Gandhi and the Partition of India". New Delhi: Sterling Publishers Private Ltd. 1984.

Throughout the chapters dealing with Gandhi’s reaction to external plans and proposals, including the Rajagopalachari formula and the Cabinet Mission Plan, Chaudhri paints a pious and harmonious picture of Gandhi.  Chaudhri suggests that Gandhi extended every opportunity to unite Muslims and Hindus.  Moreover, he goes on to say that it was Gandhi’s perusal of equal representation of Muslims in the Congress that kept unity and understanding amongst Muslim-Hindu ties in the early stages of the nationalist movement.  However Chaudhri does not mention the fact that Gandhi utilized solely Hindu-Indian symbols in his nationalist campaign for an independent India.  Although he mentions that Gandhi realized the fear of Muslims with regard to representation and equal rights, he fails to explain Gandhi’s alienating propaganda while simultaneously preaching “unity in diversity” of religions.  In another instance Chaudhri represents Gandhi as an effective leader in maintaining Hindu-Muslim solidarity of nationhood.  He explains that when Gandhi was less influential in the Congress, the idea of partition increased, further developing into reality.  Although he mentions Gandhi’s acceptance of the Rajagopalachari formula, which basically recognizes the need for a Muslim homeland, Chaudhri argues that Gandhi did not believe that it would contribute to the polemics of partitioning India.

On the other hand Jinnah is presented as an opportunist that seizes every chance he gets to secure independence from India.  Chaudhri begins by describing Jinnah as once being a believer in Gandhi’s ideals of Hindu-Muslim unity.  According to Chaudhri, the distrust and tension that continued to build-up between Muslims and Hindus polarized Jinnah in adopting Iqbal’s “Two-Nation Theory.”  With this new campaign on the frontlines for an independent state, Jinnah vigorously appealed to the masses of Muslims throughout India (particularly North-West Frontier provinces) to unite together for the establishment of Pakistan.  Chaudhri suggests that Jinnah took advantage of Gandhi’s openness and tolerance, to further his agenda while gaining the support of the British by playing them off the Congress’s refusal to assist in the War efforts.  He discredits Jinnah’s ability to mobilize support by continuously focusing on Gandhi’s arduous endeavors for an independent India and preventing partition.  Chaudhri makes Jinnah out to be a stubborn, uncooperative, self-serving figure blemishing any real effort Gandhi made to keep India united.

Although I tend to disagree with Chaudhri’s broad generalizations and judgments of Gandhi and Jinnah, I agree with his explanation for the victory of the League in the north-western provinces of India and Bengal—winning the support of the majority of Muslims.  Prior to the elections of 1946, Sikandar’s Unionist Party (also Muslims) dominated the political sphere amongst Muslims in the greater Punjab area, and Fazl-ul-Huq’s Krishak Praja Party in Bengal.  Jinnah was not popular amongst either group, and in fact the League had a hard time participating in any political activity in those areas.  However, as Chaudhri explains, after the death of the charismatic Sikandar, the Unionists were left with weak political leadership, and in Bengal division amongst other Muslim groups enabled Jinnah to arise as a popular voice for Muslims.  The failure of the Congress to bring Muslims into their fold when sentiments leaned toward a united India also contributed to the ripeness of the majority of Muslims for a powerful and charismatic leader to take the reigns.

Although Chaudhri’s analysis of the partition and Gandhi’s role in it tends to adopt a biased tone, I consider it a viable source in considering the reasons for the partition.  Nevertheless, it fails to include vital and imperative evidence for either his claims of Gandhi’s super heroism, or rather the counter balance of his inability to address a splitting nation.  His portray of British and Muslim participation in the partition, and Gandhi’s more than favorable outlook on both, takes away the scholastic credibility of this book as a source on Gandhi’s role in the partition.