Neurobiological View
One main strand of the mind/body issue regarding the definition of consciousness is the biological explanation. Humphrey (1986, 1993) argues that if consciousness is the answer to anything at all, it must be to a biological challenge which humans need to understand, respond to and manipulate the behavior of other human beings. Therefore the use of human consciousness is to enable each human being to understand what it feels like to be human and so to make sense of himself and other people from the inside. A major method of studying the brain is to monitor it’s electrical activity using the elector-enephalogram recordings. It can be used to throw light on consciousness because particular patterns of electrical activity are correlated with other indices of arousal and alertness. Another technique for investigating consciousness arose from the brain studies of Penfield and Rasmussen (1950), who showed that stimulating different areas of the brain could produce distinctive forms of behavior or experience in a conscious patient. Penfield proposed that the control of consciousness was mainly located in the thalamus and the upper part of the brain stem. But it is not really possibly to determine exactly what removal of a particular part of the brain means for a certain function; the area might simply be part of a more complex process, rather that being the site in the brain where that particular functions is localised. In support of the idea that consciousness is more concerned with the overall functioning of the brain, Gazzaniga and Sperry (1967) conducted a number of split-brain studies, which showed that the two halves of the brain appear to be able to act more or less independently, and that each seems to have a distinct form of consciousness. Using the biological explanation to define consciousness would be that we are a set of cells and our brain is made up of neural activity. Our sense of self, consciousness and anything spiritual is simply the output of brain activity.
In 1961 Wilder Penfield observed mind acting independently of the brain under controlled experimental conditions that were reproducible at will. His subject was an epileptic patient whose brain had been surgically exposed in the temporal area of one hemisphere. The “trigger” was stimulation of the cortex with a single electrode using a 60-cycle 2 volt current. There are therefore many demonstrable mechanisms in the brain. They work for a purpose of the mind automatically. When called upon – but what agency is it that calls upon these mechanisms, choosing are rather than another? Is it another mechanism or there is a mind something of different essence? It is clear that Penfield’s epileptic subject had not only a brain capable of mechanistic manipulation but also a “mind of his own” by which a contralateral area could be ordered to work at cross purposes. Here we are tempted to resort to a dualistic model to explain consciousness, taking into account not merely a physical brain but some kind of independent nonphysical reality that interacts with the brain, and possibly in the brain, and yet not of it.
Phenomenological View
The phenomenal concept of mind is a concept of mind as conscious experience, and of a mental state as a consciously experiences mental state. Descartes took a phenomenological view of consciousness. Armstrong and Malcome (1984) believed ‘Descartes held that the essence of mind is consciousness’ (p.121). By doubting everything that he knew, including his own senses, Descartes concluded that his ability to doubt proved that he was able to think. This meant that his existence as a conscious being was therefore self evident. However, his existence as a thinking being was not dependent on any material thing, such as body are two distinct substance which exist independently of each other. Lankoff and Johndon (1999) states ‘What emerged from Descartes’ philosophy was a new metaphoric view of mind as representing in some “inner” realm the objects existing in the “external” world’ (p. 391), the idea that we only ever have direct access to sense experience, never to the external world and that physical objects can be described purely in terms of patterns of actual and possible sense experience.
Dualists View
Dualism involves a belief in the existence of a non-physical substance: the mental. A dualist typically believes that body and mind are distinct substances which interact with each other but remain separate. Mental processes, such as thinking, are not the same as physical ones, such as brain cells firing; mental processes occur in the mind, not in the body. The mind is not a living brain. The spiritual explanation of dualist Descartes (1641) can be used to try and understand and define consciousness. He pointed out that, although we cannot know for certain whether this experience is a dream, we do know for certain that it exists. Here he argues that he could not be certain as to whether he is dreaming or awake which relates to issues of consciousness. Descartes (1641) believed ‘I think therefore I am’, he is aware of himself therefore exists. This means that having a body has no function in terms of consciousness, and implies a separate entity to the biological brain. Descartes believed that the mind and body are joined by God ‘when nerves which are in the feet are violently or more that usually moved, their movement, passing through the medulla of the spine to the inmost parts of the brain, gives a sign to the mind which makes it feel somewhat, to wit, pain, as though in the foot, by which the mind is excited to do its utmost to remove the cause of the evil as dangerous and hurtful to the foot. It is true that God could have constituted the nature of man in such a way that this same movement in the brain would have conveyed something quite different to the mind’ Haldane & Ross (1955) for example, it might have produced consciousness of itself either in so far as it in the brain, or as it is in the foot, or as it is in some other place between the foot and the brain, or it might finally have produces consciousness of anything else whatsoever; but none of all this would have contributed so well to the conservation of the body. Ryle ridicules Descartes’ view as “The Ghost in the Machine” and claims that Descartes commits a basic logical mistake, a “category mistake”, like thinking that a university is a building in addition to the other college buildings. To Descartes the mind and body are separate entities which interact in a mysterious way and that consciousness is unrelated to physical processes. Therefore consciousness and sense of self are special ‘stuff’ that science cannot explain. A strong motive for believing dualism to be true is a difficulty most of us have in seeing how a purely physical thing, such as the brain, could give rise to the complex patterns of feeling and thought which we call consciousness. How could something purely physical feel melancholy, or appreciate a painting? Such questions give dualism an initial plausibility as a solution to the mind/body problem. However there are a number of powerful criticisms of it as a theory. One criticism sometimes leveled at mind/body dualism is that it does not really help us to understand the nature of the mind. All it tells us is that there is a non-physical substance in each of us which thinks, dreams and experiences. Warburton (1994) alleged ‘a non-physical mind couldn’t be investigated directly: in particular, it couldn’t be investigated scientifically because science only deals with the physical world’ (p. 128). Therefore all we could examine would be its effects on the world.
Monoists View
Monoists assume that only the physical has reality or that we can substantiate neither mind nor body, and only sensory impressions exist. Therefore man has been held to be essentially an electrochemical machine. ‘The self-conscious mind is not a viewer of the screen of the brain. Mind is merely an extension of the mechanism of the brain and entirely dependent upon it’ Custance (1997). Such a view is by definition monoistic: the brain acts upon the mind, which is a mere extension of itself, but the mind has no power to act upon the brain. The dualist, by contrast, takes the position that interaction is possible both ways, the mind acting upon the brain and the brain in certain ways limiting and channeling, and therefore acting upon mind. One might argue that the mind was an active independent agent, scanning the screened program which was stored in the brain.
Materialists View
Monoists view suggests that “all is mind” and the materialists view suggests that “all is body”. Materialists interpretation of consciousness is based on its recognition as a function of the human brain, the essence of which lies in the reflection and constructive-creative transformation of the world. ‘Materialist view suggests that all is body’ Mobius (1999) and they approach consciousness as a physical problem from a scientific perspective, when it becomes a natural phenomenon which is extremely complicated, but which will one day, be understood. Boodin (1950) a materialist believed ‘If consciousness were a form of energy or substance, it should at least be comparable to other forms’ therefore it should produce discernible effects and be capable of being measured.
Epiphenomenologocalists View
Epiphenomenalism’s arguments sparked discussions about whether our mental influence on the physical realm is merely an illusion. The notion that our conscious thoughts have an effect on physical events was compared to a child sitting in a passenger seat with a toy steering wheel, pretending to drive a car which is controlled by someone else, Papineau and Selina (p. 66). Another discussion revolved around Epiphenomenalism’s implications that there could be a Zombie with no consciousness that would behave just as an individual with consciousness. Chalmers speculated that if David Chalmers’ Zombie were to exist, it would talk just the same about consciousness even though it has none to speak of in reality. Another example would be of watching a movie, stating that when an individual is so engaged in a movie they feel as though they become the character, even though they have no influence on their actions whatsoever. Using the epiphenomenological explanation for consciousness Huxley (1874) proposed that the brain can operate without any need for mind at all, he also described the brain as a factory and consciousness as the steam the factory causes. The epiphenomenalists point out that there is little evidence of conscious involvement in any of the processes occurring in the body or brain. To emphasis this lack of involvement in the processes of life, the mind was described by Ryle (1949) as being a ‘ghost in the machine’ of the brain that appears to have no function. The epiphenomenological explanation has been supported by experiments such as those performed by Libet (1993) which seem to show that we are conscious of events and decisions after they have happened. Therefore one may argue consciousness is a by-product of having a brain and therefore is not important. Epiphenomenalism has little plausibility as a theory of mind. It raises as many difficult questions as it answers. Not least of the problems associated with it makes free will an impossibility: we can never really choose to act, all we can have is an illusion of acting from choice. And why does causation take place only in one direction, physical causes having mental effects, but never vice versa?
Qualia
Qualia is one of the main distinguishing features of consciousness therefore it is important to discuss it in relation to the definition of consciousness. The feature qualia is the experience of sensory and emotional mental events and states. Alter (2000) believed ‘Mental states with qualia include: bodily sensations such as pains, itches, and or orgasms; and perceptual experiences such as seeing, hearing, and hallucinating. Candidates for other states with qualia include at least: emotions such as lust, fear, and grief; moods such as depression, euphoria, and anxiety; thoughts one thinks silently but explicitly; perceptions of sentences of a language one understands; and cognitive attitudes such as desire, regret, and even belief’. Therefore qualia describes the essence of experience and feeling that cannot be quantified and cannot be broken down into further categories. There have been experiments about qualia, Frank Jackson’s (1982) case of Mary the brilliant scientist. Mary is raised in a black-and-white room, but learns all the physical information about human color vision by watching lectures in black-and-white television. Then she leaves the room and sees colors for the first time. Intuitively, it would seem that she thereby learns something new. For example, she learns what it is like to see red. So, Jackson concludes, there is non-physical information about qualia. On the other hand some such as Dennett (1991) question whether one can learn all the physical information without experiencing color firsthand. Dennett even recommends nothing less than the view that ‘there is no such properties as qualia’.
Language
Julian James’ book The Bicameral Mind and the Origin of Consciousness argues that language is consciousness. His arguments have met considerable criticism from many scientists. Physicist Roger Penrose, in particular, argues against language being consciousness. He quotes Albert Einstein,
‘The words of the language, as they are written or spoken, do not seem to play any role in my mechanism of thought. The psychical entities which seem to serve as elements of thought are certain signs and more or less clear images which can be voluntarily reproduced and combined….The above mentioned elements are, in my case, of visual and some muscular type. Conventional words or other signs have to be sought for laboriously only in a second stage, when the mentioned associative play is sufficiently established and can be reproduced at will’.
Damato (2005) believes hand in hand with the development of language is the development of the consciousness ‘Consciousness has developed only under pressure of the need for communication’ (p.354). Therefore human beings are rather weak animals; our survival depends on consequently the use of our consciousness in relation to language and symbols. Also Spirkin (2005) believes that consciousness is always a verbally expressed reflection and if there is no language there can be no consciousness, ‘no deaf mutes or blind-deaf mutes who have received even a little training would deny this general principle: they have their own special language. And only out of ignorance can it be maintained that these people think barely on the basis of visual images’ (p.8). Therefore, the important question is, is language necessary for consciousness? The whole essence of human being, including his consciousness, is communicative by its very nature. And the ability defines the essence of consciousness and also its vehicles, the individual and society.
Artificial Intelligence
One of the most difficult problems in artificial intelligence is that of consciousness. A consciousness gives us feelings and makes us aware of our own existence. But scientists have found it difficult getting robots to carry out even the simplest of cognitive tasks. Types of thought experiment which have been used are the concept of the zombie, which is in most ways like a human, but it is not conscious; the idea of the human as a computer and the concept of a brain whose parts are replaced gradually with silicone chips. Silby proposed that an android might be constructed whose brain is functionally identical to ours. Although intuitively one might feel that it did not experience qualia, he concludes that ‘if the android’s brain was functionally identical to our human brains, it would be conscious (in so far we are conscious)’. Chalmers (1996) also would subscribe to the view that ‘given any system that has the same fine-grained functional organization will have qualitatively identical experiences’ (p.249). Alan Turing in 1950 invented a test whose result could be used to determine whether, in any practical sense, a machine could be said to be conscious. The test is quiet simple. You enter a room and encounter two terminals: one connects with a computer and the other interfaces with a person who types responses. The goal of the test is for you to determine which terminal is connected with the computer. You are allowed to ask questions, make assertions, question feelings and motivations for as long as you wish. If you fail to determine which terminal is communicating with the computer or guess that the computer is the human, the computer has passed the test and can be said to be ‘conscious’. Initial efforts to create computers with mind-like reasoning have failed miserably. Many researchers now believe that part of the reason for this failure was that traditional computers function in a way very different from the brain and emulating this with artificial neural networks. Rey (1997) specifies how a machine might operate in a way which was intentional ‘on suitably restricted environments’ (p.465). He suggests that a computer could be programmed to experience for example, colors, and even to ‘believe’ this it is conscious. This does open up a debate about whether it would indeed be conscious or whether something extra which might call life is essential to consciousness. It certainly complicates attempts at the definition of consciousness. In general then, the idea is that consciousness is just a by-product of any sufficiently complex brain, and artificial intelligence engineers need not try to isolate and recreate it specifically, it will emerge automatically as needed. If on assumes, on the other hand, that consciousness is not much a by-product, then an additional question is whether or not it is possible to computationally define, and simulate it. Thus, in asking whether computers can think, we must inevitably turn to the question of whether thinking computers would actually be conscious? In other words, at the same point in the enterprise of artificial intelligence it becomes important to define the relationship between consciousness and intelligence. For example, is consciousness a necessary condition for intelligent systems or would intelligent systems necessarily display consciousness?
Altered States of Consciousness – Sleep
We try to understand consciousness by examining the altered states of consciousness. The first altered state of consciousness is sleep. On average, we sleep for a third of our lives and so it must have an important function. Green (1987) identified three types of hypotheses which have been put forward to explain why people and animals sleep. The physiological hypotheses argue that the main function of sleep is that of physical restoration of the body, after the day’s activity. Psychological hypotheses argue that the purpose of sleep are to do with processing and storing the experiences of the daytime. And ecological hypotheses are to do with the functions of sleep concerned with the survival of the species and its relationships with other organisms. Berger (1929) and Dement and Kleitman (1957) used the EEG to show the different levels of consciousness we experience through sleep. We can measure five stages of sleep including rapid eye movement and we can measure the fact that we are still alert during sleep. REM is characterized by a highly aroused internal state and yet the body is almost paralyzed. Dement and Kleitman (1957) found that sleepers who were woken from REM sleep also tended to report dreaming. We know we sleep partly for physiological recuperation, some researchers such as Webb (1974), argue that sleep is a kind of mini-hibernation in which the basic processes of hibernation are mimicked by the body-leveled metabolic rate, blood pressure, body temperature. Does this mean that consciousness needs a rest and this takes place during sleep? This would mean that when we wake up for sleep we enter a state of consciousness, a state that continues as long as we are awake.
Altered States of Consciousness – Dream
When we sleep, we dream and this is a state of consciousness that has an important role for our waking life. Freud (1901) asserted that, during dreaming, the unconscious mind comes to the surface, and expresses its needs and wishes. He also argued that dreams function as a safety valve, so we dream of failing in order to prepare ourselves for the worst case scenarios in waking life. He also believed that dreams offer clues into the psyche since our inhibitions are lost during sleep. Blakemore (1988) argues that dreams are a way of sorting out our confusing waking like and that if we can train ourselves to control our dreams in a positive way we feel more positive during waking life. An alternative approach to dreaming was proposed by Crick and Mitchison, in 1983. They suggested that dreaming is an almost accidental by-product of neuronal brain activity.
Altered States of Consciousness – Hypnosis
Hypnosis can be argued to be an altered state of consciousness. According to Hilgard (1975), hypnosis is ‘… the state of consciousness caused in a subject by a systematic procedure for altering consciousness, usually carried out by one person (the hypnotist) to alter the consciousness of another (the subject)’. Gross (1996) believed hypnosis is ‘… a state of increased suggestibility (or willingness to comply with another person’s directions) that is brought by another person, the hypnotist’. These two definitions relate to the views of ‘state’ theorists and ‘non-state’ theorists respectively. The most influential state theory is Hilgard’s neo-dissociation theory (1974, 1977), according to which there exist multiple systems of control that are not all conscious at the same time. Normally, these cognitive control systems are under the influence of an ‘executive ego’ that controls and monitors the other systems. But in hypnosis, the hypnosis takes much of that away such that, in response to suggestion, motor movements are experiences as involuntary, memory and perception are distorted and so on. On the other hand non-state theorist such as Wagstaff (1991) has proposed that hypnotic responding may involve three stages the participant figures out what is expected on the bases of previous experience and the hypnotist’s instructions, the participant uses imaginative or other strategies to try to bring about the suggested effects and if the strategies fail or are judged to be inappropriate, the participant either gives up or reverts to compliances or faking. Therefore hypnosis works by behaviour changing in accordance to what is believed by the participant. Skeptics therefore support the theory that hypnosis is a social phenomena, other believe that hypnosis is actually an altered state of consciousness where some aspect of the mind is aware and the rest is under a hypnotic trance.
Altered States of Consciousness – Drugs
Drugs can synthetically alter the state of consciousness. These drugs are called psychoactive drugs they affect an individual’s mental state they may directly change our moods or how we respond to the environment. In general, psychoactive drugs produce their effects because they affect the way that neurons communicate with one another at the synapse. Sedatives and depressants, stimulants, opiates and narcotics and hallucinogens are drugs which can effect the neurotransmitters which are synthasised by the neurons, often from chemical substances which have passed into the brain. Users of drugs can develop a tolerance level and after extended use need more of the drug to induce the required effect. Leary, Alpert and Metzner (1965) argued that hallucinogenic drugs could provide a unique key to understanding different levels of consciousness within the human psyche. As well as effecting the brain chemistry, experiments show the expectations of the drug effects can determine the experience. This is illustrated by the use of the Placebo. A placebo can induce the same effects as the real drug because the expectations or suggestibility is there. This suggests that there is a chemical basis to consciousness and it can be produced naturally by the brain as shown by the use of placebo.
Conclusion
What do we know and understand about consciousness now?
There will always be many definitions of consciousness, the personal, the scientific, the philosophical and the social, and around each definition will be drawn the boundaries of that perspective. This is the irony of attempting to find a definition. How consciousness is perceived depends very much on the questions which are asked about it and also the fact that there are so many competing theories within differing paradigms begins to illustrate the problem of defining consciousness. (* Insert – findings of the experiment – asking 50 people to define consciousness in their own words as an exploratory exercise of understanding the layman’s understanding of what it is, there should be common themes that enhance our understanding – Discuss) Peter Bieri (1995) explains why consciousness is so puzzling. He attempts to isolate the source of the trouble. In discussing the relation of wholes to parts, he makes the following important remarks:
‘Whereas all other laws to which we get accustomed relate perfectly objective phenomena, we are here talking about the case where something subjective emerges from purely objective factors…….There is an essential point we are not willing to give away: sensing or experiencing is something different and new related to all other systematic properties.’ (p.52)
What makes defining and understanding consciousness a problem is the fact that there is no one theory to explain it, it can’t be measured and there is numerous definitions for it depending on context. We can partly understand consciousness with regards to it’s altered states and we believe we are aware of ourselves and therefore exist and are conscious. What makes the philosophy of consciousness interesting is the actual problem with defining it as it effects so many different aspects of human life. Thomas Nagel famously remarks (1974) ‘Without consciousness the mind-body problem would be much less interesting. With Consciousness it seems hopeless’. Dennett believed consciousness and intentions attract such long-standing and continuing interest because consciousness is such an obvious feature of our minds: characteristic of our everyday experience.
What don’t we know about consciousness?
‘Nobody has the slightest idea how anything material could be conscious.
Nobody even knows what it would be like to have the slightest idea about how anything material could be conscious. So much for the philosophy of consciousness’ Jerry Fodor (1992)
Fodor highlights the problems with defining consciousness and understanding it. I believe that the more important reason for continued psychological interest in consciousness is that psychological theory may provide the appropriate level of description for explanation of conscious thought and intentional behavior.
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