How relevant was the legacy or intrusion of the British Colonial Government in the Nigerian civil war between July 1967- January 1970? The investigation focuses on the developments from three main time periods: the pre-colonial era, the colonial era and t

         Nigeria was divided into four administrative units in 1940: the colony of Lagos, the northern, eastern and western provinces. This administrative division, with increased power for the colony and the provinces, was not only maintained but separateness was also strengthened and deepened by Sir Arthur Richardson’s constitution of 1946. The constitution of 1946, saw the set up of a Legislative Council for the entire country and divided the country into three regions' north, west and east, which inaugurated Nigeria’s regionalism. It however achieved a minor political breakthrough by integrating the north with the south at the legislative level for the first time, however it should not have broken it down into regions. The post second world war political awareness and upsurge of nationalism in Africa brought about the Richardson’s constitution of 1950. Political parties were formed on regional and ethnic basis. The outcome of this was obvious: full-scale regionalism. With the McPherson’s constitution of 1951, a greater measure of autonomy was granted to the regions with stronger regional legislatures.  With only residual power left to the central government, Nigeria politically took a turn for the worse, and there was a possibility of separate countries emerging out of Nigeria, a drastic change compared to the pre-colonial era. In 1953, the central cabinet split over the acceptance of a target date for securing self government with the end result of the Kano riot.  The gap between the regions widened.  For the first time the North talked openly of the possibility of secession rather than endure what they saw as humiliation. The west as well threatened to withdraw over the exclusion of Lagos in the new constitution. A federal constitution that is; a certain amount of power was given to three regional governments, Northern, Western and Eastern was proposed. 

        Due to the fact that the British allowed self-rule for so long, western influence was prominent in southern Nigeria. The northerners were apprehensive of the west minister system – a system that focused executive political power on the head of state – because despite its majority status, southerners who had already adopted this system would overshadow them. Thus, the northerners were promised that their rights would be protected. In order words, making northern Nigeria larger than the south produced a lopsided federation. However, for a working federation, there must be a no dominating side. In Nigeria, a balance could not be achieved hence the lopsided federation.

        There were constitutional conferences in 1957, 1958, and 1959 and in 1960 culminating in the granting of independence to Nigeria on October 1, 1960. It should be noted that from 1954 onwards, the political direction was constantly away from a strong center towards a formidable, almost insulation of the regional base of each major political party.  The failure of the Willink commission to recommend the creation of more states in 1958 for the Nigerian type of federalism planted the most potent seed of instability into the evolution of Nigeria as a nation in the 1950s.  All the political leaders who had strong and firm political bases in the regions fought hard for maximum powers for the regions, which weakened the center.

                                                    POST COLONIAL ERA

        The stated above colonial legacies left a newly independent Nigeria in 1960 in a west, north, south, east situation. In 1963, Nigeria became a republic with four regional governments, in which the ruling party dominated the new nation.  The new nation was elated about independence and democracy, but leery of how they would go about pacifying over two hundred ethnic groups that resided in the country Colonial legacy made different ethnic groups most especially the north and east cross part socially and politically. The biggest ethnic cross part came during the 1964 general election. The election was alleged to be neither free nor fair. The ruling parties in the regions to eliminate opponents used all devices imaginable. The Chairperson of the Electoral Commission himself admitted there was proven irregularities. The election brought up a pattern that is the domination of the northerners politically, which resulted in the constant resistance of the Igbos and the Yorubas. In 1965, disorders broke out again after the ruling political and ethnic group, the Hausa-Fulani, manipulated elections in the Western Igbo region; the igbo felt both indispensable and ill appreciated. Outraged, a coup was led by army officers belonging to the Ibo tribe. In July 1996, northern officers of the Fulani and army units staged a coup of their own in retaliation. The officer named Lieutenant Colonel Yakubu Gowon, a Christian from a small ethnic group, was a compromise candidate to head the Federal Military Government (FMG). Gowon had not been involved in the coup, but he enjoyed wide support among northern troops who subsequently insisted that he be given a position in the ruling body

        Throughout the remainder of 1966 and into 1967, the FMG sought to create a constituent assembly that would revise the constitution, and enable a return to civilian rule. Nonetheless, violence increased. In September, bloody attacks were made on the Igbo in the north by Muslim traditionalists with the aid of northern political leaders. The estimated number of deaths ranged as high as 30,000, although the figure was also estimated at 8,000 to 10,000. The four regions attempted to negotiate a return to a civilian government from September to November 1966. The military commanders and governors, including Ojukwu, met in Lagos to consider solutions to the regional strife. But they failed to reach a settlement, despite concessions offered by the northerners, because it proved impossible to guarantee the security of Igbo outside the Eastern Region.  In January 1967, the military leaders and officials met at Abauri, Ghana, at the invitation of the Ghanaian military government. By now, the Eastern Ibo Region was threatening secession. In a last-minute attempt to hold Nigeria together, the military reached an agreement that provided for a loose confederacy of regions.

        The federal civil service strongly opposed the Abauri Agreement, however in May, Gowon issued a decree implementing the Abauri Agreement. Even the Northern Region leaders, who had been the first to threaten secession, now supported a creation of a multi-state federation. Ojukwu’s government threw out the plan for reconciliation. The eastern leaders had reached a tense point in their relations with Lagos and the rest of Nigeria. Despite offers made by the FMG that met many of Ojukwu's demands, the Eastern Region Assembly voted May 26 to secede from Nigeria. In Lagos, Gowon proclaimed a state of emergency and unveiled plans for eradication of the regions, and to divide the country into twelve states. It was a highly strategic move, which pleased the eastern minorities and deprived the ‘rebellious’ Igbo’s of their control over the oil fields and access to the sea. Gowon also appointed outstanding civilians, including Awolowo, in positions in the federal and new state governments, thus increasing his political support. On May 30, Ojukwu answered the federal decree with the announcement of the independent Republic of Biafra, named after the Bight of Biafra. He cited as the major cause for this action the Nigerian government's ‘inability to protect the lives of easterners’ and suggested its liability in genocide, depicting their independence as a measure taken unwillingly after all efforts to protect the Igbo people in other regions had failed. Ojukwu justified the separation and ultimatly the war of the igbos in his Ahiara Declaration:

Our struggle has far-reaching significance. It is the latest recrudescence in our time of the age-old struggle of the black man for his full stature as man. We are the latest victims of a wicked collusion between the three traditional scourges of the black men racism, Arab-muslim expansionism and white economic imperialism... For two years we have been subjected to a total blockade. We all know how bitter, bloody and protracted the First and Second World Wars were. At no stage in those wars did the white belligerents carry out a total blockade of their fellow whites. In each case where a blockade was imposed, allowance was made for certain basic necessities of life in the interest of women, children and other non-combatants. Ours is the only example in recent history where a whole people have been so treated.

        In October 1969, Ojukwu appealed for United Nations (UN) mediation for a cease-fire as an introduction to peace talks. ut the federal government insisted on Biafra's surrender, and Gowon observed that rebel leaders would fight to the finish and that no concession will ever satisfy them. In December, federal forces opened a four-pronged offensive, involving 120,000 troops, that sliced Biafra in half. Ojukwu fled to the Ivory Coast, leaving his chief of staff, Philip Effiong, behind as "officer administering the government." Effiong called for an immediate, unconditional cease-fire January 12 and submitted to the authority of the federal government at ceremonies in Lagos.  Estimates in the former Eastern Region of the number of dead from hostilities, disease, and starvation during the thirty-month civil war are estimated at between 1 million and 3 million. The end of the fighting found more than 3 million Igbo refugees crowded into a 2,500-square-kilometer closed society. Prospects for the survival of many of them and for the future of the region were not bright. There were severe shortages of food, medicine, clothing, and housing. The economy of the region was shattered. Cities were in ruins; schools, hospitals, utilities, and transportation facilities were destroyed or out of order. Overseas groups instituted a major relief effort, but the Federal Military Government insisted on directing all assistance and recovery operations and barred some agencies that had supplied aid to Biafra.

        Because charges of genocide had strenghtened international sympathy for Biafra, the FMG allowed a team of international experts to observe the area and to look for evidence of genocide. The observers testified that they found no evidence of genocide or destruction of property, although there was considerable evidence of famine and death as a result of the war. Furthermore, under Gowon's close supervision, the federal government pledged that Igbo civilians would not be treated as defeated enemies. A program was launched to assimilate the Biafran rebels into a unified Nigeria. Igbo personnel soon were being reenlisted in the federal armed forces. There were no trials and few people were imprisoned. Ojukwu, in exile, was made the scapegoat, but efforts to have him extradited failed. An Igbo official, Ukapi Asika, was named administrator of the new East Central State, comprising the Igbo heartland. Asika had remained loyal to the federal government during the civil war, but as a further act of appeasement, his all-Igbo cabinet included members who had served under the secessionist government. Asika was unpopular with many Igbo, who considered him a traitor, and his administration was characterized as inept and corrupt. In three years under his direction, however, the state government achieved the rehabilitation of 70 percent of the industry incapacitated during the war. The federal government granted funds to cover the state's operating expenses for an interim period, and much of the war damage was repaired. Social services and public utilities slowly were put back in place, although not to the previous levels before the war.

        In conclusion, as a result of the above-elaborated divisions that existed within Nigeria, it can be seen that the British were wholly to blame for the civil war that occurred.  It seems like Nigeria is a victim to the division of Africa among the European powers during then nineteenth century. This is because, as can be seen from the above information, the different tribes that existed in the region now known as Nigeria had previous conflicts and rivalries. However that rivalry or conflict never resulted in a civil war until the invasion of the British. The colonial powers should have divide up the continent along ethnic lines rather than trying to create a unified state and then disintegrating them agian. According to my above analysis the lack of an stable political system by the colonial masters also created an unsatble and untrusted leadership from all  ethnic groups. The british sholud have given each regions seperate independence since the almagamation of each region indicated that the creation of a unified Nigeria is imposible. Present Nigeria still faces unstability and lack of unification amongst its regions with no remedy though some say the riase of another biafra will help eradicate the situation. Still alot of minorities in each regions will lose – like they would have lost in 1967 – alot if the thought of another Biafra is acted upon. 

                                                              Work Cite

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        Madiebo, A.A., The Nigerian Revolution and The Biafran War, Fourth Dimension Publishing, Nigeria 1980.

        Heater, Derek, Case Studies in Twentieth-Century World history, Longman Group UK Limited, 1988.

        Owhonda, John. Nigeria.  Dillion Press.  New Jersey: 1998.

        Ifejika, Samueal and Arthur Nwankwo.  Biafra: The Making of a Nation.  Praeger Publishers. New York: 1969.

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        Oliver, Roland and Atmore, Africa since 1800, Cambridge University Press, 1996.

        Stremlau, John.  The International Politics of the Nigerian Civil War, 1967-1970.  Princeton Press, New Jersey: 1977.

        Ojukwa, Chukwuemeka Odumegwu. The Ahiara Declaration: The Principles of Biafran Revolution.  June 1, 1969.

        Lliffe, John, Africans, The History of a Continent, Cambridge University Press, 1995.

        

        

         

 

                                                         

 

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