The Problem Of Evil.

University Degree Historical and Philosophical studies

The Problem Of Evil

The problem of evil is perhaps one of the toughest problems that has faced classical theism throughout history. It is perhaps the most poignant example that atheists have used to illustrate why they are convinced the God of classical theism does not exist. The foundation of the argument is based upon the thought that evil could and should not exist in a world that was created and operated by an all-knowing and all-loving God. Theists would claim that evil has a place in the natural order of God’s world, and although it may sometimes seem pointless to us, it is still nevertheless an essential ingredient that is vital to maintaining the natural order of the world. Theists might claim evil is like salt, harmful and disgusting on its own, but still a vital ingredient nonetheless. Whether or not evil an essential ingredient in the overall balance of the world has been argued by many philosophers for centuries, and is still open to question.

The problem of evil lies, according to J.L.Mackie, in the contradiction of believing in the God of classical theism and the reality of evil. In his article “Evil and Omnipotence”, he outlines this contradiction but says that the contradiction does not arise immediately but is more evident when we assess what we mean by God and what we mean by evil. The classical God of theism is supposed to be omnipotent and all loving yet he still lets evil exist. If God were omnipotent he would have the power to stop the evils of the world, and if he were all loving he would want to stop evil. Mackie defines good as something that “would want to stop evil as far as it possibly could”(1). So if God has total power, he should be able to eliminate evil and would want to because he is all loving. This is where the contradiction lies and Mackie claims that the belief in the two is incompatible. He later writes in his book “The Miracle of Theism” that this contradiction does not disprove the existence of God, but strongly undermines typical religious doctrines that claim that God has all these qualities. (2)

In response to Mackie’s line of thought, classical theists have responded with the “We can’t see all the picture argument”. Mackie assumes that there are evil’s in the world that cannot be justified by an all-loving God. Indeed it is hard to see how a God who is supposed to love the world can justify such evils as the Holocaust, but theists would argue that it is only difficult for us humans as we cant see the whole picture. As mere mortals, we only see some of the picture and perhaps these evils and, as repugnant as they may seem at the time, are small when taken in context with the overall history of the world. Perhaps there is method in the madness of the world and it is foolish to claim that there isn’t just because we can’t see the reasoning behind it. The evils we experience in the world are perhaps small yet vital to the overall brilliant plan of God. This is a view that is championed by such philosophers as William Alston. He sums up his line of argument perfectly when he says, “we are in no position to suppose that our inability to find a justifying divine reason is a sufficient ground for supposing there is none”(3). This argument is perhaps the strongest response to Mackies line of thought, and is hard to contest. Indeed it is a fitting response to any atheist who might claim that certain evils in the world are sufficient evidence that an all-loving and all-powerful God does not exist. The picture is indeed too big to look at any instance of evil and say it is unjustified, for if we were to have sufficient evidence we would have to look at the entire existence of the universe.

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The above theist argument would suggest that God has a plan, and that within this plan the means do justify the ends. This forms the foundations for another theistic response to the problem of evil, which is known as “The Free Will Defence”. The free will argument is based upon the assumption that we all have free will and that the evils in the world are a result of our choices. Also these evils that we perpetrate are not any justification for not believing in God. The fundamental argument behind the free-will defence is that it is better to have a world where we have choice rather than a world where all we can do is good. Actions are only morally good if there is such a thing as morally bad. Some theists would say it is impossible to imagine a world where acts can be seen as good, if there is no evil to compare it with. Philosophers such as Richard Swinburne find the free-will defence convincing and would say that it is a good thing that God has gave us the choice to harm others, because freedom is a important entity that outweighs a few evils that might be the consequences of this freedom. But others might argue that there is too much evil in the world to justify the existence of God. Swinburne replied to this by claiming, “the fewer natural evils a God provides, the less opportunity he provides for man to exercise responsibility”(4). If we were to have less evil we would, as Swinburne suggests, exist in a “toy-world, where things matter but not very much; where we can choose and our choices can make a small difference, but the real choices remain God’s”(5). This is a similar stance to which the philosopher John Hick takes when discussing the problem of evil. Hick claims that in a world that lacked the freedom of choice would be morally static, and that if God made a paradise, there would be no challenges and we would never be able to overcome hurdles because there would be none. Hick and Swinburne both would assume therefore that a world with evil and freedom of choice would be preferable to a world that lacked freedom of choice.

However, this stance leaves Hick and Swinburne open to another question of whether or not this world is preferable or is it possible to create a world with no evil but where we still have free choice. The existence of such a world where we have freedom but are still compelled to choose good over evil is impossible according to some theists such as Alvin Plantinga. According to Plantinga, if God “aims to produce a moral good, then he must create significantly free creatures”(6). This view seems reasonable enough, for if God were to simply coerce his creations towards the good and away from evil; this still wouldn’t provide humans with proper freedom. Gentle coercion is one thing, but to say that it would be possible for a world to exist where everyone chose good would require strong coercion. This surely restricts the freedom of a human being if God were to coerce us in this way. This is a strong attack that perhaps leaves Mackies theory on such a world totally unreasonable and unfounded.

Conversely, atheists have continued to further their attack on the free-will defence by pointing out that the God of classical theism is supposed to possess omniscience and omnipotence. As Mackie points out, “omnipotence and omniscience together entail omnificence. God does everything”(7). The God of classical theism is supposed to possess this omnificence, but surely possessing omnificence would undermine the suggestion that humans have free will, which would destroy the free-will defence at its very foundations. If God was everywhere and part of everything, then our choices are actually God’s choices and not our own. Human action would be part of the world just like every tree and every star in the galaxy, created and controlled by God. If this omnificence was possessed by God, then he would control our every move and choice which would limit our freedom.

In response to this argument, classical theists have suggested that although God is the cause of everything, his causality is not the type to threaten human freedom. Thomas Aquinas is a philosopher who takes this stance. He claims that “God is not something in the world, and his creatively making something to be does not interfere with it in anyway”(8). Aquinas adds further “God is no external agent able to interfere with human freedom by acting coercively from the outside”(9). However, by saying that God cannot coerce and interfere with human choice, then surely this means he can’t possess omnificence. Indeed, the whole suggestion of omnificence is questionable. Surely it cannot be impossible to possess total power over everything as displayed by the classic example of the irresistible force meeting an immovable object. If God were to make an indestructible object, his omnificence would be limited by his inability to break that indestructible object. This ancient problem is troublesome to theists’ claims that the God of classical theism is omnificent.

In response to all these arguments about the problem of evil, Thomas Aquinas replied with a very strong attack in his unreality of evil argument. The problem for theism is that if God created everything, then he would’ve had to create evil and surely a loving God would not create evil. Thomas Aquinas replied to this problem by claiming that evil didn’t actually exist at all. He claimed that evil was simply a lack of good, and didn’t exist as an actual entity and property in itself. He claimed that evil had no positive properties that suggested it was created by God, but was simply a lack of good. He concluded using this argument that the problem of evil did not pose a significant threat upon the existence of God. This argument is hard to oppose, and if Aquinas is correct in what he says then this leaves the problem of evil unfounded when trying to question the existence of God.

Although this conclusion by Aquinas may seem like he has significantly answered the problem of evil from a theist perspective, many problems still remain unanswered concerning the problem of evil. Aquinas has surely responded well to the problem that God created evil by saying that it doesn’t actually exist, but there are still more problems left unrequited. Although Aquinas has formulated a plausible theory, the question still remains of whether or not evil actually exists as a property. Certainly, some classical theism would suggest that evil does exist in the form of Satan and perhaps witchcraft, and if this were true then Aquinas’ argument is unfounded. Unfortunately, this problem is still open to opinion and suggestion and is difficult to prove either way. The problem of whether God should have placed more good in the world instead of so much evil is still open to personal opinion, as theists may argue that there is significant levels of good in the world, yet an atheist may argue that there is too much evil in the world. Regrettably, these arguments are still left unanswered but it is clear to see that the problem of evil still poses a significant threat to the argument that the God of classical theism actually exists.

Bibliography

J.L.Mackie, Evil and Omnipotence, Mind 64 (1955)
Davies, Brian, The Philosophy of Religion, Third Edition, Oxford, (2004)
Alston William, The Inductive Argument from Evil and the Human Cognitive Condition, reprinted in Daniel Howard-Snyder, The evidential argument from evil, (Bloomington and Indianapolis, IN, 1996), p.109
Swinburne Richard, The existence of God (rev. edn. Oxford, 1991), p219
Ibid, p220
Plantinga Alvin, God, Evil, and the Metaphysics of Freedom, reprinted in Adams and Adams (eds.), The problem of evil, p.106
Davies, Brian, The Philosophy of Religion, Third Edition, Oxford, (2004)
Ibid, p.222
Ibid, p.223