Account for the failure of appeasement to prevent the outbreak of a second European war in 1939

especially with the treaty of Versailles’ restrictions on German land and army. Although it can be said that Hitler was more of an opportunist rather than having planned the events leading up to the second world war, it is undeniable that the ideology is what caused Hitler to want more land, a bigger army and for Germany to become the world’s leader; “removal of the cancer of democracy…Battle against Versailles…the farmer must be saved… most important prerequisite for achieving the goal of political power. National service must be introduced.”2 This speech given by Hitler to the generals indicates that even at the start of his career as a politician, he was more than willing to go against the treaty entirely, as well as complete political power in Europe. He was prepared to do anything for Germany. As Hitler wanted to create this greater Germany – through lebensraum in Eastern Europe – it was clear that his territorial ambition was taking over the continent. Aside from the early signs of a dangerous dictator, it was perhaps the actual events which caused the outbreak of the Second World War. Re-militarizing the Rhineland “was a real turning point in the interwar years…Hitler scored a great diplomatic victory at the expense of Britain and France and at no cost to himself”3 which was made possible due to the allies wanting to avoid conflict, not just once but multiple times in the lead up to the war. Another event which suggests that the failure of appeasement led to the Second World War is the way in which Hitler obtained the Sudetenland and the rest of Czechoslovakia. Considering the Sudetenland primarily consisted of German-speaking people, it can be fair to say that it was not necessarily an act of aggression, but rather an effort to reunite Germany. However, this event proves significant in showing the allies desperation to avoid war. Avoiding war at any cost, to the point where the Munich Pact was decided by Britain, Czechoslovakia was not even invited to the meeting, “It [The Munich Pact] was not a very moral agreement, for it abandoned the Czechs rather summarily to Nazi domination”4. Hitler had the edge in knowing that the allies would overturn their own treaty to keep Hitler’s Germany at bay. Aware of this, he was able to plan further actions knowing there would be little consequences. This was demonstrated with the invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1939. Although it is impossible to single any particular event out as causing the war, it is possible that the Nazi-Soviet Pact 1939 was perhaps the turning point for war as Britain and France were left with little choice but to give Hitler an ultimatum two days after invading Poland. The significance of this pact is that it again shows the failure of appeasement:“The Nazi-Soviet Pact ended the Anglo-Franco-Soviet negotiations, and removed all possibility of a triple Alliance which might have been strong enough to deter Hitler…” 5 as they could have stopped the Nazi-Soviet pact which could have made Hitler think twice as invading Poland without an alliance could have been dangerous for Germany – even though Hitler knew war was inevitable it was necessary that it was under his terms. It was not only Hitler’s movements that saw the Second World War arise but also the failure of the League of Nations, more significantly the British and the French. The League of Nations was created to represent ‘collective security’ as well as to prevent any further wars – the last thing on any nations’ mind. With the treaty of Versailles in place it was thought that any threat would easily be avoided. Clearly it would take more than a League to stop Hitler. The treaty of Versailles stopped Germany from obtaining a sizeable army or defense at all, however proved little deterrence in Hitler’s decision to rearm Germany. “Germany’s military spending rose from three per cent of her gross national product to seventeen per cent…in the direction of a ‘war-economy’.” 6 although this does not necessarily mean it was spent on the military, navy or air force it would have been an indication into what Hitler was planning, considering he had started conscription as well. Perhaps the League’s failure of stopping the Abyssinia crisis as the first stages of the Spanish civil war combined with the failure to disarm or control German military demonstrates just how unsuccessful the League were. If it was not for the lack of power and strength surrounding the League then the Second World War may never have happened. Another example that outlines the failure of the League and the countries involved, more significantly Britain, can be seen through the Anglo-German Naval Treaty 1935 which allowed Germany to have a navy one third of the size of the British navy. Britain was openly breaking the Treaty of Versailles, inciting nations; in particular Germany and Italy; to see passed the League as being a threat – not what was intended. It is difficult to argue that any of the events discussed caused the war, nevertheless the consistent lack of threat the League of Nations showed meant that it was useless in terms of what it was set up to do, stop a war. The same could be said as well for Britain and France in the sense that they allowed Hitler to walk all over them, agreeing to pacts which put Germany in a better position whilst going against everything they had put in place post World War One. Irrespectively Hitler’s ambition for lebensraum in Eastern Europe drove and essentially led up to the Nazi-Soviet Pact, which in turn was the last action before war – not essentially the reason for the war. It is impossible to blame one event or one mistake for the war as Hitler’s aims were relatively clear throughout his rein so it can be said that the amalgamation of these events is what lead to the war actually happening, not a consistent threat from the axis. Bibliography From Adolf Hitler, Mein Kampf, trans. By Ralph Mannheim, intro, by D.C WATT (London, Hutchinson, 1969), pp. 596From Documents on Nazism, 1919-45, intro,and  ed. By Jeremy Noakes and Geoffrey Priadham (London, Jonathen Cape, 1974) Adamthwaite, P.A “The Making of The Second World War”, (George Allen & Uwin: London: 1986) Bell, P.M.H, “The Origins of the Second World War in Europe”, (Longman: New York: 1997) Carr. W, “Arms Autarky and Aggression: A study in German Foreign Policy, 1933-1939”, (Arnold: London:1979)Overy R.J, “The Origins of the Second World War”, (Longman: London:1987)http://www.learningwithsouthglos.org/History/acrobat/KS4/HitlersForeignPolicy.pdf 1 From Adolf Hitler, Mein Kampf, trans. By Ralph Mannheim, intro, by D.C WATT (London, Hutchinson, 1969), pp. 5962From Documents on Nazism, 1919-45, intro,and  ed. By Jeremy Noakes and Geoffrey Priadham (London, Jonathen Cape, 1974) pp508-93 Carr. W, “Arms Autarky and Aggression: A study in German Foreign Policy, 1933-1939”, (Arnold: London:1979), pp 664 Overy R.J, “The Origins of the Second World War”, (Longman: London:1987), pp 26-285 Bell, P.M.H, “The Origins of the Second World War in Europe”, (Longman: New York: 1997) pp 2946 Adamthwaite, P.A “The Making of The Second World War”, (George Allen & Uwin: London: 1986) p