Decision Points by George W. Bush and A Journey by Tony Blair. Are political diaries and memoirs useful contributors to the historical record

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Are political diaries and memoirs useful contributors to the historical record?

The use of a diary or memoir and its usefulness in contributing to the historiography of an event is a topic that is much debated by historians as whilst they do provide one with the motives behind the decision taken by a politician there are many unforeseen problems that a historian must comprehend before a true understanding can be gleaned.  These problems can include bias and also the stance taken by an author who is most likely to have been a key influence on the event. This is especially true if the author was a former leader. If for example the decision that they took was criticised then it is likely that the stance the author adopts would be defensive thus jeopardising the truthfulness of the event as the author portrays them. Likewise, this would also be the case if the decision taken by a politician proved to be popular as it has the potential for the author to expand on the truth so that they seem to be an even bigger influence than they actually were.

With this in mind, a project has been undertaken to determine the effectiveness of political diaries or memoirs in its contribution to the historical record with an analysis made of two more recent memoirs – “Decision Points” by George W. Bush and “A Journey” by Tony Blair - so that an understanding can be provided for the decision to invade Iraq in 2003 with a view to removing the dictator Saddam Hussein, a decision that continues to define their premiership.

The project will focus on the build up to war and to do this, a study of various source materials has been made and these include the aforementioned memoirs as well as the memoirs of Alistair Campbell, Christopher Meyer the diaries of Chris Mullin and Hans Blix.  These are complimented by contemporary media reports from both sides of the political spectrum, namely left and right, from America and Britain as well as academic periodicals, which were written at a time when the question of invading Iraq was not concluded.

To enable a thorough investigation, a series of sub-headings will be utilized under which the memoirs of both leaders will be listed with the important aspects of the build-up to war under further subheadings, with the various arguments made by others complimenting some of the key issues raised by George W. Bush and Tony Blair.

“Decision Points” – George W. Bush

US Policy and Diplomacy towards Iraq:

In his memoirs, Bush contends that he had spent the best part of a year in trying to avoid a war with Iraq.  However, such an account is contradicted by his famous “Axis of Evil” Speech which was delivered on the 29th of January 2002. In this speech, Bush alluded to three states, these being North Korea, Iran and Iraq as possessing hostile attitudes towards the Western world and as they all had Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), it was the duty of the West to address the potential threat it faced. Immediately, the European Union dismissed the speech as being “absolutist and simplistic”.  Whilst the Iranian Supreme Leader claimed it was a credit to be singled out by the “most hated Satan in the world.” From the outset, the representation of Bush’s decision to invade Iraq is a defensive one but he is adamant that it was the right thing to do and was a policy long supported by Congress. To present this, he offers the example of the decision taken by the US Government under his predecessor, President Bill Clinton, who in 1998 orchestrated Operation Desert Fox a four day bombing campaign launched by the Clinton administration with the assistance of Great Britain. In his prime time address at the outset of that particular campaign, Clinton announced “the cost of action must be weighed against the price of inaction. If Saddam defies the world and we fail to respond, we will face a far greater threat in the future.” Later, the US Congress passed the “Iraq Liberation Act” by a large majority, making the removal of Saddam a top US priority.  

 

Bush suggests that Saddam continuously rejected any opportunity afforded to him that would have avoided war and his subsequent removal. It was largely felt the reason why Saddam was not fully complying with the demands placed upon him by the West was because Saddam had material that violated various UN Resolutions, most notably UN Resolution 678 which was introduced during the first Gulf War to provide Iraq with one last chance to comply with a full surrender or face a sustained assault led by the Americans under the presidency of George H. W. Bush and notably supported by the British under Prime Minister John Major.

Various sources, including Tony Blair and Alistair Campbell agree with the notion that Bush had tried to avoid war but indicate that Dick Cheney was strongly in favour of taking action as soon as possible, Bush confirms this assertion by describing how Cheney wanted war operations to commence as early as September 2002. John Kampfner supports this by writing how the “Neo-Cons” in the Bush Administration (Including Secretary of Defence Donald Rumsfeld and Vice-President Dick Cheney) had long decided that a war was needed with Iraq and in a National Security Council meeting during 9/11, Rumsfeld, had asked his staff to seek any information that could directly implicate Saddam Hussein and Iraq for taking a lead role in orchestrating the attacks. This is consistent with the report compiled by the Project for the New American Century which concluded that a national disaster similar to Pearl Harbour was needed to provide a reason in which a reinforcement of America’s dominance on the Middle East and elsewhere could be justified. This was a project with Neoconservative connotations as it was strongly supported by Cheney, Rumsfeld and Paul Wolfowitz. The assertion that 9/11 changed American attitudes in its foreign policy is also supported by Bush who suggests that 9/11 did change everything with a traumatised public and neoconservatives inside the White House demanding that threats had to be eliminated before they could materialize.  Yet as Christopher Meyer suggests, the influence of neoconservatives in the White House was enormous, in his annual review required of all Ambassadors, Meyer concluded that a pressure for war came from groups inside the administration and the political elite that encouraged a receptive President 

The UN route:

Brent Scowcroft wrote in the 15th August 2002 edition of the Wall Street Journal to highlight the implications of attacking Iraq, especially if the US went it alone: “We simply cannot win that war without enthusiastic international cooperation, especially on intelligence."  However there was a strong reluctance on the part of the White House Administration to pursue a fresh UN Resolution with Bush himself admitting that he had little time for the United Nations and suggests that from a legal standpoint, War could be justified without a fresh resolution as UN Resolution 678 provided the legal cover. Rumsfeld meanwhile was much more forthright in his determination to avoid a fresh UN Resolution by suggesting that quite apart from lessening the threat of Iraq; a new resolution would actually make Saddam Hussein more dangerous. Rumsfeld also publicly called for Iraq to be invaded as early as August, when trying to justify such an action, he called for history to be the judge and alluded to the build up to World War 2 when the Western allies pursued a policy of appeasement despite the obvious threat that Adolf Hitler presented. The comparison between Saddam Hussein and Adolf Hitler was a regular occurrence on both sides of the Atlantic, as “pro-war“ political figures would try and justify war via this tactic which was intended to scare the public into supporting war.

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The assertion that in order to provide the war with legality that another resolution was needed is false, as William Taft and Todd Buchwald contend, if Iraq was found to be pursuing a wider conflict as it did by Saddam Hussein providing Palestinian militants with financial support, then attacking Iraq was legally justified and as Michael Dunne notes, choosing to pursue a fresh UN resolution was only an option that would’ve been helpful in America’s aspiration of Iraqi regime change.

Colin Powell (The US Secretary of State) meanwhile advised that pursuing a fresh resolution would make taking military action against ...

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