Gorbachev was entirely responsible for the collapse of the GDR - To what extent is this accurate?

To again fit the GDR into the broader spectrum for change across Eastern Europe, one can discern that the Age of Communists was dying out, and ‘those who ran the Soviet satellite regimes had lost their faith in their own systems, or had never had it.’ On 2nd May 1989, the barbed wire and divides between Hungary and Austria were beginning to be broken down. In this context, the GDR has been seen as merely part of a process of disintegration in the Eastern block, its reasons for collapse being altogether reliant on external factors, including, though not limited to, Gorbachev.

 Elizabeth Pond makes the contention that ‘It was not the case, as it is popularly assumed, that changes were ordered either by Big Brother Gorbachev, or by Big Brother West Germany.’ I would be inclined to support this, and state that external events only really provided the catalyst for change. A notable example of this extends to ‘…the changes in Hungary which were to prove the proximate cause of the East German revolution’, as the opening of its border triggered further mass emigration, which East Germany’s weak economy and failing leadership could not overcome.

I would thus dispute the accuracy of the view that ‘Gorbachev was entirely responsible for the collapse of the GDR’, and instead underline the significance of underlying, internal factors in providing the necessary preconditions for revolutionary change.  

In this context, Maier highlights the economic and political reasoning behind the end of the GDR, and consequently negates the opinion that Gorbachev is exclusively accountable, as ‘For the first time East Germany had an obvious economic crisis it could no longer deny.’ Long-term economic problems, dating to post-war devastation, worsened by reparations, and Ulbricht’s plans for economic reform, which ‘strained the economy to breaking point’, are central to this analysis, as ‘There was a failure to develop an adequate long-term plan.’ During the 1970s and 1980s, East European communist states were suffering economic failures and eventually bankruptcy. Such economic inferiority and massive debt weakened the central power of the USSR, and made people look to alternatives to the collapsing Communist system. A lack of raw materials, which forced reliance on imports, meant a distinct vulnerability to changes and problems in the world market. The 1973 oil crisis, though apparently beneficial to the USSR as a large oil producer, actually proved destructive, ‘postponing the need for economic reform’, and thus compounding problems for Gorbachev. This shows why the economic system, and Communism throughout Eastern Europe did not collapse until 1989. This fragile situation worsened in the 1980s by the shift in attention towards technological means of production, for instance the chemical industry and computers, areas in which the GDR was extremely backwards. Also, by this time, the GDR was in even greater foreign debt as Honecker’s ‘unity of economic and social policy’ failed, productivity was too low, and plans for rapid modernisation were unreachable. By October 1989, the GDR ‘had accumulated a foreign debt of 49 billion “valuta marks” ($26.5 billion)’. Economic and industrial progress degenerated drastically when the USSR withdrew, as the GDR had relied so heavily upon it. Trade competition from Asia and financing defence and army also expensive, and induced debts, loans and much discontent, showing how ‘…political turmoil had many of its roots in economic dissatisfaction’.

Fulbrook attributed the GDR’s course to ‘the political realities, rather than the constitutional provisions’. In doing so, another creditable challenge to the accuracy of the view that ‘Gorbachev was entirely responsible for the collapse of the GDR’ is posed. Principally, the leadership’s failure to react to the circumstances can be blamed for the collapse, as they were aging, stubborn and increasingly incapable, harbouring outdated visions of a socialist regime. Many who perceived this as a sign of selfish dictators consumed with infighting, and refusing to pass on power resented them. The fact that the leaders isolated themselves in rumoured luxury in Wandlitz, also generated hostility at the leadership of the GDR, and by association towards the entire fabric of the East German Communist state. The SED flatly refused reforms, ignoring both domestic protest and economic instability, and developments east of the GDR. On May 7th 1989, another anger-provoking blunder by the SED took place as they falsified the election results, leading to an increased rate of demonstrations etc. Even more responsibility for the collapse of the GDR can thus be attributed to the SED in light of the demonstration of the 7th October 1989, which they ignored, and continued the military show commemorating the 40th anniversary of the GDR. The SED was guilty of misjudged responses as well, using violence against peaceful demonstrations. A foremost example of this was the September 1987 mass march for freedom, the first allowed in East Germany. Instead of contemplating the blatant warning signs, the SED fatefully attempted to backtrack and repress opposition, and in the process only fortified resistance. Throughout 1989, demonstrations (e.g. 13th February, Dresden for human rights, and regular protests in Leipzig) were oppressed and Honecker even spoke of the longevity of the Berlin Wall. Krenz, his successor, proved just as unpopular, and equally unable to deal with the snowballing opposition movements. The executive was too far removed from the situation all along, by the time they reacted by visiting Leipzig on 13th October, it was too late. Other practical issues of crime and corruption also signalled the failings of communism.

As Maier identifies, ‘East Germany’s claim to statehood was always in question’, in other words its existence was constantly undermined by its lack legitimacy, which prevented its long-term viability and workability.  The regime consisted also of certain inherent contradictions, which had a destabilising effect, particularly the fact that there was societal equality without the political equivalent to complement it. Amongst the GDR’s shortcomings was its failure to establish a separate national identity, and this is pertinent in the context of the collapse of the GDR. Certain events in the latter stages of the 1980s highlighted the common German identity, and thus undermined the foundation of the GDR with the anniversary of Martin Luther in 1983, and the 750th anniversary of Berlin in 1987.

Another fundamental problem was that the GDR was ‘based more on repression than success’ and consequently Communism’s control was too ‘superficial’. ‘The political and economic systems in the GDR – and elsewhere in the Eastern bloc – collapsed because of their own structural deficiencies, a process that was accelerated when the Soviet Union removed its protective shield.’ This exposes how internal instability is eventually brought to light. Between 1953 and 1989 there was the overriding feeling that one should accept the regime and make the best out of it and thus the population was subdued and neutralised, it seems, rather than being converted into active promotion of the regime. The Stasi was too harsh, and with the establishment of the KVP and the NVA, society took on an increasingly militaristic edge. ‘One noticeable trend in the Honecker period was the growing numbers of military, police and state security’, and since this coincided with a growth in opposition, one naturally draws parallels between them. Political repression was very significant as people lacked basic freedoms (e.g. movement / speech etc), had no right to strike, and no forum for their grievances in the undemocratic and unrepresentative regime. Even the Trade Union, FDGB, was controlled by the SED. Clearly the GDR had not managed to procure either complete conformity, or a successful removal of the opposition, and this must partly explain what became of the GDR. Such a situation was bound to backfire eventually, and it did in 1989. Totalitarian control was too high-risk and high-maintenance, and influence and stability hard to establish if repression was lessened. Conformity, amongst other things, indeed bred dissent. Thus despotism was paradoxically a reason why the regime survived for so long, and also why it fell. No ‘middle-ground’ as adopted by Gorbachev was possible with a dictatorship. The only serious opposition was repressed in June 1953, but this was nonetheless a potent symptom of the GDR’s floundering course.

In August 1961, the building of the Berlin Wall stalled the emigration movement and opposition once more. ‘On 13 August the GDR authorities started to build a wall physically dividing East from West Berlin, ostensibly to prevent ‘spies and diversionists’ from entering their capital city but in reality to prevent the collapse of the East German economy.’ Nevertheless, by 1989, the wall was not only unable to mitigate problems, but it had become a major one itself. Hence the Berlin Wall is a not insignificant aspect to the collapse of the GDR, and one could assert that although the Berlin Wall temporarily diverted a crisis, this was only a short term expedient whose ‘shelf-life’ and effectiveness would indeed be limited.

Therefore I would assert, that it was the years of built-up repression and anger, released in 1989, which holds much responsibility for causing the collapse on the GDR. However, it was new freedoms over travel given by the SED in November 1989, which ‘would become the direct catalyst for the implosion of the political system.’ These freedoms ‘…succeeded only in bringing discontent to boiling point and therefore leaving the party leadership…with only one set of alternatives: either capitulation or the opening of the wall.’

Eventually people’s anguish eroded trust in authority, and the masses were forced to find alternate means to voice dissent. This alternate culture was located in the two types of citizen movements to be mentioned below.

The emergence of domestic opposition thus holds what I would deem a large share of the responsibility for the collapse of the GDR, as ‘The combined impact of exit and voice finally brought the regime down.’

Firstly, the environmental, peace and anti-weapons movements proliferated, organised by the church and led by intellectuals. The 1980s thus saw the emergence of a serious, strong, principled opposition that united with popular mass discontent to bring down the GDR. More and more people sympathised with reformers’ demands, particularly since censorship and subjugation continued, despite appealing rhetoric from the East. Some political activity, directly challenged the division of Europe, for instance, ‘The Initiative for Peace and Human Rights’ (IFM), who’s publishing of ‘Grenzfall’ demanded unification through demilitarisation and peace. Such movements, ‘proved to be the backbone of the “revolution” in the former GDR.’ 

Secondly, the emigration movement boomed as many protested by “voting with their feet”. Instead of voicing their anger and opposition verbally, they fled into Western Germany as a visible sign of their resentments. This had serious economic ramifications, as those who fled were mainly young, skilled and educated workers, and this worsened the labour shortage. The situation was worsened by the opening of the Hungarian borders, and in this respect, ‘…Helmut, Kohl and Genscher took the initiative and can be credited with decisive action contributing to the collapse of the GDR.’ Opposition became increasingly determined and demanding as they grew in size and strength and as the government faltered, delivering meagre reforms. Opposition movements ‘undermined the cultural hegemony of the SED by the introduction of new and competing values and the reinterpretation of party principles.’ 

However, what caused this discontent and resulting unrest? Aside from the aforementioned political repression, ‘standards of living stagnated and popular discontent increased.’ Therefore grievances over poverty, food shortages, poor housing conditions, lack of consumer goods and the fact that the best products were exported were prevalent, and the very fact that the GDR was failing in its social aspects also lessened trust and confidence in socialism. The desire for peace, travel and human rights, and opposition to nuclear weapons and military service, additionally created the necessary preconditions for civil revolution. Moreover, ‘The continued reductions in those permitted to enter universities, the lack of upward mobility, and the selective use of material privileges…furthered feelings of depravation and disillusionment.’ The Berlin wall was also highly psychologically damaging, in its visual presence, and what it stood for – especially the forbidden freedom of movement. All this upset accumulated over time, and worsened when details of prosperous conditions in the West became known, as the GDR could compare itself and realise its deficiencies. ‘While the GDR made economic progress…it was clear to East Germans that the West of the country offered greater wealth, freedom, more consumer goods and wages with more purchasing power.’ Thus increased communications between ordinary people in East and West during the 1970s and 80s hastened the collapse. The opening of Intershops with West German goods not only contributed to everyday frustration as East Germans lacked acceptable currency to purchase the goods on offer, but also opened them further to the affluence of the West, and led them to question their poverty, and the entire basis of their own regime.

Diametrically opposed to the argument that ‘Gorbachev was entirely responsible for the collapse of the GDR’, is the suggestion of the inevitability of collapse. Though one must remember that collapse was unexpected, Maier’s suggestion that unification, a natural successor of collapse, was always on the cards, must also be considered. ‘Soviet policy at the Potsdam Conference envisaged the eventual re-emergence of a unified but hopefully compliant Germany’ and consequently had the intention for it to happen all along. ‘The constitution, which was not ratified by popular vote, was designed to be compatible with that of the Federal Republic, providing the basis for possible future reunification.’ ‘Most western commentators would have countered that the switches were set wrong from the moment central planning was imposed in post war Eastern Europe’, and argued that socialism was impossible given the globalising setting of the 1980s, as it lacked the necessary purchasing power to break into the West.

In determining the relative importance of internal and external factors in effecting the collapse of the GDR, one has established that Gorbachev was not ‘entirely responsible’. The preliminary statement is accurate to the extent that Gorbachev facilitated the collapse. A response to financial necessity, and the changing international order (specifically the conclusion of the Cold War), led to Gorbachev liberating Eastern Europe, and ‘opening up’ the USSR itself. These actions, I would contend, triggered a proliferation of thought, and with it political dissent in the GDR, which led to mass civil activism and collapse. One can thus logically affirm that ‘…Soviet power was critical for the regime’, even if it was not exclusively responsible for its fall.

 

I would similarly categorize the events of Eastern Europe as activating, rather than causing collapse. The opening of Hungary’s border on September 11th was one such catalyst, and as Welsh examines, ‘…It was the decision by the Hungarian government to dismantle the border fortifications to the West…that set in motion unprecedented and unexpected developments’. Meanwhile East Euopean revolutions,, ‘…inaugurating the whole process of revolutionary change in eastern Europe.’

I would however argue, that it was the overriding drive of internal developments that one should more readily highlight as long term causes, as ‘Communist rule slowly floundered under the weight of economic decline and popular dissatisfaction’. Indeed, popular discontent over repression and living standards, sustained by economic weakness brought about the collapse of the GDR, through the proliferation of civil opposition. Coinciding with the context of East European rebellion, it was a fateful combination with unavoidable consequences. A certain amount of blame can undoubtedly be apportioned to the failures of the SED leadership, who underestimated popular fervour and refused change. Such mismanagement, coupled with ‘structural defects’, clarifies why the GDR so readily collapsed in 1989. ‘While the effective challenge posed to the Communist regime in 1989 was in large measure only made possible by the radical changes in the Soviet Union and its European and global policies, the character of the ‘gentle revolution’ was crucially shaped by the ways in which movements for reform had been developing in the preceding decade.’ 

‘A more satisfactory explanation for the events of 1989 can be developed from the observation that domestic and international politics are inseparably intertwined.’ Therefore, one can thus conclude that it was internal developments with an external influence, which brought about the collapse of East Germany in 1989. It was ultimately an interplay of a plethora of factors which effected the end of the GDR. Internal weakness and opposition (through ‘exit and ‘voice’) provided the necessary preconditions, whilst it took actions from above in the form of Gorbachev, to provoke underlying economic difficulties and bring the GDR regime crashing down.

Bibliography

Carr, William, A History of Germany, 1815-1990, (London, 1991).

Childs, David, The Fall of the GDR, (London, 2001)

Evans, Richard, J., Rereading German History, 1800-1996, From Unification to Reunification, (London, 1997).

Fulbrook, Mary, The Fontana History of Germany 1918 – 1990, (London, 1991).

Glaessner, Gert-Joachim, The Unification Process in Germany, From Dictatorship to Democracy, (London, 1992).

Hancock, M. Donald & Welsh, Helga, A., (eds), German Unification: Process and Outcomes, (Oxford, 1994).

Hirschman, Albert, O., ‘Exit, Voice, and the Fate of the German Democratic Republic: An Essay in Conceptual History’, World Politics, 45, (1993), pp. 173 - 202

Hobsbawm, E.J., The Age of Extremes, (London, 1994).

Lohmann, Suzanne, ‘The Dynamics of Informational Cascades: The Monday Demonstrations in Leipzig, East Germany, 1989 – 1991’, World Politics, 47, (1994), pp. 42 – 101.

Maier, Charles, S., Dissolution: The Crisis of Communism and the End of East Germany, (Chichester, 1997).

Merriman, John, A History of Modern Europe, (London, 1996).

Overy, Richard, The Times, History of the World, (????).

Pond, Elizabeth, ‘A Wall Destroyed: The Dynamics of German Unification in the GDR’, International Security, Volume 15, No 2, (Autumn 1990), pp. 35 – 66.

Thomaneck, J.K.A., & Niven, Bill, Dividing and Uniting Germany, (London, 2001).

---