It must be admitted that the Republican Government of Spain has waged war very ineffectually (Liston Oak, May 1937). Comment.

University Degree Historical and Philosophical studies

John McDowall Spanish Civil War

The political and military situation facing the Republic after the military rising of July 1936 was not as hopeless as one is sometimes led to believe. Yet the final result was a resounding and bloody defeat for the forces of the Republic. To some it is easy to place the woes of the Republic squarely on foreign intervention, or in the British and French cases - Non-Intervention. However, it could be argued that the major cause of the collapse of the Republic was the ineffective handling of the war effort by the Republic itself.

The start of the military rising was not an example of a well-oiled military plan. The insurrection suffered from poor communication between the conspirators, with Hugh Thomas commenting that ‘morale was low.’ It could be argued that the most important period of the war was the first 48 hours of the rising. The earliest means of suppressing the insurrection open to the Republic, since the reliability of the constitutional forces could not be guaranteed, was a wholesale arming of the trade unions and the left-wing parties.

Prime Minister Casares Quiroga prevaricated, confident proclamations issued forth as important time slipped by, but no arms were issued. Quiroga undoubtedly overwhelmed resigned on the 19th of July and was quickly followed twelve hours later by his replacement Martinez Barrio. It was the next new Prime Minister Jose′ Giral that issued a decree dissolving the army and ordering that arms be distributed. As arms had to be issued anyway the delay proved a costly mistake for two reasons. Firstly it could be argued that in areas where the military hesitated and the workers were prepared the uprising generally failed, were as conversely when the military acted quickly and the workers remained inactive the rising was a success. Secondly was the effect on the attitude of the Para-military forces. It is Beevor that makes the case that large numbers of the Civil Guard and the Assoltos were undecided, and indeed were waiting initially to see what way the tide was turning. In areas where the workers acted firmly they tended to stay loyal to the government. It could therefore be argued that it was entirely possible that had the Republic issued arms immediately the insurrection could have been dealt an early telling blow.

Even after this tragic delay the strategic situation facing the Republic was still positive. The number of forces available to both sides on the Iberian peninsular was roughly equal. The Republicans had virtually all the tanks and armoured cars while the major threat, the highly trained Army of Africa with 24,000 men, was in Morocco unable to cross to Spain as large sections of the navy had rebelled against their officers and stayed loyal to the Republic. A crucial failure for the Republic was retaining the loyalty of junior officers, of whom about two-thirds rebelled

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The vast majority of Spain’s industrial and population centres were in areas were the insurrection had failed. The socialist leader Prieto was not boasting when he broadcast that the Republic controlled, ‘the major cities, the industrial centres, all the gold and silver of the Bank of Spain, enormous reserves of men…’ The Republic had not been stripped completely of an army. There was a range of viable military options available. Two possible options that seem militarily obvious was a concentration of both navy and air force units on the Straights to prevent the transport of the Army of Africa or to despatch the virtually intact Madrid division by train to Seville and destroy the lightly held bridgehead of Colonel Yagüe at Algeciras. Both of these obvious military options could have isolated General Franco and his Army of Africa. It appears that none of these offensive military options were considered.

The Republican government instead sent the Madrid division to guard the Guadarrama passes while other troops either remained inactive or were brought to Madrid. The air force, although small and ill equipped, sent a small number of aircraft on ill planned and prepared attacks on scattered targets with little or no effect. The control of the navy by the Republic could have been a major blow to the insurgents. However the Republican navy, massively superior in numbers to the Nationalists navy, either stayed inactive in port or patrolled the straights half-heartedly. Republican strategy at this stage was hampered by an obsession with the defence of Madrid and the idea that time was on their side.

In defence of the Republic it is perhaps not surprising that emotions at this time were often stronger than common sense. Also hindering the Republic was its own loss of governmental control and the lack of communications. It is Thomas who succinctly states that, ‘with communications difficult or non-existent, each town would find itself on its own, acting out its own drama, apparently in a vacuum. There were soon to be not two Spain’s, but two thousand.’ The advent of revolution was the start for bloodletting on an appalling scale. Revolutionary committees (tchekas from the 1917 Russian organization) were formed and would undertake daily roundups, paseos, in search of fascists. Even wearing a necktie or not giving the correct socialist greeting could condemn an individual to a ‘trial’, some of which only lasted five minutes. Victims would then be taken to the Casa de Campo and shot. Among the victims were women in nightclothes and children in pyjamas. Reports would also reach other European states of the murder of priests, nuns and the burning of churches. Although Nationalist repression would be as bloody the damage was less of a concern to a military government. The international standing of the Republic would never recover with disastrous consequences for the long-term diplomatic efforts of the Republic.

What is clear is that taking quick decisions was never easy in Spain and with the dissipation of authority by the proliferation of committees and workers militia the Republic had difficulty in establishing co-ordinated central control. There was also the conviction among most groups on the left, particularly the anarchists, that military discipline was not something required by a committed revolutionary. The communists disagreed, and as there influence spread with the arrival of Russian military aid the scene were set for what became known as ‘the war within a war.’ A ‘war-inept military and civil leadership – warring political factions’, these problems typified the early days of the Republic. This division in Republican ranks might not have been disastrous had their opponents also been divided. However, this was not the case with Franco providing a united front with the creation of the Falange Espanola Tradicionlista y de las johns and with the Germany and Italy sending considerable military forces to support the Nationalists.

After missing the initial chance to smother the insurrection at birth the main hope of the Republic was to hold as much ground as possible while awaiting the onset of a general European war. Fighting a defensive war had the additional advantages of the difficult terrain in Spain that lends itself to that type of fighting. It is also easier to teach untrained troops defensive warfare rather than the complexities of co-ordinated, offensive action. The Republic’s crippling loss of trained junior officers would also be less noticeable by staying on the defensive. Defensive warfare is also less reliant on highly technical military equipment such as tanks and aircraft but requires plentiful amounts of small arms, machine guns and what has been called ‘the god of war’, artillery. Efforts to buy arms abroad had been desperate leading to the buying of antiquated small arms supplied with little ammunition and with a multiplication of calibres.

I would argue that the key shortage was in the artillery available to the Republic. The rebellion had left the Republic handicapped in numbers of artillery with 387 pieces while the Nationalists controlled 620. Artillery bought from abroad tended to be very old with worn barrels; many were supplied without the appropriate sighting mechanisms and were missing the correct gun carriages to move them quickly. Rarely was artillery supplied with the 2,400 rounds normally expected, indeed one order for guns arrived with 240 rounds; enough for two days of firing under battle conditions. Historians have commented on the erratic nature of Republican artillery fire and the large number of guns captured by the Nationalists, this has generally been blamed on Republican incompetence: lack of sights and the proper equipment to move the pieces supplies a more likely explanation. If the leaders of the Republic were committed to a defensive war the priority and finances should have been invested in the small arms and artillery supplied with the correct quantities of ammunition, rather than investing in expensive and complicated machinery such as tanks and aircraft. What has also been questioned was that no serious attempt was made to initiate guerrilla warfare,something that could have caused considerable problems for the Nationalists, especially in ‘safe’ rear areas.

The Republic undoubtedly contributed considerably too its own downfall. Prompt early action might have dealt a crucial blow to their enemies while a more co-ordinated, strategic approach by civilian and military leaders on the basic conduct of the war might have achieved the aim of extending the fighting into 1940 and finding allies amongst the democratic Western Powers. In the end these mistakes combined with foreign intervention, and Non-Intervention, would lead to the collapse of the Republic. However, what should not be doubted was the fighting spirit displayed by both Republican and Nationalist soldiers during the bloody battles to come.

Word Count 1616

Books

Beevor, Anthony, The Spanish Civil War (London: Orbis Publishing 1982)

Browne, Harry, Spain’s Civil War (2nd Ed, London: Longman 1996)

Hills, George, The Battle for Madrid (London: Vantage Books 1976)

Howson, Gerald, Arms For Spain The Untold Story of the Spanish Civil War (London: John Murray 1998)

Thomas, Hugh, The Spanish Civil War (3rd Ed, London: Hamish Hamilton 1977)

Thomas, Hugh, The Spanish Civil War (London: Hamish Hamilton 1977) p220

Quiroga even despatched the unfortunate General Prado to Saragossa in an attempt to reach a compromise with General Cabanellas. It was rejected and he was later shot along with his ADC. Thomas, The Spanish Civil War p224

Beevor, Anthony, The Spanish Civil War (London: Orbis 1982) p56

Browne, Harry, Spain’s Civil War, (London: Longman 1996) p38

Beevor, A, The Spanish Civil War p54

Beevor does make the point that the true loyalties of the Civil Guard came through later. The Assoltos proved more loyal to the Republic but were more of an urban force, and the big cities had a better prepared and more active working class. It is also worth noting that the training of these forces could be better than the average Spanish conscript.

Figures for combined army, air force, and Para-military. Republican 98,900. Insurgents 91,500. Hills, George, The Battle for Madrid, (London: Vantage Books 1976) p55

Browne, Harry, Spain’s Civil War, p39

Hills, G, The Battle for Madrid p56

Hills, G, The Battle for Madrid p50

The navy’s inaction could be explained by the lack of officers and the fact that the German pocket battleships Deutchland and Admiral Scheer were screening the ships transferring the Army of Africa. Beevor, A, The Spanish Civil War, p63

Thomas, H, The Spanish Civil War, p227

Hills, G, The Battle for Madrid, p44

Browne, H, Spain’s Civil War, p44

Indeed it could be argued that only one military force at that time could manage such attacks, the German Whermacht. It would take several years of war, and many setbacks before the officers and men of the British, American and Russian armies could even come close to perfecting co-ordinated attacking warfare.

Ten different calibres: 6.5, 7, 7.62, 7.65, 7.7, 7.707, 7.92, 8, 8.03 and 11mm. Gerald, Howson, Arms for Spain The Untold Story of the Spanish Civil War. (London: John Murray 1998) p29

Howson, G, Arms for Spain, p29

Howson, G, Arms for Spain, p109

The Spanish are credited in inventing modern guerrilla warfare in their successful campaign to evict Napoleon from their soil.