Provide a discussion on the problems associated with defining consciousness. Introduction Defining consciousness is important because it affects a wide range of subjects from ethics to quantum physics

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Provide a discussion on the problems associated with defining consciousness.

Introduction

Defining consciousness is important because it affects a wide range of subjects from ethics to quantum physics.  ‘Numerous theories of consciousness have been proposed over the millennia but none of these seem to explain the phenomenon’ Green (2003).  Psychologist have debated for decades about the definition of consciousness.  The sensory mental events and feelings which comprise of consciousness and the raw phenomenology of the stream of consciousness which makes it so difficult to define.  Indeed some, for instance Nagel (1974), would consider that it cannot be defined because our brains are not capable of understanding what it is.  Others such as Flanagan (1992), feel that a definition has to be attempted in order to show what it is that is in need of explanation.  Lycan (1996) speaks of the ‘multiplicity of meanings’ of the word consciousness which is used ‘as if it had one clear meaning and we all know what it meant’ (p.2)    Freud (1974) referred to consciousness as a spotlight in an infinite space of darkness to illustrate the relative role of the unconscious.  On the other hand Rubin and McNeil (1983) define consciousness as ‘our subjective awareness of our actions and of the world around us’.  Ruch (1984) cited in Armstrong (1981) gives it a much more cognitive emphasis by defining it as ‘… process of experiencing the external and internal environment in ways that separate immediate stimuli from immediate responses, that is, stimuli are processed and ‘understood’ in some sense as against leading directly to mechanical responses’.  Therefore ‘the notion of consciousness is notoriously obscure….  It is not even clear that the word ‘consciousness’ stands for just one sort of entity, quality, process, or whatever’ Armstrong (1981).  What we do know is that the experience of consciousness is common to us all; we are aware of being conscious.  Also the context or person defining consciousness will determine the definition and how it is understood.  It is interesting to consider why Descartes questioned his own senses and wondered whether the physical world is illusory, perhaps with regard to optical illusions.  When we see a straight stick in a glass of water, it appears that the stick is bent.  We can see a bent stick and, if we ask for our friends’ opinions, they too will report seeing a bent stick.  But call a blind friend over to investigate the stick and he or she will avow that the stick is indeed straight, if a bit wet.  Should we therefore doubt our own eyes, or should we doubt reality?  The answer is that we should doubt neither.  Our eyes, which are receptors of light waves are reporting not a property of the stick, nor a property of our perception, but a property of light waves which travel differently through different media, according to their refractive index.  Therefore, one could argue that the stick is straight and that the stick is bent, both are true, depending on the context.  I understand also, but cannot explain, that the light has the property of being waves and also particles, depending on the context.   In order for us to discuss the problems associated with defining consciousness we need to refer to alternative perspectives and the research into different forms of consciousness.

Brain in a vat

Consciousness can be startlingly intense.  It is the most vivid of phenomena; nothing is more real to us.  But it can be frustratingly transparent: in talking about conscious experience, it is notoriously difficult to pin down the subject matter.  The International Dictionary of Psychology does not even try to give a straightforward characterization:

Consciousness: The having of perceptions, thoughts, and feelings; awareness.  The term is impossible to define except in terms that are unintelligible without a grasp of what consciousness means.  Many fall into the trap of confusing consciousness with self-conscious – to be conscious it is only necessary to be aware of the external world.  Consciousness is a fascinating but elusive phenomenon: it is impossible to specify what it is, what it does, or why it evolved.  It is assumed that when physiological technology is sufficiently refined, it would be possible to keep a human brain alive in vitro.  It is said that since the brain will have already learned a language before it was put in vitro, it will be able to think verbally in its disembodied state.  It will be able to participate in any cognitive activity.  If this suggestion is taken seriously, it becomes the basis of a bizarre skeptical challenge.  If all familiar experiences of our life are, in essence, brain states and activities, how do we know that that is not what we are – a brain preserved in a vat?  How do we know that we are more that a mind and its ideas, and there is an external world independent of us?  How do we know that we are more that a brain and its processes, and that there is an external world independent of us?  Phillips (1996) rejects the brain-in-a-vat hypothesis ‘the brain-in-a-vat does not resemble a human being and does not lead a human life.  The brain does not hear anything …………….grieve at a loss of a loved one, or share in the joy of good news’ (p. 46).  It has been said that there is overwhelming evidence against the brain-in-a-vat hypothesis.  If I am sitting in a chair typing an essay, I do not feel like a brain-in-a-vat.  I do not think myself as a brain-in-a-vat.  I know that whatever I say will be re-described as an experience being had by a brain-in-a-vat.  But this supposition is itself irrational, experiences, the pattern that they have, shows me that I am not a brain-in-a-vat.

Mind/Body Problem

To define consciousness we have to tackle the mind/body issues.  The mind/body problem has remained essentially unchanged since Descartes put it forward in 1641.  The problem is: what is the nature of the conscious mind, and how it relates to the body?  As Huxley (1974) asked the question ‘How is it that anything so remarkable as state of consciousness comes about as a result of initiating nerve tissues, is just as unaccountable as the appearance of the Djin, where Aladdin rubbed his lamp in the story…’ (p.46).  I understand it to be about the attempt to explain mental states in physical terms.  I have never heard anyone in contemporary philosophical debates put the question from the alternative starting point, that is, how may matter be explained in terms of consciousness.  Here is a typical example of the prevailing view:  ‘how much of mind is a physical entity; asks a reviewer of Towards an Understanding of Consciousness by Daniel Dennett.  He goes on ‘much of the function of the mind is built into the systems and organs of the body itself, taking it as quite uncontentious that mind actually has a function in bodily terms like the spleen or a kneecap’.  The question for this reviewer is what is the role of consciousness is a physical system not whether consciousness is capable of any role at all.  ‘Our bodies posses minds’, he writes as through minds were things like cakes or handbags which could be owned, property to be bought or sold.  Another reviewer of the same book asks what are the details which ‘physico-chemical processes are turned into consciousness’ (Sunday Telegraph, 11th August 1996).  Because a clear distinction is not recognized between matter and consciousness, consciousness is assumed to have an as yet unexplained but an eventually explicable physical basis.  It is seen as, in a sense part of the body.  Plato considered that the body and mind were two separate entities, the body being made of earthly stuff, therefore ‘human, mortal….non-intelligible’ and the mind or soul ‘similar to what is divine, immortal, intelligible, uniform, indissoluble, unvarying, and constant in relation to itself’ (Phaedo, 80a-b, tr D. Gallop, 1975, cited by Smith and Jones, 1986, p.10).  Aristotle’s theory of the soul is exceedingly complex, but monoist.  Smith and Jones (1986) sum it up by explaining that the soul is ‘what makes a body a living creature of the kind it is’ (p.78).  Therefore the problem in a nutshell with defining consciousness in relation to the mind/body problem is that since people are composed of chemicals, they must be physically explicable, but yet since they have consciousness they can’t.    

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Neurobiological View

One main strand of the mind/body issue regarding the definition of consciousness is the biological explanation.  Humphrey (1986, 1993) argues that if consciousness is the answer to anything at all, it must be to a biological challenge which humans need to understand, respond to and manipulate the behavior of other human beings.  Therefore the use of human consciousness is to enable each human being to understand what it feels like to be human and so to make sense of himself and other people from the inside.  A major method of studying the brain is to monitor ...

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