Russian imperial interests in central Asia.

        On the other hand, the war proved extremely damaging to Russian’s power status.  Its claim to be a European Great Power was discredited by the realization of the empire’s sorely backward economic system, weak infrastructure, outmoded and under-equipped military and corruption-infected political structure.  These weaknesses not only left serious doubt regarding Russia’s ability to defend itself against other world power, but also raised much anxiety over the declining legitimacy of the Russian autocracy and the possible loss of state control over the peasants.  The rise of revolutionary activities, the open revolts against St. Petersburg in the Western provinces of Russia, the Polish rebellion, and the persistent demand from the serfs to be emancipated, all indicated serious instabilities in Russian political and social structure – instabilities that could escalate into anarchy if changes did not take place.  

        It was in this atmosphere of economic backwardness and imminent social unrest that the government instituted a series of reforms, among which the most important were the emancipation of the serfs and greater bureaucratization of Russia’s political system.  The emancipation freed the serfs from the personal power of their landowners, gave them land, and organized them into village communities.   The costs of such reforms were felt acutely by the nobility, who now had to slowly relinquish most of their land and power to the bureaucrats operating the communes.  In their new roles as polices of the communes, where the newly emancipated serfs were quickly beginning to become disillusioned by the unrealized promises of emancipation, the landowning class was exposed to hostility from peasants and bureaucrats alike.  Thus, the results of reform were the declining of status of the nobility and the increasing rebelliousness of the peasants – revealing a crisis in autocratic power that either had to be addressed by either “political concessions or economic largesse.”  Russia was not in a good position to do either.  Political reforms lacked the backing of the landowning class, which was no longer as powerful and as loyal to the Tsar as before because of emancipation.  Furthermore, dramatic political reforms in face of increasing revolutionary sentiments threatened a down-ward spiraling of power for the Tsarist regime.   Economic reform was an equally, if not more, difficult task.  Debts from the war, financial crises, bad harvests in 1875 and 1876, sinking grain prices in the world market, capital flight caused by the fleeing of the nobility out of Russia, and vulnerabilities of industries to international conflicts, (the sudden drop of cotton supply because American Civil War left the textile industry almost crippled) all contributed to falling domestic and foreign confidence in the Russian economy.  This did not help the government’s attempt to attract foreign investment for its new project – the construction of a railway system.  A railway system would have done much for Russia in terms of strengthening its military by facilitating easier transport of troops, expanding its agricultural exports by allowing easier transport from the countryside to commercial centers, or simply by making railway construction a profitable industry itself.   However, there was just not enough fund to carry this project out to such an extent that that its profits would outweigh its costs.  

        It thus became clear that the goals of securing domestic stability, maintaining the legitimacy of the aristocracy, and recovering Russia international position of eminence, one that it had lost after the Crimean War, could not be achieved only through economic and political reforms, at least not without alienating both the peasants and the nobility in this new tension ridden class society.  Something else was needed to deal with this newly awakened sense of Russian discontent, some sort of antidote that would steer public attention away from economic woes, quell the rising disillusionment with the government, and establish once again public confidence in Russia as a thriving empire.  

        Compensatory foreign policies in the form of expansionism became the palliative of the day.  Indeed, successful military conquests of new territories, if done with little costs, could regain for the army the prestige that it lost during the Crimean war as well as rally public support for the government.  The promise of new markets and cheaper sources of raw materials could raise public confidence and stimulate economic activities. Furthermore, imperial conquests would reaffirm Russia’s endangered status as a global power.  With its outmoded military and its struggling economy, however, Russia could not hope to accomplish these goals by competing against her rivals in the West.  Any hope of gaining a competitive edge would have to be done where she had the greatest strength – Central Asia. Unlike the Balkans, where the interests of the European great powers intertwined, its location on the periphery of the world political scene made an invasion of Central Asia a fairly isolated scheme that did pose for Russia any risk of collective retaliatory action.  Except, of course, for England.  

        For England, Central Asia represented a threat to her most prized colonial possession in the East – India. After the Indian Mutiny of 1857, the British colonial regime was especially nervous about anything that could incite internal unrest.  Military activities near India’s northern border with Central Asia, the British feared, would encourage rebellious activities in its northern states.  Facing a tight budget, and no longer certain of the Indian army’s loyalty, such a prospect did not sit well with local colonial authorities.  This sense of British Russophobia was most urgent in the sentiments of Lord Ellenborough, who, in a dispatch to the Secret Committee to the Governor-General in Council [of India], raised the possibility of a direct Russian invasion into India via Turkistan.  Such an invasion would not only seriously endanger British control over India; it would also embarrass Britain on the international stage and limit her policies in Europe.  

        Under the command of General Chernayev, the Russian military invaded Turkistan in 1865, and took over the Khanate of Bukhara in 1868.  Then under the command of the Governor of Turkistan, General Kaufman, Russia secured the Khanate of Khiva in 1873, and annexed the Kokand khanate in 1876.   This series of expansion took the Russians to the cities of Merv, Herat, and finally Kabul in Afghanistan, which was located right at the foothill of the Khyber Pass in the Hindu Kush – British India’s natural border with Central Asia.  When they reached Merv, the Russians and British came dangerously close to an all-out military confrontation, however, neither country wanted war and both backed down quickly.

        For the British, this only confirmed their fears regarding Russia’s intention to encroach upon their sphere of influence in the region.  One British consular official warned that Turkistan would become Russia’s Algeria, “the great military school of the Empire.”  However, such fears may have been exaggerated because Russia, as much as it wanted to reassert itself as a great imperial power, was in no shape to go to war with the British, not in Central Asia and certainly not in India.  It could conquer Central Asia easily because the khanates of Central Asia were not only technologically inferior compared to the Russian army, but they were also deeply divided among themselves. Against the British, however, Russia had neither the money nor the guns to seriously engage in war. The speed at which it was willing to back down at Merv demonstrated that rather than encroachment, Russia was more likely trying to resist what it saw as expanding British influence in Afghanistan through its own expansion.  With its huge continental plains, extremely long borders, lack of access to the Atlantic Ocean, a solid block of enemies on the western frontier (Germany, Poland, Turkey), unfriendliness from Japan and China on the eastern frontier, and a vulnerable southern frontier because it was banned from constructing a fleet on the Black Sea, Russia did not have the greatest geopolitical advantage.   On the other hand, with its maritime prowess and diplomatic ties to Turkey, Western Europe, and the Middle East, “England could strike Russia anywhere.” It was clear that Russia had with few strategic positions, and could only reach England in Afghanistan or through Turkistan’s oases.  Thus, even if it did not have any aggressive designs for the British, Russia’s own goals of solidifying its military position and resisting British influence on its own southern territories made for compelling reasons to annex Central Asia.  

        Furthermore, with a stagnating economy at home, Russia saw in Central Asia, particularly in Turkistan, an opportunity to exploit natural resources and to develop commerce.   Particularly, it saw possible trade relations and a source of cheap raw cotton for its textile industry – one that was suffering from climbing prices and underproduction because of the American Civil War.  Revenues could be raised through taxation of the subdued khanates to support Russia’s frontier army.  And Turkistan, if nurtured, could become a great cheap supplier of silk for Russia.  

        Strategic and economic interests can only explain half of the story however. To understand the underlying causes of Russian invasion of Central Asia, especially when there was so much uncertainty in its internal affairs, we must go back to our earlier thesis of imperialism as a possible compensatory policy which the ruling elites – no longer certain of its position in society – exploited for its own purpose of self-preservation.  To expound on this, we must begin by looking at the business of the makers of expansionist policies in St. Petersburg.

        The development of expansionist policies in St. Petersburg was dominated by two interest groups with quite different ideas and motivations for the Russian presence in Central Asia.  Proponents of the invasion were mostly those with strong ties to the military.  Among the most ardent expansionists were: General Kaufman, a favorite of the Tsar, A.D. Milyutin, Minister of War (the driving political force behind Russian expansion), the Grand Duke Michael, Viceroy to the Caucasus, and frontier army officers.  Critiques of the expansionism came mostly from the Minister of Finance and the Foreign Minister, who were concerned with the economic and diplomatic costs of annexation.  Interestingly, it is written that formulation and implementation of foreign policies in this era were dominated not by the Foreign Ministry but the Ministry of War. Milyutin, the Minister of War, wielded much influence over the Tsar, and thus was able to seek permission for expansion despite opposition from the Finance and Foreign Ministry.  Sir Henry Rawlinson wrote in 1875, “Russia has always attributed to her military chiefs a degree of power in influencing the national policy…The same antagonism of feeling between the civil and military authorities is said to have existed in Turkestan from the first outbreak of hostilities.”  Thus, while Russian diplomats worked frantically at their consulates in London and in Calcutta to reassure the British that Russia did not have aggressive designs on British interest in the East, the War Ministry at home continued sending troops closer and closer to territories near India. What special interest did the military have in Central Asia?

         The War Ministry was very much influenced by pressures from its own officers on the frontier, who commanded respect because they were the only connection St. Petersburg had to Central Asia. For these officers, the deeply divided, technologically inferior tribes of the steppes were easy to conquer so that military expansion mostly entailed successful campaigns that could earn them honor and prestige in the empire. Aside from personal gains, the military establishment itself stood to benefit from new conquests.   Imperial Russia was a military society in which the army occupied an honorable and powerful position.  The defeat it suffered in the Crimean War, however, left it humiliated and eager to seek new successful adventures to compensate for its loss.  This compensation was to be found in Central Asia.  Expansion into Turkistan was portrayed as protecting Russian interests and preserving Russian honor from the British, something the military could not do in Europe, but definitely was capable of in Turkistan. In 1868, after taking over Samarkand, Governor-General Kaufman refused to return it to the khanate of Bukhara, saying:  “I could not commit such sacrilege against the prestige, honor, and rights of Russia. [The world knows] that Turkey and England are watching us. The slightest concession and we will not merely cease to be respected and feared, but will risk losing all that we have acquired earlier.”  In speaking of Russia’s decision to enter the go to war in the Balkans, the Minister of War, D. A. Milyutin expressed similar sentiments: “Russia’s honor forbids us to stand about any longer with lowered guns just for the sake of peace.”  We can see then that Russian expansionism, at least for the military, was not always pursued for strategic gains and often for the status of Russia on the international political scene.  

        The military’s preoccupation with imperial honor and prestige was bound up in the aristocracy’s attempt to maintain internal stability and to regain its status in the eyes of the Russian public. Tales of conquests, dreams of far-away riches, and the nervous reaction of Europe (especially that of Britain) provided the public a distraction from the miserable state of affairs inside Russia.  Victory reports like the news of the slaughter in Geok Tepe or the break down of the Tashkent gates “elevated the public mood” and “dispelled disappointments on the European front and the depressing news concerning the inner state of the empire.” If this “inner state of the empire” was to be improved through economic and political reforms, the government recognized, internal security had to be established.  While the police and the military were always viable options for such a task, excessive exercise of state control in such an atmosphere could result in a disastrous backlash.   Rather, the government needed the cooperation and support of the public, which only be mobilized if a sense of public solidarity as well as confidence in the regime existed.  An important step toward regaining this confidence was the exorcism of Russian public’s insecurity regarding its national identity and its position in the world – both of which were seriously challenged by the Crimean defeat.  Thus, by assuming the role of a civilizer among the barbaric tribes of Central Asia, Russia could flaunt its “Westernness”, assure itself that it too could march beside and not behind European progress, and hence, reaffirm its identity as a maturing member of the civilized world.  And while pitting itself against the British in Central Asia had its diplomatic risks, resultant Anglophobic nationalism was useful as an instrument to divert “pent up pressures of internal problems toward foreign territories and foreign opponents.”   Likewise, Russophobic voices in England and the shared perception of external threats from England’s allies among the Russian people, served to “strengthen the sense of purpose between the government and the public”.  Thus, despite the argument from critics of Russian imperialism that “history of Russia is played out in Europe, not in Asia” it was the conquest of Central Asia that was used as an instrument to retain a place for Russia in European affairs and, hence, reaffirm its European identity.  (This use of expansionist policies to channel internal discontent to foreign affairs is not particular to Russia.  John Gallagher argues that German imperialism as pursued by Otto von Bismarck was based on the same method: “his overseas policy was a component of Bismarck’s policy of preserving the status quo in state and society: it held out the prospect of economic advantage, and acted as a sort of tension-conductor.”)

        This sort of state-craft was aided by the rise of the mass circulation press, the proliferation of public organizations and institutions, and the organization of popular scientific exhibitions and art exhibits, all of which provided a new setting for the spread popular culture.  The newspaper Golos, for example, helped to promote imperial schemes by popularizing the military’s achievements through its sensational accounts of the take-over of Turkistan and the capture of the mountain tribes of Dangestan in the Northern Caucasus. The Russian Geographic Society was also useful in spreading knowledge about Central Asia.  And finally, the ideologies of imperialism were popularized by Slavophile writers (having been especially humiliated in the Crimean defeat) who pushed for the “civilizing mission” of Russia in Central Asia.   

        Thus, while European historians have tended to attribute Russian colonial polices Central Asia to the laws of geography or the military logic that “new actions were continually deemed necessary,”  and Marxist Russian historians to sole economic motivations, our exploration of the topic has shown that as significant as they were, these interests were subsidiary relative to the greater goal achieving internal stability and regaining Russia’s position of eminence on the global stage.  Russia invaded Central Asia not because it could dramatically alleviate its internal economic ailments but because it was there in Central Asia that it had the geopolitical advantage to make a show of successfully resisting British hegemony.  Furthermore, the frequent evocation of themes like “honor” and “prestige” as justification for imperial policies indicated the ruling class’s doubts regarding its legitimacy.  Combining this with the new reality of social and political discontent from the peasants as well as the land-owning class, it is not implausible for us to conclude that Russian imperialism was an endogenous type of imperialism used to palliate internal disorder and alleviate the ruling class’s fear of revolution.

        

---