Assess the impact of domestic policy considerations on foreign policy decision making with special reference to the CMC.

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Assess the impact of domestic policy considerations on foreign policy decision making with special reference to the CMC.

The Cuban Missile Crisis of October 1962 was arguably the closest the United States and the Soviet Union came to a nuclear exchange in the whole history of the Cold War.  The problem of resolving the crisis fell to the youngest president in American history, President John F Kennedy.  The successful resolution of the crisis afforded President Kennedy much popularity and international prestige.  Ormbsy Gore British ambassador to the US wrote to Kennedy on the 30th October 1962 “I am lost in admiration for the superb manner in which you have handled the momentous events of the critical week we have just lived through…..I mean it quite sincerely when I say that America and all of the free world must feel a deep sense of gratitude that you are President of the United States”  Kennedy’s successful resolution of the crisis seems significant when noting that 1962 was also an election year.

        The mid-term congressional election were due in November and Kennedy’s domestic polices of his first two years had been hampered by a slim majority in Congress.  It was essential for Kennedy to gain more seats in Congress if he did not want his first term to become a failure.  Taking this into consideration Kennedy’s critics have charged him with deliberately engineering the Cuban Missile Crisis for political gains.  This raises the question how much of an impact did domestic policy considerations have on decision making during the Cuban Missile Crisis?  To answer this question a number of factors need to be examined.  First is the need to understand the two schools of thought that have evolved on the subject of Kennedy’s domestic policy considerations during the Cuban Missile Crisis and the main points of their debate.  Second, an analysis of these ‘main points’ of the Cuban Missile Crisis with reference to domestic policy considerations will be undertaken.  Third, the effect of the Cuban Missile Crisis on the November congressional elections with analysis of the results of the election will be examined.  Finally other aspects effecting decision making apart from domestic policy considerations will be evaluated from which conclusions will be drawn.

        In Theodore C. Sorensen’s biography of Kennedy he notes that the President if signing a bill, presenting a medal, approving a commemorative stamp always spoke with a wider audience in mind.  During Kennedy’s presidency the press received twice as many White House news releases each year than ever before.  This combined with his numerous television appearances and interviews on a range of subjects from nuclear test bans to tax cuts and civil rights bill has given Kennedy the reputation of being one of the most articulate and eloquent Presidents since Lincoln.  However Kennedy only ever went on television to endorse an issue when he felt he could actively sway opinion.  Consequently this led to politics being an ever present influence in the Kennedy white house.  Politics was used as a counter balancing force to test the acceptability of any particular decision or speech accordingly it was automatically assumed by Kennedy’s staff that part of their role was to weigh the effect of every move large and small, on various voter groups, on congress, on national unity and on the 1962 and 1964 elections.  Such focus on public perception of his decisions has given rise to arguments that the Cuban Missile Crisis was a deliberately engineered event to portray Kennedy as the hero of the hour and subsequently improve his prospects in the November congressional elections.

        Two opposing points of view about the Cuban Missile Crisis have grown out of speculation on Kennedy’s motives for its successful resolution.  The traditional interpretation describes the missile crisis as a deliberate Soviet provocation.  Writers such as Theodore C. Sorensen and Arthur M. Schlesinger see the Cuban Missile Crisis as a test of Kennedy’s power and resolve to preserve NATO and convince Nikita Khrushchev to remove the missiles without resorting to a pre-emptive strike.  The quarantine strategy that Kennedy used is depicted by such writers as an unqualified triumph, resulting from his skill as a political leader.  The revisionist interpretation sees the crisis and Kennedy’s actions in a wholly different light.  The Revisionist argument centres on Kennedy needlessly risking war for political gain.  Writers such as Barton J. Bernstein and James Nathan condemn the American blockade as irresponsible and see the resolution resulting more from Kennedy’s luck than judgement.

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        The main point of contention is whether Kennedy was concerned over the domestic consequences of the Cuban missiles and his response.  The traditionalist approach highlights Kennedy’s concern for the international implications of the missiles. Although the missiles had little impact on the overall U.S-Soviet military balance, they had an effect on the political balance.  The successful deployment of missiles on Cuba would prove Soviet ability to act in a zone vital to American Security interests.  This would damage America’s international prestige and could cause its allies in Europe to question the ability of the U.S to contain communism.  The traditionalist ...

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