Did Bismarckengineer, and was therefore mainly responsible, for the Franco-Prussian War in 1870?

The origins of the Franco-Prussian War are long-term and Napoleon III is to a large extent responsible for destroying Europe’s political equilibrium and bringing about the final Franco-Prusso stand-off. Under his rule French foreign policy had one sole aim: French aggrandisement. His most theoretical work Des idées napoléoniennes, written during his stay in Ham prison in 1938, were the basis of his presidential election campaign in 1848 where he promised the restoration of ‘la grande France’ and the establishment of French hegemony throughout Europe. His proposals amounted to no less than a ‘United States of Europe’ – in practice a revival of his uncle’s legacy – with its capital obviously in Paris which Louis-Napoleon grandly rebuilt in the following years for the staggering sum of five billion francs. With this vision in mind Napoleon I’s nephew, in the period from 1852 to 1870, went about dismantling the conservative phalanx which had been set up in 1815. The Russian declaration of war on the Ottoman Empire provided an ideal opportunity to isolate and defeat Russia during the Crimean War. This move turned out to be of great significance in 1866 and 1870 when Russia on both occasions rewarded Prussia with neutrality. In 1858 Louis-Napoleon’s secret negotiations at Plombières led to the joint French-Italian campaign that drove Austria out of rich Lombardy. Thus having enabled Italian unification, Louis-Napoleon created a powerful Piedmontese kingdom which effectively challenged Austria’s southern frontiers and tied up vitally needed forces during the Prussian onslaught in 1866.

       July 3, 1866 was the eye-opener which confirmed finally that Louis-Napoleon’s diplomacy had backfired. By then Bismarck had effectively outmanoeuvred Napoleon in his bid for supremacy in Germany. On two occasions in 1862 (Tuileries diner) and in 1865 (Biaritz) Bismarck had cunningly dangled the prospect of border rectifications in favour of France in return for her benevolence in the ensuing struggle for hegemony in Germany. Bismarck but had wittingly avoided to commit Prussia to any compensatory arrangements. Thus as France was idly witnessing the swift destruction of the powerful Austrian Gendarme, events were relentlessly moving towards the final contest of French greatness as opposed to German unification.

      From Bismarck’s point of view policy was ultimately very simple. The one unbending rule in the quest for power was primacy of Prussian interests in all aspects of European diplomacy. And from this very basic rule follows the principle of Realpolitik: The end justifies all means. After all “one cannot play chess if from the outset sixteen of the sixty-four squares are out of bounds.” Bismarck’s intention was not to engineer a Franco-Prussian War. On the contrary, in 1853, only months after his appointment as Ambassador to Paris, he had shocked the conservative Prussian establishment by advocating an alliance with the despised parvenu Emperor Napoleon III. Bismarck had consideration only for Prussian interests. And because Prussia was one of  “Germany’s two equal protecting powers” it followed that “there is nothing more German than the particularist interests of Prussia rightly interpreted.”  

      ‘Prussian interests rightly interpreted’ amounted to nothing less than full German unification under Prussian leadership. In pursuing national unity, war played a vital part. In fact Bismarck described the waging of war as the only viable option in determining nineteenth century international relations: “Warfare and there is no other means in this present century by which the clock of development can be made to show the correct time.” Weak governments in particular tended to “force wars upon us in order to strengthen their own position.” It is therefore plausible to assume, in line with Bismarck’s boastings in 1892, that war had been deliberately instrumental in overcoming Prussia’s initial weaknesses, and that the 1870 War in particular had been engineered to seal Germany’s final chapter of unification. Step one had constituted an overwhelming show of force to re-establish law and order in Schleswig and Holstein. Led by the ageing 1848-reactionary General Wrangler, this punitive expedition was not led to further nationalistic enthusiasm. Instead it was executed as a ‘classic cabinet-war’ with the clear intention of forcing the domestic constitutional crisis, which was obstructing Roon’s military reforms, in favour of the government. Step two had evicted the Austrians from Germany and established Prussia as the sole claimant to German national hegemony. And finally, step three – the great show-down and ultimate test – , aimed at clearing the international obstacle out of Germany’s path to unification: This was France; her injured prestige and her undermined ruler. Outwitted by Bismarck’s territorial pre-war bluffs and embarrassed by the Mexican debacle, Louis-Napoleon had turned out empty handed and, following the rejected compensatory bid for Luxembourg in 1867, was subjected to biting criticism from the Corps Législatif: “When a hunter is ashamed of returning from the chase with an empty bag, he goes to the butcher, buys a rabbit, and stuffs it into his bag, letting the ears hang out. Voilà le Luxembourg!”

      In the long run, both Bismarck and Napoleon III were inclined to the waging of war and thereby contributed to the build-up of tensions which escalated into the Franco-Prussian War: Louis-Napoleon by demolishing the checks to the balance of power that the Congress of Vienna had installed in 1815; and Bismarck by ruthlessly exploiting the impotence of the 1815 defence mechanism. Given all that has been said two assumptions should be made which are of importance in determining whether or not Bismarck was mainly responsible for engineering the Franco-Prussian War.

Firstly, given Bismarck’s war-loving record it is fair to suggest that if not having intentionally engineered the war, he was nevertheless bent on avoiding war in 1870. Given the inherent difficulties of incorporating the southern German states into the Prussian Confederation, a War in 1870, which would revoke common century old resentments against the archenemy, was ideally suited to draw a line under what would come to be Bismarck’s life achievement.

Secondly, given the urgent desire for retribution, Napoleon made a critical decision of summoning the notorious duc de Gramont to the foreign ministry; an appointment which “there is no other way of saying it … is a prelude to war, nothing could be clearer.” De Gramont ever since has been made to take the brunt of allegations that it was clumsy and stubborn French policy in the first instance which ultimately triggered the war: “There can be no doubt that France was the immediate aggressor, and none that the immediate provocation to her aggression was contrived by Bismarck.”

      The scandal which provoked France sufficiently into declaring war on Prussia broke in early July 1870, when, due to an unfortunate telegram deciphering error, it became public that Leopold von Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen had secretly agreed to accept Spanish offers to the throne of Spain. The Times reported the whole business as being “a vulgar and impudent coup d’état in total contradiction to accepted diplomatic practice in handling such matters.” The natural French reaction was one of outrage; an affair “nothing less than an insult to France.” Although long kept in secret it is now undisputed that Bismarck actively forwarded the candidature of Prince Leopold against the initial will of William I, who was not inclined to take the risk of putting his nephew on the unstable Spanish throne. Historiography is fiercely divided as to why Bismarck was pursuing the Spanish candidacy. After all it was this defining incident which kick-started the Franco-Prussian War. Was he without intention? In that case the war was the sole responsibility of the undoubtedly trigger-happy French. Was he intentionally seeking the war, believing it to be the only realistic way of achieving German unification? Or else was Bismarck simply trying to score a diplomatic victory?

      Complete innocence can be ruled out safely: Upon hearing of Charles Anthony’s renunciation of the Spanish throne, Bismarck was sufficiently depressed to plunge into a depression “worse than Olmütz.” After all the whole point of manipulating and publishing the Abeken Telegram was to the flames of conflict alive: “Bismarck’s Telegramm … war so grob, wie ich es kaum für möglich gehalten hatte.”

      A warmongering Bismarck does, however, not resemble a picture drawn up by Wetzel who argues that Bismarck on many occasions, between 1868 and 1870, had to hold back aggressive nationalists, notably Helmut Moltke who were absolutely itching to march into France. Wetzel points out that Bismarck was unconvinced that war with France was really inevitable: “An arbitrary intervention in the course of history, on the basis of purely subjective factors, has never had any other result than the shaking down of unripe fruit. That German unity is an unripe fruit today is in my opinion obvious.” It could be argued that the Hohenzollern candidacy was one of Bismarck’s cunning diplomatic moves, which backfired only because the candidacy was prematurely leaked. Technically the French had absolutely no say in determining who the Spanish chose as their king. If Salazar had not adjourned the Cortez, the whole affair would have been done and over with by the end of June, thus confronting Napoleon with a fait accompli.

      Indeed, the obstinacy with which the duc de Gramont, a man “dramatic to the last vein” continued to intrude Franco-Prussian diplomacy even after Charles Anthony had renounced the Spanish throne, borders on hysteria. Despite William I’s forthcoming gestures of congratulating Bernedetti on Leopold’s withdrawal and sending a message ensuring the former that he gave Charles Anthony’s formal renunciation “his entire and unreserved approval” , Garmont continued to demand the express evacuation of Mainz fortress and a written note of apology by William I to Louis-Napoleon. “Do you want all Europe to say that although the substance of the quarrel was settled, you have decided to pour out torrents of blood over a mere matter of form?” demanded to know later President Adolphe Thiers.

“Great crises provide the weather for Prussia’s growth” was Bismarck’s encompassing slogan. And accordingly he utilised the Hohenzollern candidacy to overcome the untenable post-1866 Franco-Prussian relationship. Untenable because Louis-Napoleon desperately needed to teach Prussia a lesson in order to save the Second Republic. Bismarck’s Prussia on the other hand was yearning to cross the Main and assume natural frontiers bordering on Alps and the Rhine. Anything less than that was an untenable compromise.

The involuntary Hohenzollern candidacy – in itself a problem with dynastic rather than political or even strategic aspects – was a more than welcome opportunity for Bismarck to counter Austrian-Franco alliance negotiations and produce a great crises which would provide the weather for further Prussian expansion. “Why nowadays do great states wage war? The only sound foundation of a great state is political egoism and not romanticism, and it is unworthy of a great state to pick a quarrel for a cause that does not serve its own interests.” The publication of the Ems declaration was a masterly stroke of statesmanship because it converted the Spanish throne vacancy into a theme of German national defence. By creating a casus belli  which was applicable to Germany as a whole Bismarck forged a Bund which, although previously “incapable of aggression”, turned out to be “invincible in defence.”

Bibliography:

Becker, Frank: Bilder von Krieg und Nation. R. Oldenbourg Verlag. München, 2001.

Carr, William: The Origins of the Wars of German Unification. Longman. London, New York, 1991.

Howard, Michael: The Franco-Prussian War. Rupert Hart-Davis. London, 1961.

Richter, Werner: Bismarck. trans. Brian Battershaw. MacDonald. London, 1964.

Schieder, Theodor: Propyläen Geschichte Europas 1848-1918 – Staatensystem als Vormacht der Welt. Ullstein.  

     Berlin, 1999.

Wawro, Geoffrey: The Franco-Prussian War. Cambridge University Press. Cambridge, New York, 2003.

Wetzel, David: A Duel of Giants – Bismarck, Napoleon III, and the Origins of the Franco-Prussian War. The  

     University of Wisconsin Press. Wisconsin, London, 2001.

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