On the other hand, David Carlton despite stating that “ …it does not follow that the country today would be significantly different if the episode (the Suez crisis) had never occurred ”, in Anthony Eden: a Biography, he argues that “with perspective Suez may come to seem relatively unimportant event in and of itself, more an effect than a cause of national decline.” For the fact is that Great Britain, given its modest base in terms of population and economic strength, had been over committed throughout the world since at least the end of the Second World War (and maybe for much longer). Retreat from formal and informal Empire was inevitable, as was decline as a global power. This could have been arranged smoothly or otherwise. But reduction to the level of a post-imperial medium power by the 1980’s was surely unavoidable. Suez on this view was a rather dramatic hiccup in a generally well-managed transition.
In general, one could say that there happened three main changeovers in Britain’s foreign policy after the Suez Crisis. Although one might argue that these three changes cannot be completely attributed to the Suez crisis, it is quite clear that they came through some impact of the 1956 crisis.
- British decline: Rapid Decolonisation in Africa.
Many historians hold that British withdrawal from much of Africa was by no means a well-managed adjustment to the inevitable but assumed, in the aftermath of Suez, an appearance of near panic. “The wind of change” (as Macmillan described it) was, according to this view, more like a hurricane, resulting in the British being evicted from the whole of Africa within a decade of Suez rather than over a protracted period that was otherwise the likely prognosis. An alternative interpretation involves placing stress on the argument that the sudden rise of nationalism in Black Africa owned little or nothing at all to Nasser’s victory over Eden. The revolt against the colonialists and the white settlers (and not only the British were affected) had its roots in local conditions. Support for this contention is bolstered by reference to the records of Black African Liberation Movements and to the public speeches of their leader where Suez, rarely merits a mention. But a rejoinder to this argument runs that we should not overlook the unspoken assumptions that influence any generation of leaders. Furthermore, one continues to question the rapid approach of African decolonisation when it was clear that ‘the pace of retreat from Africa had upset many of our supporters’, according to a party strategist and combined with disgruntlement over the government’s domestic economic policies, had resulted in protest votes against them at by-elections (at Orpington, for instance). Party managers knew that middle-class opinion was antipathetic to the government’s African policy. The middle-classes had become increasingly anxious about the perceived diminution of the United Kingdom’s international prestige and power since the end of the Second World War and the apparent rapidity of the decolonisation process under the Macmillan government.
Ronald Hyam in Winds of Change: the Empire and the Commonwealth states that the Suez Crisis changed the Conservative government’s policy which it had adopted in 1951: that is political advancement for West Africa, the Sudan and Malaya. The two historians with the deepest knowledge of the colonial policy archives and complementary expertise have both concluded that its (the Suez) impact on the conservatives was catalytic: ‘If there is any single event that marks the turning point in the dissolution of the African empires’ writes W. R. Luis, ‘it is the Suez Crisis of 1956’; while the official historian of colonial development, D. J. Morgan, detects a ‘post-Suez revaluation’ of overseas commitments and ‘an acceleration of colonial change from 1957’. Adding to this, at the last meeting of the Eden Cabinet on 8 January 1957 it was agreed in the light of Suez that rebuilding Britain’s influence with the United Sates was the quintessential objective, and that this might best be done through a closer association with Europe.
Thus, though the debate of Britain’s policy over the rapid decolonisation of Africa is a controversy which is clearly set for a lengthy run, one could clearly state that Suez impact is highly evident and it played a big part in the Conservative’s approach over the decolonisation of Africa.
- The Impact on the Middle East.
It is likely to be much the same story in the matter of the impact of Suez on the Middle East itself. At one extreme is the view expressed by the American journalist Donald Neff in Warriors at Suez: Eisenhower Takes America into the Middle East where he claims that Suez was a hinge point in history which spelled the end of Western colonialism and the entry of America as the major Western power in the Middle East. He also sees Great Britain, France and Israel as having decisively discredited themselves, thereby providing the opportunity for which the Soviets had been waiting.
However, the extent to which Suez was such a ‘hinge point in history’ in the Middle East is, of course contentious. First there is the argument naturally favoured by Eden at the time and in his memoirs that it was indeed a hinge point but that it was not disastrous for Great Britain, France and Israel. On the contrary, it served decisively to check Nasser as Mussolini and Hitler had not been checked in the 1930s.
As for the relative weight in the Middle East of the British, the Americans and the Soviets, it is again possible to maintain that Suez was not quite the hinge that Neff claims to be. In fact, British influence in the area did not collapse overnight following the Suez crisis. True, pro-British regimes in Iraq and Libya were overturned during the ensuing decade. But pro-British regimes survived in Jordan and Kuwait. And Lloyd was probably correct in claiming that ‘in 1964 we were certainly as powerful in the Persian Gulf as we had been in 1956.’ At all events, subsequent British withdrawal from ‘East of Suez’ by the Labour government of Harold Wilson was clearly not directly caused by the Suez Crisis but derived from a combination of the need to make financial savings and domestic Party considerations.
So far as the Americans were concerned, the Suez Crisis may likewise have been only one of a number of factors gradually leading them towards a great degree involvement in the Middle East. The Americans, already enjoyed some special relations with Middle East countries such as Saudi Arabia, and the long-standing close American relationship with Israel needs no emphasis. Thus the Suez Crisis was probably a good deal less seminal in shaping long-term policies in the Middle East than talk of a ‘hinge point in history’ would suggest. Much the same is probably also true for the Soviets. Their increasing involvement in the wider world and by no means limited to the Middle East, has been a major feature in the international scene since 1945 and it clearly has not been dependent on the events of a single year. Moreover as has been seen, the Soviet Role in supplying arms and advisers to Egypt had preceded the nationalization of the Canal and this process was probably neither greatly slowed nor greatly advanced by the Anglo-French operation.
(3) Britain’s relations with the Commonwealth, the NATO and the EEC.
Notoriously, the Suez Crisis brought the Commonwealth ‘to the verge of dissolution’, according to Canada’s Lester Pearson. All members were angry at the lack of consultation. Most were shocked as a matter of principle by Eden’s action. As Lester Pearson put it, ‘it was like hearing a beloved uncle had been up for rape’. India and Ceylon were fiercely and publicly opposed, with Nehru openly siding with Nasser. Even the prime minister of New Zealand wavered in support. Surprisingly, the Pakistan government was more helpful than might have been expected, at least behind the scenes, while South Africa was officially neutral and neither helped nor hindered. It could of course expect to increase profit from increased traffic round the Cape after the blocking of the canal. Only Australia under Menzies was actively supportive. The Commonwealth group at the United Nations ceased to meet together and it was many years before they re-convened. In a real sense, the Commonwealth was never quite the same again.
As regards Britain’s relations with America and the NATO after the Suez conflict, Macmillan had been a direct beneficiary of the breakdown in Anglo-American relations under Eden. It is not perhaps surprising that having intrigued behind Eden’s back with the American’s, Macmillan once in 10 Downing Street should have been content to be little more than Eisenhower’s subaltern on most major issues concerning Western security. A series of meetings between Macmillan and Eisenhower established a ‘special nuclear relationship’ with the United Sates and Great Britain. They also agreed on collaboration on atomic energy research and to bring together scientists and engineers from the two countries to work on the same task. Agreements on missiles supplies had also been reached.
However, Britain’s position was a risky one too. The advantages of any British lead has to be weighed against present and future costs of dependence on Washington for supplies of missiles and against the lack of domestic consensus that has been an inevitable associated of so close defence relationship with a less than universally popular superpower. France, in fact, met Britain’s partnership with America with great hostility. It had felt betrayed by Britain over the Suez Conflict since the fact is that Eden informed rather than consulted Mollet on 6 November about the ceasefire decision. From now onwards, France took a defence policy totally independent from Britain and moreover from the USA. Under de Gaulle, France decisively set its face against seeking any American assistance with its independent nuclear weapons programme with the result that today the country is in no way vulnerable to American pressures that might arise from a superpower-led drive to create a nuclear-free Europe. The French have also consistently refused to allow American weapons to be based on their territory. And since 1966 France has effectively excluded itself from NATO’s military structure.
Britain’s bid of entering the EEC fell victim of France’s foreign policy too. The British paid their price for becoming little more than auxiliaries to the Americans during Macmillan’s premiership by being excluded from the European Economic Community. The precise consequences of this prolonged absence are, of course, controversial and I will make no attempt to evaluate them. More important is to see whether the exclusion was the direct result of the Suez Crisis. Had Butler or some other leading Conservative succeeded Eden, the extent of the deference paid to the Americans might have been a good deal less and the decision to forge a ‘special nuclear relationship’ with Washington might never have occurred. In that case, Great Britain might have been readily admitted to the EEC as early as 1963. If this thesis has merit, then the dramatic long-term divergence between Britain and France and British exclusion from the EEC was not the result of the Suez Crisis and not even the events of 6 November but was the direct consequence of the course Macmillan took voluntarily and enthusiastically.
Conclusion.
As one could clearly see, the Suez Crisis is a really controversial debate. Britain’s involvement in the war and the impact of the crisis on its foreign policy are highly debatable and there exist numerous perspectives on the topic. One thing, which apparently is quite clear to state, is that the crisis, awakened Britain from its post-war illusion of still being a world power. It became obvious for her that she cannot act on her own or worse, ignoring a country, which had assisted her for a whole world war; that is the USA. The long-term impact of the Suez War was there, and somehow, it hit Britain, causing her consequences, which surely, were not easy to deal with.
Bibliography.
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Eden, (Robert) Anthony, 1st Earl of Avon (1897-1977), British statesman, who briefly served as prime minister (1955-1957).
Macmillan, (Maurice) Harold, Earl of Stockton (1894-1986), British prime minister (1957-63).
Douglas-Home, Sir Alec (1903-1995), British statesman and prime minister (1963-1964).
Nasser, Gamal Abdel (1918-1970), Egyptian statesman, who rose from humble beginnings to become president of Egypt (1956-1970) and the most influential leader of the Arab world. He was elevated into power by the revolution of 23 July 1952. It brought the abolition of the monarchy and the introduction of the republic.
David Reynolds, Brittania Overruled, United Kingdom, Pearson Education Ltd., 2000, op. cit. p. 193.
Hugh Thomas, The Suez Affair, Great Britain, C. Tingling and Co. Ltd., 1967, op. cit. p. 154.
Norman Lowe, Modern World History, Great Britain, Macmillan Press Ltd, 1997, p. 230.
David Reynolds, Brittania Overruled, United Kingdom, Pearson Education Ltd., 2000, op. cit. p. 193.
David Carlton, Britain and the Suez Crisis, USA, Basil Blackwell Ltd., 1988, op. cit., p.97.
David Carlton, Anthony Eden: a Biography, London, 1981, p. 478 in Ibid. p.97.
David Carlton, Britain and the Suez Crisis, USA, Basil Blackwell Ltd., 1988, p.97.
Wolfram Kaiser and Gillian Staerck, British Foreign Policy, 1955-64, Great Britain, MacMillan Press Ltd. 2000, op. cit. p.71.
David Carlton, Britain and the Suez Crisis, USA, Basil Blackwell Ltd., 1988, op. cit., pp. 99-102.
Wolfram Kaiser and Gillian Staerck, British Foreign Policy, 1955-64, Great Britain, MacMillan Press Ltd. 2000, p.203.
David Carlton, Britain and the Suez Crisis, USA, Basil Blackwell Ltd., 1988, op. cit., pp. 102-105.