A study into how much John F. Kennedy was responsible for the failure of the Bay of Pigs and the influence it had on him in future crises.

Kennedy inherited a military that was weak as a result of neglect from Eisenhower, as he favoured massive retaliation. Eisenhower believed the threat of using nuclear strike capability as a first response was economically more convenient than a large conventional force that was not needed. Kennedy however wanted a more dynamic policy and ended up formulating his “flexible strategy.” This strategy as it suggests, was designed to give Kennedy various options in a situation that required the military, as he felt a ‘nuclear retaliatory power is not enough’ along with realising that  massive retaliation alone ‘cannot deter Communist aggression which is too limited to justify atomic war.’ Thus under Kennedy the USA announced the largest military spending budget ever, as he focused on strengthening counterinsurgency and pro-insurgency operations. He spent heavily on modernizing the military and buying new aircraft; under his new ‘flexible strategy’ he also recognised the importance to keep up with Moscow and their nuclear programme. With nearly a billion dollar defence budget for the first time in American history, Kennedy and his ‘flexible strategy’ had given him more military options than diplomatic solutions to deal with Cuba. Keen on using the military Kennedy often planned to use diplomacy, but often ended up relying on the military. He not only inherited a covert operation from Eisenhower, he had continued building on that, giving himself the strongest military any president had ever had at his disposal. How he utilised the military throughout his presidency has been criticised, along with his decision making concerning military operations. This next chapter examines the reasons for the failure of the Bay of Pigs operation, and who is to blame for that failure.

Chapter 2

It is widely acknowledged that the failure of the Bay of Pigs invasion stemmed from three key factors. (1) Incompetent CIA planning, (2) President Kennedy’s lack of ability to make good decisions before and during the operation, (3) the limited role of the military in the planning of the invasion. These three factors combined to make create confusion across all levels of government; in fact the only one common goal the military, CIA and Kennedy agreed upon was the need to remove Castro. The most important assets to an American president at the time of an invasion or potential invasion are the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS). The role of the JCS first and foremost is to advise the president on his military options along with offering expertise which had been accumulated over many years of service. Kennedy lacked trust in senior military commanders, citing the incompetence of senior officers during his time in the military as the main reason for his distrust, it was a trait that he carried into his presidency. Sadly this distrust continued throughout the whole of his presidency; however it never cost him more than during the Bay of Pigs. The JCS were not even informed of the plan that the CIA had been formulating until January 22nd 1961, after the briefing the JCS assembled a report on Cuba in early February of 1961. The report was entitled “Military evaluation of the CIA paramilitary plan-Cuba”, critically this was the first input military experts had put forward. The report went on to state that due to the complexity of the operation and the target, it would prudent if ‘an independent evaluation of the combat effectiveness of the invasion forces and detailed analysis of logistics plans should be made by a team of Army [sic] Naval [sic] and Air Force officers.’ Even though this was the first input the JCS had on operational planning, Kennedy ‘denied the JCS an opportunity to staff the project further.’ However the rationale for denying the JCS further input into operation, was more to do with Kennedys distrust. By essentially cutting out advice from military experts, he limited his knowledge and obviously advice, causing him to make under-informed decisions in situations where he could have been more informed.

The CIA chief who was keen to capitalise on the president’s choice to ignore the JCS and military advisors was Richard Bissell, Deputy Director of the CIA. Bissell had been the indispensable man for covert operations for Eisenhower, and had kept hold of his position and continued his and Eisenhower’s work in developing a plan to overthrow Castro. However between November 1960 when Kennedy was first briefed and early February 1961 political relations between America and Cuba had fallen apart. Bissell, now knowing that Kennedy would have to act within months, increased his efforts to instil confidence into the President that an invasion was the correct way to move forward. Once the JCS were given a minimal role by Kennedy, he used his influence and energetic enthusiasm not only on the president but anyone who was involved with the planning on Cuba. Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr. Former Kennedy special assistant turned historian recalls the influence Bissell had ‘we all listened transfixed—in this meeting and other meetings which followed—fascinated by the workings of this superbly clear, organized and articulate intelligence, while Bissell, pointer in hand, would explain how the invasion would work or discourse on the relative merits of alternative landing points,’ Having the attention of Kennedy in such a way, almost made Kennedy just a yes man to Bissell’s plans. Another key man, Allen Dulles, played a crucial role in calming the nerves Kennedy was having. Having had the training and planning ‘expedited’ as Kennedy wished, cancelling the operation now would be the disbandment of hundreds of anti-Castro and CIA personnel. In doing this it would have no doubt of been found out that the Americans had been training for the secret invasion in Guatemala. Also it would make America look weak, as it would appear to the world they lost the nerve to follow through with their plans, which would ultimately ‘discredit the United States, dishearten Castro opponents and eventually “produce pro-Castro revolutions all around the Caribbean.

Behind closed doors the State Department amongst other various advisors were also opposed to the planned invasion of the CIA. In a meeting on February 9th Secretary of State Dean Rusk warned that an operation like this ‘could have grave effects upon  the U.S. in Latin America and at the U.N.’ In the same meeting Adolf Berle and Secretary Rusk also expressed that they felt ‘no present decision on the proposed invasion was necessary.’

To reassure the President following through with the invasion was the right choice Dulles drew on the Guatemala success he helped plan under Eisenhower. Guatemala was truly a covert coup that was flawless. Dulles told Kennedy ‘Mr. President, I know you’re doubtful about this, but I stood at this very desk and said to President Eisenhower about a similar operation in Guatemala, “I believe it will work.” And I say to you know Mr. President, that the prospects for this plan are even better than our prospects were in Guatemala.’ The presidents worries and hesitancy was born out of the fear that if America were to act with military force on Cuba, that Soviet president Khrushchev would act in retaliation with military force in Berlin. If that were to happen it would result in a situation not dissimilar to what had happened in Hungary.  

The Hungarian revolution of 1956 was an unexpected, spontaneous revolt in which the whole nation came together, to voice their unhappiness with the Hungarian communist government. The government had its polices imposed upon it by the USSR, who were continuing there post war communist expansion, the Soviets at first showed signs of negotiating the removal of Soviet forces out of Hungary. However due to the geographic importance Hungary held in the Eastern Bloc, the Soviets decided it was in there best interest to intervene and defeat any resistance to the Soviet policies. The operation was codenamed Operation Whirlwind, and with the USSRs military strength it took less than a week to crush all resistance. The intervention had shown the west that by no means would the Soviet Union be willing to let any resistance prevent them in their expansion. In a further display of power, the then Hungarian president Imre Nagy was replaced by Janos Kadar, a long time socialist and prevalent member Hungarian Socialists Workers Party. It is also known that President Khrushchev had Imre Nagy executed, probably to send a clear message to all other Socialist leaders that if they fail their fate will be the same as that of Nagy. It is easy to see why Kennedy was worried, as an invasion of Cuba if successful would lose the Soviets their most important communist partnership, and to retaliate by invading West Germany and claiming it, effectively they would have taken a key American asset.

This concern Kennedy had reinforced the fact that in his mind the United States needed to carry out a fully deniable operation. In early March Bissell presented Kennedy with the Trinidad plan, the plan however required a day time air and amphibious assault. Clearly this went against everything Kennedy had hoped for in the proposed planning as it had already been made clear how important deniability was. Pressure from his own counsel was also causing indecision in the president’s mind about which course of action to take, if any, about Cuba. This pressure was heavily applied by two advisors in particular; Special Assistant Schlesinger and Arkansas senator J William Fulbright, who was also Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. The fear expressed by Fulbright was that if the US were to successfully invade Cuba, ‘it would be denounced from the Rio Grande to Patagonia as an example of Imperialism.’ Fulbright was a strong believer in the method of containment and this is presumably why he questioned the planned invasion. Fulbright also went onto state that an invasion would have ‘undone the work of thirty years in trying to live down earlier interventions’. Raising such points Fulbright hoped it would cause the president to re think the invasion, on the grounds of the damage it could to his image and legacy, a legacy in which Kennedy was known to care a great deal about. Dissent was also coming from Special Assistant Schlesinger, who expressed his concerns to Kennedy through a memorandum and offered alternatives. The main concern he stated was that ‘this would be your first dramatic foreign policy initiative. At one stroke, it would dissipate all the extraordinary good will which has been rising toward the new administration throughout the world.’ 

Throughout the planning phase it is apparent that there was not even broad agreement at any level; the CIA was pushing its own agenda - which was opposed by the State Department and only partially supported by the JCS. As seen in the previous paragraph, some in Kennedys own counsel were entirely opposed to any form of invasion. This lack of common ground demonstrates just how fragmented planning was in the upper echelons of the government, and how all the conflicting advice led to hesitancy and an overall lack of faith in the planned invasion. Bissell and Dulles continued to have the most influence on President Kennedy, becoming aware of growing dissent towards the plan, Bissell continued to reassure Kennedy invasion was the right option. The CIA continued to report that an invasion would be a success up until March 30th; with having a D-Day primarily set for April 5th it shows the agency felt they had to keep reassuring the ever hesitant president he was doing the right thing. It can be argued that Bissell, ably assisted by Dulles, led the president by the nose, which in turn means that Bissell effectively led US foreign policy with regards to Cuba. This is a reflection of Kennedy being unduly reliant and too easily influenced by those few advisors he did trust.

The CIA was relying on their perception that the Cuban people were struggling and disgruntled with a ‘shortage of basic food and household items, felt by all levels of society,’ This again was part of the persuasion of Kennedy; if America were to invade and be successful, they would be heroes - rescuing the malcontents of Cuba and giving them liberty and freedom. Allen Dulles pre warned Kennedy that ‘heavy rains would descend on the Caribbean by the end of April, necessarily delaying the invasion for weeks. In short Dulles was telling the president that by no means can the operation be put back any further than mid-April.

Chapter Three

President Kennedy left Washington and travelled to Florida to spend the Easter with his family, It was during this trip the president decided to ‘postpone D-Day to 10 April’ and again this date was ‘moved once again to April 17th.’  This hesitancy that Kennedy had been showing throughout out the planning vanished as quickly as it appeared. On return to Washington on April 4th Kennedy, had a change in attitude and displayed conviction for the first time in getting the invasion underway. McGeorge Bundy, President Kennedy’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs, recalls that the doubtful attitude Kennedy had towards Cuba had gone. Upon his return from Florida Bundy states he ‘really wanted to do this... when he came to the moment of truth—the decision to go or not go—he made up his mind and told us. He didn’t ask us.’ Kennedy had finally displayed the kind of leadership his presidency had so far been lacking.

As everything was picking up pace, the New York Times reported that an invasion of Cuba was imminent, with a headline reading ‘Invasion Reported Near.’  The report not only angered Kennedy into confiding to press secretary Pierre Salinger that ‘Castro doesn’t need agents over here; all he has to do is read our papers. It’s all laid out for him. However it pressed Kennedy into making an announcement about any possible American involvement in Cuba. Now being undeniably linked to invasion plans Kennedy felt like he had to make a statement, in which he made assurances that ‘there will not be under any conditions, an intervention in Cuba by the United States Armed Forces.’ Furthermore Kennedy committed the United States to ensure ‘no Americans involved in any actions inside Cuba having made such a bold statement to a global audience it had a direct impact on the planning of the invasion and the fatal decision of changing his mind in regards to the use of the Air Force during the invasion. Despite Kennedy making it clear that he was intent on keeping American deniability as his priority, the plans for the invasion did not slow down or decrease in planned numbers and use of the military. On 14th April the invasion fleet sailed from Nicaragua, on that afternoon Kennedy placed a call to Bissell giving approval for the bombing of Cuban airfields. However once Kennedy learnt that Bissell had planned on using sixteen aircraft for the operation, Kennedy revoked his go ahead and informed Bissell ‘I don’t want it on that scale. I want it minimal.’ The invasion went ahead with only eight aircraft, although this was enough to strongly hinder the Cuban response to the invasion, it was only enough aircraft to cause sufficient damage to delay the Cubans and not stop them reacting in force.

After the failure of the Bay of Pigs, the Cuba Study Group, which was chaired by General Maxwell Taylor, came to the conclusion that there was four, major issues that contributed to the failure. The four being ‘ (1) “The inadequacy of the air support of the landing;” (2) “the failure of the brigade, when defeated on the beaches, to break out into the interior in guerrilla bands;” (3) “ the responsibility of the Joint Chiefs of Staff for military deficiencies;” (4) “the contradictions in the understandings and attitudes of senior officials involved in the operation.’ Three of four reasons can be accepted and in general agreed as valid reasons; however the controversial issue was that of putting blame onto the JCS. Mentioned at the top of the chapter was the importance of the JCS to the president in providing military expertise. However the lack of trust in the JCS and minimal input allowed by Kennedy for the JCS to give, it is hard to agree that they deserve to be blamed as one of the main reasons the invasion failed. The role of the JCS was strictly a supporting one and providing critiques of the CIA planning, however with the CIA so secretive and constantly changing invasion proposals, the JCS argued that ‘Secrecy kept them from properly staffing any plans and providing detailed options. No records were taken at any meetings nor agendas circulated among the participants to assist in preparations. Additionally, the plan was revised so often that military planners did not see it in its final form until the day of the invasion. 

It can be seen that the argument blaming the JCS does not have a solid foundation to argue, the CIA should have formed an open relationship with the JCS and shared all plans and intelligence, to form an effective working relationship, which would help both parties to achieve their own objectives successfully. Furthermore the secrecy in which the CIA insisted it operate, and their insistence on planning the invasion alone may have led to interference with recommendations made by the JCS meant only for the attention of the President. Chief of the Join Subsidiary Activities Division of the Joint Chiefs had been given instruction to study the possible options available to overthrow Castro. This study carried out by a committee headed by Brigadier General David. W. Gray, even though the military were not officially briefed on invasion planning until January 1961, they had been making contingency plans and preparing for any involvement long before then, which resulted in this study. The committee suggested the following recommendations ‘(1) economic warfare, including sanctions and embargoes and diplomatic pressure to isolate Cuba in concert with the organization of American states; (2) naval blockade; (3) infiltration of a guerrilla force with covert U.S. military support; (4) infiltration of a guerrilla force with overt United States back-up (5) naval and air warfare with no invasion; and (6) unilateral all out invasion.’ These suggestions would have given Kennedy flexibility and support for alternatives to invasion. However the CIA after spending a prolonged period planning for an invasion did want to see another alternative presented as viable to the incoming president. The Cuba Study group, who had stated the JCS were to blame in part, acknowledged that these recommendations ‘reached the Secretary of Defence but appears to have been lost in the activities arising out of the change in administration.’ Whether or not the CIA or a high ranking government official who was pushing for Cuba to be invaded, intercepted the message is unknown, but it is extremely unlikely that material so sensitive would go missing by coincidence.

The JCS however may be blamed for not doing enough to prevent the invasion being planned solely by the CIA and making enough effort to express their concerns. Suspicions about a secret mission being planned on the orders of the Whitehouse had been on going for some time in the military. The first whisper of a planned invasion was heard by General Lemnitzer who was then Chairman of the JCS. Having heard of a ‘most highly secret operation’ in October 1960 he was quick to dismiss it as none of his business, when in reality any operation requiring the military is very much the business of the JCS, especially its chairman. Even though it was dismissed, it should have raised alarms that Kennedy was keeping information from the JCS that in itself is enough for Joint Chiefs to raise concern to the President about the role they had to play. There is no valid reason as to why the JCS did not do more to raise their concerns, considering the power they held, however it ultimately falls on Kennedy.  The Cuba problem was never a crisis as severe as it was made out to be, however by defining it as the Cuba problem, it gave everyone from the public to the President to feel a need that immediate action was required. The truth is that Kennedy was really riding the momentum of Eisenhower in relation to Cuba, and the the Bay of Pigs was proof of this. It exposed an administration that was not prepared for a situation that demanded an extreme experience in crisis decision making. Eisenhower himself had made the plans and tailored how he wanted the invasion to go and the process of removing Castro done, however Eisenhower had vast amounts of experience in highly pressurised decisions, including being the Allied Supreme Commander of the D-Day invasion in Normandy during WWII, and was a brilliant strategist. When Kennedy came into power, according to Dean Acheson; chairman of Kennedy’s Advisory Committee on NATO, all Kennedy succeeded in doing was removing ‘those elements of strength.’ Acheson is referencing to the fact Kennedy as mentioned earlier substantially weakened the invasion force, to try and maintain deniability.  The fiasco of the Bay of Pigs however, was only the start as the consequent political aftermath led to Kennedys defining moment as President.

Chapter Four

The Cuba problem was overblown as a crisis that led to the Bay of Pigs; however the Bay of Pigs was likely the catalyst for the events that ended up leading to the Cuban Missile Crisis. The following day after the failed invasion, Kennedy obviously had to address the issue to a national audience; it was also his chance to confirm his posture on Cuba. Throughout his address the theme of re assuring a policy of non-intervention in Cuba, he stated that ‘we made it repeatedly clear that the armed forces of this country would not intervene in any way’ further reinforcing his commitment for no American intervention he also made clear that any intervention without an external attack on American would have been ‘contrary to our traditions and our international obligations.’ However Kennedy also knew after the Bay of Pigs it would be vital that he sent a message across that America was not be thought of us as weak against Communism. Essentially Kennedy was in damage control mode, but the final parts of his address made it clear that he intended to ‘re-examine and reorient our forces of all kinds, our tactics and other institutions here in this community.’ Other institutions being the CIA and other government agencies, he confirmed they were still to have a role to play that was in Kennedy’s words a ‘struggle in many ways more difficult than war.’ 

Even though the CIA and to a much lesser extent the Joint Chiefs had let Kennedy down, he perhaps foreseen that Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev would view him as weak and vulnerable when under pressure. Due to this Kennedy was quick to deflect any criticism away from the CIA especially by absorbing all the blame, as argued throughout the study Kennedy was the main reason of the failure, but not the only reason. In fact Kennedy was adamant in keeping the reputation of the CIA a good one, when Lyndon B. Johnson directed criticism at the agency; Kennedy told him ‘when I accepted responsibility for this operation, I took the entire responsibility on myself’ to further make this point clear the Whitehouse released a statement that made clear ‘President Kennedy has stated from the beginning that as President he bears sole responsibility.’ The reasons Kennedy absorbed the blame, were primarily to prevent the immediate questioning of the role the CIA had leaving the agency to continue whatever operations it had on going. Also it downplayed any doubts that Kennedy had towards the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the CIA, it was also political damage control, however despite the attempted damage control, Kennedy was heavily critiqued. Following the immediate period after the Bay of Pigs, Eisenhower had a private behind closed doors meeting with Kennedy. Eisenhower was amazed that the President felt as though the world would not suspect America were behind any invasion towards Cuba, he went onto

The Bay of Pigs may have been the catalyst for the Cuban Missile Crisis; however the summit meeting between Khrushchev and Kennedy that took place in Vienna, in June 1961 certainly accelerated proceedings leading towards the Bay of Pigs. Although the meeting in Vienna only briefly touched on the Bay of Pigs, Kennedy was very timid over the issue, thus confirming to Khrushchev his beliefs that Kennedy was a weak.  When Kennedy left the summit meeting he later acknowledged in an interview that it was the ‘roughest thing in his life,’ and that Khrushchev had ‘beat the hell out of him’ Knowing the most difficult challenges of presidency lay ahead, Kennedy knew he had to show Khrushchev he was not going to let himself be pushed around. Having also been warned by Eisenhower that, ‘the failure of the Bay of Pigs will embolden the Soviets to do something that they would otherwise not do,’ Kennedy knew his poor performance at the summit would of only encouraged the Soviet. The dominating issue at the summit was the Berlin Crisis, as Khrushchev had threatened to sign a new peace treaty with East Germany, which if achieved would end the four power treaty that existed between the Soviets, America, Britain and the French in regards to the control of Berlin. Thankfully the Soviets came to another solution, erecting what was to become known as the Berlin Wall between the Eastern and Western zone of the city. Although it was not ideal Kennedy showed little resistance and remarked that ‘It’s not a very nice solution, but a wall is hell of a lot better than a war,’ it was shortly after the erection of the Berlin Wall that Kennedy would face his biggest challenge.

Khrushchev opinions of Kennedy were very underwhelming and stated that the President ‘doesn’t have a strong background, nor, generally speaking, does he have the courage to stand up to a serious challenge.’ It was under this opinion of Kennedy, that Khrushchev sort to capitalise on the failed invasion of Cuba and strike a deal with Cuba to install missiles. Even though the move was drastic and the ramifications could be disastrous for the entire world, but at the same time President Kennedy also acknowledged that ‘he takes a great chance but there are quite some rewards to it.’ The main reward being the leverage in regards to Berlin it would give Khrushchev once the American’s discovered the missiles on Cuba. As Berlin was of more strategic importance to the Soviets than Cuba was, Khrushchev could demand that for the missiles to be removed, West Berlin was to become his. Also in memoirs Khrushchev explained another reason for the motivation to install missiles in Cuba ‘The Americans had surrounded our country with military bases and threatened us with nuclear weapons […] we’d be doing nothing more than giving them a little of their own medicine.’ As part of a small report written by Walt Whitman Rostow, in April of 1961 he noted the five main threats the Castro regime posed to the Americans. The first threat Cuba posed according to the report was that ‘it might join with the USSR in setting up and offensive air or missile base.’

This bold prediction Rostov had warned Kennedy of became a reality on 16th October 1962, when Kennedy received information from McGeorge Bundy that Soviet missiles had indeed been installed on Cuba. Kennedy unlike how he handled the Bay of Pigs, reacted immediately with decisiveness on what he needed to do. Throughout the planning of the Bay of Pigs, Kennedy lacked the leadership to bring his advisors together, he could not afford for the same to happen again. The Cuban Missile Crisis was a clear illustration of the maturation process  Kennedy had undergone since the Bay of Pigs. His immediate response to the missile installations in Cuba was to be the spearhead of foreign policy himself, by using his closest advisors constructively.

This constructive approach led to the president forming Executive Committee of the National Security Council, or as it was to become known as EXCOMM. The idea of EXCOMM was that it was ‘giving everyone a chance to vent his ideas and to feel he was participating,’ according to Raymond Garthoff, the Special Assistant for Soviet Bloc Political and Military Affairs, Department of State. Also Kennedy had learnt from the Bay of Pigs that the relationship between his top advisory councils was strained and fragmented. Which is another reason according to Secretary of State Rusk that Kennedy founded EXCOMM, Rusk stated ‘he president thought that it was well to let his principal subordinates—the secretaries of State and Defence, his National Security Adviser, and so on—meet on their own without his presence and debate these things (e.g., blockade versus military action) among themselves as a matter of gaining a consensus among his chief advisers.’  The way in which Kennedy utilised his advisors during the Cuban Missile Crisis, was a credit to the President.  Using EXCOMM as a way of letting his advisors discuss matter among themselves, he removed himself from being exposed in private meetings with one individual were he may have been influenced. In making his advisors come to a general consensus on issues between themselves, it left him with just a decision to make, and removed fragmented plans among his Chief advisors.  

The two mentioned factors alone played a huge part in the failed invasion of Cuba; by removing the mentioned factors, he had already improved his chances of finding a successful resolution in the Cuban Missile Crisis.As mentioned earlier in the study, President Kennedy also worried greatly about his legacy and reputation in global politics. This concern for his legacy and reputation was a major influence in calling of the planned second airstrikes of Cuba which ultimately doomed the invasion. To prevent any external pressure from the international councils such as NATO, it was decided that they would only be informed and not consulted of the foreign policy. This was supported by Theodore Sorensen, Special Counsel to the President, in his “Summary of Agreed Facts and Premises of October 17, 1962,” specified that only NATO and “certain Latin nations” were to be “notified” however they were “not consulted immediately prior to any action by the United States.”  This left the President to be free from any pressure that of been otherwise applied to him, on how to act in the Crisis. In only being notified and not consulted it removed any impact on the decision making process. It was also obvious that the President Kennedy was not going to let Cuba yet again cause him another political defeat. Roger Hilsman Jr, Assistant Secretary for Intelligence and Research, Department of State, recognised that ‘it very quickly became clear to Kennedy that it was his baby, and he became the desk officer; he could not delegate this one. So, boy, he was on top right from the beginning.’

The Bay of Pigs influenced Kennedy massively; he had learnt that it was dangerous to permit the CIA to act with total independence, along with further losing the little confidence he had left in the JCS. The impact the failed invasion had on Kennedy was evident in his instructions to the Joint Chiefs, that the Jupiter missiles in Turkey would not be launched without presidential authorisation. He asked Paul Nitze, Assistant Secretary for International Security Affairs, to confirm this by stating that ‘what we’ve got to do is make sure these fellows [Turks] do know, so that they don’t fire them [Jupiter missiles] off and think the United states is under attack. I don’t think we ought to accept the chiefs’ word on that one, Paul.’ Kennedy was referring to his distrust on the chiefs’ word on if and when the missiles should be launched. Clearly he felt more at ease knowing he could be the only to authorise them, but it also suggests that he felt it was a possibility, that the more Cuban Missile Crisis intensified, the more Chiefs’ would go ahead and launch the missiles.  As mentioned earlier Kennedy could not face another political defeat in regards to Cuba, this was not lost on George Ball, Under Secretary of State. He emphasised the influence the Bay of Pigs had on Kennedy’s desire to control the Cuban Missile Crisis ‘what happened in the Bay of Pigs had a certain psychological effect on the president’s response on the Cuban Missiles Crisis, because he couldn’t being put down by Cuba in two situations.’  This link between the Bay of Pigs and the Cuban Missile Crisis, clearly explains why Kennedy wanted to be hands on with the flow of information coming live to him from EXCOMM and to have no interference or mixed agendas being presented to him. The adjustment Kennedy made in his methods of leadership and approach to handling the Cuban Missile Crisis led to a peaceful solution. It is evident that his mistakes from Bay of Pigs had haunted him and motivated him to succeed a second time around.

Conclusion

Kennedy left behind a legacy that was defined by him being the first president to realise that there was a role to play for a conventional military, with conventional capabilities. Nuclear warfare before Kennedy was seen as the only form of defence that was needed. Containment of Communism he realised could be far more flexible with a conventional force that was easier to justify use of, instead of justifying a nuclear attack. This need for a large conventional force however, led to the eventual introduction to of American forces into Southeast Asia, leading to a pro longed and highly unsuccessful war effort in Vietnam. The Vietnam war hindered presidents following him, and is yet another fault on Kennedy. However the definitive moment of his foreign policy was the prevention of nuclear war breaking out between the United States and the Soviet Union, despite many experts during that period thought it was inevitable. President Kennedy was also very well versed in understanding the modern day uses the military could have, and knew of its importance as a symbol of national power. The same could be said of Khrushchev as parades showing the strength of the Soviet military were carried out as a message to the rest of the world, especially America, that it was a forced to be reckoned with.

Throughout his presidency Kennedy was very vocal on what the modern day use of conventional military will be for America after being neglected by Eisenhower who favoured nuclear strike as a first option. However Kennedy became smitten and obsessed with the potential of the military, he often seen it as the only option, even it was not, as was the case with the Bay of Pigs. It was however his rebuilding of the conventional military that led him to be able to react to the situation, if he carried on Eisenhower’s doctrine of relying on a nuclear deterrent, there is no telling of what reaction could have carried out.  Although Kennedy inherited the “Cuba Problem” it was he who chose to lable it a crisis, knowing it would prove to be politically advantageous.  He went ahead with the Bay of Pigs, which proved to be not only a disaster but also a positive. The Bay of Pigs was without question the catalyst for the Cuban Missile Crisis, it was also the result of the Bay of Pigs that produced the decision making mechanism that enabled Kennedy to find a solution to the Cuban Missile Crisis.

Despite his legacy as one of the most popular Presidents in American history, there is no escaping his short term was style of substance. Kennedy lacked the experience necessary perhaps not only to handle the Bay of Pigs, but office in entirely. Kennedy’s management style of the military and its deployment was largely ineffective, with not only the Bay of Pigs being a failure, but also his decision to commit troops to Vietnam a poor choice. The Cuban Missile Crisis was an exception to Kennedy’s usually poor deployment of the military. His conservative approach was highly unlike Kennedy, and had the Cuban Missile Crisis happened without the Bay of Pigs being a factor, it is safe to presume Kennedy would have acted more aggressively. Kennedy fully understand the role the military had to play in his foreign policies, however he failed to acknowledge the importance the advice his advisors had to offer. His management style also restricted input from military experts, and his reliance to take advice from close knit circle advisors, who had little military experience, ultimately doomed Kennedy in all of his military deployments, apart from the Cuban Missile Crisis, which is the only reason his legacy is looked back upon in a positive way by most.

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