In essence, it is the control of the economy that lies at the heart of the concept of total war Is Beckett right?

        William Culbertson argued that the interaction of three fronts resulted in an effective total war. These being the military campaign, the psychological front (ie; morale) and the economic front. Although all three are essential to the effort, Culbertson suggested “total economic war soon becomes total war”. Within this statement lies the suggestion that engagement of a nations economy towards war production, as seen in Britain, Soviet Russia and later Germany, would lead to an all encompassing total war effort. Certainly there can be no ignoring the fact that all the major powers in the Second World War placed a huge emphasis upon the war production of their economy, in terms of armaments, munitions and basic essential materials. Gordon Wright emphasises this point with a quote from Hitler – “Modern warfare is above all economic warfare”. This realisation that modern warfare was no longer based upon the success of the army, but also upon the ability of a home front to successfully supply and support the armed forces was central to the idea of total war. Britain’s success in the Second World War, against an enemy with a larger population and broader economy can be in part attached to her ability to concentrate all her economic priorities upon war production, in a scale and manner that no other nation achieved. This came about both through the diversion of labour and manpower towards war aims, both in conscription and forced National Service, but also in the centralization of economic decisions to a few choice men, who geared everything towards victory. Nazi Germany’s notoriously vague distribution of power amongst Generals and Ministry’s in all areas, not just economically, was contrasted with the sharp and tightened clear authority of the War Cabinet in Britain, led by Churchill, who had the power to answer all large questions of economy.

        The diversion of manpower and industrial production towards the war effort undoubtedly involved the British public in a metaphysical way with the war that they had not previously experienced in other campaigns. The total increase in “gainfully occupied persons” during the war years was 2.8 million people, of which 2.2 million were women. According to Wright, no other nation did this in such a ruthless and effective manner, which undoubtedly geared society towards victory and gave a feeling of totality towards the war effort. Britain was defined by its reliance on economic warfare, in contrast to Germany who adopted a driven war economy far too late to provide any real stimulus to their campaign. However, ‘economic warfare’ as utilized by Britain, can be used to describe efforts such as controlling of important enemy ports, blockades on trade towards enemies and the purchasing of materials vital to enemies. This does not provide quite the same ‘total war’ connotations as the assumptions we place upon economic warfare, which are based around the home front and the idea that everybody pulled together to produce essential materials.

        It is important to place the economic effort during total war into context. The idea that control of the economy defined total war cannot be explained without referring to the nature of the control. Within Britain, the most effective wartime economy, the conversion towards such autonomy of control was not immediate, and not necessarily enforced. Britain relied upon a piecemeal transition, and also upon the general support. “Total war in Britain operated by consent rather than compulsion”. The fact that Britain was a democracy would lead us to believe that transition towards totality would have been easier for nations such as Germany and the Soviet Union, where principles of state control of the public were already in place. For Britain to undergo such a radical re-organisation of industry, it would have been impossible without the support of the public. This leads us to question whether the stiff, resolute British spirit imagined during the war was a result of enforced state instructions to the economy, or whether it was present prior to the intervention, and possibly influenced it. Indeed, prior to Dunkirk, Britain were far from a fundamental overhauling of the economy towards war efforts, and were focusing on buying time rather than mobilizing the country. This changed with the eye-opening affair at Dunkirk, but it was influenced by a change in perception of the war, rather than a belief in a principle of modern war. “the difference … was therefore, primarily a difference in mood rather than in program or purpose”. This leads us to believe that control of the economy was influenced by a unity of community spirit, rather than vice-versa.

        The idea that total war is about attitudes to war will always be a difficult concept to grasp. Unlike economical control and production, or military deaths and consequences, it can not quantifiably be assessed, and will therefore always be open to assumptions. The question of whether communities and societies experience a collective understanding of events is very much up for debate, with a number of contradictions and contrasting pieces of evidence. For example, there is the widespread suggestion that personal interests were set aside during the war, and this can be viewed in the British public’s admirable consensus to state control and forced National Service during the Second World War. On the other hand, a budding black market for excess foods, and growing crime rates and labour disputes suggest that many were not influenced by the supposed national identity. Other methods of measuring changed attitudes and understanding of war, such as the supposed need for social change following the war to ensure a better Britain for all, are somewhat of an exercise in futility, as all areas of social change which followed the war had indicators prior to it, and it can be argued they were already in the process of development. The two major world wars were undoubtedly a landmark in terms of interaction between the home front and the armed forces with regards to knowledge. With no previous wars were the public faced with such graphic knowledge of the horrors of war, and this undoubtedly adds to the theory of total war.

        It is clear that there were many relative concepts impacting upon societies within the major wars. All of the associations central to the idea of total war are consistently overlapping and contrasting, which make it difficult to define what truly makes the two major wars unique in their manner. Certainly with regards to control of the economy and public imagery of the war, it is a delicate relationship between the two, and hard to ascertain which was more important or which came first. Certainly economic control would lead underprivileged groups of societies, such as women and children, into areas of the social stratification they had not seen before. This, it could be argued, was responsible for the collective spirit of the war. On the other hand, visions of the barbarity of the war projected through the media could have aroused public interest, and influenced the government to implement such a strong war time economy. I believe the defining factors of total war all rely upon each other for validation, as the overlapping features of each are undeniable.