The ‘Ten Year Rule’ as it was known, stated that Britain would not be engaged in another great war during this period, therefore, ‘no expeditionary force is required for this purpose.’ This ‘rule’ led to cuts in Britain’s armed forces, cutting spending from £692 million (1919) to £115 million (1921) and this figure only began to rise in 1934. Conscription was also abolished in 1920 which cut army recruits to less than before WW1. This also implied that there was no urgency to build a major bombing fleet, so the RAF suffered cuts due to the rule. Winston Churchill decided that this rule should be renewed annually to keep spending in check. Although this was abolished due to the Manchurian crisis in 1932, Britain’s military forces could not be rebuilt due to the British involvement in the disarmament conference.
The Royal Navy was affected by the financial limitations placed on it due to international treaties such as the Washington Naval Conference in 1921-22. The London Naval Treaty updated this agreement, limiting the size and nature of the British flees for a further five years. This limit was made in the hope of preventing an arms race. However, this was economically convenient for Britain as it was unrealistic at the time for them to pursue an arms race, but this also had the effect of indicating to Germany and Japan that such was the case.
This lack of military force can be seen by the outcome of the crisis over Czechoslovakia and the Munich agreement. After the Anschluss Hitler turned his attention to Czechoslovakia and the three million Sudeten Germans. In April 1938 Chamberlain and Halifax made it clear to Daladier that they would not guarantee France or Czechoslovakia if the latter were attacked. Britain and France put pressure on Benes, the Czech President to give in to Germany. Chamberlain flew to see Hitler in a series of meetings. At Berchtesgaden Chamberlain made it clear to Hitler that Britain would accept self-determination for the Sudetenland. But Hitler wanted more than this. A week later Chamberlain flew to meet Hitler at Bad Godesberg to finalise the agreement made at Berchtesgaden. When he arrived he found that Hitler was not just asking for the Sudetenland’s right of self-determination, but was asking for the withdrawal of Czech troops from the Sudetenland and was also demanding territories on behalf of Poland and Hungary. Britain and France were reluctant to agree to these demands. Then Mussolini stepped in with the proposal for a four-power conference in Munich on the 29th September.
Chamberlain flew to meet Hitler, Mussolini and Daladier at Munich. Here Chamberlain gave into German claims for the Sudetenland. The Czechs were completely ignored by this decision, as were the Russians. For a brief moment Chamberlain was triumphant. He returned to Britain with his ‘piece of paper’ which had averted war and which promised peace between Germany and Britain in the future. On October 1st Germany took the Sudetenland, and Poland and Hungary gained the territories they had been seeking. As the weeks passed the gloss on Chamberlain’s success began to fade and when Hitler invaded the rest of Czechoslovakia in March 1939. It should be noted that in September 1938, at the height of the Munich crisis ‘Britain did not even have two fully equipped army divisions to send to France in the event of a war breaking out.’ (McDonough.F. Hitler, Chamberlain and Appeasement.) Both Chamberlain and his chiefs of staff agreed that Britain could do nothing about the situation as they were in no military position to do so as their forces were not strong enough to ‘safeguard our territory’.
Another important factor in the policy of appeasement is the destruction caused in the first World War. There were 722,000 British deaths and 1,676,000 wounded and it was felt that ‘carnage on such a scale should never be allowed to happen again.’ ‘Boxer, ‘The Domestic context’ Britain and Appeasement. It was therefore called ‘the war to end all wars’ by HG Wells, which showed the public feeling that they strongly opposed another war of such destruction.
Public opinion was an essential factor in the policy. It was strongly felt that the public wanted peace, so ultimately, Chamberlain would not have had enough support to go to war. The public were unhappy as they felt that WW1 was fought for no good reason and didn’t want war to be a solver of national disputes as they felt that this was not an effective method. They were much more in support of collective security to stop aggressors, but in the same way, against rearmament, so it would have been difficult for the Government at the time to follow exactly the public’s wants, as it is difficult to stop a potential aggressor without rearming, so as to negotiate from a position of strength.
The Abyssinian crisis in 1935 showed that the public were strongly opposed to the Italian invasion, and this feeling of hatred for war could not be ignored due to the coming of a general election. When Italian troops invaded Abyssinia in October 1935, due to Mussolini’s desire for territory in Africa, the general election’s main slogan was, ‘peace by collective security,’ therefore there was no other option but to carry out these promises, so the imposition of economic sanctions was supported by Britain against Italy. However, although their aim was to prevent war by not allowing Italy war supplies, this did not include oil, and the League of Nations took no military measures to enforce the sanctions.
The Hoare- Laval pact created an outburst of public opinion as it was felt that this betrayed the commitment to the League of Nations. This was due to the fact that it was planned that Italy should retain what she had conquered of Abyssinia already, including about a third of what she had not. However this plan failed as it was leaked to the press and it was widely felt to be a betrayal of the principles of collective security. This shows how influential a factor public opinion was on the actions of the government. It also gave a sign to Hitler that Britain and France had no intention of stopping acts of military aggression.
The Remilitarisation of the Rhineland also showed that the public did not support the removal of German troops as they felt that Germany was simply reoccupying what was rightfully hers. When, on the 7th March 1936, Hitler marched about 100 000 troops into the demilitarised zone, Baldwin said that forceful action would succeed ‘only in letting lose another great war in Europe.’ This view was supported by the public, who didn’t want to remove German troops from German territory. The Terms of the Treaty of Versailles were considered unfair so many British people sympathised with Hitler’s demands. This can be described as ‘passive’ appeasement as German foreign policy was simply accepted by the British Government and the British people.
The East Fulham by-elections showed a wish to increase defence spending, showing a wish to preserve peace. The election was a good indication of public opinion and showed a massive swing in voting against the Conservative MP who wanted to increase defence spending. The Labour Party became increasingly influential in the period from 1933 onwards mainly due to their pacifist policy on war. This shows the people’s wish to prevent and avoid war as they began to support parties whose policies reflected their own. It is also possible to see the effect of public opinion in the extracts from party manifestos at the 1935 General Election. The National Government, Labour party and Liberal Parties manifestos are all very similar, showing that they are responding to their perception of public opinion being the hope that another war would never occur. There is also strong emphasis placed on arms reduction in each of the manifestos. The Liberal party states, ‘a colossal, panic expenditure upon arms is not the road to peace.’ This is agreed by the National Government who promise ‘a general limitation of armaments by every possible means, whether by restriction of numbers or by prohibition of weapons and methods of warfare.’ And the Labour party propose ‘The complete abolition of all national air forces.’ This would especially have influence foreign policy at the time and been a factor in the appeasement of Hitler and other aggressors.
The peace Ballot of 1935 asked the public opinion on a number of issues concerning British foreign policy in the 1930’s. It concluded that the majority of the British public were in favour of an all round reduction of armaments and national military and naval aircraft. Eleven and a half million people voted in Britain, with 95% of these voting in favour of peace. This is likely to be a good representation of the views of the public as it was quite a large sample, so politicians had to take these views into account, largely explaining foreign policy in this period.
A factor interrelated to the military weakness of Britain in the economic difficulties she faced during the inter- war period. The standard of housing and healthcare in the country was very poor and the Labour party believed that this was a much more pressing issue on the country and reform needed to come before costly armaments were produced in mass. This was also influenced and worsened by the wall street crash in October 1929, leading to the Great Depression, which was a great concern for Britain.
There was a growing fear of communism so people let felt that if Hitler grew stronger in moderation, then a stronger Germany could prevent communism spreading from Russia throughout Europe. The public also felt that appeasement of Germany was the best way of preventing pushing Germany and Russia together, which could prove disastrous for Britain.
Within British politics there was a belief in the League of Nations and its role and effectiveness in solving problems in Europe so Chamberlain did not want to threaten Hitler with war. Both the National Government and the Labour party in their party manifestos in 1935 express their wish to ‘ fulfil our obligations towards the League’ which implies that the political parties appreciated that this was the general wish of much of the public. The Peace Ballot of 1935, question 1 also shows a great public support for the League as a great majority (96%) wanted Britain to remain a member of the League of nations. ‘A very large majority of British people saw the League as a better means of keeping peace in the world than military alliances backed by strong armed forces.’ ‘McDonough.F’
Chamberlain felt that some of Hitler’s demands were reasonable, and also morally justified, such as the Anschluss. Chamberlain did not take any action against Hitler when he invaded Austria as 99.7% of people voted for union with Germany, so Chamberlain felt that it was essentially right that there should be a union, even though he disagreed with Hitler’s aggressive methods of obtaining this. After 1919 the policy towards Germany was to recognise that there were a number of German speaking people outside Germany who would one day want to be part of the Reich. Therefore appeasement aimed to achieve German reunification peacefully. Britain would and could not effectively defend the new countries of Eastern Europe namely Poland and Czechoslovakia, and therefore encouraged these states to make concessions to Germany in a peaceful way.
Chamberlain misjudged Hitler, so he trusted Hitler’s promises that the Sudetenland was the last of his aims. Chamberlain had total faith in the policy and believed that eventually Hitler could be controlled. His hopes deceived him as he admitted with the outbreak of hostilities: ‘Everything that I have worked for, everything that I have hoped for, everything I have believed in during my public life, has crashed into ruins.’
In conclusion, I feel that both the military weaknesses of Britain and also the overwhelming public opinion against war very much influenced the decision to follow a policy of appeasement. Many of the issues looked at determine both that Britain was not in a militarily strong enough position to cope with taking action against aggressors, but this action would not have been supported by the British public in any case. This is exemplified by the fact that the army was initially used the ‘voluntary principle’ showing that the British people had consistently opposed conscription in peacetime. This lead to a vicious circle, as there were few trained army officers due to a lack of desire to fight, which lead to military weaknesses.
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