The Impact of the Strategic Defence Review.

Introduction

‘Before a commander can even start thinking of manoeuvring or giving battle, of marching this way and that, of penetrating, enveloping, encircling, of annihilating or wearing down, in short of putting into practice the whole rigmarole of strategy, he has – or ought – to make sure of his own ability to supply his soldiers with those 3,000 calories a day without which they will very soon cease to be of any use as soldiers; that roads to carry them to the right place at the right time are available, and that movement along these roads will not be impeded by either a shortage or a superabundance or transport.’(Van Creveld, 1997)

In as much as military strategy and tactics have changed with advances in technology then so the range, depth and composition of soldiers on the battlefield have also changed. The principle remains the same however in that soldiers need effective and timely logistics to sustain their momentum and to overcome the enemy’s ability to return fire. An effective front line needs effective logistics support and equipment. This essay will attempt to evaluate the effect the Strategic Defence Review has had on the British Armed forces to date and consequently its ability to prepare and maintain for operational campaigns

The Impact of the Strategic Defence Review

British military and naval forces are now deployed around the world to a degree that surpasses its cold-war era. British soldiers can be found on deployment in places ranging from Brunei to Bosnia, from Cyprus to Saudi Arabia, from Belfast to Botswana, from Germany to Gibraltar and many other countries. The diversity in deployment is also matched by the variety of their operational roles. These range from peacekeeping to limited war in support of national, NATO and U.N objectives and their spectrum of tasks are carried out under widely different climatic, geographical, and operational circumstances. Such demands require a flexible structure, a dynamic doctrine, strong leadership and obviously a broad inventory of weapons and equipment capabilities. A new Labour Party Government intended to address the Services’ ability to meet operational demands more effectively and so in 1998 a comprehensive Strategic Defence Review was compiled and released for publication.

The SDR reassessed Britain’s security interests and defence needs in the light of new and emerging strategic realities, and so it emerged that the country’s armed forces were to be rationalised and better relationships were to be established between Britain’s defence industrial base, the government and the services. In short the report aimed to modernise the forces and develop more cost effective practices in supplying front line troops with what they needed to pack a punch wherever and whenever they were required to do so. Three years on from its release, has the SDR achieved what it set out to do? Has it enhanced the forces ability to perform or has it hampered its might? Can we prepare ourselves for battle more effectively or has the SDR blunted the forces’ logistics edge?

This is what the author will attempt to answer in the following text, but before continuing it is worthwhile noting that the SDR was both welcomed and viewed with a certain amount of cynicism among ministers and armed forces personnel from the beginning. A cynicism that might also be considered as a form of resistance to change. Lord Craig of Radley (Nov 1998) articulated some concerns in the House of Lords when he identified some of the problems associated with mounting offensive operations at great ranges from ‘home’ and against a numerically stronger force. He correctly highlighted that such operations call for a great intensity of effort and when mounted thousands of miles from home, they place enormous demands on logistics support. Fighting forces need large tonnages of fuel and munitions and all the other paraphernalia for waging war. The Lord pointed out that since 1991 there have been a number of important changes in logistic support to all three services and that the SDR had taken these forward in a sensible and significant way. When these changes were in place with ro-ro ships, the strategic airlift and so on he foresaw the forces would be better placed than in the past to mount and sustain distant operations. He then followed by saying that the equipment wasn’t yet in place however and so he was cynical of their availability in the future owing to the serious stretch of dealing with Serbia, Kosovo and Bosnia and the like. Here the author is inclined to agree that although the proposed changes looked good on paper it would be difficult for the government and the MOD to be able to deliver these changes in the timelines stated with other commitments pending.

Another concern of the Lord’s was the concept of a chief of defence logistics, in that it was far removed from that of a chief of defence procurement. The latter provides for the services in the future, but logistics was for the day-to day running and operation of a service. The Lord was concerned that different methods of operation inevitably called for different approaches to the logistic needs of frontline forces, and though the SDR acknowledged this fact it then stipulated that the three single service logistics organisations were to be unified and developed into a single ‘joint’ organisation. He pointed out that if Royal Air Force Harriers are embarked alongside Royal Navy Harriers then both would need to adopt the naval way of spares provision and on-board storage of them when at sea, but exception would not always provide the best basis for a general policy. The author is also inclined to agree with this argument that joint operations do not necessarily equate to more joint integration and to claim so is to over-simplify a very complex area. The Lord insisted that until 1998, and many experienced forces personnel would agree, joint operations had been successful because of the existing logistics styles that recognised the individual and specific needs of certain operations. Here the author disagrees because this attitude encapsulates the old attitude of ‘if its not broken then don’t fix it’. I doubt the Lord had actually fully appreciated the impact that new technology could have on logistics processes as well as taking into consideration the benefits that benchmarking with other industries could have on improving supply chains. Prior to the SDR, too many of the United kingdom’s key defence programmes had been over budget, behind schedule, and lacking the dynamic top-down leadership structure that could create the imaginative approaches that would bring the right equipment into service on time.(Kilvert-Jones 1999).

This is a preview of the whole essay

What of the unification and joint operations? Since 1998 the ministry of defence has set up and continues to enhance a pool of Joint Rapid Reaction Forces to provide more capable, more deployable and better-supported Joint Forces with increased size and punch. It has announced the formation of Joint Force 2000 – a joint Royal Navy/ Royal Air Force Harrier force that is to form part of a new Maritime Air Group. The formation of a Joint helicopter Command is underway and should bring together RN Commando, Army attack and RAF support helicopters into a fleet of 400. A Joint Rapier Training Unit has been formed to ensure that RAF and Army low-level air defence capabilities are fully integrated and that on operations the MoD can draw on both RAF and Army assets for all air defence tasks. A Joint Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Regiment has been established to provide an NBC detection, survey and decontamination capability on operations. Furthermore the MoD has increased the responsibilities of the Chief Joint Operations to give him greater authority over the Joint Rapid Reaction Forces as well as increasing his financial authority and resources. This should allow him to push forward measures that will increase the three services joint punch, direct joint training, evaluate joint standards and provide training for potential Joint Task Force Commanders and their staffs. A Joint Doctrine and concepts Centre has been opened to foster closer working relationships between the three services and the MoD has also strengthened the top management structure of the Defence Medical Services to give them greater influence in the MoD. Closer links with the NHS have also been established to create a new centre of excellence for Defence Medicine and new measures have been introduced to increase numbers and make good the shortfall in experienced medical personnel.(MOD 2001). Furthermore a restructured but reduced mission-orientated reserve force has been established, in addition to a reserve training and mobilization Centre and a command logistics centre (the Defence Logistics Organisation) has already been established.

So changes have been made to the structure and organisation of some aspects of the Armed forces and yet again in theory these changes claim to enhance the responsiveness and collective punch of the services. In under three years the MOD has amalgamated, created or phased out whole Regiments to meet its targets for Joint Service Organisations but to what cost? According to the Fleet Risk Register, leaked to the Daily Telegraph, there were a number of major concerns relating to the effectiveness of the Navy’s equipment following the cuts and reorganisation brought about by the SDR.(Daily Telegraph 2001). The leaked document claimed that the Navy was unable to play its role in Nato’s joint rapid reaction force because its ships were not fit for task. The article highlighted that significant armoury shortfalls have forced ships to go to sea without enough ammunition to defend themselves should they go into action. Concerns were also highlighted about the Fleet’s helicopter operation in that the new Mercury anti-submarine helicopter cannot use its sonar at night or in low visibility when the pilot is flying on instruments alone. Also serious problems with the 29 Lynx helicopters based on board destroyers and frigates meant that only 12 were operational. The Sea King helicopter, not due for replacement until 2009, does not have sufficient lift or range and the Army has been forced to renegotiate agreements for its Apache attack helicopters to support the Royal Marines. Furthermore to compound these problems the document claims that there will not be enough pilots to fly aircraft for one of the two carriers that were to join the Navy as the central pillar of the SDR.

These failures translate into operational risk in the front lines and there also seems to be a problem with providing spares to support activity across all types of command, impacting their ability to meet tasking. The Commander –in –chief attributes these faults and inabilities to the financial pressures being place on the newly formed Defence Logistics Organisation. Regardless of these problems the government remains adamant that ultimately the proposed plans for restructuring the forces will pay off. It seems, to the author, that these changes have proven to be extremely costly and more so than the government had initially predicted. The government also seems to be reluctant to pay the full costs essential for properly implementing its SDR. Yet with the possibility of war looming with Iraq should the Labour party consider being more ‘Conservative’ towards its defence sector. The government is taking steps to highlight and allocate more funds towards the modernisation of its forces such as inviting bids from potential suppliers and selecting from the lowest bid as opposed to accepting a price from one of its former monopolists.

Saving Money

Preparing for war and cutting costs would seem to be a contradiction in terms to those with a military background as the whole business relies on timely delivery of expensive resources and equipment. When a purchaser’s supply chain leads to the war zones of Afghanistan and Kosovo the exact price of nuts and bolts should rightly become a secondary concern to how the mission is to be achieved. Even so the MoD has recently discovered holes in its inventory data. The National Audit Office (NAO) discovered that the ministry not only holds a collection of radiation detectors- now obsolete- worth 10 million pounds but also that it holds an inventory of brass nuts valued at 83 million but actually worth only one million pounds.(Parker, 2002)

Since the SDR, defence purchasers have come increasingly under the spotlight. The responsibility for buying “cheaper, faster and better” has been split between the Defence Procurement Agency and the Defence Logistics Organisation in a bid to centralise the MoD’s procurement network. Purchasers have been pressurised to produce savings of nearly 1.5 billion by 2005. According to Parker any successful attempts at unifying procedures were hampered by the poor passage of information and feedback on successful or unsuccessful contracts. The NAO said in November 2001 that the 1.8 billion contract for Bowman army radios suffered because no accurate benchmarking was available and also that a ‘lessons learnt’ database of procurement contracts contained no data from deals that did not go out to tender.

Unlike the Unites States Army, the British Army has not the financial or human resources available to rely on ‘iron mountains’ of weapons, spare parts and ammunition kept at the front line. To overcome the possibility of not being able to supply its front lines with what they need the MoD has developed a smart acquisition strategy which means developing closer and less adversarial relationships with the private sector. Given the complexity and security demands of military supplies, and the long service expected of them, the risk-management and long-term maintenance promised by the government’s private finance initiative (PFI) also seems to fit in with the new approach to procurement. Having said so the MoD’s largest PFI deal has recently suffered a setback, after winning a top prize at the Public Private Finance 2002 awards, following a 290 million pound 20-year deal for tank transporters – it has been delayed by 15 months! Inevitably there will be complications to such arrangements because of the sensitive nature of security and demands for robust and reliable equipment. There is also the argument that private organisations will also claim to meet timelines in their bid to secure the deal initially, knowing full well that the delivery of such goods will take much longer.

To avoid these problems the MoD aims to set up e-commerce and bring 80% of its procurement online. In linking to Exostar, the defence and aerospace e-marketplace, the MoD will potentially add 2000 new companies to its supplier base, giving it immense leverage for negotiations. In support of this initiative the MoD claims that its first electronic auction was a success. (DLO website 2002) In the first trials, the DLO organised a series of reverse auctions including a 20 month contract for the purchase of up to 250,000 litres of washing up liquid. It appointed Cheltenham based auctioneer Group Supplies Plc to conduct the auction on its behalf and companies were invited to submit their paper bids. The company making the lowest bid was declared the ‘winner’ and the DLO estimates that it generated savings of almost 30%, worth £50,000.

This type of initiative could therefore be the MoD’s answer to lengthy and costly contracts and it certainly puts it on par if not ahead of much of the public sector in representing a working model for online trading with private industry.

Another example of how e-commerce works on efficiency concerns military operations themselves. Traditionally, information about supplies in the field has been poor. Of this the author can verify. The risks of running out of fuel or clothing were mitigated by holding some surplus stock should it be needed, but as previously mentioned this is expensive in any supply chain. “ Just in time support used to be an anathema for operational situations” says Brigadier Paul Flanagan, head of the Logistics Information Systems Agency (LISA), now a part of the DLO. (Vernon, Oct 2000). “ but we simply cannot have large reserves, just in case, any more”. The project behind this last inventory issue is the Defence Stores Management Solution (DSMS) and apart from cost savings it illustrates a number of effectiveness issues being addressed by the DLO also.

Increasing Effectiveness

Another important aspect for increasing effectiveness has been developing partnerships with the IT industry. LISA works in an on-site, outsourcing relationship with EDS, the US computer service group. Previously the forces tended to avoid outsourcing because of their fear of being unable to take whatever it was back in-house. Today the MOD recognises that it can’t afford not to do so. In line with best practice, LISA concentrates on what it does best, meeting operational imperatives, while EDS provides IT support.

Likewise the Armed forces have adopted a similar approach to feeding its personnel. The Defence Catering Group (DCG) has the responsibility for feeding servicemen and women and spending 120 million of taxpayers money in doing so.

The organisation consists of 65 staff, 32 of whom are military but the main contractor for food supply to the forces is contractor’3663’. (Hotel & Catering Int. 2002). For Exercise SAIF SAREEA II in May 2001 a joint 3663/ 6 Supply Regiment service was based in Salalah Port, Oman, and delivered fresh food to the 14,000 land based troops in 15 locations spread over 900 kilometres or re-supply routes. The majority of fresh food was sourced through 3663’s Basingstoke warehouse with fresh fruit and vegetables travelling overland from Dubai. The Operation was considered a success and involved over 28 staff at the warehouse, picking 257 products per day and at its peak delivered to 33 units per week. Approximately 2.5 million of food was consumed and 3663 contracted vehicles travelled over 135,000 miles. Would this have been possible without contracting out? The DCG thinks not. The team continues to supply catering services to those on operations in Bosnia, Croatia, the Falkland Islands, Italy, Kosovo, Kuwait, Northern Ireland, Saudi Arabia and Sierra Leone. In line with Wellington’s strategies of capable and intact supply lines British Soldiers are relieved from the worry of feeding and consequently are able to fulfil their missions in a much better condition than their enemies or in some cases their allies.

People Power

In order to deliver its services and meet its tasks the forces require trained, motivated and properly equipped people. Without people there can be no effective logistics network let alone a front line and so over the past three years the MoD has addressed overstretch by matching better the number of tasks with numbers of people in the Armed Forces. In 1998/99 overall recruiting was up by 8.5% and to address retention issues the MoD recognised the need for people to have some stability and time to spend with their families. Where operational commitments have allowed, force levels have been drawn down.(MoD Web 2002). Whilst this has been true for troops in Northern Ireland as a result of the peace process, the author remains aware of personnel who have spent as little as six months in the UK before redeploying on Operational tours.

The MoD has improved operational welfare by increasing the free telephone allowance for deployed personnel to talk to their families and entertainment equipment is now provided for those on operations. A Service Families Task Force has been launched to tackle issues of concern to families and this has lead to new Department for Education and Employment guidance on schools admissions policy to recognise the special needs of service children. A new Veterans Advice Unit has also been established to advise callers on how best to obtain expert help on issues of concern to them.

To address retention and to attract high quality people the performance pay system has been simplified and improved arrangements for annual leave and maternity/paternity leave have been introduced also. In addition new education and training initiatives have been introduced to improve the qualifications awarded to its personnel. Soldiers can now translate their skills into qualifications that civilian employers can appreciate and recognise in return for time served and as an incentive to soldier on. Revised and more attractive pension terms have been introduced allowing soldiers to transfer their pensions from the forces to a civilian or personal scheme in the hope of holding on to its experienced and talented soldiers. (AFPS 2002) In fact the Forces have gone to considerable effort in advertising its new equal opportunities policies so that people recognise its efforts to better reflect society. The author’s concern is that in striving to increase its reserve of human resources the MoD might be diluting the quality of its entrants, leading to high turnover and more welfare issues that detract its more competent soldiers from achieving their tasks.

A New Chapter

Having outlined these changes the services continue to fail to meet recruiting targets despite having reduced in overall size. A defence policy paper made public by the Daily Telegraph (Mar 20, 2002) highlighted that the target of a 108,500-strong Army set by the SDR has been reduced further by around 1,500. The new target of 107,000 to be achieved by 2005 is claimed to reinforce the argument that the MoD is finding it increasingly difficult to meet demands placed on it by ministers. In the author’s view the target should theoretically have been increased if the government intends to commit its forces to the threat of new overseas operations as well as maintaining a presence on its current campaigns. Indeed following the events of September the eleventh a new chapter to the Strategic Defence Review was released and highlighted issues that are to ensure that Britain’s defence policies, capabilities and force structures match the new challenges illustrated on this tragic day. The new chapter contains plans to boost defence spending over the next few years, including financial support to enhance network-centric systems, strengthen intelligence, provide domestic quick reaction and response teams, and take other actions designed to counter terrorism. Defence Secretary, Geoff Hoon announced the new chapter of the SDR in parliament on July 18 and said, “international terrorism and other asymmetric threats are long-term challenges.”( Aerospace Daily 2002) Hoon also said that network-centric capability (NCC) must be achieved by getting the right forces quickly to where they are needed; making better use of intelligence to identify the threat; deciding how to deal with it; and striking decisively. NCC would also require exploitation of new and existing technologies, as it is a stage further than the digital battlefield.

As a result of the spending review 2002, Uk defence funding will rise by 3.5 billion pounds between 2002-2003 and 2005-2006. (Aerospace Daily, Jul 16) Included in this is 1 billion pounds of new capital and 500 million pounds of new resources for the equipment and capabilities needed to respond to the additional challenges now identified. The new chapter also concludes that there is a need for an integrated approach across government to combat asymmetric threats to the UK; the use of new technology to aid the analysis of information, speed decision making, and deliver precise attacks against often fleeting and difficult targets; the need to further develop U.K expeditionary capabilities to react worldwide; and a need to improve home force, trained and structured to deploy in support of the civil power.

In Conclusion

This essay has looked at the changes proposed in the 1998 Strategic Defence Review and whether the MoD and the government have been able to implement them as intended. In conclusion the author has seen that in terms of unifying the three services in some aspects of defence such as logistics the revised plans have seen limited success. Failure to supply certain newly formed commands such as the Naval Fleet with essential equipment and spares has resulted in operational risks. Other units have been amalgamated to create pools of joint service expertise making it easier for the MoD to access information and deploy these units at short notice but to the detriment of morale and a failure to harness the true potential of these units. Furthermore contracts for the supply of new equipment systems fail to meet deadlines and units are kept waiting for kit essential for their operational effectiveness. These failures, as previously mentioned, could be attributable to the pressures placed on the Defence Logistics Organisation to cut costs by 20% over the next three year. These pressures may result in compromises in the quality and reliability of spares and supplies and could possibly develop the attitude that cheaper is better. When it comes to defence equipment this cannot be the case as the reliability and quality of equipment ultimately dictates the power the front lines has at its disposal.

The development of e-commerce however has great potential to expand the MoD’s supplier base and consequently increasing its negotiating power where previously it has allowed its suppliers to dictate prices. Value for money and improved after sales care can now be introduced to the negotiating table and whole life costing will give the MoD greater visibility of the final cost of some of its larger contracts. More mutually beneficial relationships are now possible also as opposed to the more adversarial ones of the past and access to commercial practices should force the MoD to re-evaluate its supply chains as it has done with its catering services.

In terms of managing its people the MoD has also made some positive changes in terms of providing better qualifications during training and introducing more financial incentives to prolong their service terms. It is the author’s observation however that these improvements, along with the others mentioned above, are not enough to retain and attract the right people if they continue to be rotated from one operation to another without respite. The MoD needs to further improve its recruiting strategy to increase numbers to appease the strain placed on its personnel through overstretch. Yet the new asymmetric threats outlined in the New Chapter have the potential to aggravate the whole situation.

The good news about the New Chapter is that the government is prepared to increase defence funding at least to meet the new demands placed on the UK’s defence capabilities. Where previously the government was reluctant to increase the budget to facilitate the costly changes proposed in the 1998 SDR, it now realises that the threat of terrorism is too unpredictable and volatile for its current armed forces to deal with in a suitable fashion – immediately. The reality is that new and developing technologies needed for intelligence purposes are expensive but the MoD should not forsake its existing fighting equipment as ultimately this is what will be relied on to deal with a terrorist attack should the intelligence identify the threat.

There are many flaws in the new systems but fortunately the need for reform and modernisation has been identified and hopefully not too late. Despite its critics the SDR has been a catalyst for great changes and when these changes and plans bear fruit then surely the British Army can lay claim to being the most powerful, efficient and deadly equipped and trained (small) Army in the world!