‘We are unwilling to pronounce the living eudaimon until one has died...eudaimonia should be something stable and no way easily changeable’ (1100b)
Whilst eudaimonia is said by Aristotle to be “living well” and “doing well”, Ackrill makes the distinction that we should view it more as “doing well, not the result of doing well” suggesting a process rather than an end. Were this to be the case it would agree with another common translation of being eudaimonia as “flourishing” or achieving success in all areas of in ones life. Unlike happiness, which is in most cases a short term experience, eudaimonia is a long term process and so it is suggested that one should not be judged as being Eudemon until one has died. However if one must also consider the action of children and descendants when declaring a man eudaimonia then how can eudaimonia be the final end if the process continues beyond ones death? Aristotle says it is both absurd that it should make a difference and absurd that it shouldn’t but, for myself, I would conclude that the actions of children and descendants should not impact on whether or not a man is said to be eudaimon simply because this has little or no relation to his own actions.
‘Eudaimonia is composite of certain good things (and is) nothing apart from these, but these’
Eudaimonia can also be interpreted as being an inclusive end, meaning unlike dominant ends, it is composed of other virtues and ends, as opposed to being superior to them. Therefore to be wealthy or to have honour is part of being eudemon as opposed to be a means to eudaimonia. This I believe fits more closely our perception of eudaimonia being a complete life or a self-sufficient end. We can criticise this by questioning whether it is truly possible for all the separate parts to act in accordance with reason.
Reason is central to our obtaining eudaimonia as it is through a man performing his function in life and exercising his faculty of reason that Aristotle says they will reach this state, due to our ability to reason being the factor which distinguishes us from the rest of nature. There are many inherent problems with this deduction, not least the existence of other factors, such as man being the only creature who kills his own species indiscriminately, which could be used to challenge this theory. Of the three possible routes to eudaimonia– ‘the three lines of life that stand out prominently to view’ – the life of sensual pleasure is swiftly dismissed as is a life within society and so Aristotle concludes that a life of contemplation is the most eudemon because it results in the highest usage of reason. He also contradicts himself at this point in that he states eudaimonia is best achieved by man judging as to what his own version will consist in but then rejects any profession other than his own. Whilst most would consider this to be elitism Urmson believes however these views are simply reflecting the social values of the time, his dismissal of painters or nurses as having less rewarding lives.
It can be strongly argued that a life spent in pursuit of one goal cannot be seen as the best kind of life and consequently that eudaimonia should not be seen as the ultimate end of human action. Aristotle believes our all actions should focus on achieving our own eudaimonia but in reality doing things we hope will lead to eudaimonia may in fact have the opposite effect. Here we can distinguish between epistemic, what we think will be the ends of actions, and actual ends, what does actually happen. So a life spent trying to hit eudaimonia may indeed make it harder for us to reach it than a life spent pursuing single ends relevant to us at the time with no ultimate end in view. In this case eudaimonia can therefore be seen as the epistemic end of human action even if it is not the actual end and that perhaps the most one can do is to try to ensure that the epistemic ends and the actual ends coincide.
The concept of a Eudemon life is likened to the idea of a ‘fault-less cube’ in that even the smallest down point would prohibit the ability of man to achieve eudaimonia. External factors such as a close friend being hit by a car or being struck by disease would result in eudaimonia being out of reach. Similarly there are those whose are born unable to achieve Aristotle’s eudaimonia, the low-born or the ugly. What would be the point in them focussing their all on achieving eudaimonia if they are doomed to fail? Perhaps in the case of the low-born it could be argued that their progression through society would become their ultimate end. In situations such as these eudaimonia could not be argued as being the ultimate end of human action.
The primary criticism of ‘eudaimonia’ is that it is in essence an egoistic concept which renders ethics into an issue of acting in ones own interest. It could be argued that a life pursuing ones own interest, to disregard of others, is likely to result in one being treated in a similar manner and subsequently failing to form friendships or to live according to the virtues and so putting eudaimonia out of reach. It does not allow for the possibility of altruism and negates the value of smaller actions if they are simply seen as a means to a higher aim.
Aristotle claims that the ultimate objective end of human action is eudaimonia and that this consists in a life of man fulfilling his function and exercising his powers of reason. His believes that all action is aimed at achieving eudaimonia through virtues such as Honour, seen as either means to or parts of eudaimonia. In principle this could be seen to be correct as all human beings wish to be successful and to achieve the highest of all realisable goods, happiness. However as we have seen there are many flaws in his logic, with the most important of these being that a life spent in pursuit of eudaimonia does not guarantee its attainment and that the involvement of unpredictable external factors would lead to other factors becoming the final ends for some. Man also often fails to plan or organise his life for attainment of a single end and so on the whole it is best to conclude that in most cases eudaimonia can be seen as the epistemic end of human action even if it is not the actual end.
Susannah Amini
JL Ackrill, ‘Aristotle on Eudaimonia’, in Rorty Essays on Aristotle’s Ethics, 1980
J.O Urmson, 1988, Aristotle’s Ethics, pg 20
J.O. Urmson, Aristotle’s Ethics, 1988, ch 10
Hardie, ‘The Final Good in Aristotle’s Ethics’, Philosophy, 1965