The first of Disraeli’s aims was that of appealing to the working classes. Whether or not he was successful in this aim within his program of reform is a point of debate amongst historians, for example Smith who has argued that the permissive nature of the reforms meant that they made no significant difference to the attitudes of the working classes ‘The reforming years of Disraeli saw no drawing together of party and of people’. However there were some acts which gained popularity among the working class. An example of this is the Conspiracy and Protection of Property act of 1875. This is an example, as Patterson says, of Disraeli’s government ‘amending an unpopular Gladstone Act in a popular decision’. According to Blake, this was also an effective piece of legislation, as it ‘settled the question of labour for a generation’. Disraeli is also quoted as saying that this Act ‘will gain and retain for the Conservatives the lasting affection of the working classes’. As Blake has asserted, Disraeli was aware of the need to retain the support of the newly-enfranchised working classes by specifically tailoring some of his legislation to them. Smith agrees with this point, and like Blake asserts Disraeli’s grasp of the popular view that ‘social measures… were accepted as an essential insurance against the dangerous fermentation of working-class discontents’. This shows there is a certain amount of agreement among some historians about the need to appease the working class, although there has been some disagreement on the effectiveness of the reforms introduced in fulfilling this aim, which can be exemplified in the claim by Feuchtwanger that there were many things more present in the minds of the working class than the reforms: ‘In 1875 the case of the Tichbourne claimant caused greater popular excitement than the social reform legislation’. The fact that a false claimant to titles had attracted more public interest than the enormous amount of legislation being put through by the government shows the limited effectiveness of the reforms in fulfilling this aim.
As already mentioned, Blake has asserted the effectiveness of the Employers and Workmen Act and the Conspiracy and Protection of Property Act in satisfying the needs of the working class, however in relation to the success of the rest of the rest of the legislation he says they were ‘of varying quality and efficacy’. This can be seen to be true especially in the light of his defeat at the 1880 election, as although Disraeli had tried to win over the hearts and minds of the working class, the unsuccessful and generally permissive nature of his reforms meant that they had not made enough difference to the lives of the people to truly bring them over to the Conservatives.
Secondly, Disraeli’s aim to endear himself to the landed classes, which can be seen less in specific pieces of legislation and more in the nature of the reforms themselves. An example of this is how permissive many of the reforms were. Whilst this is not necessarily a specifically Conservative value, as many of the reforms passed under the liberals were equally permissive in nature, Disraeli’s claim ‘we came in on the principle of not harassing this country’ shows that they were committed to a program of permissive legislation, with an emphasis on a laissez-faire government, once they came to power. Whilst this is an example of the Conservatives fulfilling their election campaigns, it is also, as Blake reminds us, a reflection of the mood of the time: ‘it is doubtful whether the temper of the times would have allowed anything more’.
In his social reforms, Disraeli had to travel a fine line between winning over the working class and appeasing and retaining the traditional Conservative supporters, the landed classes. As Norton and Aughey stressed, these reforms were only ‘giving self-help an institutionalised push’, and the eagerness of Disraeli to stress the laissez-faire attitude which the state was going to take towards the reforms is a sign of the government attempting to retain the support of the landed classes, who were cautious of anything that would give the working classes more power. Therefore they had to appease both sides at one time, as Smith put it ‘they were trying to satisfy the one without alienating the other’.This did retain the support of the landed classes in general, as there were few major concessions to the working classes within the program of reforms as a whole.
However, the fact that many of the reforms were very permissive in nature, due to Disraeli’s aim to appease the landed classes meant that the effectiveness of the reforms has a whole was limited, which links to Disraeli’s third aim of improving the condition of the British population as a whole.
This aim was the most often expressed by Disraeli in the 1874 election campaign, but has been most disputed by historians as to whether Disraeli was truly committed to changing and improving the condition of the people, or whether this was merely election rhetoric. Whilst Smith emphasises the practical considerations which Disraeli took into account, in that they had to ‘show that Tory criticisms of Liberal neglect had been ore than debating points. The party that for years had posed as the real friend of the working classes could hardly ignore their needs after they had helped to place it in power’, and places most of the passion and drive with Disraeli’s home minister Cross, whilst P.R Ghosh credits with Disraeli with a far more active involvement in the formation of the drive towards social reform, and even credits him with ‘the seamless development of the Conservative reformist tradition from the institutional to the social sphere’.
However, Disraeli’s desire to create a stronger nation also links to his belief in ‘One Nation’ Conservatism. In the ‘One Nation’ theory, Disraeli expressed a belief that the condition of the poorer elements of society should be raised, whilst at the same time perpetuating an appropriate sense of hierarchy within English society. Although Disraeli had distanced himself somewhat from this statement of belief in comparison to that of his novels, in particular Sybil, written in 1845, there maintained in his policies a residual indication of his continuing agreement in this belief. The idea that the condition of the people of Britain should be elevated was one that concerned Disraeli, and should be seen as one of the most important underlying aims behind his reforms. This is reinforced by Walton, who states that ‘he sought to remove unnecessary grievances and to restore and sustain that state of harmony between rich and poor… which he held to be the natural state of society.’ Although it can be seen that the desire to improve the condition of the people of Britain, as can be seen in Walton, who says ‘his motives were hard-nosed as well as romantic…he feared for the future of the race’, there have been those who have questioned to which this was a true aim of Disraeli. This is emphasised by the recollections of Cross, Disraeli’s Home Secretary, who recalled ‘from all his speeches, I had quite expected that his was full of legislative schemes, but that did not prove to be the case; on the contrary, he had to entirely rely on the various suggestions of his ministers… there was some difficulty in framing the Queen’s speech’. The fact that Disraeli did not have specific ideas about the reform program when he came to power in 1874could suggest that his aim to improve the condition of the nation was not so important to Disraeli as to filter through to his planning in any specific detail a legislative program. This is reasserted by Smith, who says ‘not only was Disraeli without a definite policy in 1874, he was also virtually incapable of constructing one’.
Although there were some examples of effective legislations which did improve the condition of the people, as Walton says ‘only the revision of the labour laws was straightforwardly successful’. This is arguably because the Conservatives were so concerned with finding the balance of support between different social groups, all of whom had different requirements which they wanted the social reform to be achieved. This meant that the effectiveness of the reforms program was severely limited, which means that they were unable to truly achieve Disraeli’s aim of improving the condition of the people.
Another reason why the reforms were limited in effectiveness in fulfilling Disraeli’s aims was that they only really lasted for two years, from 1874 to 1876. After that Disraeli became increasingly involved in foreign policy, and his domestic legislation suffered as a result. This could demonstrate the fact that Disraeli was not ever fully committed to social reform, as Eric Evans has remarked it is difficult to identify any of Disraeli’s policies from his pre-election speeches. This may be because Disraeli did not, as has been claimed by Cross, plan any of his legislative program before coming to office, instead relying on his ministers to form the detailed policies themselves. In the lead up to the election, Disraeli relied much on his impressive oratorical skills, and characteristically did not concern himself overly with the detailed planning of his promised legislative program. This resulted, according to Smith, that ‘the government of 1874-6 did not posses and never attempted to develop a domestic policy’. This relates to Smith's conclusion that the reforms of Disraeli were ‘dictated by the pressures and circumstances of the hour’. This shows Disraeli’s lack of interest in domestic reform, but as it was recognised as important and useful in terms of gaining and retaining the support of various groups in society.
Whilst Disraeli did have a genuine desire to improve the quality of living for the nation in his domestic reforms, the nature of his other two main aims made it difficult for him to achieve this. The desires of the landed classes and the working classes were so diverse that Disraeli’s desire to please them both simultaneously seriously affected the effectiveness of the legislation, meaning that it was impossible for all of his aims to be fulfilled through his legislative program of 1874-6. Although Blake does say that ‘the social measures passed in 1874-80 did do something to make the lot of the urban masses less unhappy, less precarious and less unhealthy’, it is important to remember that there were serious limitations to the legislation. But is did represent the most substantial implementation in domestic reform on the nineteenth century, and did go some way to improve the quality of life for many, as it became the basis for some future reforms. It also represents the best effort at social reform considering the mood of the time and the relative disinterest of Disraeli in the policies themselves. So to an extent Disraeli did indeed succeed in his aim to improve the condition of the nation. However he did not achieve such relative success in his other two aims. As was stated by Smith ‘social legislation alone could not win the masses for the Conservative party’. This can be perhaps best shown in the fact that the Conservative lost the election of 1880, thus showing that by trying to endear the Conservatives to both the working and landed classes, Disraeli satisfied too few and led the voters instead to the Liberals. So whilst the success of the reforms themselves can be seen, Disraeli was not successful in maintaining the level of support he had sought in his program of reforms.
P. Smith, ‘Disraelian Conservatism and Social Reform’, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1967
Disraeli speaking in the commons, 1875
Blake, Disraeli, University Paperback, London, 1966
J Walton, ‘Disraeli’, London, 1990
P. Smith, ‘Disraelian Conservatism and Social Reform’, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1967
Blake, Disraeli, University Paperback, London, 1966
P. Smith, ‘Disraelian Conservatism and Social Reform’, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1967
Patterson, Liberalism and Conservatism 1846-1905, Heinemann, Bristol, 2001
Zetland, The letters of Disraeli to Lady Bradford and Lady Chesterfield, i, June 29, 1875
P. Smith, ‘Disraelian Conservatism and Social Reform’, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1967
Blake, Disraeli, University Paperback, London, 1966
Quoted from Disraeli located in: P. Smith, ‘Disraelian Conservatism and Social Reform’, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1967
Blake, Disraeli, University Paperback, London, 1966
Norton and Aughey, Conservatives and Conservatism, London, 1981
P. Smith, ‘Disraelian Conservatism and Social Reform’, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1967
P. Smith, ‘Disraelian Conservatism and Social Reform’, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1967
P.R Ghosh ‘Disraelian Conservatism: A financial approach’, English Historical Review, 1984
John Walton, ‘Disraeli’, Routledge, London, 1990
J Walton, ‘Disraeli’, London, 1990
Cross, ‘A political history’, 1903
P. Smith, ‘Disraelian Conservatism and Social Reform’, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1967
J Walton, ‘Disraeli’, London, 1990
P. Smith, ‘Disraelian Conservatism and Social Reform’, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1967
P. Smith, ‘Disraelian Conservatism and Social Reform’, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1967
Blake, Disraeli, University Paperback, London, 1966
P. Smith, ‘Disraelian Conservatism and Social Reform’, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1967