The Free Will Debate

University Degree Historical and Philosophical studies

In this paper, I will discuss the continuing debate of free will and the existence of choice. There are two main competing viewpoints in this debate; the first being the determinist perspective and the second being the indeterminist perspective. I will argue that neither extreme is true; not only do both free will and determinism exist; they in fact rely on each other. This stance is called compatibilism; a stance which requires the refining of the definitions of freedom and determinism in order to gain a true understanding of their congruent relationship. There are three true premises which support compatibilism when combined; the absence of natural contradiction, the consistency of causation, and the reality of decision making process. These premises lead to the opinion that not only does causality exist, decisions actually require it. This idea, of course, does not escape scrutiny. I will also consider the opposing opinion of a libertarian; an attitude that mostly rejects causality. The underlying issue in this debate is that of moral responsibility. I will discuss my opinion that moral responsibility is essential in human life and the deterministic belief that we cannot be held morally responsible is impossible due to natural human responses. First and foremost, the definitions of freedom and determinism must be addressed in order to illustrate their compatible relationship.

The definition of freedom is often misconstrued in philosophy, hence implying the incompatibility of freedom and determinism. Freedom is best described as the power or ability to do something; a power which one may or may not choose to exercise. Thomas Hobbes believed that a man is free when he finds “no stops in doing what he has the will, desire or inclination to do” (Kane 2005, p.13). A person is free when they do what they desire, without constraint. One may be constrained physically, mentally, through a lack of ability or opportunity, or through coercion. For example, one may not have the freedom to walk to work if one was paralysed which would mean one is constrained through a lack of ability. This definition of freedom is compatible with determinism as one is free if there are no constraints and one is doing what one desires, even if what one wills or desires is determined by one’s past. Freedom also means that a person has the power to otherwise; one would do otherwise if one wanted to. This definition of freedom means that free will is compatible with determinism, if the definition is also refined and confusion cleared. An objection to this standpoint would be that this definition of freedom is not sufficient, and that freedom of will has a ‘deeper’ meaning. My reply to this objection would be to state that if freedom has a deeper meaning that isn’t compatible with determinism, it would be incoherent and we couldn’t have it anyway (Kane 2005, p. 17). Freedom, according to the compatibilist, needs to have a refined definition as previously stated. This polished account of freedom makes it compatible with determinism, but in order to further sustain this compatibility, the definition of determinism must also be clarified.

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Determinism is often misinterpreted causing the belief that it is a threat to freedom; a misconception that is far from the truth. Causation is often confused with constraint. It is constraints, not causes that undermine freedom and prevent choice. Constraints are causes, but of a different kind; they’re hindrances in doing what we want. Whether actions are free or not depends on the kind of cause involved. Some causes such as strength of will enhance freedom while others hinder freedom. Freedom is often seen as inconsistent with determinism as people have the misguided idea that the laws of nature are controlling us against our will. To the contrary, A.J Ayer states that “the existence of the laws of nature indicates only that certain events follow others according to a regular pattern. To be governed by the laws of nature is not to be in chains” (Kane 2005, p. 18). The definitions of freedom and determinism are somewhat unclear and often misconstrued, causing confusion about their relationship. The aforementioned meanings clarify that it is possible to have free will with causal determination; this does not mean that our choices are completely predetermined and we have no power over our lives, but means that our choices are truly ours as they are shaped by our context and experience. In order to further support the theory of compatibilism, one must take into account three true premises, which, when combined, show that our choices require causality.

There are three true premises that lead to the idea that our decisions have causes but are still free in nature. The first is the absence of natural contradiction. This premise is based on the law of identity- things are what they are and do not change their nature. “A is A” (Rand 1996, p.72). A fridge would not suddenly start microwaving food, just as a lizard would not begin hopping like a rabbit. If one were to believe that contradictions exist and are not simply errors in our thinking, all rational thought would be broken down. This premise connects with the second premise; the consistency of causality in existence. Contradictions do not exist, just as nothing is uncaused. Hence, an uncaused change would be contradictory.

Causality is true and consistent in all matter and events. Things and their behaviour are determined by their nature. For example, a ball falls due to the nature of the ball, the earth and gravity. An apple rots because it is in its nature to rot. If something could evade causality, its behaviour would be completely haphazard and random. The gaps in our scientific knowledge are closing and we are still yet to find something that escapes causality. C.J Ducasse states that ““no change occurs and no state persists without a cause”, is known to be true merely as a corollary of the law of identity” (Ducasse 1969, p. 64). This second true premise implies that nothing in nature that is made of matter evades causality.

The third premise is the fact that people experience decision making every day. Making decisions is a fact of life; whether one chose to walk to work or to eat an apple for lunch, decisions are a reality. Within this premise is a problem of definition. I believe that most accept a free decision as ‘a conscious choice to take a certain action, free from any prior cause’. This definition is what may lead indeterminists to abandon causality and determinists to abandon the idea that decisions exist. I propose that a decision is a ‘conscious choice to take certain action which is causally determined by the state of the deciding agent; e.g. one’s knowledge, thoughts, feelings, emotions and experience’. This definition allows for free choice and the impact of causal determinism. The premises involving the absence of contradiction, the consistency of causality and the fact that we make decisions support the theory of compatibilism. The denial of any one of these premises would be ignoring vast empirical and scientific evidence. Therefore, the next step is to assume that internal causation exists and affects our decision making process.

Since causation is true and consistent in nature, it is then evident that internal causation exists and affects choice. Internal causes may be our values, beliefs, experiences, emotions or ideas that are continually changing throughout the lifespan and affecting our decisions. It is apparent that given the premises, decisions actually require causality. Without causality, one would not be able to decide based on one’s desires or needs; a process one practices on a regular basis, whether it involves deciding schooling for one’s child or what one should eat. The theories discussed in this paper do not avoid scrutiny, as there are many differing views on the matter.

A problem raised against my viewpoint involving the discussed true premises would be from that of a libertarian, as the libertarian theory mostly rejects the supposition of causality. Libertarianism involves the belief that the agent is the ultimate originator; no events are caused and choices are only free if they are completely independent and unaffected by outside forces. In reply, I would state that this claim is impossible as it is not explainable by the sum of the kinds of causal conditions that psychologists and social scientists appeal to—such as how an agent sees one’s situation, what one takes their options to be, one’s other beliefs, desires, character, experience, genetic inheritance or one’s environment. Libertarian free action awaits exercise of an ability that no natural being has: the ability to rise above the complex mix of causes and display an “unexplainable X factor, over which the agent has ultimate control, and which renders theretofore-insufficient causes sufficient for the choice or action” (Baker 2006). The idea of an ultimate originator seems unrealistic and not a part natural order. I would also maintain that since causality is consistent in all things, and since the brain is matter, it would be inconceivable to assume that the brain is the only thing in nature that acts without cause. One of compatibilism’s main features is its support of moral responsibility; an issue that libertarianism also promotes and that hard determinism disregards.

The issue of moral responsibility is significant in the free will vs. determinism debate and is one of the main positive features supported in compatibilism. Moral responsibility is essential and inescapable in a cohesive society. Determinism denies moral responsibility due to believed lack of free choice. It is my opinion that the removal of moral responsibility is impossible due to the attitudes and emotional reactions that come naturally to the human race. For example, people naturally react to witnessing ill will. Their attitudes and opinions are directed at the perpetrator’s intentions or attitudes. These natural responses are basic features of our social lives. To give up these attitudes, expectations and emotional responses is virtually inconceivable, as stated by P.F Strawson in his Psychological Impossibility Argument which declares, “It is psychologically impossible to stop holding persons morally responsible for their conduct as it is psychologically impossible to stop having emotional responses” (McKenna 2004). It is also hard to see how an agent can pursue a moral life without appeal to moral responsibility. Moral responsibility is essential to a functional society as it encourages interconnectedness and societal cohesiveness; a world where a person is not morally responsible for their actions would, in my opinion, be chaotic and inconsistent.

In summary, neither extreme of free will or determinism are realistic in society; it is the merging of these ideas that maintains moral responsibility and a realistic view of our freedom to choose. Freedom is choice without constraint, and the freedom to do otherwise. This is compatible with the real definition of determinism, which has been confused with a force that takes away freedom. When the true meanings of these terms are clarified, it is obvious that not only are they compatible, they in fact rely on each other. There are also three true premises that, when combined, sustain this argument; the absence of natural contradiction, the consistency of causation in all things and the fact that people make decisions. These premises imply that not only does causality exist within us; our decisions in fact require causality. One of the main issues in this debate is the existence of moral responsibility. It has been my claim that even if determinism were true, the disposal of moral responsibility in society would be impossible due to our natural humanly responses. Free will means that one can make free decisions when one is not constrained, but these decisions have causes, just like everything else on this planet. To say that we are completely free from cause or that we have no free choice at all would be too extreme and unrealistic.