A being is omnipotent if and only if it has every power that it is logically possible to possess (Kenny). Is this a satisfactory definition of omnipotence?

    Up until now, it seems that God’s omnipotence implies that God can do anything. However, St.Thomas claims that anything should refer to ‘only objects, actions or states of affairs whose descriptions are not contradictory’ (Pojman & Rea 2007, pg 268). My failure to draw a  square in an may indicate my lack of geometrical skill however my failure to draw a square circle does not indicate this lack, because the concept of a square circle is contradictory and St.Thomas, as mentioned above, has argued that we should not determine God’s omnipotence based on contradictory states of affairs, objects and actions. The question ‘Can God create a stone too heavy for him to lift?’ poses a problem which many Philosophers have tried to overcome as this goes beyond simply stating that God cannot draw a square circle, which does no damage to the concept of His omnipotence as it is a contradictory claim. However, if we say that God can create a stone too heavy for him to lift, then this implies that this stone does exist and so is not contradictory. If God cannot lift such a stone, then God cannot be omnipotent as this is not a contradictory claim and so, according to the definitions above, God should be able to everything that does not entail a contradiction. Furthermore, if God fails to create such a stone then we are denying his omnipotence because he has failed to create something, and he should be able to create everything that again, does not involve a contradiction. Mavrodes tries to overcome this paradox. His begins his argument stating that we have two choices; God is either omnipotent or he is not. Mavrodes argues that we should assume that God is omnipotent and he believes that we can overcome the ‘paradox of the stone’ through this assumption. He suggests that if we assume that God is omnipotent then the phrase in question becomes self-contradictory and therefore if God cannot lift such a stone that is too heavy for him to be able to lift, then there is no limit on his omnipotence.

    However, Swinburne does not believe that Mavrodes has actually overcome the implications of the ‘paradox of the stone’; it does nothing more than question whether it makes sense to suppose that God is omnipotent and this is not the problem. He argues that God could create a stone that he could not lift; if God did create a stone too heavy for him to be able to lift would show that he is not omnipotent however, God has not created such a stone but this does not limit his omnipotence because as Swinburne argues since the fact that ‘God can abandon his omnipotence does not entail that he will.’(Swinburne, 1993, pg 159). Kenny has argued for God’s omnipotence, an argument that focuses on the powers that God possess rather than what he is able to do. Kenny argues for this definition of omnipotence: ‘a being is omnipotent if it has every power which it is logically possible to possess’. (Kenny 1987, pg 131). However this still does not overcome some issues as it is logically possible for us to change something or create something that God did not make therefore Kenny has revised this and has arrived at this definition of omnipotence: God’s omnipotence consists in his possessing all powers that it is logically possible for a being with his attributes as God to possess. This account seems to avoid the problems raised for God not being able to, for example, create a stone in which he cannot lift. For this power to create a stone in which he cannot lift does not seem plausible as it is not a logically possible power for God to possess because within the description of this power poses a hidden contradiction. Therefore, it is clear that there has been much debate about the definition of the term ‘omnipotence’ up until Kenny’s definition was formulated the paradox of the stone created huge difficulties in arguing for what God can do. Kenny’s revised definition seems to tackle this problem by focusing on not on what God is capable of doing but rather the powers that he possesses and therefore seems a plausible in accounting for the definition of omnipotence.

Bibliography

Descartes, “Letter to Arnauld”, “29th July, 1648, in Descartes Philosophical Letters, trans and ed. by Anthony Kenny (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1970), p.236.

Swinburne, R. 1933. The Coherence of Theism (Clarendon Library of Logic and Philosophy). Revised Edition. Oxford University Press, USA.

Peterson, M., Hasker, W., Reichenbach, B. and Basinger, D. 2006. Philosophy of Religion: Selected Readings. 3rd Edition. Oxford University Press, USA.

Pojaman, L.P., Rea, M., 2007.  5th edition. Philosophy of Religion: An Anthology. Wadsworth: Wadsworth Publishing Company.

 

Morris, T.V. (ed), 1987. The Concept of God, Oxford University Press, Oxford.