Nevertheless, we can still use Berlin’s basic definition of positive to compare with. Whereas negative liberty was expressed as freedom from constraint, the absence of obstacles, its positive brother follows the freedom to follow a certain chosen way of life, and the path to “personal autonomy or self government”, and the idea of self-realisation. This divides into two forms; the first being internal to the agent, whereby the rational self rules over the self’s lesser elements. The second, being less individualistic and more political, holds that no individual can live autonomously “except as a member of a free political community, a state that is not only independent of other states, but one that is itself organised democratically so that all citizens can share in its governance, and in the sense, at least, be self governing” (Routledge, 2). However, this theory is also flawed, as it is clear that a state can incorporate the ideals of democracy whilst overlooking liberty. Fareed Zakaria has explored the relationship between the two forces, and cites Periclean Athens, a slave-owning society, as the start of this. In reverse, much of the nineteenth century in America and Britain illustrates the importance of liberty but having little democracy (Economist: 90). Thus, the fact that positive liberty is contrasting to its negative opponent, it is possible to assert that this weakness of the former is a strength of the latter.
The focus of positive libertarians is the fulfilment of a specified set of goals or ends. With this being a highly normative aim, due to every person desiring different things, Plant points out that this is both paradoxical and dangerous. Paradoxical because it seems to validly justify the use of coercion to secure this freedom. Citing Rousseau, this is the notion “to force some to be free”, whilst dangerous as it appears to allow some individuals or groups imposing their values of human fulfilment and the good of man on to others in order to secure their liberty (Plant, 1991: 249). This is highly disturbing, and any exponents of negative freedom would point to this argument in order to support their own.
Plant also offers a list of inabilities, ranging from logical (unable to draw a round square or be in two places at once) and congenital inabilities (unable for a male to bear children), to decision-based (unable to run a marathon because of my physical condition, a result of not exercising) and social and resource-based inabilities (unable to fly on Concorde because I lack the resources needed to fulfil this). These are categorised respectively into ‘natural’, whereby they cannot be altered by human intervention, and ‘social’, whereby human intervention can alter the situation. This allows Day to put forward his argument – “where an inability is both natural, that it so say not induced [nor] alterable by human arrangement, then the question of freedom does not arise” (Plant, 1991: 224).
Oppenheim argues from a slightly different perspective, drawing a distinction between negative liberty and the value of liberty. These may differ greatly and thus can undermine the strength of negative liberty. For example, the tramp is negatively free to dine at the Ritz, having no political obstacles preventing him from doing so. This is all well and good, but this freedom is of no value or relevance to him, as he has no means or resources (‘ability’) of exercising it. This was the stance taken by the nineteenth century philosopher T.H. Green, a proponent of positive liberty, as he gave his own take on the notion, and in effect offers a critique of the negative form of freedom. As discussed earlier, a ‘free political community’ forms part of the conditions for the former notion mentioned. This includes non-interference of the police and other ‘agents of the state’, in order for one’s desires to be fulfilled. True freedom must also include the essential resources to enjoy it, such as a minimal level of wealth, physical health, talent and knowledge. These can all at least aided by the State, through job opportunities and benefits, provision of health care, and education respectively. Either way, it seems that the concept of negative liberty sustains serious criticisms.
However, whilst it is clear that to fully enjoy negative liberty, one must have the presence of resources achieved through positive liberty, many liberals, including Berlin, have accused the positive form of freedom of ushering in a state of authoritarianism. Taking the case of a permanent and oppressed minority, despite participating in the democratic process controlled by the majority, and thus can be said to be free on the basis of being members of a self-governing society, they are in essence, like the slave, unfree from their oppression.
Berlin also cites the belief of some defenders of positive freedom that the self extends further than the individual, into an area termed an ‘organic social whole’, consisting of “a tribe, a race, a church, a state, the great society of the living and the dead and the yet unborn” (Berlin 2002: 179). Under this standing, the true interests of the individual become the true interests of this whole, and therefore to remain a rational individual would sanction the use of coercion to fulfil the interests of the whole. Berlin continues, “Once I take this view, I am in a position to ignore the actual wishes of men or societies, to bully, oppress, torture in the name, and on the behalf, of their ‘real’ selves, in the secure knowledge that whatever is the true goal of man…must be identical with his freedom”.
As it is clear, the concepts of positive and negative liberty are very controversial and still provide an issue of serious philosophical debate. Some writers, including MacCallum, reject the idea of having a polarised distinction between the two, explaining that this is too simple and not practical enough. He suggests there being a whole range of possible interpretations of the single concept of liberty, which would promote a more valuable discussion. Nevertheless, the ‘two concept’ theory still has great importance. In my eyes, the strengths of negative liberty seem to rise above its weaknesses and provide a solid basis of society, and the division between public and private life. The idea of positive freedom, despite raising significant arguments against its negative brother, just fails to convince me of its dominance and importance, and seems to offer loopholes to infringe on individual freedom. Whatever the case, liberty will remain a contended issue until Utopia is achieved.
Bibliography
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Berlin, Isaiah (edited by Henry Hardy) (2002), Liberty: Incorporating ‘Four Essays on Liberty’, Oxford, Oxford University Press
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Carter, Ian, Positive and Negative Liberty at:
<> (checked 5 March 2003)
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Flathman, Richard (1987), The Philosophy and Politics of Freedom, Chicago, University of Chicago Press
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Feinberg, Joel, Freedom and Liberty entry in Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy, at:
<http://ca.geocities.com/jazzchul2000/glossary/freedom_liberty
(checked 5 March 2003)
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Goodwin, Barbara (1997), Using Political Ideas, Fourth Edition, Chichester, Wiley
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MacCallum, Gerald (1967), ‘Negative and Positive Freedom’, Philosophical Review vol. 76
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Plant, Raymond (1991), Modern Political Thought, Oxford, Blackwell
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Skinner, Quentin (2002), ‘A Third Concept of Liberty’, London Review of Books, vol. 24 no.7
- Zakaria article from The Economist, vol. 366 no. 8314