Peloponnesian Politics: What can the events between the First Macedonian War and the Achaean War tell us about inconsistencies in Roman foreign policy in the Peloponnese and Peloponnesian reactions to it.

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AH7301        Student No. 061867039        10th June 2011

Peloponnesian Politics: What can the events between the First Macedonian War and the Achaean War tell us about inconsistencies in Roman foreign policy in the Peloponnese and Peloponnesian reactions to it.

Introduction:

The Roman world ventured into the Greek world in 229 BC during the First Illyrian War to stop Illyrian pirates sabotaging trading routes across the Adriatic, which led the Republic to establish a protectorate over Greek cities in southern Illyria and Epirus. Roughly eighty years and four Macedonian wars later, the Romans had established hegemony within Greece proper. From such humble beginnings, with a desire to protect Greek autonomy, the situation had turned itself on its head when L. Mummius Achaecus sacked the city of Corinth, defeating the Achaean League in the eponymous war of 146 BC. Over the course of those eighty or so years, the Roman Senate and its legates in the field embarked upon many diplomatic embassies within the Peloponnese, arbitrating between many disputes that arose from there, involving powers like Sparta as well as the Achaean League. I should like to explore Rome’s aims behind its diplomatic interventions in the Peloponnese between the Achaean League and the rest of the Peloponnese, the aims of the Achaean League and the other Peloponnesian polities’ response to Roman and analyse discrepancies in Polybius’ account of the events.

Rome’s aims in the Peloponnese for the Achaean League:

Contact between the Achaean League and the Roman Republic was first established after the demise of the Illyrian War in 228 BC. Roman envoys were sent to the Aetolian and Achaean Leagues respectively to announce this victory with another envoy sent to Athens after the swearing of the peace treaty (Polybius 2.12.4-8; Eckstein 2008: 41). However, these initial contacts were not followed up; no permanent treaties were signed (Eckstein 2008: 74). Presumably, the purpose of these envoys was to seek approval and recognition of their endeavours against the piratical Illyrians. Nothing more is heard between these two until the Macedonian wars. The Achaean League threw its lot in with Philip V of Macedon during the First Macedonian War (Eckstein 2008: 113).

By the Second Macedonian War in 200 BC, Rome had freed up its forces by defeating Hannibal in the Second Punic War and thus could exercise more force against Philip, which did not just include using its armies, but diplomacy too. The Romans actually managed to convince the Achaean League to change sides and to support Rome (Eckstein 2008: 285). This was a masterstroke; in one fell swoop, Macedon was alienated of allies and Philip was surrounded. The addition of the Achaean League to its alliance meant that Greece in 197 BC was ‘friendly’ – a good position to be in (Eckstein 2008: 285). The alliance with the Achaean League was made official when Achaean envoys visited Rome in the winter of 198/7 (Livy 32.23.1-2; Polyb. 18.10.11, 42.6).

Roman foreign policy seems to have been conducted by those commanding legions during this period. The Romans, or more specifically Pro-consul Flamininus and a decemvir, rewarded allies in the war with territory – the Achaean League was given  possession of Corinth, making it the most powerful state in the Peloponnese; simultaneously  many polities formerly under Macedonian influence were ‘freed’ (Polyb. 18.47.6-7; Eckstein 2008: 288). The idea behind this was to create a balance of power – though the Achaean League seems to have become Rome’s main ally in Greece at the time, and profited from it via Corinth, Rome must have recognised the danger of giving one state too much power whilst celebrating Greek freedom at the Isthmian games of 196: interstate freedom was to be backed by Rome (Eckstein 2008: 289).

Despite this, Roman forces withdrew from the region in 194 BC, which has been interpreted by many scholars to mean that they exhibited a lack of interest in Greek affairs  but really it was just a continuation of policy (Eckstein 2008: 285, 292). In appointing Flamininus as pro-consul, the senate opted to view Greece as a sphere of interest (Eckstein 2008: 298), yet maintaining a loose alliance towards friendly Greek states which Flamininus viewed as the best way to gain Greek support for any future conflicts (Eckstein 2008: 299, citing Eckstein 1987: 311-15). This appeared to work with the Achaean League who appealed to Rome for help against Spartan aggression under Nabis. Flamininus called a conference of Greek states in 195 BC to gain support for Roman military intervention against Nabis (Eckstein 2008: 286).

The Roman-Syrian War of 192-188 BC saw the Romans call upon Achaean help again as Antiochus III of the Seleucid Empire marched an army through Greece, forcibly persuading states to his cause (Eckstein 2008: 332). This was understandable, since Rome’s former allies in the Hellenes were being recruited under duress by Antiochus. That said, Achaean forces spent more time conquering the Peloponnese than helping Rome against Antiochus. Flamininus complained about the Achaean League’s actions against Elis, Sparta and Messene but ultimately the League went unpunished and was even rewarded with a permanent treat of alliance in 192/1 BC (Eckstein 2008: 332-3). These territorial gains were formally accepted by Rome at the Peace of Apamea in 188 BC, which marked the ending of the war with Antiochus. Presumably, this was done in return for Achaean assistance (Livy 36.31.5-9; 36.35.7; Errington 2008: 219). Once again, Rome found itself at the head of a coalition of Greek states, but the treaty with the Achaean League must have implied that the Achaeans would fight alongside Rome.

The alliance was practical, since a number of Greek states fell to Antiochus during the previous war, at least Rome could ensure one power remained loyal in the region; hence putting up with Achaean aggression was a small price to pay for a guaranteed ally in Hellas. Hereafter follows a series of attempts by the senate and visiting embassies in the 180s BC to intervene in Achaean aggression. For example, the senate refused to aid the Achaean League in its suppression of a Messenian revolt in 182-1 BC. The result of Roman intervention in Greece and of Achaean aggression in the Peloponnese meant that the senate and its various embassies became the de facto receiver of complaints from Messenian and Spartan diplomats. Over time, the Roman senate and the legates viewed themselves as having the right to mediate and modify Achaean actions (Eckstein 2008: 351). The senators urged the League to return Spartan exiles and to stop executions after they had occupied Sparta, which Eckstein has interpreted as the Romans attempting to advise the Achaeans so that they might lead to better relations between the Spartans and Achaeans (2008: 351).

The senate often urged the League to refer such disputes to them instead of acting on their own. However, during this decade, Roman advice was largely ignored and Achaean actions went mostly unpunished, again (Eckstein 2008: 351-2). A demonstrable example was the crushing of a Messenian revolt, where Roman attempts at mediation failed yet again and were even covered up when the senate assured the League that they had done their job as allies by preventing Messenian rebels from accessing anti-war materials (Polyb. 23.17.3; Eckstein 2008: 352). The senate wanted to solve disputes between Greek states, but upon receiving representatives from the Greeks, the senate deferred the matter to a select few senators or Greek mediators. Rome seemed to be far more interested in Greek states recognising their status rather than exercising control (Eckstein 2008: 359). Thus Rome’s ineffectual arbitration in the Peloponnese must have led leading Achaean League members to think that they had a right to do what they want and Rome was maintaining their status quo; this was altogether not surprising since Rome had effectively forged the status quo.

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The 170s BC marked a different approach in Roman diplomacy in Greek affairs. The long-standing aim of Rome was to maintain a balance of power in the Greek sphere and to prevent one power from being too powerful. In 171 BC, Rome deemed Macedon to threaten stability in the area and once it was beaten, Rome split it up into four client republics (Eckstein 2008: 365-6). Like the last Macedonian war, foreign policy was dictated by those using the sword! Roman commanders actively supported the creation of pro-Roman factions in polities (Polyb. 24.10.3-7; Eckstein 2008: 365-6). The new, post-war ...

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