Popper (cited in Thornton et al, 2009) sees contradiction between the notion of science and the inductive process. Science views the world in terms of problems that need solving, induction in terms of generalisations that require proving. Popper believes a scientist must try to overcome the difficulties in gaining true knowledge of reality, by achieving scientific research. Induction is problematic for Popper because of Popper’s belief that observation – the initial stage of induction – is not value free. Any observation is laden with the scientist’s pre-conceived notions and wishful thinking, and thus the theory formed will be a result of preconceptions from what has been observed (cited in Arnold et al, 1998), and with enough manipulation, even if unintentional, corroborating ‘evidence’ for a theory can be found to suit the goal of the scientist (Popper, 1974, cited in Miller, 1983).
Popper (1972) sought to improve on this model of induction. The structure of creating a theory through induction is: first, observations of particular variables are made, upon which generalisations are based. A theory is then created which is based on the observed phenomena that tried to explain the relationship/s between the variables. The theory will offer predictions about the behaviour of the observed variables in the future. Popper (1974, cited in Miller 1983) offers as an example of induction and its flaws with a scenario in which a scientist observes white swans repeatedly, and does not ever encounters swans that are not white. This leads the scientist to create a hypothesis based on a generalisation, that all swans are white. There is the implied prediction, also, that all swans will always be white. This would be a reasonable hypothesis to offer, based on the scientist’s experience and because this hypothesis can be tested by observing swans. The observation of just one non-white swan will completely disprove the hypothesis. This is, therefore, a scientific statement by Popper’s standards.
However, despite the possibility of falsification of an inductive hypothesis, Popper believes it is flawed because he believes it to be too easy to find evidence that will corroborate any hypothesis. He explains this in relation to the swan-hypothesis by stating that if the scientist were to be shown a swan that was not white, the claim could be made that the theory has not been negated, but rather that the non-white swan would likely be a different, if similar, species to the white swan. This sort of reaction, by stripping the hypothesis from the falsifiability it once possessed, diverts the scientist from achieving true knowledge (Popper 1974, cited in Miller 1983). Without the possibility of the falsification of a theory, its hypotheses become “acts of faith” (Fife-Schaw, 2000, p. 357), and renders the theory tautological: the definitions of a swan includes the colour white, creating a circularity that sets up the theory to only predict future events to resemble past events (Haralambos et al, 2004).
Another reason for the high regard that Popper’s work has garnered is because it made a significant mark on the development of the social sciences. By bravely disregarding or criticising very popular and respected theories of his time, such as Karl Marx’s theory on history, and the work of John Stuart Mill on ‘psychologism’ (also people like Freud and Adler, and theories and concepts such as induction and empiricism) along with on the interpretation and justification of social studies as scientific, Popper’s criticisms turned longstanding notions on their heads. An example of Popper’s challenge to the popular ‘scientific’ theories is his criticism of Marxism. Despite a short spell as a self-described Marxist, and perhaps as a result of it, Popper soon turned on Marxism and came to see it as a ‘pseudo-science.’ Popper (1974, cited in Miller, 1983) employed his tack on demarcation to show that the working Marxist approach in his day actually failed to allow for any possibility of circumstance in which his hypotheses could be tested and proven wrong. Using his method of falsification, Popper shows that although early Marxism, specifically Marx’s own work, had more solid scientific ground than later ‘versions’ of Marxism (in accordance with his own model), it was unable to make an accurate and precise prediction regarding the occurrence of a proletariat revolution against the bourgeoisie. Even more offensively to Popper were the ad-hoc adaptations of Marxism that Marx’s successors created and allowed for to validate unforeseen phenomena that may falsify the original hypotheses. These types of alteration rendered Marxism even harder to falsify than before, and therefore stripped it of scientific merit (Gorton, 2006).
Winch’s (1958, p. 71) efforts to show that the social sciences are not science, have, despite the polarised views, been aided by Popper’s objections to Mill’s attempts to describe “the findings of history as ‘empirical laws of society’, rather than as statements of trends” (italics in quoted text). Mill (no year, cited in Winch, 1958) made a case that trends in history can be explained in terms of allocating them to scientific law. Popper (1957, cited in Winch 1958) believed this to be false and insufficient, stating that the formation of any trends in history is rooted to “a set of specific initial conditions” (Winch, 1958, p. 92). Popper also attacks Mill’s work on ‘psychologism’ with the argument that for a psychologist to refer to their experience of their own mental processes, though understandable, is not enough to predict future behaviour. In order for this to be acceptable to Popper, the theory must still be testable and falsifiable (Winch, 1958). Popper’s bold criticisms of such respected works are crucial to the impact and significance of his work, because his views have been utilised and expanded on for the purpose of getting closer to truth in researching within the social sciences.
Popper’s work is not without its flaws: Falsification has been criticised for disallowing anomalies, as science, in practice, must take into account anomalies, and by doing so allows for theories to be expanded and improved on. Problems have been raised (Latakos, 1970 cited in Thornton, 2009) regarding the truth of the variables that could falsify a theory. Popper’s method of demarcation has been scrutinised for involving a priori of the existence of infallible ways in which to falsify or corroborate a theory. Winch (1958) believes that the near-obsession with deciding if a theory is scientific or not can distract from the most important goal of finding truth.
The very existence of these carefully considered criticisms suggests the importance of Popper’s work. Science is said to ‘build on the shoulders of giants.’ Popper’s work has been built on and learned from to such an extent, that in the context research and philosophy of science he is, unquestionably, one of the proverbial giants. Such considerations of his work and attempts to improve on his theories fall in line with Popper’s own attitude toward constructing good scientific theories for the purpose of seeking truth. Research is such a crucial aspect for the study of human behaviour, and Popper had a very distinct role in shaping the critical and (now generally considered) scientific nature of social science research.
Word count: 1536.
References:
Arnold, N. S. and Benditt, T. M. and Graham, G. (1998) (eds.) Philosophy: Then and Now, Oxford, Blackwell Publishers Ltd.
Fife-Schaw, C. (2000) ‘Bivariate Statistical Analyses’ in Breakwell, G. M. and Hammond, S. and Fife-schaw, C. (eds.), Research Methods in Psychology, (2nd ed.), London: SAGE Publications, Ltd.
Gorton, W. A. (2006) Karl Popper and the social sciences, Albany, State University of New York Press.
Popper, Karl (1983) [1974] 'The Problem of Demarcation' in Miller, David (ed) A Pocket Popper. Glasgow: Fontana.
Popper, K. R. (1935, 2002) The Logic of Scientific Discovery, London, Routledge.
Popper, K. R. (1972) Objective Knowledge: An Evolutionary Approach, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Thornton, S. (2009) Karl Popper [online], Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy, California, Stanford University, available at: http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/popper/[accessed April, 2010].
Winch, P. (1958) The Idea of a Social Science and its Relation to Philosophy, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.
