How far must we consider the Norman Conquest as a Military victory

        Of course, the battle did have some obvious connotations to the conquest; Harold Godwinson was killed along with many of his prominent Anglo-Saxon elite causing the battle to be (in the eyes of the Normans at least) a decisive event, giving William the reputation as a fierce warrior and powerful leader. In this sense it is clear to see that the beginnings of the Conquest were solely based on the Norman military prowess. To even look at the Bayeux tapestry with the  far more superior Norman knights on horseback fighting against the lesser English foot-soldiers, one can see that the Normans prided themselves on being a far more sophisticated fighting force and encouraged their military competence as a reason why they were able to overthrow the English ruling elite. Indeed, when William faced challenges to his rule later on in his reign, he would lean on the battle as a symbolic victory where God’s will enabled him to overthrow the ‘corrupt’ government of King Harold and entrust him to rule over the land with his superior might and judgement. However, it is important not to place too much emphasis at the feet of Hastings as it is clear that even though William was able to claim victory, the Anglo-Saxons “hesitated to submit” to his will and even refused to entertain him as a candidate for king. Again, it becomes clear that the conquest was increasingly due to Norman military strength, as William’s actions (including the quick fortification of Dover and the forced march upon London, which in turn meant the rapid seizure of Canterbury and Winchester) forced the chief Anglo-Saxon magnates to comply to his wishes and alerted them to the hopelessness of rallying round Edgar Atheling as a rival claimant. Cumulating with his coronation in Westminster Abbey on Christmas day (nearly a full three months since his landing at Pevensy) it can therefore be seen that (what most historians would hail as) the first stages of the Conquest were based entirely on a military victory, even if this was not chiefly centred on Hastings itself.

        It is also, however, important to look at the way in which William consolidated his power after his coronation to determine whether the victory can be placed entirely on military standards or not. It is clear that after William ascended to the throne, he set up a number of measures to accommodate his rule and to try and unify England in order to stop the countless rebellions that he was faced with in the early years of his reign. To the Anglo-Saxons, one of the most dramatic steps that he undertook was to almost revolutionize the ruling elite and replace nearly all of the Anglo-Saxon magnates that were left after the battle of Hastings, with Norman barons to assist him in the running of the country. In this sense, it can be clear that William did not wish to rely completely on his military strength to complete his conquest, but rather aim to use diplomatic tactics (albeit to varying successes) to bring stability to his new government and the country. However, this was not a quick process and took many years of negotiating and squashing rebellions to complete. William claimed that as the lawful successor of Edward the Confessor he would “preserve the ancient laws and take nothing except by due process of law” highlighting his intention to work with the people of England in order for his rule to be accepted as quickly as possible. However, because William’s lordship over England was extremely tenuous until the latter years of his reign, it was important for him to satisfy his Norman barons in order to keep their support; which he did by redistributing the lands of the former Anglo-Saxon magnates to them. When William succeeded to the throne, the lands of both the Godwin family along with those of royal property were united, making William the richest king (in terms of land) that had ever existed. As a result of this, he was able to redistribute it amongst his most prominent men. Lordships such as Richmond and Northumbria were established to bring some semblance of order to the country; even the King’s half brother, Odo bishop of Bayeux, was given so much land that he was the richest man in the country (second to only the king). Chibnall states that “lordship and tenure were of immense importance [as] they influenced almost every aspect of law and society after the Conquest” which was extremely important because the king and his lords were reliant on each other. The king needed the support of the lords to remain in power, with the claims of the Norman lords to land only being legitimate as long as William remained on the throne. Thus, a new kind of relationship was created between the king and the most powerful men in the country and one which, in theory at least, should have resulted in a shift away from a military way to complete the conquest of England. It is even clear that William was willing to work alongside those Anglo-Saxons that had not perished at Hastings or been forced into exile. Indeed, most of the survivors of the English heritage were connected with the royal administration and although few of these lasted long, “their co-operation was essential in the early years of the Conqueror’s reign for the effective running of royal government”.

        However, whilst in theory this should have led to a demilitarization of the Norman Conquest, the reality was somewhat different. Becoming discontent with the haphazard nature of the way in which land was distributed (often meaning that one could not always claim legitimate lordship over an area), many of the barons began to disagree with the king on this matter. As well as this, the king’s sometimes failing attempts to merge Norman and Anglo-Saxon families through marriage caused resentment, and often led to open rebellion; which in turn meant that the king had to increasingly rely on his military strength to regain control. In an effort to gain complete control over the country, William realized that he would have to bring the North under his influence, to both stop the constant rebellions that were occurring there at the hands of the deposed Earl of Northumbria and to also remove the threat of Danish invasion. The subsequent ‘harrying of the North’ has since been regarded as one of William’s most infamous acts and, in my opinion, one of the chief ways to highlight how he used his military strength to bring the country to heel. Even though Dalton makes a compelling case as to why historians perhaps overestimate the significance of this act, it has been considered by most to be an “act of cruelty that was never forgiven”and even lost William the support of some of his most ardent admirers because of the overdramatic and ruthless nature of it. Whilst there were other physical forces used against rebellion (such as the constant sacking of the lands of Eadric ‘the wild’), it is this devastating event which shows that the bulk of William’s power came from his fighting force and leads most historians to the conclusion that the Conquest was mainly a military victory.

        What is clear is that William could not rely solely on political diplomacy to make a success of the Conquest and establish himself as a firm leader. Due to the unsettled nature of events that followed the Norman victory at Hastings and the political unrest that followed the revolutionary changes in the ruling elite, it is clear that William had to rely heavily upon his military prowess in order to frighten the English into submission. It would have become clear to him that his policy of creating a genuine Anglo-Norman state was unrealizable and so would have been implemented by force rather than consensus. In these early years, the Normans would have been obliged to behave as an “army of occupation, fortified in their new castles to interrogate people and cow them into submission.”Golding believes that the Easter court of 1070 marked the end of the military stage of the conquest as the country was now apparently secure from internal disorder. With Norman authority now extending into Scotland and Wales, whilst there were still powerful external threats, it now appeared that the Norman Conquest was irreversible. Whilst there is a notion that William politically radicalized the country, it has also been suggested that the Anglo-Saxon kingdom was already well organised before the Normans arrived, giving William the strength of the royal administration to advance his conquest. It was not until he had secured the country using his military might that William could start on his Domesday Book; perhaps the greatest achievement of his reign. As Clanchy states; “The Conquest in all its savagery at Hastings and in the Harrying of the North provided the Normans’ power. The Domesday Book entitled them to rule [because the rights of land were now placed in a written document]”. Technically, nobody but the King had rights to England before 1066, meaning that these rights stemmed from the Conquest which was ultimately achieved using brute force and superior military might to frighten the English into submission.

Bibliography

Brown, R. Allen- ‘The Norman Conquest of England: Sources and Documents’, 1984

Chibnall, M- ‘Anglo-Norman England’, 1986

Chibnall, M- ‘The Debates on the Norman Conquest’, 1999

Clanchy, M.T- ‘England and it’s Rulers 1066-1272’, 1983

Dalton, P- ‘Conquest, Anarchy and Lordship: Yorkshire 1066-1185’, 1994

Golding, B- ‘Conquest and Colonisation: The Normans in Britain 1066-1100’, 1994

Matthew, D- ‘Britain and the Continant 1000-1300, the Impact of the Norman Conquest’, 2005

Williams, A- ‘The English and the Norman Conquest’, 1997

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