Assess the impact of external factors on Japanese expansion between 1937 and 1941.

The September 1939 outbreak of war in Europe presented Japan with a fortuitous opportunity similar to the one experienced in 1914.  As the world focussed on Europe, Japan could continue its expansionist designs in the Far East.  The Asian colonies of Britain, France and the Netherlands were left virtually undefended as forces were redeployed in preparation for the confrontation with Germany, making them easy targets for Japan.  When the Netherlands and France fell to Hitler in May-June 1940 the Japanese were able to extort economic and strategic concessions because of there weakened state.  At the same time the Vichy government in France was pressured by Japan into closing off the supply route through Indochina to Chiang Kai-shak’s besieged regime in Chungking, reducing the Chinese threat to Japanese control.  Later in September Japanese forces occupied the northern part of French Indochina for the supposed purpose of ensuring the isolation of the Chinese Nationalists’ stronghold.  These are all reactions to developments in Europe, which resulted in direct Japanese expansion.

It was also economic factors brought about by the war that caused the move South.  The war further disrupted the flows of trade and capital, making it more desirable than ever for Japan to secure a position of advantage in Southeast Asia.  Therefore the Colonial minister Koiso Kuniaki said Japan should look to the ‘South seas for the supply of needed materials for the realisation of the New Order in East Asia.’  This was based on an October 1939 study by the Cabinet Planning Board which argued that because of the restrictions the war placed on exports from the European colonies and the United States it was necessary for Japan to ‘bring within our economic sphere areas on the East Asia mainland and in the southern region which could contribute to Japanese self sufficiency.’ 

However Professor Hosoya argues that Japanese interest in Southeast Asia was due primarily to its desire to keep western imperialism out of the region.  The fall of the Netherlands and France in 1940 left their colonies ‘fatherless’.  But for Japan the defeat of these two colonial powers raised another problem, that of Hitler’s Germany inheriting the colonial obligations of the defeated powers.  This would simply exchange one western colonial regime with another, a prospect that opposed all Japan was trying to achieve through expansion.  So the war in Europe as an external factor both provided Japan with opportunities to further its own desires for territorial and economic expansion in Southeast Asia, and also forced them to do so because of pressures on resources and a fear of German colonial acquisition.

Japanese fear of Russia was a constant factor in these considerations over expansion.  During the 1930’s there had been a steady build-up of Soviet military strength along the Amur.  Also the Soviet Union was sending substantial war material, aircraft and ‘volunteer’ pilots in support of the nationalist regime in China.  In July 1938 and august 1939 there were two major frontier clashes between the two countries.  On both occasions the Kwangtung Army suffered at the hand of the Russians, owing primarily to technological inferiority.  This enforced the argument in Tokyo for greater guarantees against a conflict with Russia that Japan was not prepared for.

There were some internal struggles between the army and navy over where Japanese priorities lay.  The navy had always viewed the United States as Japans most probable enemy since the London naval Conference of 1930.  They pressed for naval parity with the US in order to control the western Pacific and enable an eventual advance southward.  The army however wanted to focus on protecting the Chinese empire against the Russian threat, and an advance south would leave China weakened and temp Moscow.  Therefore for because of the Russian threat, and disagreement between the two services expansion could not proceed southward.

In 1941 two events occurred that reduced the Russian threat.  In April 1941 the Soviet Union signed a peace treaty with Japan.  More importantly in June, Hitler launched a full assault on Russia, which forced Stalin to transfer many Eastern divisions to protect the cities of the West.  After the German attack, its foreign minister Ribbentrop attempted to reverse his pressure on Japan of the previous year to attack Singapore, which Japan had so far resisted.  Now he wanted Japan to attack the Soviet Union, a complete u-turn on Germany’s previous request that Japan improve its relations with Moscow.  However, much of the Japanese leadership were angered by this German inconsistency and apparent lack of respect for its Japanese ally, so they proceeded south instead.  Here Japan shows a resistance to external pressure from Germany because its interests lay elsewhere.

The cabinets’ decision in July 1941 to acquire bases in Indochina preparatory to a strike against Singapore and the East Indies reflected the confluence of strategic opinion in the two services, now the Russian threat was lessened.  This plan had the advantage of appearing to be a response to German requests pre June, while at the same time making it impossible for Japan to meet the new German demands to attack Russia.   This shows that from 1937-1941 Russian neutrality, and its preoccupation with Germany was an important factor in uniting the two services and in Japanese expansion into Southeast Asia later in the year.  However it also shows Japan had a clear agenda of its own, and did not submit to external pressure from Germany to open a second front with Russia, but continued with its expansion Southward.

After the war in Europe broke out, President Roosevelt assigned priority to the overthrow of Nazi Germany, guiding American world strategy by the simple logic that Germany’s friends ere Americas enemies.  When Japan befriended the “Nazi devils” American opinion grew much more hostile.  However Hosoya Chihiro argues that the Tripartite Pact was not an attempt by Japan to establish links with the fascist powers to challenge the United States, but means of ending Japans worrying isolation and simply deterring American interference in the Far East, even as a preliminary to an improvement in Tokyo-Washington relations.  Therefore at this stage Japan still believed the external threat of the United States could be placated through diplomatic manoeuvrings, and so it continued with its expansion into Southeast Asia believing America would not act decisively.        

America’s response to Japanese troops taking southern Indochina in 1941 was to freeze all Japanese assets in the United States and imposing an embargo on high-octane gasoline creating a more hostile relationship between the two countries.  Japan was deprived of the fuel she needed to resume mechanised military operation in the Asia mainland.  American financial support for China also increased, and in April 1941 Roosevelt legalised the mercenary activity of the “Flying tigers” and later that year sent an official military mission to Chiang’s government.  This deprived Japan of vital materials and increased pressure on Japan from the Chinese nationalists, which itself diverted more important resources from the Southern campaign.

By September 1941 because of the imposition of the American embargo and the military support for Chiang, Japan had already come to feel that she would need to fight for her ‘self-defence, self-existence, and self respect’.  Japan possessed less than a two-year supply of oil, with major shortages in other key minerals and continued expansion in China absorbed huge quantities of these dwindling resources.  As the inflexible nature of America’s stance toward Japanese expansion was realised self-sufficiency in strategic materials became even more important.  Certain sections of Japanese official opinion, aware of the increasing Anglo-American naval cooperation, disheartened by the failure of Germany to defeat Russia and anxious about Japans dwindling resources, were advocating accepting Americas demands to withdraw from all territories occupied since 1931.  But no Japanese leader in a position of authority was prepared to relinquish the special position in Manchukuo and China that had been acquired at such great cost.  Now Japan had realised that its role as a great power lay in its ability to secure the vital resources it was being deprived of.  To not try a southern expansion, even if it meant taking on the United States would leave Japan exposed to western economic blackmail indefinitely.From this perspective expansion must proceed because of external events.

In talks with Washington the incompatibility of the two sides demands became apparent.  In Great Britain and the origins of the Pacific war, P, Lowe argues that the US secretary for war Stimson, Winston Churchill and Anthony Eden in London and Chiang Kai-shek were pressuring Roosevelt to maintain demands of a complete withdrawal of Japanese forces, making it impossible for Hull to continue negotiations with a resolute Japan.  The Japanese government blamed the start of the war in 1941 on the Hull note which demanded that Japan withdraw totally from China and return to the status quo before the Manchurian incident.  Therefore Japan blamed external factors for forcing them to adopt a policy of hostile southward expansion.  

Finally Japan had a narrow window of opportunity within which to conduct a war with the United States.  America had identified Germany as the foremost naval threat and presumed Japan would never risk a war, and even if it did a defensive naval taskforce would protect all its possessions.  By autumn 1941 the Japanese navy had obtained virtual parity in the region with the combined fleets of Britain and the United States.  However productive capacity was much higher in the Western Powers.  Importantly as an external influence, the United States had recently embarked upon a massive naval construction program that would remove Japans advantage within a few years.  This dilemma of short-term advantage faced with long-term inferiority therefore increased feeling amongst the Japanese leadership that expansion must increase, even if a preventative war with the US were required.  

To conclude Japanese expansion was heavily influenced by external factors.  As a revisionist state challenging the established authority of the Great Powers Japan had to use caution in its foreign policy.  The Nationalist regime in China with its support from foreign powers was a constant drain on resources and obstacle to expansion elsewhere.  Only when events in Europe and Russia made possible a Southeastern expansion did Japan risk such a policy.  The United States always posed a constant threat to this expansion, adopting a moral stance regarding China and refusing to allow Japan a free hand in Asia. The economic strangulation brought about by America and the European war forced Japan to choose to abandon the “Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere”, and its ambitions as a Great Power, or to risk all in a Pacific conflict.  

Bibliography

• Keylor, William R. (2001, 4th edition) The Twentieth Century World: An International History. New York: Oxford University Press

• Kennedy, Paul. (1988) The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers. Glasgow: Harper Collins Publishers

• John W. Hall, Marius B. Jansen, Madoka Kanai, and Denis Twitchett. (1988) The Cambridge History of Japan. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press

• Beasley W.G. (1987) Japanese Imperialism 1894-1945. New York: Oxford University Press

• Brailey N.J.  (1987) Southeast Asia and Japans Road to War. The Historical Journal, Vol. 30, No, 4,

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