Since the Frankfurt School theorists developed much of their work from a critical engagement with Marx, and also advocated an historical materialist view of history, they also tend to view philosophy as an “ongoing socio-historical phenomenon” (Fagan 2005). From this perspective, Critical Theory would seem to absorb the dialectical methodology of Marx, and this is what gives it its potential for social transformation. Hence: “the area of tension between an established social order and the ideas of reason it relies on is just where dialectical critique drives its wedge” (Hoy & McCarthy 1994:20). The emancipatory potential of Critical Theory thus lies in being able to diagnose ‘areas of tension’ in contemporary society, where, in particular, ‘reason’ is wrongly used to uphold particular practices. However, this would seem to be a decisive turn away from Marx’s attempt to establish a positive science of society through historical materialism in general, since it is further held that “the great philosophical attempts to grasp the totality of life had failed” (Held 2004: 200).
However, the Frankfurt School theorists often differ from one another in their approach. For example, Horkheimer’s Eclipse of Reason (1946) pursues the theme of reason in general, beginning by explaining the author’s intention to “interpret accurately the profound changes now taking place in the public mind” and “not... to suggest anything like a program of action” as “the modern propensity to translate every idea into action... is one of the symptoms of the present cultural crisis” (Horkheimer 2004:vi). Here, Horkheimer explicitly embraces interpreting as opposed to action, as his focus turns instead to understanding the ‘cultural crisis’. This is a new phenomenon. However, Horkheimer’s aim is to examine how ‘mass culture’ has undermined the role of Reason in society, extenuates social atomization and hence abrogates grounds for collective action, and ultimately serves to affirm the status quo: “modern mass culture, although drawing freely upon state cultural values, glorifies the world as it is” (Horkheimer 2004:96). Hence, although not drawing up a program of political action, Horkheimer aims to unmask and challenge prevailing cultural norms, showing how these neuter political action and support the prevailing order. In comparison, Marcuse became a key figure in leading a ‘cultural revolution’ amongst a new generation of middle class students in 1960s America to develop new modes of thought and being in the world (Kellner 1998:16), and was so politically active that he was forced into hiding after receiving death threats (Kellner 1998:17). Further still, Adorno explains that revolutions begin with changes in thought: “after having missed its opportunity, philosophy must come to know, without any mitigation, why the world – which could be paradise here and now – could become hell itself tomorrow” (cited in Zuidervaart 2007:134). Hence, although the three theorists seem to have different relationships with philosophy and the wider political and social world, they all nevertheless premise the importance of philosophy knowing how the world really is, in being able to develop new ideas about the future, and more profoundly, see culture as a new site of political struggle and contestation.
It can also be seen that there is not a clear consensus on Marxist methodology, or that of Critical Theory, throughout the work of the three theorists or over the historical period in which they work. This makes their writing more difficult to appraise. For example, a particular site of criticism is the positivistic approach, and its relationship to both reason and the Enlightenment. Horkheimer and Adorno criticise the “lapse from enlightenment into modern positivism” (Horkheimer, Adorno & Noerr, 2002:xii), and further hold positivism responsible for “abolishing the subject” and taking over “thought itself” by eliminating “the last intervening agency between individual science and social norm” (Horkheimer, Adorno & Noerr 2002:23). This is a characteristic articulation of Critical Theory’s lack of an agent of change – both in terms of the working class and the individual. As the aim of the Frankfurt School is to show how human thought is the result of human activity, positivism is not considered a sufficient mode of investigation (Fagan 2005). Instead, similar to Marx (Gorton 2010), Horkheimer advocates an interdisciplinary approach where empirical studies are used to illustrate and improve theoretical ideas, but must be interpreted “[with]in the total context to which their concepts and judgements refers” (Held 2004:188). However, it could be argued that the rejection of positive science in general is a rejection of the Marxist project of establishing a totalising positive science of society, as we saw earlier. Additionally, pace Marx, rather than truth subsisting in a relationship between theory and the world, both construed in abstract terms, the truth of a theory could only be established through historical struggles (Held 2004:191). Whilst it can be argued that the early Adorno was initially concerned with an immanent critique of philosophy and the dispensation of old patterns of thought, it is also the case that in his later collaboration with Horkheimer, he becomes prepared to include empirical analysis within his search for the concept of truth, whilst Horkheimer’s pessimism grew closer to that of Adorno (Held, 2004:200-201). However, Adorno, in particular, is known for his anti-metaphysical beliefs (Hohendahl 1995:7). Certainly there seem to be contradictory methodological approaches within the work of the two theorists.
A central focus of the Frankfurt School theorists’ writings is the function of Reason in society in general, and its relationship with social power in particular. Their non-Marxist influence is Nietzsche, who holds that Reason is a symptom of repression and a tool for social control. Therefore, following the project of exploring the role of culture in ‘demolishing the subject’ the Frankfurt School explore how modern forms of government – capitalism and communism – can hold sway over the mind. Following the materialist approach of Marx, they argue that Reason is a result of social conditions (Fagan 2005), as opposed to following Hegel, Marx’s predecessor, who holds that thought precedes reality (Hampsher-Monk 2008:419-420). However, whereas Marx held that economic conditions ultimately determined social practices, the Frankfurt School theorists believed that culture, history, politics and the family played equally significant roles (Fagan 2005). This is a considerable departure from the basis of Marx’s theory of proletarian revolution, aimed at explaining why such revolution failed to occur – namely, culture and the repressive function of Reason make such agency difficult, if not seemingly impossible. Horkheimer therefore defines reason as “the feeling that there is nothing to inquire into, that the concept of reason is self-explanatory, that the question itself is superfluous” (Horkheimer 2004:3).
Adorno and Horkheimer hence begin to explore how people rationalize their domination by external forces through the reasoning of ‘grand narratives’, which the authors dub ‘false reasoning’ - a point later reiterated influentially by Lyotard (Trey 1998:59). On this view, false reasoning gives rise to the belief that society is run in a way that is “falsely perceived as a reflection of some natural, inevitable order” (Fagan 2005). It naturalises social relations, and therefore must be challenged. Therefore, all thought must be examined and criticized, which gives rise to Critical Theory - or deconstruction, as it is more widely termed today (Atkinson 1999). A particular aim of the Frankfurt School is thus to make people aware of how repression is perpetuated, both phylogenetically and ontogenetically, in order that society may rise above their instruments of repression and become free.
This theme of overcoming repression to be free is further expressed in the work of Marcuse, where it takes the form of challenging particular social norms and patterns of thought. However, in Eros and Civilization (1955) Marcuse is reluctant to use the word ‘freedom’ “because it is precisely in the name of freedom that crimes against humanity are being perpetrated” (Marcuse 1974:xiii). There is hence a confused discourse concerning freedom in contemporary society. In Negative Dialectics (1973), Adorno further shows how this confusion regarding freedom is the product of ambivalence in modern society: the Enlightenment was man’s way of controlling nature but man cannot be separated from nature (Fagan 2005). Meanwhile Horkheimer agrees with Freud that there are certain aspects of human existence that “can be shown to be natural properties of the species” (Held 2004:197) and therefore “require no reasons, excuses, or justifications” (Horkheimer cited in Held 2004:197). This reflects a confusion regarding the status of human beings in relationship with nature, which might be seen to make it difficult to make an emancipatory argument pace Marx, that nature can and should be dominated and controlled by humanity in the pursuit of human ends.
This ambivalence concerning dominating nature is a symptom of a wider ambivalence about social power and the role of domination with the work of the Frankfurt School theorists. This can be understood through examining how their work is influenced by the psychoanalyst Sigmund Freud (1856-1939), who argues influentially in his later and characteristically pessimistic work Civilization and its Discontents (1929), that some kind of mechanism of domination is necessary for society to function properly. This is because human beings have naturally aggressive impulses – significantly, sex and violence – that would destroy society if not kept in check by civilizing mechanisms that force them to be expressed in more mediated and controlled forms (Freud 1929:10). Civilization thus precludes the happiness of the individual, but at the same time its structures of domination are necessary to avoid his destruction. This view influenced Marcuse significantly, which frustrates the articulation of a more positive project of wielding social and political power in a collective sense. Hence, for Marcuse, the challenge becomes to release the individual mind from the bondage of ‘false needs’: if this were attained, then revolution would be spontaneous (Marcuse 2010:44). This view is significantly contra Marx, who theorized socialist society as a realm of individual freedom and human flourishing without either the existence or need for domination of one person over another, but rather characterized by man’s domination over nature viz. the conditions of his own existence.
In Eros and Civilization (1974), Marcuse argues that “economic and political dominion depends on the continued (and enlarged) reproduction of the military establishment” (1974:xxiv) and further expands that the prominence of guerrilla warfare in the Global South is due to this part of society not having achieved a basic standard of living (Marcuse, 1974:xvii). Affluent societies repress the growth of the poorest nations in order to perpetuate their military-industrial complex, and in so doing control their own citizens. Hence, military power is seen as a particular problem in itself, rather than understood more widely as the symptom of a broader exercise of social and political power within society.
Horkheimer did not believe that revolution was likely to occur within capitalist society, even though he could foresee the economic collapse of the capitalist system (Held 2004:63). In particular, the later Horkheimer became increasingly disillusioned with the proletariat, arguing that they were not capable of rising up against the domination of capital in revolution. This is perhaps an unfair criticism considering the observation that the working class had been submerged into the capitalist class, and therefore class distinctions are less clear than previously (Held 2004:195). Hence, whilst Marcuse was active in the student protests of the late 1960s, theorizing the students as new agents of radical social transformation, Horkheimer “was not persuaded... by... their invocation of praxis, that is, political action guided by revolutionary theory” (Stirk 1992:180). In this view, Horkheimer follows Marx’s warning that objective social and historical conditions must be right for revolution, otherwise people are merely acting upon utopian ideals (Kilcullen 1996). However, this does not entail that particular, repressive aspects of society were not both challenged and changed by the ‘cultural revolution’ of 1960s America, in which Marcuse was an influential figure.
Adorno is perhaps the theorist who does most to examine ideas for a future society, which he articulates in Negative Dialectics as an enlightened society which “negates the suffering of the least of its members” (Adorno 1973:204). This is strikingly similar to John Rawls’ (1921-2002) theory Justice as Fairness published in A Theory of Justice (1971) in which it is argued that the most just society would be one in which all have access to the same vehicles for self advancement, and that any inequality must mean that the least in society would be better off than they would be under any other set of conditions (Rawls 2001:42-43; Richardson 2005). However, “Adorno [made] the critical objection against optimism that the attempt of ethical theory to eliminate failure and miscarriage, and thus suffering as such, is itself bound to fail” (Menke 2010:145-146). This pessimism about the future, and the potential of people to transform their own circumstances to better the lot of humanity would seem to mark Adorno out as failing to meet the challenge issued by Marx, that philosophy should seek to articulate an idea of radical social transformation, viz. revolution.
In a similar way, it would seem that Marcuse takes a negative view towards the possibility of revolution: “Whereas previous revolutions brought about a larger and more rational development of the productive forces, in the overdeveloped societies of today, revolution would mean reversal of this trend” (Marcuse 1974:xviii). However, it can also be seen that Marcuse aimed to move away from the traditional Marxist conception of proletarian revolution most thoroughly, and instead advocated a technologically advanced society (Marcuse 1965). Marcuse was a “radical idealist” and participated intimately with the New Left during the 1960s and 1970s (Kellner 1998:2) coining phrases such as “we shall overcome” (Marcuse 1974:xx) and “make love, not war” during protests against the Vietnam War (Atkinson 1999). Marcuse was dedicated to a total revolution in theory, yet he advocated that radicalizing students and non-participants in advanced industrial society would cause a gradual change to which the prevailing forces would be unable to react. In this vein, the idea to not participate in the institutions of the day was known as the Great Refusal and was heavily influenced by André Breton (Kellner 1998:6-7).
Atkinson (1999) believes that the Frankfurt School were “cultural revolutionaries” who combined cultural Marxism with the psychoanalytical devices of Sigmund Freud and ultimately brought about the destruction of traditional American family life. It is ironic that Atkinson labels Marcuse et al with indoctrinating the American population from the inside out, when it was the psychological indoctrination via the mass communications system that the Frankfurt School exposed. However, if Atkinson’s views are to be believed then this would make the School’s members some of the most influential revolutionary characters to have ever existed.
This patriarchal system was felt by the School to be the main instrument of repression in society, particularly of women (Schlipphacke 2001). However, Atkinson’s assertion that the New Age Revolutionaries have largely achieved their goal is surely absurd given the continued prevalence of the military and corporate culture within Western civilization. That is not to say that the Frankfurt School have made no inroads, as we have seen the increase in feminism and an increased awareness of the agents of repression amongst the educated classes has increased substantially, but these are still peripheral groups. This position is further refuted by the spread of global capitalism via the Bretton Woods institutions and the increase in inequalities this has caused both between the Global North and Global South and also within Northern hemisphere societies (Karns & Mingst, 2004:23). Kellner (n.d.) argues that a revolutionary culture was seen between the 1960s and 1980s, but since that time the rise in global capitalism has turned society’s focus back onto pleasure, individuality and consumerism – the very concepts of which the Frankfurt School were critical. In this writer’s view, the Frankfurt School’s ultimate achievement was in articulating their vision of a technologically advanced society, based upon what could realistically be achieved (Held 2004:196).
In conclusion, the short answer to Marx’s proclamation of which this essay is the subject is that the Frankfurt School creates a new paradigm in philosophical thinking – Critical Theory. Marx advocates interpreting the world in order to understand the present social conditions and the historical circumstances which cause those social conditions, in order to equip the proletariat with ‘class consciousness’ required for revolution. In a similar vein, the Frankfurt School theorists agree with Marx’s historical materialist view of history and their various works reflect this belief. However, where the Frankfurt School builds upon Marx’s ideas is in their assessment of the impact of the culture industry upon man’s ability to reason. In doing so, they are inspired by the works of Lucáks, Nietzsche and Freud in particular. The late Horkheimer is perhaps less of a revolutionary character than Adorno and Marcuse, having lost faith in the capability of the proletariat to rise up in revolution. For Horkheimer, this pessimism stems both from the disappointment in Soviet communism as well as the insertion of middle class aspirations into the minds of the traditional working class. This is further reiterated by Adorno, particularly in his essay The Culture Industry (1984), wherein he purports that the propaganda disseminated by the mass communications system leads society to believe that the way in which it is run, i.e. the status quo, is due to an inevitable and natural order of things. All three theorists take up the challenge to change the public’s perception of the world by showing the methodologies which the system employs. Meanwhile Marcuse embroils himself deeply with the revolutionary culture of the 1960s and therefore takes up Marx’s challenge with some vigour. Overall, it could be argued that the Frankfurt School hold more firmly to pure Marxist doctrines than do the communists. Yet they expand on his work significantly to take account of developments in political and social life during the twentieth century. From this perspective the Frankfurt School could more accurately be described as social theorists and activists rather than as philosophers. Marx would be very impressed with their efforts.
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