Is free will compatible with causal determination?

 If they were being held a gun point, the question of moral responsibility becomes a little blurred. While they still had the capacity to choose not the commit a murder, the fact that their life would be forfeit is seen to remove some or all moral responsibility for the action. This is a very grey area, and trying to determine what external constrains and compulsions (such as being held at gun point) are sufficient to negate moral responsibility is a seemingly endless task. However, it is enough to say that if such constraints do not exist, and someone makes an informed decision, then they can be held accountable for the consequences of that decision.

The above account of free will would indicate that moral responsibility is only possible where free will exists; i.e., if someone is able to make a choice, then they can be held accountable for that choice, but if no choice exists, then they cannot be held accountable for those actions. This brings up the question of what it means to be free. According to the “could have acted otherwise” model of free will, freedom is the ability to make choices. However, we can see from the murder at gun point example, there are other situations in which someone is not strictly free, despite having a choice open to them. The consequences of certain choices can be so dire that making a decision is exceptionally difficult. It could even be said that in some situations, the fact a choice exists is entirely irrelevant. Take for example, a man who litters in a world with very harsh penalties for littering. A law enforcer accosts him in the street and he is presented with an option; pick up the litter, or be executed. He could choose to leave the litter on the ground and forfeit his life, but it would be highly irrational to do so and it is almost inconceivable that he would actually make that decision. A choice exists, but he almost certainly act a certain way. Not only this, but if he did decide to forfeit his life so as to avoid picking up the litter, one would question his sanity and it would be asked whether he was under the influence of some external constraint such as a narcotic. Is he truly free in this situation?

The compatibilist such as Moritz Schlick would argue that it is the existence of such external constrains and compulsions that limit freedom, and thus negate moral responsibility, and not the existence of choice. It is whether someone can act in accordance with their will and desires that determines whether they are free;

“Freedom means the opposite of compulsion; a man is free if he does not act under compulsion, and he is compelled or unfree when he is hindered from without in the realization of his natural desires.”

Schlick later elaborates upon his definition of freedom when he discusses the constraints placed upon someone with a mental illness, and whether or not this person could be said to be free. In this instance, he uses the term “natural tendencies” instead of “desire”. This allows for a situation where someone would naturally want to do X, but is so affected by their condition that they desire to do Y. If it can be seen that this desire to do Y does not reflect their personality and normal desires while in a healthy state, then simply doing Y in accordance with their desire to do Y does not equate to freedom; “we view the illness as a disturbing factor which hinders the normal functioning of his natural tendencies”.

Whether or not this is an adequate account of moral responsibility shall be handled later in the essay, when I explore what forms or types of free will, if any, are compatible with causal determination.

What is “causal determination”?

Causal determination is a relatively simple concept. In a causally determined world, everything that happens – every thought, action and occurrence – has a cause rooted in the past. This means that once a future action’s cause has occurred, that action is fixed and will be realised, irrespective of other future actions or choices. Causal determination is not necessarily a theory which states that fate or destiny exists, and it does not hold that every event that occurs is determined from the ‘dawn of time’, as it were. While theories concerning causal determination may hold one or more of those beliefs, the term is strictly taken to mean simply that events have causes, which determine what shall happen later on.

There is also disagreement as to whether these causes apply to the macroscopic world, the microscopic world, or both. As theories about the nature of the physical world develop, and new discoveries are made, it seems increasingly likely that some events concerning fundamental particles may happen randomly, or by chance, with no discernable cause. However, these events go on to cause further events, and so a chain of causation is created which goes on to govern macroscopic events.

Is free will compatible with causal determination?

        If we take free will as the ability to have acted otherwise than one did in a given situation, it seems that this is incompatible with causal determination. This is for the simple reason that in a causally determined world, only one course of action is available or possible. Thus, irrespective of one’s desires, that course of action will happen, and there is no ‘otherwise’. In other words – “if natural determinism is true, that is, all events obey immutable laws, then my will too is always determined by my innate character and motives. Hence, my decisions are necessarily not free.” However, the existence of compatibilist viewpoints indicates that this issue is not to be resolved so easily.

        The ability to take moral responsibility is tied up with many definitions of free will. In a situation where someone cannot be held accountable for their actions, then they did not act in accordance with free will, and in a situation where free will does not exist, it is hard to see how they could be held accountable for their actions. However, for the compatibilist, freedom of action and free will are separate, and the existence of freedom of action is what determines moral responsibility. Thus, if someone desires to commit a murder, and does commit a murder, they are morally responsible for that act, so long as their desire was not influenced by an external factor such as a mental illness. However, the compatibilist also believes in a causally determined world, but does not hold that causal determination is an external influence in the same way that a mental illness is.

        In order to explain this, the compatibilist differentiates between a descriptive law and a prescriptive law. A descriptive law is one that simply provides an account of how things work.  Causal determination is a descriptive law because nothing is forcing it to act upon a causally determined world, it simply does. A prescriptive law, on the other hand, is one that constrains or compels a certain course of action, such as a social law where sanctions exist for those who disobey it. For the compatibilist, freedom is determined by whether a prescriptive law is in action. In the case of mental illness, someone is constrained or compelled to act against their natural tendencies. However, when someone is only ‘limited’ by causal determination, nothing is stopping them doing what they want to, and thus they can take moral responsibility for their actions, and according to our definition of free will, the fact that moral accountability is possible indicates that free will is present. The ‘law’ of causal determination is not seem by the compatibilist to be a limiting factor, as it simply describes the way the world works.

        However, for many people, this breaks with intuitions about what it means to be free, and to have free will. If we must have certain desires, then are we acting freely when acting in accordance with those desires? It seems that although our experience is not one of being constrained, we do not have real choice available to us. There is not a fork in our path, to use the earlier example. If we have no choice, then it seems intuitive to say that we cannot be held accountable for those actions that we could not help but perform.

Conclusion

         In a causally determined world, we have no choices open to us. Our will is dictated by past events, and we cannot act in a manner other than that is determined, irrespective of whether our experience is that of being limited by a prescriptive law, or whether we appear to have choices. Any choices we appear to have are simply illusions, as we will always act in a certain manner and will not and cannot chose to act otherwise. This is very different to looking retrospectively into the past, and seeing what choices were made, and this is where I feel the compatibilist is misled. Causal determination does not simply describe the outcome of a situation, but shows how that outcome was caused by events in the past. In effect, the term ‘causal determination’ is a description of a prescriptive law, as past events prescribe how the future will develop.

        If we have no choices, then we have no free will, according to the “could have acted otherwise” model, and if we have no free will, we cannot take responsibility for our actions. Even murder is determined by events outside the murderer’s control.

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Bibliography

• M. Schlick, When Is Man Responsible?, 1939

• A. Ward, lectures for Problems In The Philosophy Of The Mind, 2008

• J. E. Turner, Causal Determination: Its Nature and Types, published in Journal of

Philosophical Studies, 1930

• M.McKenna, http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/compatibilism/, 2004

• http://www2.sunysuffolk.edu/pecorip/SCCCWEB/INTRO_TEXT/Chapter%207%20Freedom/Freedom_Compatibilism.htm

• http://www.jimpryor.net/teaching/courses/intro/notes/cd-hv-done-otherwise.html

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