Each of the four major powers had their own motives in the peace settlements after the Napoleonic Wars.
Each of the four major powers had their own motives in the peace settlements after the Napoleonic Wars. To a certain extent restoration did occur after 1815, once Napoleon had been finally exiled, and indeed was part of the four Great Powers' aims. However it is arguable as to how far this was their primary objective. In considering whether restoration or stability was the main goal of the major powers, 'restoration' should be considered a complete return to a previous state. 'Stability' is therefore peace and an equilibrium of power and authority that would prevent further war and conflict in Europe and the wider world. Many changes and events, needing contemplation, occurred during the period under investigation. For example, revolutions, growth of a middle class (and with that nationalism and liberalism), as well as various congresses and treaties resulting in a 'Congress System' and a 'Concert of Europe'; these all indicate the priorities, either restoration or stability, of the nations and their leaders.
It is possible, as summarised by Lowe and acknowledged by many other historians including Pilbeam, to identify three core aims of the great powers, after the Napoleonic wars, at the Congress of Vienna in 1815. These were, to make the French pay for their misdeeds, further their own interests, that 'rulers expelled by Napoleon were to be restored ... as the best guarantee of peace and stability ... with principle of "legitimacy"'1 and with this the prevention any aggression in the creation of a 'Balance of power' where 'no single nation was either able or willing to make a bid for dominance'2; therefore a guarantee of peace and stability. Yet which was the main issue? It initially appears that peace and stability dominated the agenda of the great powers, although what about beyond 1815?
The creation of the 'Balance of Power' was indeed a method to maintain stability in Europe. It has been argued that these congresses and the equilibrium of power where merely to maintain the restored monarchies in their place, yet this is obviously not so as the congresses [Vienna (1815), Aix-la-Chapelle (1818), Troppau (1820), Laibach (1821), Verona (1822), and St. Petersburg (1822)] also focused upon revolutions and other non-domestic and international threats. Even if the only aim of the 'devices'3 was to sustain the restored monarchies, then this in itself surely is the maintaining of stability. Indeed 'The object of these meetings was, the document [the Second Treaty of Paris] says, "to consult upon their common interests and to consider the measures ... considered the most salutary for the repose and prosperity of nations, and for the maintenance of the peace of Europe"'4. The many congresses show a turn for wanting, and attempts at achieving stability, as simple restoration unquestionably could have been undertaken in a single meeting. Yet the desire (under Article VI of the Quadruple Alliance) of the major powers to meet at later dates shows a commitment to discussion rather than war to resolve problems and disputes that would arise.
There was indeed, also a 'widespread fear of revolution ... [as well as]... war'5 that had to be discussed at the congresses. The revolutions during the period 1815-1848 failed as Gentz admits the: ''wider object' of the peacemakers was to contain the 'restlessness of the masses and the disorders of our time''6. This was due to the fact '... all statesmen feared that the French revolution was still a powerful influence...'7. This inspired a '...unity of the powers in the face of revolution' and so therefore 'suppressed'8 the revolutions. The great powers also recognised the power of the ...
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There was indeed, also a 'widespread fear of revolution ... [as well as]... war'5 that had to be discussed at the congresses. The revolutions during the period 1815-1848 failed as Gentz admits the: ''wider object' of the peacemakers was to contain the 'restlessness of the masses and the disorders of our time''6. This was due to the fact '... all statesmen feared that the French revolution was still a powerful influence...'7. This inspired a '...unity of the powers in the face of revolution' and so therefore 'suppressed'8 the revolutions. The great powers also recognised the power of the new movements, for example Liberalism, and these could not just be ignored. 'The rulers may have been the same... but their countries were often much changed'9. This is, therefore, evidence that restoration did not and could not occur fully. The populations of some countries liked these new ideas. It seems only Britain and was willing to reform, for example in 1832, and so as a consequence seemingly avoided revolutions as the population was conciliated under what we see today as the British tradition of 'gradualism'. As a means of stability, the 'Great Powers [had a] desire for... order within states as well as between states'10.
In the restoration of the Bourbons in France, we can see that the great powers did consider the reappointment of dynasties and did not just impulsively restore the monarchs as presumably would have been the case if restoration was the main aim of the great powers as: 'The Allied governments were in accord that it should be a monarch [that replaced Napoleon], but the return of the Bourbons was far from clear-cut'11. Indeed the Comte de Provence was moderate and 'seemed to offer some guarantees [to maintain stability], but his heir ... was a strident anti-revolutionary ultra-royalist...'12. Indeed, the Comte de Provence was restored to be the monarch, however, differing from pre-war France, with a constitution as '...the returning Louis XVIII had agreed to a constitutional form of rule ...the Charter...'13. Therefore this was 'not a restoration'14 and '...deposed monarchs were only restored where convenient for the Allies'15. The only real autocratic restoration took place in Austria16.
It has been argued that the restoration of territory to the pre-1789 arrangement was impossible, yet this is not so. It wasn't impossible to restore the borders of 1789, yet to re-establish the borders and maintain peace and stability, however, was impossible because '...territories ...were added to restored states in order to preserve the balance of power and to build up a strong defence...'17, even if this balance of power and defence did not later occur, as so in Italy18. Indeed 'We speak of a 'restored' Europe, but this was barely perceptible on a map' as it was 'reconstructed'19 and 'Above all, there was no attempt to restore the Holy Roman Empire'20. Also 'The kingdom of the Netherlands had been created; Prussia had been strengthened in the Rhineland; ... Swiss [had declared] neutrality...; [and] Kingdom of Savoy-Sardinia had been enlarged...'21. Indeed, Anderson continues to argue that the rearrangements made in central Europe acted as checks to any aggression from countries, especially Russia, with the enlargement of Prussia, the Habsburg Empire and the new German Confederation. Therefore no argument concluding that restoration, or at any rate a territorial re-establishment, took place can endure. Territory was awarded to winners as means of 'compensation'22 and 'concessions'23 to quash any rivalries and quarrels that may have threatened stability. Indeed 'buffer states'24 surrounding states considered a threat were strengthened, for example the cordon sanitaire around France.
The ruling elites, émigrés during the war, also wanted to return and retrieve their lands and re-impose the class system. Apparently, this restoration did not occur as populations had learnt new ideas from the revolution and so felt differently towards the class system. Also liberalism and nationalism, regarded as an impediment to stability, began to become popular. Many of the estates destroyed by the revolution were never fully recovered: 'the French nobility lost ... 5 per cent of its property'25. Again, therefore, not full restoration.
The attitude of the leaders was one of peace and stability. Firstly, they are labelled 'peacemakers'26 and not 'restorers'. Each had their own individual idea of peace and stability, due to their country's circumstances, as well as a fear of threats to this. Nevertheless, it was their single unified aim to achieve these notions of secure positions. Tsar Alexander I, throughout the period, had a 'paranoiac fears of revolution'27, Metternich dubbed himself 'the chief Minister of Police in Europe'28, and Castlereagh had an '...insistence ... [For] European peace and stability...'29. We can see that the great powers were indeed interested in stability with their sustained effort to ensure peace through congresses, meetings and a number of alliances. Realistically they also sought to ensure their own place in power and that their opinion was heard, yet nevertheless this does not negate from the fact that 'The statesmen of Europe had accomplished the considerable feat of ending two decades of unprecedentedly devastating war by a peace which left no major state, not even defeated France, nursing an irreconcilable grievance [and therefore were stable]'30. This is also seen in the way that the Quadruple Alliance was made the Quintuple Alliance to accommodate France. A mutual war weariness also added to the push for stability and peace: 'The turbulence and costs [of war] ... caused conservatives and liberals alike to opt as far as possible for peace and stability, underpinned by such devices as varied as the Concert of Europe or free-trade treaties.'31. It was certainly '...a peace based, understandably, on fear'32.
Although restoration did occur it was merely a partial return to pre-war Europe. The great powers did not 'put the clock back'33 and furthermore this was not the main aim of the major powers. However this partial return to 1789 Europe, in itself, does not indicate that restoration was not the key aim of the Great Powers as they may have merely not achieved it. Yet still, the evidence indicates that with, many territorial borders changed, the existence of constitutions and 'legitimacy' (in the place of divine right), and the suppression of revolutions, threats and opposition to order, that restoration could not have been the main aim of the major nations. The sheer number of treaties and the organisation of the 'Concert of Europe' and the 'States System' stand alone to indicate the great powers' eagerness to co-operate, discuss and maintain peace and stability. Restoration was undoubtedly desired, yet simply as a tool for maintaining stability and as there was little alternative: 'rulers expelled by Napoleon were to be restored ... as the best guarantee of peace and stability ...'34. Indeed 'The prime concerns of government in the post-1815 decades were with domestic stability...'35 and threats to this stability, revolutions and new ideologies, were indeed dealt with. While monarchs were indeed restored, they were restored to altered thrones, realms and subjects. Therefore restoration of dynasties did occur, yet only if it would result in adding to the stability, and the maintaining of a 'Balance of Power' in Europe. Therefore the events of 1815 to 1848 do undeniably bear out the judgement: 'Stability not restoration was the goal of the great powers in 1815'.
Bibliography:
M. S. Anderson, The Ascendancy of Europe 1815-1914 (London, 2nd Ed., 1985)
C. M. Andrews, The Historical Development of Modern Europe 1815-50 (London, 1896)
G. de Berthier de Sauvigny, Metternich and his Times (London, 1962)
F. R. Bridge and R. Bullen eds., The Great Powers and the European States System1815-1914 (London, 1980)
N. Davies, Europe: A History (London, 1997)
P. Kennedy, Rise and Fall of the Great Powers (London, 1988)
S. J. Lee, Aspects of British Political History 1914-1995 (London and New York, 1996)
J. Lowe, The Concert of Europe: International Relations 1814-70 (London, 1990)
N. Lowe, Mastering Modern British History (London, 3rd Ed., 1998)
J. Merriman, A History of Modern Europe Volume Two (New York and London, 1996)
S. Miller, Mastering Modern European History (London, 2nd Ed., 1998)
P.M. Pilbeam, 'The 'Restoration' of western Europe', in Themes in Modern European History 1780-1830 ed. P.M. Pilbeam (London, 1995) pp. 107-124.
H. G. Schenk, The Aftermath of the Napoleonic Wars (New York, 1967)
J. Sperber, Revolutionary Europe 1780-1850 (London, 2000)
N. Lowe, Mastering Modern British History Third Edition, (London, 1998) p.33
2 P. Kennedy, Rise and Fall of the Great Powers (London, 1988) p. xxviii
3 Ibid., p.143
4 C. M. Andrews, The Historical Development of Modern Europe 1815-50 (London, 1896) pp. 119-120
5 M. S. Anderson, The Ascendancy of Europe 1815-1914 (London, 2nd Ed., 1985) p. 2
6 F. R. Bridge and R. Bullen eds., The Great Powers and the European States System1815-1914 (London, 1980) p. 28
7 S. J. Lee, Aspects of British Political History 1914-1995 (London and New York, 1996) p. 38
8 F. R. Bridge and R. Bullen eds., The Great Powers and the European States System1815-1914 (London, 1980) p. 37
9 P.M. Pilbeam, 'The 'Restoration' of western Europe', in Themes in Modern European History 1780-1830 ed. P.M. Pilbeam (London, 1995) pp. 113
0 J. Lowe, The Concert of Europe: International Relations 1814-70 (London, 1990) p. 22
1 P.M. Pilbeam, 'The 'Restoration' of western Europe', in Themes in Modern European History 1780-1830 ed. P.M. Pilbeam (London, 1995), pp. 108
2 Ibid., pp. 108
3 J. Sperber, Revolutionary Europe 1780-1850 (London, 2000) p.333
4 P.M. Pilbeam, 'The 'Restoration' of western Europe', in Themes in Modern European History 1780-1830 ed. P.M. Pilbeam (London, 1995) pp. 116
5 Ibid., pp. 109
6 J. Sperber, Revolutionary Europe 1780-1850 (London, 2000) p.339
7 C. M. Andrews, The Historical Development of Modern Europe 1815-50 (London, 1896) p. 93
8 J. Lowe, The Concert of Europe: International Relations 1814-70 (London, 1990) p. 23
9 F. R. Bridge and R. Bullen eds., The Great Powers and the European States System1815-1914 (London, 1980) p. 28
20 P.M. Pilbeam, 'The 'Restoration' of western Europe', in Themes in Modern European History 1780-1830 ed. P.M. Pilbeam (London, 1995) pp. 109.
21 M. S. Anderson, The Ascendancy of Europe 1815-1914 (London, 2nd Ed., 1985) p. 1
22 P.M. Pilbeam, 'The 'Restoration' of western Europe', in Themes in Modern European History 1780-1830 ed. P.M. Pilbeam (London, 1995) pp. 109
23 F. R. Bridge and R. Bullen eds., The Great Powers and the European States System1815-1914 (London, 1980) p. 6
24 J. Lowe, The Concert of Europe: International Relations 1814-70 (London, 1990) p. 23
25 P.M. Pilbeam, 'The 'Restoration' of western Europe', in Themes in Modern European History 1780-1830 ed. P.M. Pilbeam (London, 1995) pp. 118
26 F. R. Bridge and R. Bullen eds., The Great Powers and the European States System1815-1914 (London, 1980) p. 28 and J. Lowe, The Concert of Europe: International Relations 1814-70 (London, 1990) p. 17
27 M. S. Anderson, The Ascendancy of Europe 1815-1914 (London, 2nd Ed., 1985) p. 5
28 G. de Berthier de Sauvigny, Metternich and his Times (London, 1962) pp. 75-76
29 J. Lowe, The Concert of Europe: International Relations 1814-70 (London, 1990) p. 28
30 M. S. Anderson, The Ascendancy of Europe 1815-1914 (London, 2nd Ed., 1985) p. 1
31 P. Kennedy, Rise and Fall of the Great Powers (London, 1988) p. 143
32 M. S. Anderson, The Ascendancy of Europe 1815-1914 (London, 2nd Ed., 1985) p. 1
33 N. Davies, Europe: A History (London, 1997) p. 762
34 N. Lowe, Mastering Modern British History Third Edition, (London, 1998) p.33
35 P. Kennedy, Rise and Fall of the Great Powers (London, 1988) p. xxviii
Nicholas Edwards Professor P. Cottrell and Dr C. Szejnman
'Stability not restoration was the goal of the great powers in 1815'. How far do the events of 1815-1848 bear out this judgement?
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