In Fritz Fischer's Germany's Aims in the First World War it is evident that the blame is being laid almost entirely onto Germany. Not only however is Fischer laying the blame onto Germany, he is also through his writings making it clear

Next, Fischer goes on to prove that Germany did indeed premeditate the First World War through a number of tactics. His first area of focus is the German pressure on Vienna, to act, and act quickly. He uses the presence of German ambassador, Tschirschky at all important conferences between the Austrians as an example of profound pressure on Germany’s behalf. He also refers to the daily conversations between Tschirschky and Ballhausplatz about action against Serbia 3. Next, Fischer goes on to point out the desire of Austria appear valuable in the eyes of Germany. This, created by the enormous pressure of Tschirschky, of course encouraged Austria’s aggression against Serbia 4. The next means of pressure that Fischer discusses is Germany’s demands for an impossible ultimatum to Serbia. This would ensure war 5. Whilst exerting this great amount of pressure onto Austria, Fischer points out that Germany wanted it to seem as if Austria’s actions came as much as a surprise to them as it did to the other powers 6. In addition to which, Fischer states that Bethmann Hollwegg’s main concern was to make Russia take the blame for the war 7. It becomes clear the Fritz Fischer is trying to prove to us that Germany without a doubt premeditated the war, and then simply wanted to cover up this fact.  

Finally, Fischer proves through his arguments that Germany took the risk of a World War with open eyes. Ideally, Germany wanted to keep the conflict localized. For this, they needed British neutrality, for which they desperately hoped. Fischer states however, that Germany knew that Russia would certainly not stand aside and allow Austria-Hungary to act in the Balkans freely. Despite knowing this, Germany kept egging Austria-Hungary on to attack Serbia 8. In addition, Germany rejected attempts of British mediation. Britain’s suggestion that Austria-Hungary should withdraw any impossible demands from the ultimatum was met with contempt in Germany 9. As well, Fischer highlights the fact that Bethmann Hollwegg had formally refused to bring the Austro-Serbian conflict to a European tribunal for mediation 10. Bethmann Hollwegg’s policies collapsed however, when Germany was informed that the British would not remain neutral if France was brought into the war. However, this did not stop Jagow from sending a telegram to Austria-Hungary in which it demanded Austria’s ‘immediate participation in the war against Russia.’ 11

It is via these means that Fritz Fischer attempts to persuade his audience that Germany’s actions and decisions ultimately led to the First World War. However, while doing this, Fischer also makes certain implications that lead us to believe that the war was premeditated primarily by Germany’s civilian leadership, particularly Bethmann Hollwegg. Such implications are quite detrimental for Germany as a nation, as they are suggesting that it was the civilians themselves who were eager for a war. Through examples, mentioned above, Fischer demonstrates Bethmann Hollwegg’s involvement in the encouragement of war.

Gerhard Ritter’s article, A New War-Guilt Thesis?, is clearly a direct attack towards Fritz Fischer’s Germany’s Aims in the First World War. Even more so than presenting his own theories and arguments, Ritter seems to simply rebut those of Fischer. Throughout his entire article, Ritter with his arguments turns Fischer’s theories into ‘thesis history’. Ritter claims that what Fischer has done is purposefully searched for documents to prove his point 12. Time and time again, we witness Ritter making claims that Fischer is simply taking certain information and interpreting it in the favour of this thesis with obvious bias. For instance, Ritter directly attacks Fischer’s interpretation of the fact that Bethmann Hollwegg wanted to prevent French chauvinism in order to keep the conflict localized. While Fischer states that this was a straightforward attempt on behalf of Hollwegg to break up the Entente, Ritter states, “Can one argue any more one-sidedly?” 13 While Ritter reads Tschirschky’s wanting to avoid the impression that Germany is holding Austria back from war innocently, Fischer “interprets these additions as if they had intentionally pursued the objective of sabotaging the effect…” 14 Ritter claims that the additions were supposed to prevent the sensitivity and wariness of the Austrian government, who often enough felt bullied 15. It is clear that Ritter is trying to portray the fact that Fischer’s arguments are unjustified and have no logical proof behind them. For instance, Fischer supposedly states that Zimmermann made clear to Count Hoyos that if there was to be Russian-French intervention, Germany would be able to take on both nations in a war. Ritter argues that there is absolutely no support for such a statement in the sources 16. The disagreement on interpretation continues when the two historians interpret the cancellation of the telegram to ‘stop the war’ on the part of Bethmann Hollwegg completely differently. Ritter ardently states that the chancellor’s efforts to reduce the war were made to nothing, and that the telegram that was to stop the war was cancelled simply because Russian mobilization was already under way 17. Fischer on the other hand states that the reason Hollwegg cancelled this telegram was because he saw a ‘glimmer of hope’ for British neutrality 18.

Ritter’s last main argument is that Germany waged a defensive war, one that they were simply pulled into. Ritter claims that Germany was beginning to fear the growth of Russian armament, and it was simply due to this that they did not want to completely reject the idea of a defensive war 19. Ritter also brings up the fact that Austria asked for Germany’s help, and not vice versa. Germany was simply helping an ally 20. Ritter claims that Fischer’s attempt to turn this situation around is senseless.

Through his arguments, Ritter paints the picture that demonstrates the innocence of Bethmann Hollwegg, and ultimately lifts the responsibility of the war off the shoulders of Germany’s civilian leadership.

Whereas both Fritz Fischer and Gerhard Ritter hold extreme opinions about Germany’s war guilt, our next subject of interest, Konrad Jarausch’s Bethmann Hollwegg’s Calculated Risk takes a more moderate stance. Jarausch’s article focuses mainly on the analysis of Kurt Riezler’s diary. Riezler, having been a personal assistant to Bethmann Hollwegg at the time of the July Crisis, offers an untainted perspective of Hollwegg’s aims and thoughts during this eventful period. Much of the evidence that Jarausch uses is Hollwegg’s direct quotes. The only doubt we may have about their validity is whether or not he was genuine in them. This allows for an analysis different from that of Fischer or Ritter. In the first paragraph of his article, Jarausch presents a statement uttered by Bethmann, “all nations are guilty; Germany too, bears a large part of the blame.” 21 This goes to show that Jarausch is not arguing for or against the innocence of Bethmann Hollwegg. Jarausch however believes that the Blank Cheque issued by Hollwegg was not truly blank, was delivered with certain implications for offense in the Balkans 22. Jarausch also examines the idea of ‘calculated risk’ on the behalf of Bethmann Hollwegg. He claims that though Russia was becoming an increasing threat, Hollwegg decided to take the risk of them getting involved 23. Jarausch argues that Hollwegg did not want a continental war, or even a world war. He wanted the breakup of the Entente, and a localized Balkan war, if there had to be one 24. Jarausch also points out that Bethmann did not take the risk of war thoughtlessly, but rather considered the position of Germany ‘desperate’ 25. Unfortunately, Hollwegg’s calculated risk had not delivered favourable results. Jarausch shows us that war as an outcome of Hollwegg’s calculated risk did all but please him 26.  Jarausch also demonstrates to us that Bethmann Hollwegg admits his mistake, “we have lost control and the landslide has begun.” 27 Jarausch’s article offers a balanced and relatively unbiased perspective on Bethmann Hollwegg’s war policies.

History is indeed an interpretation of selected facts. We witness this quite vividly while examining the articles of Fritz Fischer, Gerhard Ritter and Konrad Jarausch. Fischer interprets numerous historical documents in such a fashion, that it is made clear throughout his article that solely Germany was to blame for the First World War. Ritter, on the other hand, takes many of the same documents and interprets them in a completely different fashion, stating that Germany was not solely responsible for the war. Lastly, we are presented with Jarausch’s article that serves a balance between the extremes of Fischer and Ritter. Using Kurt Riezler’s diary, Jarausch takes a deeper and less biased look into the mind of Bethmann Hollwegg during the July Crisis. These three historians each offer an individual approach to a single subject matter, each showing us a different perspective.

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