Historiographical analysis of World War One

Germany began to surpass Britain in naval power and this angered the British. The second Moroccan crisis in which the German gunboat “Panther” arrived at the Moroccan port of Agadir caused further Anglo-German tension. The crisis ended badly for Germany and caused them to have some resentment towards Britain. Now that Britain saw Germany as an aggressor they began to have a close relationship with France. This led Germany to create the Scliefflen plan in order to protect itself from dual attack. Now that alliances were clearly defined, German ministers advised Austria to send an ultimatum which would “avoid the odium of attacking Serbia without warning, put her in the wrong, and thus make it easier for Rumania and Britain to preserve at least neutrality.” (Fischer p.56) Fischer believes that the ultimatum was an attempt to allow attacks on Serbia without being labeled as an aggressor. This would hopefully stop neutral countries from getting involved and allow an easier war to be fought. The ultimatum was sent and Austria was gearing up for war. Britain began to intervene and wanted to hold a conference. Fischer states that Germany’s actions during this process demonstrate they were no longer trying to avoid a continental war but rather maneuver Germany into the best position possible.

Fritz Fischer takes a radical stance with his arguments. Instead of using events and situations that occurred Fischer takes into account the thoughts of the German ministers and the strategic planning that was thought out prior to World War One. Fischer then concludes that the assassination in Bosnia was not the cause of the war, but rather a trigger that unleashed the final steps towards war. Fischer puts all the blame on Germany stating that, although they appeared reserved and peaceful, it was only a cover for their true nature. Fischer believes that Germany sought war in order to assert themselves as world powers and would use any method to accomplish it. Although one might be convinced by Fischer’s arguments, they do contain some flaws. Fischer’s main arguments have to do with German foreign policy; Fischer states that Germany sought an alliance with Britain in order to better itself in a war between Russia and France. This idea makes German foreign policy a lot more aggressive than it really was. Germany wanted an alliance with Britain for security reasons, they were surrounded by potential enemies, but did not assume that having Britain as an ally would allow them to start a war. Another problem with Fischer’s arguments is his attitude toward Germany’s alliance with Austria. When Germany gives the infamous “blank cheque” to Austria, Fischer believes that this was done in order to boost Austrian confidence and allow them to attack. This would cause a war that Germany did not personally begin, making them look less aggressive. This assumption of the alliance shows that Fischer believes Germany only used the alliance to make Austria do the ‘dirty work’. Fischer does not state that Germany was only backing up its ally in order to be truthful to its alliance. Fischer’s arguments are convincing at first glance, but a deeper interpretation shows that they are just a way to draw attention to the situation. Fischer manipulates words and actions taken by German ministers to make it look like a war is being considered. To counter Fischer’s arguments Gerhard Ritter wrote a counter to Fischer’s views in his “A New War-Guilt Thesis?”

Gerhard Ritter, another Germany historian counters Fischer’s thesis because he does not believe Fischer is telling the whole truth. Ritter begins by explaining that Fischer’s fist witness of the Berlin government was a journalist named Vikor Naumann. Naumann tried to persuade an attack on Serbia through Count Hoyos, saying even if it meant risking a European war, Serbia should be attacked. Ritter explains that Fischer portrays Austrian policy as “fundamentally peaceful oriented and only through the greatest pressure by Berlin did Austria allow herself to be pushed into war.” (Ritter p.99)

Ritter argues that Germany was not pushing Austria into war but rather supporting them in any decision made. Ritter explains that the German push for quick action was not to force a war but to deny the Serbians time for diplomatic and militaristic counter-measures. Ritter also ridicules Fischer on his explanation of German preparations and action before the war.

When Fischer explains that the German army was ready at a moments notice to mobilize for war, Ritter counters this by saying that there were no actions taken to prepare for war, the preparations Fischer argued about was a yearly plan that was reviewed every spring. Ritter concludes by explaining that Fischer misinterpreted many aspects and thus his conclusion was based on several false facts. Ritter states that Germany’s main goal was to preserve its alliance with Austria. They were not planning a war, nor did they want one to occur for personal gain. Ritter explains that Germany had the same ambitions and traits as any other country at that time and should not have been held singularly responsible for the war. 

The final historian Konrad Jarausch, used the actions taken by Germany’s fifth Chancellor, Theobald von Bethmann Hollweg, to illustrate that the war was indeed planned on a much smaller scale but when it began, those who created it lost control and it became something they did not imagine possible.  Jarausch argues that Hollweg planned a war, but not the war that occurred. Jarausch describes Hollweg as an optimistic politician that hoped a conflict would bring Germany forward. Jarausch focuses heavily on the failed alliance talks with Britain, stating that the whole war could have been avoided if an alliance was conceived between Germany and Britain. “It could only have been avoided by a rapprochement with England that is still my conviction. But after we had decided for a [common] policy with Austria, we could not desert her in such danger.” (Jarausch p. 48) The fact that the alliance did not occur had left Germany with only one decision, which was to back up Austria despite its decision. Hollweg puts blame on himself for leading the German people to war. Hollweg still believed that although he took a big risk with his pre-war decisions that the actions taken by other countries also contributed to the conflict. Jarausch concludes by calling Hollweg a German nationalist because he took risks to benefit the German people rather than the state itself. Hollweg realized too late severity of the risk that he took and that is why he allowed Germany to enter a continental war.

Taking all three historians into account gives three very different explanations of the events before the war. Although one can never be certain as to the truth of the events, the accounts of each of the historians must be considered and we must try and decipher which one is most plausible.   While Fischer raises interesting opinions and interpretations, his views are too radical. Fischer uses actions taken by Germany that were also taken by other countries and gives them a negative twist. The simple act of helping an ally out turned into a “blank cheque” that resulted in the war. Many countries at that time offered assistance to allies in case of war, but those countries were not planning war. Ritter’s argument is based on old German views. Ritter believes that the actions taken by Germany were because Germany was just being a truthful ally to Austria. While this may explain why Germany backed up Austria, it does not explain why they “pushed” them into a conflict so soon. Jarausch’s argument was that Germany was planning a war but not a continental war, and the continental war only occurred because the German ministers lost control of it. Jarausch’s argument seems most convincing. He states that Germany was planning a localized war in order to stimulate the economy. They planned the war based on British neutrality and slow Russian mobilization, when both failed they lost control and the conflict escalated toward a global war. This analysis takes into account Germany’s pre-war actions without portraying them as an aggressive war driven country.

The historical debate over the origins of World War One will continue on for many years. Many ideas and interpretations will be formed, and the cause of the war will be debated. Examining the views of historians allows individuals to interpret the information from different stances and develop their own opinions as the true causes of World War One.