It was especially the policy of containment which trapped the United States in Vietnam for a very long period of time. Most historians believe that the underlying cause of the America’s longest and most divisive war is rooted in the essence of containment policy. The containment doctrine became “a psychologically obsessive, ideological dogma in the minds of the Presidents, national security managers, cabinet members, and other who made government policy” (Kimball 1990: 9). Each president and its executive officers had put a lot of effort trying to prevent the triumph of communism in Vietnam. The driving force behind their effort is clearly influenced by the Truman Doctrine and the policy of containment as well as the impact of the loss of China. To American administrators’ minds, Vietnam was seen as a good place for them to develop a clear containment policy which never really applied in the Far East before. The American policy of containment had been originally designed to check the spread of communism in Europe but now it was clear that the policy of global containment can be applied to Asia as well.
Behind the policy of containment was the belief that a communist victory in one area would result in further expansion. This was the core of domino theory. Kimball contends that:
If Vietnam fell into the Soviet or Chinese Communist orbit, then neighboring Laos and Cambodia would too; all of Southeast Asia might fall; America would lose the strategic Strait of Malacca; communism would spread westward through India toward Turkey and eastward through Japan to the Philippines (Kimball 1990: 7).
The domino theory was the common belief held widely among American officials during the early 1950s. It distorted American foreign policy perceptions. “A country like Vietnam might not have been important to the world order per se, but once the Americans made a blanket pledge to resist the spread of communism, it became important” (Degroot 2000: 58). The Vietnam War became a testing ground for the American responsibility and determinism in implementing its long range-policies to contain communism. The loss of Vietnam would tip the balance of power against the United States. Recent Communist victory had already aroused nervousness in Europe and another major victory might lure the Europeans to reach an accommodation with the Soviet Union. American options in Vietnam became limited by the “investment trap;” that is, the more the United invested of its resources in Vietnam, the more difficult it became to withdraw or reduce its commitment (Hess 1990: 171). The deep attachment of the global strategy of containment in each presidency can be best explained from the following quotation:
Truman, of course, inaugurated this policy and then passed it on to his successors…Eisenhower inherited the policy. He assisted in the overthrow of leftist regimes in Iran and Guatemala; he sent marines to Lebanon…John F. Kennedy attempted to remove Fidel Castro from Cuba; he used convert forces to aid in the defeat of left-wing guerillas in Columbia and British Guiana…Lyndon Johnson sent troops to the Dominican Republic to put down a leftist insurgency less than two months after he sent the first ground combat forces into Vietnam (Donaldson 1996: 70).
American presidents from Truman to Johnson certainly inherited the quagmire in Vietnam, but more importantly they also handed over the containment policy which demanded American intervention anywhere in the world where communism threatened the balance of world power in the postwar world.
The vital impact of the loss of China can also be put into account to explain the ongoing American commitment in the war. Since the loss of China, every American president is still haunted by the political setback of the American foreign policy. The impact of the loss of China brought about the shift in American foreign policy in Asia from economic assistance and diplomatic negotiation to direct military intervention as it was applied later to the Korean War and the Vietnam War. The lessons of China can be seen in the foreign policy of Eisenhower. Even though, he intended to maintain peace in Vietnam, he did not risk to being another president who suffered the consequences of losing another country to the Communists. Donaldson described “He [Eisenhower] was proposed to do everything possible to avoid a Communist takeover of Vietnam” (Donaldson 1996: 84). Upon the aftermath of the fall of the most populous country, China, American leaders inferred that Southeast Asia was vital to the security of the United States. Herring mentions:
Should the region be swept by Communism, the National Security Council warned, we shall have suffered a major political rout the repercussions of which will be felt throughout the world (Herring 1979: 11).
The United States, at this point, started to feel the difficulty and the pressure of saving Asia for the free world. Its solutions were hardly in sight unless a new foreign policy has been implemented.
Although the United States always denies the importance of economics as a major
cause of US involvement in Vietnam, the importance of economic in Southeast Asia plays a considerable role in preventing the United States to withdraw itself from them Vietnam War. Williams observes:
“And so, quite naturally, once again to war…to secure the necessary access to the world marketplace”
-William A. Williams, The Tragedy of American Diplomacy
Most economic explanations of US involvement in Vietnam War can be put under “the umbrella of what may be called the theory of neocolonialism” (Kimball 1990: 19). Many scholars agreed on the fact that neocolonialism guided the American policymakers to a policy of opening doors abroad to investments, raw materials, and markets that suited American interests. The Americans are “fighting the war to defend an economic empire-fighting to control the markets and the resources of a wealthy corner of the globe” (Kimball 1990: 272). From this view, it can be concluded that the United States is fighting the war to defend its own economic interests. As we know, Southeast Asia was “the world’s largest producer of natural rubber and was an important source of oil, tin, tungsten, and other strategic commodities. North Vietnam is rich in coal, and South Vietnam has large oil reserves” (Kimball 1990: 156). Despite the fact that the economic of Vietnam was not impressive to the United States, the commodity values in Southeast Asia was vital to the United States interests. If these important raw materials and other resources suddenly change hands to the Soviet Union, Communism would be enormously strengthened at the expense of the West (Herring 1979: 11). Moreover, the impact of the loss of Vietnam on Japan, America’s major Far Eastern ally, could be disastrous. By denying access to the raw materials and markets in Southeast Asia of which Japanese economy depended, the Japanese might turn to ally with the Soviet Union. The loss of Vietnam would inevitably mean the loss of access to one of the major natural resources and one of the most potentially profitable markets in the world.
While containment policy seems to be the most reasonable explanation of the American involvement in Vietnam, it was not only communism ideology that the United States opposed. The importance of Southeast Asia as a strategic position in the Far East also makes a major contribution to the hallmark of the American foreign policy in America’s longest conflict. A few historians argued the United States involvement in Vietnam was a continuation of long-standing interest in the Pacific. As Hess records, “The United States’ emergence as a power in Southeast Asia during the 1940s reflected an extension of interests and ideology that accompanied American expansion across the Pacific” (Hess 1990: 22). American policymakers claimed the loss of Vietnam would also lead to the loss of access to the whole of Southeast Asia region. The loss of Vietnam would damage the nation’s strategic position in the Far East. Herring asserts:
Control of the off-shore island chain extending from Japan to the Philippines, America’s first line of defense in the Pacific, would be endangered. Air and sea routes between Australia and the Middle East and the United States and India could be cut, severely hampering military operations in the event of war. Japan, India, and Australia, those nations where the West retained predominant influence, would be cut off from each other and left vulnerable (Herring 1979: 11).
American officials agreed Southeast Asia was vital to the security of the United States. They all concluded that Indochina, especially Vietnam was the key to the defense of Southeast Asia. American leaders do not want the expansive nation as the Soviet Union to control over all of Southeast region. Vietnam itself dominated the marine access to the South China Sea (Burson no date given, htpp://www.jmu.edu/Madison/teach/burson/viet- nam.htm). The trade routes between Europe and Asia also passed through this area while the U.S. had a major naval and air base at Subic Bay in the Philippines. “The Communist victory in Vietnam allowed the Soviet navy to establish a strong presence in the South China Sea and to pose a military threat to the United States in that region during the Cold War” (Burson no date given, http://www.jmu.edu/madison/teach/burson/vietnam.htm).
To a greater or less degree, the role of presidents tends to be the major focus of the analysts of American foreign policy in an attempt to explain the reason why the United States devoted their effort in Vietnam for a very long period of time. Kimball says:
A more traditional approach to the explanation of American foreign policy focuses on the central role of the President as chief executive, politicians and maker of foreign and military policy--and as the person who appoints his advisers and is ultimately responsible for their decisions (Kimball 1990: 14).
Beginning from the Johnson years and continuing through the Nixon years, most of the critics saw the war as “Johnson’s war” and “Nixon’s war”. Many critics went on criticizing the American political system in that it gives too much power for the president to influence over the foreign policy. At the core of theories about the cause of presidential as an escalator of the war, major analysts of political arena often focus on the role of the President in leading the United States to the escalation into the Vietnam War. One of the best examples of unilateral presidential decision making and manipulation of congressional and public opinion is how Johnson handled with the Gulf of Tonkin incident in August 1964 (Kimball 1990: 15). The incident basically stated the North Vietnamese had fired on the battleships, “Maddox” and “Turner Joy”, in the Gulf of Tonkin. Both ships claimed to have come under torpedo attack although there was not enough evidence to support the claim. “Captain John Herrick, radioed to his superiors that an attack may not have occurred, and that a complete evaluation of the incident should be made before Washington took any hasty action in response” (Donaldson 1996: 98). Either the incident was really occurred or not, President Johnson used the Gulf of Tonkin incident to persuade the Congress to legitimate his undeclared war in Vietnam. Given the power to “take all necessary measures to repel any armed attack against forces of the United States and to prevent further aggression” (BBHQ 2003, http://www.bbhq.- com/Vietnam.htm), from now on, the President has the power to exercise in his own hands.
Year after year, each president had kept on fighting and ignoring opportunities to withdraw. There should be a reason for the continuation of US involvement in Vietnam. The structure of domestic politics in the United States is considered as one of the major contributions to the American’s longest war. As seen on the case of Truman’s , the Republican continuously charged Truman and the Democrats for being “too soft on Communism” (Donaldson 1996: 79). Thus, Truman intervened and escalated in Vietnam in fearing that his party would lose the chance in the next election. Similarly, when the Republican Presidents were elected, they would apply the same action in Vietnam or else they would lose the public support. Both parties wanted to maintain the public support while trying to pave the way for their own parties to win the next election. John F. Kennedy won the election because of his major theme; “It’s time America started moving again” (Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff 1986: 142). It was clear to anyone that most of the movement he had in mind was the Vietnam War. Another good example would be when President Johnson used “The Gulf of Tonkin” incident as an excuse to escalate the war in Vietnam as well as to regain his popularity for a better opportunity to win the next election. The poll showed that President’s handling of The Gulf of Tonkin helped him to regain his popularity- his rating in the Louis Harris poll skyrocketed from 42 to 72 percent overnight (Burson no date given, http://www.jmu.edu/madison/teach/burson/ vietnam.htm). The Gulf of Tonkin incident contributed him a landslide victory in November, three months after the incident. There is also another important psyche that was deeply rooted in the presidents’ minds, the United States has never lost a war before. Neither the Democrats nor the Republican wanted to be the first to lose a war. The long American effort in the Vietnam War can be seen as the exercise of each President in so as to avoid being the first President to lose a war in American history.
The longest American commitment in the war ended as a disguised surrender and left its scars on the institutions and future direction of American foreign policy. The United States intensively suffered from its enormous-but-waste investment in Vietnam in almost every aspect. If the United States had withdrawn itself from Vietnam earlier, it would not have had to suffer from severe Vietnam syndrome. The possible causes which obstructed America’s extrication from Vietnam are as following: the long rivalry ongoing conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union; the importance of the global strategy of containment and the essence of domino theory; the impact of the loss of China; the growing of economic interests in Southeast Asia; the significance of Southeast Asia strategic position; and the role of the President and the pressures of domestic politics. Many scholars have questioned “if the United States had use its military power more judiciously, it could have succeeded in attaining its goal in Indochina at a reasonable price and in a timely manner” (Walton 2002: 152-153). After all, the United Stated had perceived that stepping into one’s stake was quite an easy task for the superpower with all sorts, but disengaging without any great losses would be the most impossible.
RICHARD NIXON, April 1964
The first issue is what the goal of the United States should be. I believe that the goal can be nothing less than victory.
RICHARD NIXON, February 1965
What is involved here is, in effect, to let the Red Chinese know in Vietnam as we, in effect, let Khrushchev know in the confrontation in Cuba that the United States will not stand by and allow any power, however great, take over another country by aggression.
RICHARD NIXON, May 1966
A retreat by the United States from Vietnam would be a Communist victory, a victory of massive proportions and would lead to World War III.
