on TV had obviously been beaten by police - shown to intimidate others. One prominent BWAF activist, Han Dongfang, gave himself up to police rather than wait for this to happen to him.
Chinese leadership again showed fear of independent workers' organizations, fear of Chinese Solidarity (explicit comments of Deng and others). Actually WAFs hardly got off ground in terms of workplace organization, though some able to claim very large membership recruited at stands just off Tiananmen Square (e.g. BWAF’s 20,000 names).
But felt it important to make their mark, say what they believed in, show fellow-workers that independent organization a possibility (much more widely accepted as necessary now - comments on importance of independent TUs commonplace in workers' discussions). Workers knew they were likely to be wiped out, but believed had to make stand, show others it was possible to resist.
Last task in movement of many workers' groups was to help activists, especially some of "21 most wanted", go underground and eventually get out of China. E.g. Chai Ling and Feng Congde hidden and smuggled out - emerged in France a year after end of movement. Hong Kong snakeheads even smuggled people out for free. And some top worker activists also hid out and escaped. Zhao Hongliang reports peasants willingly hid him: "We used to hide the communists from the Japanese in the war, and now we'll hide you from the communists."
International reaction actually quite limited – e.g. Japan withdrew aid, but not soft loans, which were far more important to China financially. Japanese universities actually helped Chinese authorities to track down Chinese students who'd participated in movement on their campuses.
Whereas Australian Prime Minister declared on the spot that all Chinese students afraid to go back to China could stay indefinitely.
Elsewhere, vocal condemnation but little action. Some embarrassment about who would be first Western leader to shake hands in public with “Butchers of Beijing” (John Major, with Li Peng), but visits on again within months. Deng insisted throughout crackdown that economic reform would not be affected, and leadership won gamble that to the rest of the world, China’s business was more important than its human-rights record.
So in 1989 army to the rescue, and CCP still in power today, having watched similar protest movements and other events topple former allies in Soviet bloc.
Would it have made difference if “velvet revolutions” etc. had come before Tiananmen? I think it would – from e.g. reaction of Chinese activists to overthrow of Romania’s Ceausescus.
Did have an impact on collapse of socialist bloc in Europe. Some regimes looked at Chinese crackdown and realized they didn’t have the stomach to stay in power by the same means.
Others didn’t think they could trust their own armed forces to do the job against a genuinely popular opposition movement – and Soviet Union wouldn’t do it for them, Gorbachev made clear.
Annual commemorations in Hong Kong well attended - hundreds of thousands at 10th anniversary in 1999. Tiananmen Square itself always flooded with plainclothes police on anniversaries, and closed for renovations in 1999. Few attempts to mark anniversaries result in instant arrest, as does trying to compile lists of dead and missing or accounts of movement on the internet.
But Zhao Ziyang, among others, continues to push for a reversal of the verdict on 1989, and for a recognition of the movement's popular, patriotic and democratic character. Zhao circulates open letters at top CCP and NPC meetings calling for this. Groups of relatives of the dead have also organized to demand proper accounting of what exactly happened to their family members. One group even attempted to sue Li Peng in the US courts, without success.
Most people think a reversal of the verdict will have to wait until those most closely associated with the crackdown are dead (all are retired now).
They are: Deng Xiaoping, died February 1997; Li Peng, former Premier and recently retired head of NPC; and Chen Xitong, disgraced former mayor of Beijing and head of Beijing CCP Committee, sacked in April 1995, expelled from the CCP in 1997, and convicted of corruption on a grand scale in July 1998; sentenced to 16 years in prison.