League of Nations - Good or Bad?

University Degree Historical and Philosophical studies

Many of us wish that we could create world peace, but most of us know that this is not a one man task. When I think of Woodrow Wilson I am reminded of a common quote, “The road to hell is often paid with good intentions!” Woodrow Wilson had good intentions and put a lot of effort into them when he proposed the League of Nations. However, his efforts drew short and the League was destined for failure. In my opinion, it needed all of the world powers in order for it to have been successful, and in order for this to happen each and every one of the members would have to be satisfied with the requirements. Unfortunately, the U.S. was a world power and they were not willing to give up any of their rights for peace, hence the failure of the League of Nations.

One must understand the history behind the League of Nations before judging it. In November of 1918 an armistice was declared in Europe. Wilson was more of an idealist than a war villain, and viewed this event as an opportunity for international peace. He did not believe that the war should end in a new balance of power, but rather in an organized common peace. In other words, he wanted “peace without victory”(Knock, 2000). His biggest step towards this ultimate goal was the Treaty of Versailles containing fourteen points, of which the fourteenth consisted of a League of Nations to settle international disputes. The Senate supported most of the treaty such that it guaranteed principles of the Monroe Doctrine be extended throughout the world giving America “superiority in the Western Hemisphere.” (Schulzinger, 2002) However, they did not support the League of Nations, because they it would make the U.S. too involved in foreign affairs. “Senators, jealous of the prerogatives of Congress, saw the article as a way around their control of the war power,” (Schulzinger, 2002). Despite Wilson’s efforts to sway public opinion, support of the League weakened after his stroke. The result of his hard work was a formation of the League without the U.S. as a member. The League has been able to settle disputes since then, but it has also further aggravated some situations usually with respect to whom should be leader.

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Wilson’s idea of creating a common peace was acceptable if and only if it could incorporate all of the world powers, and it failed in including the United States. The failure of the League of Nations lied in the fact that members would have to surrender some of their rights in order to receive protection and knowledge. The senate as well as the public wanted peace but not at any price. Republicans “believed that Wilson had consigned too many vital national interests, such as sovereignty, to the will of an international authority,” (Knock, 2000) The U.S. would also no longer have the right to use their military power at their own leisure. In addition, the League required members to use their military forces to settle disputes regardless of wether or not they were part of the dispute. This seemed like an unnecessary risk for our soldiers. In other words, just because you are willing to risk your butts for ours, why should we risk our butts for yours.

As ridiculously unfair as this may seem, it is human nature to look out for one self and this greed was the major down fall for the League of Nations. In defense of Wilson, his speech at Indianapolis, Indiana gave an important reason for us to give up some of our sovereignty which I personally agree with and do not understand why any other man would not.

Every man who makes a choice to respect the rights of his neighbors deprives himself of absolute sovereignty, but he does it by promising never to do wrong, and I can not for one see anything that robs me of any inherent right that I ought to retain when I promise that I will do right, when I promise that I will respect the thing which, being disregarded and violated, brought on a war in which millions of men lost their lives...(Congressional Record, LVIII)

Wilson attempted to make everyone happy by making four alterations. The alterations provided that the Monroe Doctorine would be protected, domestic disputes could not be interfered with, nations could refuse a mandate for a territory, and finally the nations could withdraw from the League. In my opinion the last one kind of undermines the whole point of having a League of Nations. If a nation could withdraw at anytime, then one would expect that as soon as a conflict arose they would withdraw so that they could settle it in their own way. However, I restate that all nations must agree to the requirements and Wilson believed that these revisions would be what would make the U.S. agree. Unfortunately, that did not work for many felt it was not enough and they would still be giving up to many rights.

Again I point out that greed is a major reason for the failure of the League of Nations, because it is hard for one to give up anything for protection if they believe they are perfectly capable of protecting themselves without sacrifice. Greed also plays an important role in who gets to take charge of this so called League of Nations. Unfortunately, the U.S.’s idea of civilization consisted of all nations being governed in the same way as America. We all know that the world is made up of many different cultures and beliefs and to be able to satisfy them all, let alone force them to believe the way that we do would be ultimately impossible and probably immoral, thus the failure of the League of Nations.

References

Congressional Record, LVIII In: Major Problems in American Foreign Relations. Volume II: Since 1914. Ed Dennis Merrill, Thomas G. Patterson. New York: Houghton Mifflin, 2000. 44-49.

Knock, Thomas J. “Wilson’s Battle for the League: Progressive Internationalists Confront the Forces of Reaction” Major Problems in American Foreign Relations. Volume II: Since 1914. Ed Dennis Merrill, Thomas G. Patterson. New York: Houghton Mifflin, 2000. 63-73.

Shulzinger, Robert D. U.S. Diplomacy Since 1900. 5th ed. New York: Oxford University Press, 2002