Merely becoming a capitalist society, however, does not necessarily produce a democracy. This was a radical assertion in Moore's time, a deviation from the idyllic image of Papa parliament and Mama merchant going hand in hand. Instead, he argues cogently, it was the alliance between the bourgeoisie and the upper classes against the monarchy that produced a democracy. The Tudors and Stuarts had for a long period of time been fighting a battle for political control with the nobility. The sovereign's interference with the enclosures, which will be discussed below, brought the industrial elite in the towns to the nobility's side, since both were threatened by sanctions against their economic maneuvering (14). The collaboration of the agrarian upper classes and the bourgeoisie in an effort to further their livelihood, Moore argues, culminated in the Puritan Revolution, Charles I’s loss of his head and a defeat of royal absolutism from which the English monarchy never recovered (423-25).
So, the reader concludes, an alliance against the English monarchy between the bourgeoisie and agrarian elite that is interested in commercialization resulted in the eventual reduction of the monarchy's power, and was necessary to forming a parliamentary democracy. But what about the peasants' role in creating this polity? According to Moore, they contribute by being eliminated. The method by which the nobility gradually eased into industrialism was to reclaim the "common," or general farmland used by a peasant village, so as to produce wool (21). The consequences were mass migrations to towns and a constant supply of inexpensive labor for both the urban commercial elite and the nobility, since the remaining rural peasants could no longer support themselves by farming the common (26). Thus "sheep ate men," eliminating any possible peasant response to the social and political appeals of communism or fascism, and at the same time, the English nobility waltzed (relatively easily) into capitalism (426).
England's history concludes, however, not with Moore smiling and spreading his arms wide with a sage smile like that of a wizened storyteller, but with a grim reproving frown. He reminds the reader that, in the case of England for example, "the costs of moderation have been at least as atrocious as those of revolution, perhaps a good deal more" (505). As a strong supporter of democracy, however, he proves to be equally appreciative of the fruits of the English modernization route. To determine whether the benefits reaped from modernization outweigh the cost, and whether a gradual revolution can produce a score card that is at least balanced in the areas of pain and profit, one needs to examine the costs of alternate routes to modernization.
Unfortunately, Moore, though he did conduct an immense amount of research on the subject, did not include chapters either on Germany or Russia. They are, however, included as supplements to the extensive chapters on Japan and China. Moore notes preconditions in feudal and later times that are similar in all these countries. The histories of these four countries reveal a similar negative response to commercialization, a centralized government through which the nobles perpetuate their livelihood and an attempt to maintain very much intact the old feudal positions of authority.
A difficulty in reading Moore's study of fascism is that he seems to have trouble in reconciling some of the differences between the German product and the Japanese, which is not surprising since they differ greatly in their societies' structure and values. For example, in German culture there was no equivalent to the Japanese destitute nobility, the samurai, who Moore claims were influential and occasionally engaged in peasant revolts, but on whom he does not expand (257). He is much more successful in noting the general similarities that existed in feudal times than when attempting to compare both of their immediate entrances into modern times.
Both the Japanese Shogunate and China's agrarian elite perceived a potential threat in the merchant. Bourgeois success in China would injure the scholar-gentry by eroding the system they had developed to justify their privilege--Confucius's teaching and emphasis on tradition--and thus they taxed and manipulated the merchants so as to restrict their power (174-75). In Japan, because of the expensive lifestyles the Shogunate required of members of the court, the nobility found their profits going to the merchants in return for luxuries. They responded by chaining the struggling bourgeoisie in social fetters; the nobility denied them political influence, restricted their trade, and because of an anti-foreign policy, the merchants could not defend themselves with western ideology (253-54). Thus the bourgeoisie were restricted from creating any revolution.
The peasants of early Japan and China, being an equal if not greater threat than the merchants, were also repressed with a series of legal moves and social institutions. This system, which Moore categorized as "labor-repressive," required constant participation by the central authority on the behalf of the aristocracy (434). It is an interesting point, which Moore does not fully develop, that the orchestrators of oppression were much more clearly defined for the Japanese and Chinese peasants, whereas the English nobility, after the enclosures, allowed their views to be mediated through the market. The reader suspects that it is this difference in the treatment of peasants--directly with political authority or indirectly through market mechanisms--that either provides or hinders peasant revolutions, although Moore never formerly addresses this question.
He does, however, examine several important factors that influence the possibility of a peasant revolution, especially after noting that, though the rural lower classes of various societies may suffer equally with each other, only certain conditions prompt such a revolution. After discussing the similarities between the Chinese and Japanese Shogunate’s treatment of the rural underclass, he is prompted to consider the two important points on which they differ: the relationships that the agrarian upper classes maintain with the bourgeoisie and peasant. For example, the Japanese government and landed elite, called daimyo, eventually exhibited a strong interest in modernization in response to threat of western capitalists--but modernization without a redistribution of wealth or change in status (244). Thus, in the later Meiji period the daimyo condescended to ally with the weak bourgeoisie, who leaned on them for political protection, against a peasant insurrection (432; 438). The Chinese, however, so strongly resisted the commercial influence of the West that there were virtually no indigenous merchants to collaborate with, since any talents that could be exercised in trade were channeled into the aristocratic bureaucracy. Thus the nobility faced alone the peasant revolution that took place (478).
Yet the Chinese peasants, who were only indirectly forced to bear the brunt of modernization, unlike the Japanese peasants, were the ones who successfully revolted. Moore ponders this dilemma and eventually provides a solution: the Japanese aristocracy had managed to develop a tight system of control over their peasants, whereas the Chinese gentry had overlooked the importance of such a system. Moore has determined three important preconditions that will regulate discontent: the intensity of a binding relationship between the peasant and landlord, the class and property divisions within the peasant class itself, and the extent to which a peasant community can be united (468). While the Japanese aristocracy attended to all three of these factors, the Chinese nobility were removed from contact or even a supervisory position over their peasants (201). Further, while the Japanese aristocracy carefully skimmed off the upper layer of the peasantry whenever wealthy and potentially discontent peasants ever rose into view, making them into new class landlords, the Chinese allowed the peasantry no opportunity for advancement--no incentive for an increase in production (274).
The Chinese left the peasant community intact, although disgruntled and in constant competition with each other over limited resources (222). However, the Japanese, in the Meiji period, transformed their peasants into tenant farming communities and established the pao system, which was unsuccessful in China but adopted by the Japanese aristocracy, this system operated with group punishment if any individual shirked his tax duties (260). Thus the daimyo were able to keep a tight reign on their peasantry, whereas the Chinese peasants were aggravated and with little contact or sympathy for their landlord.
Even with their nerves rubbed thin, however, Moore doubts that peasant revolution was imminent. He claims that the Japanese invasion of China in the 1930’s was the "decisive ingredient" because it prompted the agricultural elite to abandon their land holdings and move to the towns, leaving the peasants to their own devices, and also unified the lower-classes against the "extermination campaigns" that the Japanese military pursued (223). It is here that one glimpses a flaw in Moore's arguments, not because he may necessarily be wrong about what triggered the Communist revolution, but because it is one of the few moments when he recognizes the importance of a country's relationship to the world. Often what is lacking in Moore's book is attention paid to the role timing and external forces had on the modernization path of a nation. In this instance he notes the importance of the Japanese invasion; however, for the most part, Moore ignores the world systems theory and therefore neglects the influence of core and periphery countries on each other. Moore concedes that England, for example, being the first to industrialize, held an advantage in the market for a period of time, but as other countries followed suit its success diminished (439). How much of England's "peaceful revolution"--a term he argues is untrue--is due to its head start? Would it have chosen a different path if other countries had modernized sooner? It is hard to imagine the English not creating a parliamentary democracy, but the extent a revolution's success is owed to timing and its relationship to the world is a significant factor, and one that does not only appear in Chinese history but needs to be examined thoroughly in all countries studied.
The universality and insightfulness of Social Origins is especially apparent when one recognizes its relevance to modern events. What has hindered democracy in Africa and South America, or aided the development of reactionary parties in these countries, bears a striking resemblance with what hindered democracy in China or culminated in a reactionary response in Japan of some of the agrarian elite. Unfortunately, what one wonders when one recognizes the wisdom of Moore's conclusions, is whether he is correct in stating that "the costs of moderation have been at least as atrocious as those of revolution, perhaps a good deal more." Such a prospect bodes for a dismal future, for, if no state can escape the contagion of modernization, whether a country confronts the monster and escapes with scars, or stagnates and suffers the consequences, as in the case of India, it will still be racked with pain and rage with fever. It is for future nations' sake that one hopes Moore is in error concerning this point and that a cure can be found which alleviates the pain of modernization.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Moore Jr., Barrington. Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy: Lord and Peasant in the Making of the Modern World. Boston: Beacon Press, 1966.
Stone, Lawrence. "News From Everywhere." Review of Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy: Lord and Peasant in the Making of the Modern World by Barrington Moore Jr. New York Review of Books 24 Aug.1967: 31-35.
*Moore defines modernization on two dimensions. In agriculture it is "the extension of market relationships over a much wider area than before and the replacement of subsistence farming more and more by production for the market" (467). Politically, "successful modernization involves the establishment of peace and order over a wide area, the creation of a strong central government" (468).
