Balance of Power or Hegemony: An Investigation of Paul W. Schroeder's Thesis

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Balance of Power or Hegemony: An Investigation of Paul W. Schroeder’s Thesis

Balance of Power or Hegemony:

An Investigation of Paul W. Schroeder’s Thesis

MARTIN FEDERICO MEYER

THE PERIOD STARTING AFTER NAPOLEON’S defeat in 1814 until the First World War was characterized by a high degree of stability and peacefulness on the European continent. At a national level, several crises, such as the 1850 revolutions, did put the situation in serious doubt but generally one is able to say that international relations produced no major confrontation on a European scale during this time. Historians are commonly quick in attributing this state-of-affairs after continuous wars since 1789 to the peace settlement of the Congress of Vienna. The Congress of Vienna brought together about 200 different states but essentially revolved around Europe’s main actors – England, Russia, Austria, Prussia, and later on France. The main purpose of this pentarchy was, on one hand, to redistribute territories and redraw the borders between nations, hence significantly altering the European map, and, on the other, to re-establish a conservative political order by creating a balance of power between states. Or so it has been said, because in a mere 24 pages Paul W. Schroeder does away with this century long notion that the Vienna settlement and the ensuing political system of nineteenth-century Europe was based on such a system. In his essay, he argues that any interpretation of an 1815 balance of power needs not to be redefined but should be completely disregarded, for the “essential power relations were hegemonic, not balanced, and a hegemonic distribution of power, along with other factors, made the system work.” 

        But let us first turn towards the issue of balance of power, a term that itself imperatively calls out for further clarification, and has been the focus of hot-heated debate among historians. The concept of balance of power is historically specific and changes according to the situation, implying that it is not a universal principle. It is a very vague notion that bears different meanings. In order to provide a concise and clear definition, the one proposed by Schroeder seems to be appropriate. According to him, a balance of power system “must mean one in which the power possessed and exercised by states within the system is checked and balanced by the power of others.” In the same context, a nation must thus fear retaliation by the other powers in case of some predatory action that could jeopardize the continued existence of the balance. Policies for achieving a balance of power would include a redistribution of territories or linking the powers of different states by alliances. The Congress of Vienna pursued both of these policies. France lost all the territory gained by Napoleon and, at the same time, the bourbons were restored to the throne under the rule of Louis XVIII. The kingdom of Netherlands was created by uniting the Dutch Republic with the Austrian Netherlands. Prussia was given much of Saxony and important parts of Westphalia and the Rhineland Province. Austria was restored to its size prior to Napoleon’s invasion and also given land in Germany and Italy. Russia received Finland and control over Poland, whereas Britain got several strategic colonial territories.

Schroeder himself supports the notion that, at first glance, the Vienna system seemed to follow balance of power politics. But he raises doubts as to if power was “apportioned so that all major actors and actual or potential power blocs were subject to countervailing power from others.” According to his definition of “a great power,” Britain indeed qualified for the label world power. Already enjoying a pre-eminent status before 1815, the Industrial Revolution and the technological development carried in its wake further enhanced Britain’s position by equipping it with “economic resources quite different in scale from those of her political rivals.” In the nineteenth century, its annual output at all points exceeded that of any other country in the world; in the 1860s it accounted for approximately 50 percent of the world’s iron and coal production. Britain was not only the frontrunner in industry but it was also the leader in world commerce. It was also the greatest colonial and naval power of the time, the size of its fleet second to none in the world. Finally, its distinctiveness in the realm of finance meant increased richness at home and abroad. However, as Kennedy notes, Britain’s overall GNP was by far not as impressive as its GNP per capita or its stage of industrialization. In addition – this fact being clearly more significant – Britain’s technological, industrial, and financial capabilities did not correlate higher military strength. In the post-1815 period, Britain regarded the military as a mere need of self-protection, and hence defense expenditures were reduced to the lowest possible levels. There was not only little enthusiasm from the British side to intervene on the European continent, but such intervention was largely deemed unnecessary for the survival of the equilibrium between the Great Powers. Kennedy concludes that Britain was “a different sort of Great Power by the early to middle nineteenth century,” but its influence “could not be measured by the traditional criteria of military hegemony.”

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Similar to Britain, Russia was likewise a true great power, superior to the others in several regards. It had by far the largest territory, the largest population, and the largest army. Especially its military strength was of a different order of magnitude from those of other states of Europe. However, in reality Russia’s strengths were to large extents exaggerated. Although it did play a dominant role in the eastern and southeastern parts of Europe, there were also serious impediments to what it could truly achieve. This was mainly due to the fact that Russia was losing ground on the other ...

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