As well as French attempts to bring Spain on its side Cecil claimed they had also cast doubts on the Queen’s title and had “began to say that the Queen of England was illegitimate”. In “ catholic eyes, the legitimate ruler” was considered to be Mary, and Cecil cleverly knew that this threat was the one that would upset Elizabeth the most. Having just newly come to the throne and not yet being firmly established “she was especially susceptive to any slightest aspersion on her title to the throne”. It greatly aroused her suspicion and animosity towards them. Finally Cecil pointed to “their malice by the usurpation of her arms and style”. Not only was Mary’s marriage seen as a deliberate provocation but also their use of the English arms on their dinner plates was taken personally by Elizabeth. It was seen as another attempt to prove her illegitimate “an action calculated to touch the most sensitive nerves of the Queen of England”. Being new to the throne Cecil also pointed to the fact that the French might attack sooner rather than later. They had more confidence to push their ideas in Scotland now that they officially ruled it and were getting more and more suspicious of Elizabeth’s Protestant feelings by the day. So Cecil bid his mistress hasten to aid the rebels for fear of imminent French action.
Although these were the official reasons given for why intervention in Scotland should happen there is no doubt that there were other motives for involvement. One obvious one was a common religious cause, that of Protestantism. The fear of the French partly stemmed because they were Catholic and there was significant pressure from protestants in England to got the whole way in supporting the Protestants, thus entirely riding Scotland of the Catholic Church. Cecil himself was a zealous Protestant and he and other fellow Protestants feared that if France pushed Catholicism in Scotland and crushed the Reformation there, it would be a “spearhead of a deeper move to restore catholic ascendancy throughout Europe”. It was thought that France was eager for peace in 1559 only so it could take “action against Scottish heretics” and other heresy within its realm. Support to Protestant groups would bring unity to its cause against catholic countries and help groups to resist this general Inquisition that was happening on the continent. However these motives were never cited as reasons to invade because there was too much potential in them for unrest with England. The situation in England was fragile with Elizabeth preferring to be moderate rather than support any kind of extremism and also realising that outside London there were many who were still pro-catholic. Outright help on religious grounds could prove to be domestically disastrous. Elizabeth was also not pleased with their “bruits of their (the Scottish rebels) disobedience, where they refused to resort to their Sovereign and had confederated themselves against her (Mary) and levied a force”. She also had a personal disliking for their leader John Knox, due to his ill timed attack on women rulers in 1559. However pressure from Cecil and the argument that the nobles were “advancing God’s cause”, attacking a French dominated government, and that no Scottish blood would be spilt. “Elizabeth’s’ support was given despite the existence of Knox” although there is no evidence that she ever forgave him
Besides the motive of a common religion, Elizabeth also appealed to the role of benevolent protector of the Scots as “the greater part of the nobility of Scotland have presently sent to the Queen a request”. They had a “desire for an English alliance” and therefore given that they had at times begged her for aid, she had “take the liberty thereof into her protection” and had sent her army north at the end of March 1560. Its role in besieging Leith and also the role of the English navy had been invaluable. The English also had a lot of empathy with the Scots at this time, due to their dependency on foreign power. In Scotland there had been an “explosion of injured national feeling against alien dominance” as the monarch’s foreign match had not only led to foreign dependency but also “an absentee sovereign, a foreign regent and a foreign garrison to back her up”. The presence of French troops was an “affront to national sentiment” and in this atmosphere of talk romantic ideas of an Atlantic Arpeligo (union of England and Scotland under one rule) began to arise again and also the more practical considerations of a need for friendly allies against France.
It was also seen as practically the right and unique time to attack. France would not be able to being over more troops until winter was over and during that time England could make a swift strike before reinforcements arrived. Spain was also a long way off and probably wouldn’t interfere unless it absolutely had to. Hesitant ministers were also comforted by rumours that were circulating of Mary Stuart’s bad health, the fact that she was unlikely to have children and the possibility of an early death. A unique opportunity existed, one not likely to recur, as Cecil himself said “any wise kindle the fire, for if quenched, the opportunity will not come in our lives”. The Scots were more worried about French domination than English and were therefore prepared to accept English help when at other times they didn’t. Also within Scottish politics “a stroke of luck for the reformers in that their interests happened to suit the politicians”, thus uniting different groups with a strong cement of religious ideology, an ideology it held in common with England. Therefore there was a “fragile basis for Anglo Scottish co-operation”.
Elizabeth had many worries about how intervention in Scotland would be viewed, whatever motives she deemed as her official ones for going in. So to counter these worries her support to the Protestants was mainly unofficial and kept secret, even from many of her own ministers. Her support was given in the way of money as “some small comfort” and even when she did this, she often denied knowledge of it claiming that her ministers sent it. However the French didn’t always buy into this story “4,000 crowns surprised by the French, which was sent in relief of the Scottish rebels…a portion sent only by M.de Cecil…ye cannot make the French believe so…their rebels are covertly threto induced and maintained by your Queen”. Elizabeth also maintained that her armies in the north were simply strengthening the borders and that she had sent “Lord Grey to enter Scotland with his army and first try to settle matters by negotiation and afterwards by force (her only option)”. She also sent ships to Scotland on the basis that they were looking for pirates, when in reality their presence acted to cut off French supplies and communication lines. Another clever way of avoiding Spanish agitation was to write to Philip asking very flatteringly for “her good brothers wisdom and friendship” and calling for him to mediate. Thus he offers to replace French troops with Spanish troops and thus maintain Catholicism in Scotland but alleviate English fear of French. So Elizabeth’s fears over her motives were assuaged in different ways. The most important motive that made Elizabeth act was proof of an immediate threat of invasion and a “grave threat to her throne”. A culmination of all other motives soon won her over bit by bit and as all of her ministers came around and backed Cecil Elizabeth couldn’t dare oppose them in the end.
Thus the motives were set for intervention and it is in this light that the impact of these events must be viewed. Firstly there was a big impact of events within England, particularly on Elizabeth herself. For her it had been a painful episode, forced on her by unavoidable circumstances. She had been respectfully but relentlessly been forced down a path she did not wish to follow. Furthermore what she did in supporting the rebels was against her own grain and what she established in Scotland in the end was really contrary to her own authoritarian likings. Her bid for Calais, whilst Cecil was away from court, during the negotiations for the Treaty of Edinburgh showed that she didn’t the current feeling of powerlessness and wanted to exert her will again. The cabinet did indeed learn a lot about their mistress during the crisis, namely “the Queen’s whole vision of politics differed from that of her minister”. She was like her father in that she believed in the divine and infragilable rights of all monarchs and therefore was less progressive in what she wanted to achieve. Thus there was a gulf between her and her servants as they looked beyond immediate threats to threats to the nation and also opportunities for English safety and glory in the future whereas Elizabeth was “deaf to arguments for long-term benefits”.
There was also a great impact within the cabinet, especially upon Cecil and other personnel of high politics. The successes of Scotland particularly transformed Cecil’s status from a newcomer to a first rank politician and decisive leader in the government. Although it gained him many rivals he was noted to have a good understanding of his mistress and how particularly to bring her to certain decisions. Also within the cabinet the successes brought down the reputations of those who had actively opposed it, particularly Arundel. He became an outsider of the cabinet and became soured by the fall from the great place he had had in the politics of the late regime. The events in Scotland also brought new faces into the cabinet, such as the Duke of Norfolk and Sadler; men who had been appointed to charge of the borders and had almost worried a minor revolution in the regional politics in the north. They had removed Catholics from power such as the Earl of Northumberland and had therefore brought the northern region temporarily more in line with the government.
As the intervention in Scotland had been a “dazzling success”, it had opened up “the brightest possibilities for the future” within English national policy. National policy had now taken a strong ideological bent of Protestantism and within the counsel, conservative opponents had been beaten (those that were more cautious) and those that were left had nudged their mistress reluctantly into the role of Protestant champion within the island and within the larger theatre. Therefore “the drive for action and for change came from servants of the crown, alternately harassing and cajoling the reluctant queen” thus presenting themselves as a stronger force in government. Their success meant they were able to put more pressure on Elizabeth to embark on other Protestant endeavours later on in her reign.
There was also a significant impact on both France and Scotland. The Treaty of Edinburgh concluded peace in July 1560 and there was an extent where one can say that France had not lost but had rather been distracted by conspiracies of Calvinists within its own borders and therefore couldn’t send enough troops to quell the rebels. Coupled with blow that Mary of Guise died in 1560, the French really couldn’t see any way of holding onto power without a huge commitment to it. Therefore Circumstances at home and in Scotland (series of defeats) and also not able to get their reinforcements because of the weather meant threw in their hand and agreed to withdrawal of all but merest token forces. English troops also withdrew at the same time. At the same time Scotland was having all of its demands the “request to be ruled by their own nation and laws, to keep the religion they have received, and that the French be revoked out of Scotland” fulfilled. The Lords of the Congregation set up new counsels and the Reformation Parliament met for the first time on the 1st August 1560. The Protestant religion was established with a Calvinistic confession of faith adopted, whilst the Roman Catholic Church was abolished along with mass and the jurisdiction of the pope. However it has to be noted that the majority of the population were still Catholic and that Mary then soon arrived in Scotland to lead a counter-reformation the result of which was murder, rebellion and civil war. So the intervention in Scotland, although bringing the climax point of the reformation and strengthening “the reformed church of Europe by their victory”, meant there was a lot of hardship and change ahead for the general people.
Thus the motives of the intervention were fulfilled as shown by the impact of events. Fears of French domination of Scotland, and England, subsided with the removal of French troops and the Protestant cause was greatly strengthened in Scotland. All the motives played a part in causing Elizabeth to act, the main one being the imminent threat to her crown. However her involvement would bring further long-term effects; soon her ministers would once again be pleading her to intervene on the continent in order to help the Protestant cause.
Bibliography
Primary Documents – taken from HY302 Course Pack I
- Thomas Challoner to Cecil, Brussels, 6 Dec 1559
CSP Foreign Elizabeth n.385 pp164-172
- Killigrew and Jones to the Queen, 6 Jan 1560
CSP For n.552 p.265
-
Instructions for Montague and Chamberlain sent to the King of Spain, 23rd Jan 1560
CSP F Elizabeth n.629 pp315ff
-
The Queens Answer to the Spanish Ambassador, 11th April 1560
CSP For Elizabeth n.984 pp526-8
- Sadler and Croftes to the Earl of Arran and the lard James, 6 Dec 1559
CSP F Elizabeth n.388 P173
-
Dr Wotton’s discourse touching the Queen’s interference in Scotland, 11th April 1560
CSP For n.985 pp528-30
-
An Answer for Melville, 1st October 1565
CSP F Elizabeth n 1593 p.476
-
Bedford to the Queen, Newcastle 17th Oct 1565
CSP F Elizabeth n 1602 p.493
-
23rd Oct 1565. The Privy Council (to Smith)
CSP F Elizabeth n 1621 p.499 extract
Secondary Documents
Donaldson, G – “James V to James VII (vol3 of the Edinburgh History of Scotland”, Oliver & Boyd 1965
Wormald, J – “Mary Queen of Scots”, Collins & Brown 1991
Wormald, J - “Court, Kirk and Community. Scotland 1470-1625”, Edinburgh University Press 1992
Read, C – “Mr Secretary Cecil and Queen Elizabeth”, Oxford 1956
MacCaffrey, W.T – “The shaping of the Elizabethan regime: Elizabethan politics 1558-72”, Princeton University Press 1969
MacCaffrey, W.T – “Elizabeth I”, New York 1997
Primary Document 1 P1 (see list in bibliography)
Primary Document 4 (see list in bibliography)
Primary Document 3 P1 (see list in bibliography)
Primary Document 4 (see list in bibliography)
MacCaffrey, W.T – “The shaping of the Elizabethan regime: Elizabethan politics 1558-72 P57
Primary Document 1 P1 (see list in bibliography)
Primary Document 3 P1 (see list in bibliography)
Primary Document 1 P3 (see list in bibliography)
MacCaffrey, W.T – “The shaping of the Elizabethan regime: Elizabethan politics 1558-72 P43
Primary Document 1 P1 (see list in bibliography)
Primary Document 2 (see list in bibliography)
MacCaffrey, W.T – “The shaping of the Elizabethan regime: Elizabethan politics 1558-72 P43
Primary Document 4 (see list in bibliography)
MacCaffrey, W.T – “The shaping of the Elizabethan regime: Elizabethan politics 1558-72 P59
MacCaffrey, W.T – “The shaping of the Elizabethan regime: Elizabethan politics 1558-72 P57
Wormald, J - “Court, Kirk and Community. Scotland 1470-1625” P116
Primary Document 9 (see list in bibliography)
Wormald, J - “Court, Kirk and Community. Scotland 1470-1625” P113
Primary Document 3 P1 (see list in bibliography)
Wormald, J - “Court, Kirk and Community. Scotland 1470-1625” P109
Primary Document 3 P1 (see list in bibliography)
MacCaffrey, W.T – “The shaping of the Elizabethan regime: Elizabethan politics 1558-72 P 57
Donaldson, G – “James V to James VII (vol3 of the Edinburgh History of Scotland P86
MacCaffrey, W.T – “The shaping of the Elizabethan regime: Elizabethan politics 1558-72 P58
Wormald, J - “Court, Kirk and Community. Scotland 1470-1625” P109
MacCaffrey, W.T – “The shaping of the Elizabethan regime: Elizabethan politics 1558-72 P58
Primary Document 3 P1 (see list in bibliography)
Primary Document 1 P1 (see list in bibliography)
Primary Document 4 (see list in bibliography)
Primary Document 3 P2 (see list in bibliography)
MacCaffrey, W.T – “The shaping of the Elizabethan regime: Elizabethan politics 1558-72 P59
MacCaffrey, WT – “Elizabeth I”, P 67
MacCaffrey, W.T – “The shaping of the Elizabethan regime: Elizabethan politics 1558-72 P55
MacCaffrey, W.T – “The shaping of the Elizabethan regime: Elizabethan politics 1558-72 P56
Primary Document 6 P1 (see list in bibliography)
Wormald, J - “Court, Kirk and Community. Scotland 1470-1625”, P116