The music analyst understands the construction of a piece of music, and “according to a common view of musical understanding, to know how a piece is put together is to advance a long way towards understanding it”. In analysing music, deconstructing it into its component parts and giving different qualities or attributes of the piece names, that is, attaching terms to them or fitting the particular under a universal, it seems that the analyst can come to know and comprehend the nature of the music, but as Roger Scruton states: “The ability to think about music in this way is not necessary for understanding it; nor is it sufficient.” What the listener has done so far is to have made certain observations about the music they have heard. This shows they have some understanding of the piece, presuming of course that their observations are correct, however a different listener, listener B, could have made the same observations, and therefore come to the same understanding of the piece without having the terminology to describe it as listener A did. Thus proving Scruton’s, point that being able to talk about music in this technical way is not necessary to understand it. In order to gain a deeper understanding of the piece in question the listener must not just ask how it is put together, but why it is put together in this way.
To more fully understand the music the listener must recognise the significance of the observations they have made. For example, not just that a certain chord is a Neapolitan sixth, or that a theme has returned in the dominant key, but what effect it has on the music as a whole, and the reasoning behind it being there or happening. They should be able to explain why that note is there. This is the point that Davies makes when he objects to the view that knowledge of how a piece is put together is the primary source of understanding. For the observations we make to be meaningful we have to understand them in the context of the work as a whole. Ridley discusses this idea when he talks about Wittgenstein’s theory that the understanding of music is much more similar to understanding in a linguistic sense than we think. Wittgenstein rejected the theory of ‘meaning-atomism’, that by breaking up something into its component parts and attempting to understand each individual part before putting them back together we can understand correctly, and emphasised the importance of context to understanding. He claimed that we do not understand a sentence just as a “compound of independently meaningful atoms” but because of the context they are in. The same goes for music; for us to understand a feature of the music we must understand it in the context of the entire work, and the way in which it relates to all other features. If one is capable of realising and explaining the significance of features of a piece on the piece as a whole then they are able to ‘know and comprehend’ not only the nature of the music they are analysing, but also something of its meaning. This type of understanding cannot be gained through any means other than concentrated listening. What this suggests is that to understand music it is not enough just to hear it or listen to it superficially, but that “listening to music is not a passive exercise, as being subjected to noise is, but an activity.” If one is to listen with understanding they must make a decision to ‘donate’ themselves and their time to the experience. Scruton goes on to say that “the expert musicologist may show through his playing or listening that he does not understand what he hears, despite his skilled descriptions. The decisive fact is the experience itself.” Again the point here is that if one is to have a full understanding of a musical work it is not merely enough for them to make an observation about the features of the music in a detached way, they have to experience these features in action for themselves to enable them to understand why the observations they have made are significant. For this reason I believe that the person who has analysed a musical work in a dry academic manner cannot, however accurately they describe the features of the piece; claim to have understood it without listening to, not simply hearing, the music. Their understanding of the work is incomplete, as understanding lies within experience.
Once it has been established that experience of music is essential to one’s understanding of the music we are led to consider whether the converse of this is also true. Experience is important to one’s understanding of music, but is understanding essential to musical experience and enjoyment. In his book, The Philosophy of Music: Theme and Variations, Ridley suggests that if someone does not understand the music they are listening to they will be incapable of enjoying it as music.
“[the uncomprehending concert goer] hears a lot of noise, perhaps, as a cat or dog might, but for him it signifies nothing. As music, it passes him by completely.”
To me this seems like a very strong claim to make as many people who are ‘uneducated’ in respect to music, without the type of understanding discussed above which can come only from listening with comprehension of the significance of the musical devices employed by the composer, find listening to music a pleasurable experience and pastime. Davies makes the suggestion that “many music lovers mistake the enjoyment they experience for the pleasure that would be afforded by deeper levels of understanding.” I find this view more easily acceptable that that offered by Ridley, and would agree that in many cases some level of understanding enables a listener to experience a greater appreciation for the music they are listening to. However I would also be inclined to believe that one can enjoy a piece of music without having any real understanding of it. We may hear the music of a different culture for the first time, and listen to it intently, absorbed in the new experience, without understanding it because its unfamiliarity, newness, and our lack of understanding compels us to want to hear more. Our fascination at the unfamiliar music means that we can enjoy the musical experience although the music itself is beyond our understanding. Indeed one may go as far as to say that it is due to our lack of understanding that we enjoy the music, because it is its mystery which we find so entrancing.
As listeners, we can attempt to gain a fuller understanding of a piece of music by close listening to and studying of it, however it would be impossible of any of us to say when we knew that we understood the piece fully, and this leads me to question whether or not a full understanding of any piece of music is even possible. If anyone was to have a complete understanding of a musical work it would be the composer of that work, however even a composer may not fully understand his own composition, and therefore I believe it to be impossible for any of us to be able to ever fully understand a piece of music. Music is inherently beyond our understanding as its very nature is to conceal from us its innermost meanings, and as one can never know when they have understood and grasped a piece of music this would suggest that the understanding of it is constantly out of our reach.
In conclusion, to understand music one must have experienced the music personally to be able to recognise the significance of its individual feature within the context of the piece. Understanding comes in varying degrees, but although some listeners may have a greater understanding than others no one can claim to fully understand any musical work as music is by its very nature beyond our understanding. Understanding can increase ones enjoyment of, and appreciation for a piece of music, however understanding is not essential to the musical experience.
References
Davies, Stephen Themes in the Philosophy of Music,
2003, Oxford University Press
Ridley, Aaron The Philosophy of Music: Theme and Variations
2004, Edinburgh University Press
Scruton, Roger The Aesthetics of Music
1997, Oxford University Press
Davies, Themes in the Philosophy of Music 13:213, 2003 Oxford University Press
Davies, Themes in the Philosophy of Music 13:215, 2003 Oxford University Press. Davies disagrees with this view and I shall go on to discuss why this might be the case
Scruton, The Aesthetics of Music 8:212, 1997 Oxford University Press
Ridley, The Philosophy of Music; Theme and Variations 8:24, 2004 Edinburgh University Press
Ridley, The Philosophy of Music: Theme and Variations 1:19-20, 2004 Edinburgh University Press
Scruton, The Aesthetics of Music 8:212, 1997 Oxford University Press
Ridley, The Philosophy of Music: Theme and Variations 1:18, 2004 Edinburgh University Press
Davies, Themes in the Philosophy of Music 13:232, 2003 Oxford University Press