Problem of justifying induction and Humes solution
In An Inquiry Concerning Human Understanding, Hume states that all knowledge of the external world comes from perception and that reason depends on experience. Through observations, induction has worked in the past, but does not indicate that it will work in the future. For this reason, it is difficult for one to justify induction without using inductive reasoning. It seems the only way to justify the common inductive reasoning and similar inductive reasoning is through induction; hence, the justification is circular. This is often called the problem of induction. Hume provides a solution to this problem which at the end still seems to be problematic. I will begin by clarified the two forms of reasoning—inductive and deductive. I will then explicate Hume’s claim on how all reasoning is based on experience. This will lead as to the problem of justifying induction. I will then present Hume’s solution to the problem. It is through custom and habit that grounds the bases of all reasoning. I will then contend Hume’s conclusion in justifying induction. If induction cannot be justify with reason, then induction lacks evidentiary value. Next, I will then attempt to solve the problem, using Garrett’s claim, by understanding Hume’s argument to be descriptive rather than normative. Lastly, I will then conclude that Hume’s argument is still a challenge to the knowledge of human life. In order to understand Hume’s position, one must understand the knowledge of inductive and deductive reasoning. In deductive reasoning is used, a valid argument is when one assumes the premises are true and agrees with the conclusion. The conclusion does not have more information than the premises. The conclusion does not go beyond the premises. The conclusion, in a sense, is already embodied in the premises. The subject of geometry can be used to illustrate this concept. If one follows the laws to a mathematical question, one will arrive upon the right answer. On the other hand, inductive inferences are the inferences that are not deductive. There are some connection between the premises and the conclusions; however, the conclusion is not followed by the premises. Instead, the conclusion makes probable inferences to it. The generalization made by Newton on the force of gravity is an example. He observed apples and other things falling to conclude with that generalization. He did not have all the possible observations. He was reasoning beyond his premises through certain observations and data. He concluded with the generalization that all bodies behaved in such a way. It is reasoning from the premises which the conclusion goes
beyond the premises, but the premises make the conclusion probable or very plausible. Without the actual experience, reason cannot be able to draw the inference concerning the matter of fact. Moreover, Hume’s view of human nature must be understood to understand his justification on induction. He believes that “all reasonings concerning matter of fact seem to be founded on the relation of Cause and Effect (Hume, 1995, pp. IV, 2).” When we examine the notion of ‘A’ causing ‘B’, what do we actually find when we are recalling ourselves critically or analytically to the sense impressions we find? Hume does ...
This is a preview of the whole essay
beyond the premises, but the premises make the conclusion probable or very plausible. Without the actual experience, reason cannot be able to draw the inference concerning the matter of fact. Moreover, Hume’s view of human nature must be understood to understand his justification on induction. He believes that “all reasonings concerning matter of fact seem to be founded on the relation of Cause and Effect (Hume, 1995, pp. IV, 2).” When we examine the notion of ‘A’ causing ‘B’, what do we actually find when we are recalling ourselves critically or analytically to the sense impressions we find? Hume does not believe in causality since “every effect is a distinct event from its cause (Hume, 1995, pp. IV,5).” Hume says that we have no experience of causality, instead we have the experience of continuity. He uses the example of the billiard ball (Hume, 1995, pp. IV, 5). There are two experiences that exist if you shoot the cue ball to hit one of the stripes: (1) the cue ball moving (2) and the stripe ball will move as well once it gets hit. This illustrates that there is nothing more than the continuity of sense impressions temporary relating. Causality is not available to experience. It is a complex idea which one abstractly or falsely derives from our experience. Furthermore, the idea of cause and effect must exist to reason inductively. Otherwise, one would not be able to connect heat with fire or instant pain. This idea is not developed by reason but by experience (Hume, 1995, pp. VI, 3). They are primitive in a sense. The example of how man would discover, at first, through experience if the light and warmth of fire would hurt him (Hume, 1995, pp. IV, 3). One would not find any arguments by reason because it is not based on reason. It is because of this experience to have this reason. It is not possible when one tries to justify the ideas with reason because experience is already in your mind. The idea of inductive reasoning is based on experience. Without this experience, there would not be inductive reasoning. The experience we have shape the inductive reasoning. Consequently, the natural world is available to knowledge by the senses. “[O]ur knowledge of… [cause and effect relation] is derived entirely from experience; and that all our experimental conclusion proceed upon the supposition that the future will be conformable to the past (Hume, 1995, pp. VI, 8).” He believes that all knowledge is a posteriori knowledge. It can articulate uniform features of the world that is provided to us with experience. The idea when an object is in motion strikes another object will cause a certain type of collusion. If we assume that perception is the face of all knowledge, we will come to the conclusion that this so called uniformity of the natural world is just a kind of gathering of prior experiences into what we like call laws of nature. “Nature will always maintain her rights, and prevail in the end over any abstract reasoning whatsoever (Hume, 1995, pp. V, 3-4).” No matter what philosophy we used, the nature will not change. The laws of nature are at best defined as law like generalization based upon gathering of previous experience. The question that may arise is, “how does one know the uniformity of nature is going to stay that way?” This indeed will lead us to the problem of induction. Hume does not state that induction is not justifiable but specifically it cannot be justified by reasoning. There are many inductive inferences that are considered to be good ones, including numerous scientific inferences. If one cannot justify something that it reflects the knowledge of our nature to use inductive reasoning. The problem is that it becomes a threat to human knowledge. One may justify induction with the future is similar to the past in the relevant senses or even the “it always has been the case” rule. One is using the same type of inductive reasoning to justify one type of inductive reason. This is not a strong argument and leads to an infinite regress. It shows that the belief of one is something that one cannot trust. The knowledge of one’s beliefs become shakier than ever. One cannot predict from mere observe experience because the consistency is based on that experience. Future experience can differ from the past. The generalization is making a prior claim that the natural world is uniform instability to one’s experience. Hence, one must prove this claim or else one cannot use it as one’s premise. In addition, induction is a form of reasoning that does not perceive first principles but instead perceives from the gather of evidence to come to a conclusion. Hume used the belief that the sun will rise tomorrow. The uniformity which one observes cannot be use to predict the uniformity that will become. Hence, the belief cannot rationally be validated because the bases for any claims that are made in favour of that being true are entirely derive from our past experiences that the sun has risen every single morning in our entire lives and throughout history, but up till now. All that is said is based on our experience to conclude with it always will. When we find our self temporary, we are unable to rationally predict because the sum total of our knowledge is derive from our past experience. The future experience is beyond what we can see. Although the belief that the sun will rise tomorrow is not based on rational, it is at best customary expectation. This directs us to Hume’s solution to the problem of induction. Custom rather than reason is “the great guide in human nature (Hume, 1995, pp. V, 4).” Human beings are exposed to the mind and shape their mind in a connection with cause and effect. This is based on inductive reasoning. We are basing it on necessary connections between things that are based on exposure to experience and are not subjective to reason. “Without the influence of custom, we should be entirely ignorant of every matter of fact beyond what is immediately present to the memory and senses (Hume, 1995, pp. V, 4).” There is no thought or reason if there is no experience. To reiterate, induction is not justified by reason. By the time one is reasoning one has already accustomed to custom and habit. To question is to think, one must have this foundation before one can question. Custom and habit of the mind is the bases of all reasoning and this determine the foundation of when one affirms something as reasonable. We have a perfectly natural expectation that things which both have gone the same way will continue to go the same way in the future. One may feel that a problem for induction still remains, namely how induction cannot be based by reason. Hume’s argument is commonly considered as “the claim that inductive arguments never provide any real ‘evidence (Garnett, 1997, p. 77).’” The justification of inductive reasoning tends to lead to an infinite regress; hence, there is no way to justify induction by reason. The traditional skeptical interpretation of Hume’s conclusion is that if “inductive inferences are not ‘determined by reason’ is true, claims “that induction is unreasonable…in the sense of having no evidentiary value (Garnett, 1997, p. 82).” However, Hume believes that “reasonings will be reliable if we did not already accept that conclusion in practice” which makes reason simply a name that is generally used for making inferences (Garnett, 1997, p. 92). In order to ask if induction is justified, one must have the idea of what is justitication. When one asks about whether induction is justified, you already presuppose your thought. There is a certain meaning to the word of justification by assuming you already appeal to custom and habit. Once you assume the foundation in order to understand what reason is, induction is the result of the induction, it is the same kind of thought. Hume claims “that we are not caused to engage in induction by grasping an independent argument supporting its reliability, because there is no such argument available (Garnett, 1997, p. 93).” This explains Hume’s use of ‘reason’ as referring to all arguments and inferences (Garnett, 1997, p. 93). Hence, Hume’s argument does not directly entail that induction lacks evidentiary value. Moreover, another response to resolve the problem has emerged. It is to deny the concept of Hume’s ‘reason’ as essentially normative (Millican, 1997, p. 12). According to Garrett, he resolved Hume’s argument by arguing that the conclusion is rather descriptive than normative (Millican, 1997, p. 14). It is not a direct denial of the evidential value of inductive inferences on any conception of them, but is instead a straightforward negative conclusion, within cognitive psychology, about the causes of the mechanism of inductive inference (Millican, 1997, p. 14).” Hence, there is no conflict between proving that induction is not grounded by reason and Hume’s inductive method of reasoning. Even so, Garrett’s interpretation entails difficulties. The problem of description is not to show that our inferential practices are reliable, but simply be able to describe them as they stand (Lipton, 1998, p. 418). It is true that this will raise no general problem of infinite regress since justification is not the problem in description. “In practice, however, we usually have the opposite problem: we can not come up with even one description that would yield the patterns we observe (Lipton, 1998, p. 420).” Habit or Custom is the formation of Hume’s idea of induction. It can help one to predict what one will do on the basis on what one has done in the past, but it will not tell what one is going to do in the future. Therefore, Hume’s problem of induction is not close to being resolved. In An Inquiry Concerning Human Understanding, Hume states that experience is where all knowledge of the external world comes. Reason depends on experience. Hume suggested that the uniformity of nature is what governs the principle of all our inductive inferences. If one can show the nature is indeed uniform, one can justified that the unobserved world is much like what one has already observed (Lipton, 1998, p. 416). The only way to do that is to use an inductive argument which leaves to an infinite regress. The problem of induction still exists, though many philosophers have attempted to resolve it. Works Cited Garnett, D. (1997). Reason and Induction. In Cognition and Commitment in Hume’s Philosophy (pp. 76-95). Oxford: Oxford University Press. Hume, D. (1995). An Inquiry Concerning Human Understanding. New Jersey: Prentice-Hall. Lipton, P. (1998). "Induction," in M. Curd and J.A. Cover (eds.). In Philosophy of Science: The Central Issues (pp. 412-25). W.W. Norton & Company. Millican, P. (1997). “Induction”, in Don Garrett and Edward Barbanell (eds.). In Encyclopaedia of Empiricism (pp. 180-8). Greenwood Press.
