pilgrimage prior to the issue of QP1. At Louis Christmas Court 1145, the Bishop of Langres preached a sermon asking for assistance for the king to go to the aid of Christians in the East, but the response was muted, there was no mention of the pope or indulgences. It was decided to discuss the matter again at Easter 1146 with the aid of Bernard. Louis consulted Bernard as though he were a ædivine oracleÆ (see ref: 3). Bernard though instructed by Eugenius to do so, believed that were Louis to go to the Holy Land it would be better to do so under the guidance of the Church; thereby giving æpapal authority over the crusadeÆ (See ref: 2). This is significant as it allows us an insight into St. BernardÆs mentality. Prior to the issuing of QP2, St. Bernard in letters to Eugenus 111 had made it known of his intentions not to leave the monastery of Clairvaux. Yet he did leave, and from there on he made political as well as spiritual decisions. This needs a little more in depth investigation. Probably the best example of spiritual decision making, is how Bernard persuaded Louis to take the cross in the first place, with the advice and aid of Eugenius. Then some time later, following the antics of Rudolf (a renegade Cistercian) the political decision to enlist the assistance of Conrad 111 of æGermanyÆ, this time without papal authority. Eugenius had for some time hoped that Conrad would aid him against the threat posed by Roger 11 of Sicily, who was an ally of Louis. So the argument goes that Bernard had been a little idealistic in thinking that Conrad would be able to overcome differences with Roger for the expedition to the East. In so doing æcompromisedÆ the chances of success in the East by his simplistic, disappreciation of the stresses caused by having two enemies unite to fight the infidel in the East, and as it turned out, their inability to be good allies. This is too easy an explanation for what is an extremely complicated matter. The oath taken, when taking the cross was extremely difficult to renege on. Conrad had taken the oath previously in 1124 (see ref: 4) but had failed to go because of internal feuding. Rufus had whipped the æGermansÆ into an anti-semetic crusading frenzy. Bernard had little trouble in encouraging Conrad to take the oath, again. Bernard did this without EugeniusÆs knowledge but eventually talked the pope around to his way of thinking. Bernard had little option but to let the GermanÆs join the crusade. As far as he was concerned, it would be better for the Germans to go (on Crusade) with papal authority than without it, the same as with the French. For without papal authorisation, papal prestige would be badly damaged if the crusade were to go ahead. There is also a more elaborate reason for Bernard wanting the Germans to go on crusade that makes clearer BernardÆs ideology. On the 13th March 1147 Saxon nobles ask for privileges to extend to the Wends. Bernard authorises the crusade without papal authority but eventually talks Eugenius around to his way of thinking. More disturbing for the pope was BernardÆs so-called death or conversion alternative. The pope had only spoke of conversion, and agreed to most of BernardÆs alterations except the death part. Neither of the two events above really compromised the æsecond crusadeÆ but they do show us a deeper side of St. Bernard. According to the Sibylline Prophecies, mankind was at the eve of the end of the world (see ref: 5) and Bernard believed this. The saviour of the world according to this would have the initial C, Conrad fitted the prerequisite for ælast emperorÆ. Other historians (Giles Constable in particular) claim that Eugene welcomed a ædiversion of German forces against the SlavsÆ. This would allow some of ConradÆs forces to remain in Europe and offer some protection to the papacy. This is a reason but it would also follow that Bernard was merely in this case following orders. However it seems that Bernard agreed to the crusade and more importantly the death or conversion alternative without papal authority and so fully believed in the Sibylline prophecies. Back to Roger of Scilly, was Bernard aware of the feuding between the Norman and Conrad, and was he also blind to the fact that Roger wanted to extend his empire into Byzantium, an ally of both Eugenius and Conrad? The first part of the question can be answered in the affirmative, that of course Bernard would have been aware of feuding between the two men. It does however appear, that Bernard was assuming that Christians would be able to unite against the infidel. In his article (see ref: 6), David C. Douglas claims that Roger was pleased that Conrad was going on crusade, for it would mean æthat his (Rogers) most formidable enemy in EuropeÆ would no longer be there, this appears to be accurate. Roger was also afraid of the alliance of Conrad/Manuel Commenus, the emperor of Byzantium. Douglas also claims and rightly so, that Manuel feared Roger more than he did Nureddin, his Muslim foe. This fear would lead Roger to attack Byzantium territory, before that alliance attacked him. Again it looks as though Bernard is being a little naive to think that great nations would be able to get along for the sake of Christianity. This is possibly correct, however it does not make him responsible for the decisions that were made by Roger, Eugenius, Louis and Manuel. It is highly probable that Roger would have done all within his power to increase his æempireÆ, even had Conrad not participated in the crusade. That aside, Bernard did alter the direction of the crusade by inviting Conrad to take the cross, but it was not a fatal judgement to have one of the most formidable kings in Christendom on ones side. For with Conrad away in the East, Roger attacked Byzantium territory as Manuel was preoccupied with the crusader army at the gates of Constantinopole. So if Bernard making decisions such as inviting kings to participate (in the crusade) and declaring crusades without papal authority did not compromise the second crusadeÆs chances of success, what did? In responding to these questions it should become clear that the crusaders of the first crusade were æluckyÆ and that those of the second crusade were doomed to fail, before it began. The answer to the above question lies not in the Western world with all its infighting for territory and prestige but in the East itself. The First Crusade succeeded in the East because the Muslims were not united, as the battle of Antioch demonstrated in 1099. By 1145 the Muslim world was becoming more focused and confident than ever before, the capture of Eddessa confirms this perfectly. The alliance of Western Christendom would not be militarily competent enough to deal with such a venture as recapturing Eddessa or any other Muslim city. Both Louis and Conrad eventually decided to travel to the East by more or less the same route the first crusade had taken. It is with this that Bernard is again accused of compromising the chances of success for the crusade. If it had not been for him (Bernard) allowing Conrad to join the crusade, then the sea route involving Roger would have been chosen by Louis; this was believed to be the more astute military option. However this is forgetting the point of pilgrimage, that the physical endurance of going on pilgrimage should be so strenuous as to wipe out æpast sinsÆ. Louis had already proclaimed before the issue of QP1 of his intent to go on pilgrimage to the Holy Land and both Louis and Conrad after the failure of the crusade, both pray at the Holy Sepulchre. Moreover the land route had been made hallowed by the exploits of Bohemond 1 and Raymond of Toulouse. So although the sea-route was possibly the more militarily preferred, it was not the route taken by those that had already successfully æcaptured JerusalemÆ, and so almost any other route would have been æunsuccessfulÆ. Firstly the German army failed after having been beaten by Muslims. Then the French about three weeks later were routed. The farce at Damascus highlighted the military sham that was the second crusade, for all to see. The feared infighting within the crusade did not really establish itself, although both Oto and Odo came up with different reasons for the failure of the crusade, neither made claims that it was the others fault (petty reasons aside). Without Bernard there would have been no second crusade, at least not on such a grand scale as to be called the second crusade. BernardÆs preaching was critical for the crusade to take place but to hold him responsible for itÆs failure, or that he compromised itÆs chances of success is wrong. Bernard did alter the original intentions but he did so out of self-belief and the good of the papacy. However he was a little too optimistic and idealistic as regard his political decisions, especially regarding Roger 11 and Conrad. Bernard inspired spiritual people, but Roger motivated the secular world. Ecclesiastics attributed causes for the crusadeÆs collapse to the sin of the individual crusader, as after all Bernard had stated that this crusade had been created by God for individuals to redeem themselves. However the logistic difficulties encountered by the crusaders were immense, foul weather, disease and above all lack of food and water. This was also true of the First Crusade but on the Second Crusade the forces of Western Christendom encountered a more united Muslim world. In conclusion St. Bernard did alter the crusades æoriginal intentionsÆ but not fatally. Prior to the issue of the first crusading bull QP1 and even up to the issue of QP2 the intended crusaders, that is the nobles and knights were interested in pilgrimage but it would take the æhoney tongued doctorÆ (Lecture notes) to persuade them to go on crusade. As he saw it, the crusade was a chance for the unworthy to redeem themselves before God before it was to late. It is also important to place Bernard as the most influential person of his time in Europe. And that Eugenius was of BernardÆs making and probably did as his old protÚgÚ saw fit. Doubtless the belief Bernard had in the Sibylline prophecies swayed all his judgements. Bernard on occasions was idealistic to the point of fanaticism as was the case with believing Roger and Conrad could overcome their differences. However this did not effect the crusade aversley and if anything allowed the crusade a greater chance of success. Reference. 1. 2. George Ferzoco æThe origin of the Second CrusadeÆ P96. 3. Jonathan Riley Smith æThe CrusadesÆ p96. 4. Jonathan Riley Smith æThe CrusadesÆ p95. 5. Hans Dietrich Kahl æCrusade Eschatology as seen by St. Bernard in the years 1146 û 1148 p35. 6. David C. Douglas æThe Norman FateÆ. 7. Giles Constable æThe Second Crusade as seen by ContemporariesÆ p256 Bibliography. Bruno Scott James æThe Letters of St. Bernard of ClairvauxÆ Burns and Oaks 1998. David C. Douglas æThe Norman FateÆ Eyre Methuen 1976. John R.Sommerfeldt æStudies in Medieval Cistercian History, 11Æ Cistercian Publications 1976. Hans Dietrich Kahl æCrusade Eschatology as seen by St. Bernard in the years 1146 û 1148Æ. Jonathan Riley Smith æThe Crusades a Short HistoryÆ Athlone Press Ltd. 1990. Hans Eberhard Mayer æThe CrusadesÆ Oxford University Press 1990.
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