Libertarianism: some of our actions are free
Libertarianism argues that some events that happen are not determined by prior events. In defending freewill, Chisholm suggests:
We must not say that every event involved in the act is caused by some other event; and we must not say that the act is something that is not caused at all. The possibility that remains, therefore, is this: We should say that at least one of the events that are involved in the act is caused, not by any other events, but by something else instead. And this something else can only be the agent—the man (440).
Given Chisholm’s suggestion, I can say that my action-A is free if and only if I am the cause of A and that I could have done another action-B other than A. If determinism is true, I could not have done B. But I could have done B because I am the cause of my actions. My decision to do A caused me to perform A, and was not caused by past events. So therefore, I am free. Does this view entail more consequences versus that of determinism? Before I analyze the strengths and weakness of these views, I shall first explain one last position, i.e. Compatibilism. I shall turn to Ayer’s version herein.
Compatibilism: causes determine actions
Compatibilism is the view that claims: first, that every cause has a causal explanation. And second that we have freedom to act upon our choice. Notice that the first is a deterministic claim and the latter, a libertarian claim. So if all causal relationships have specific laws that govern them, how can there be freedom in the sense that any causal law does not determine it at all? Ayer’s answer is simple, i.e. you could have done otherwise. How does this work?
Take for instance the following example: I drink alcohol as a result of my own choice. So my act of drinking alcohol is voluntary. Furthermore, my choice of drinking alcohol is not due to peer pressure. So the immediate cause of my choice must me internal to me. Now while I was walking to the nearest bar to get a drink, I bumped into a friend of mine who asked me if I wanted to go watch a movie. I could have gone with my friend if I really did not want to drink. So I would have acted otherwise had I chosen to. Therefore, my actions are caused but are free, for I could have done otherwise, had I chosen to do so.
The main thrust of compatibilism is to reconcile the problem of freewill, i.e. the incompatibility of freedom and determinism. “Compatibilism is the thesis that free will is compatible with determinism” (“McKenna”). But why attempt to reconcile the two conflicting concepts? For, “it seems, then, that determinism is necessary if we are to make any sense of the notions of freedom and responsibility” (Greetham 247). In the next section, I shall discuss the consequences, i.e. strengths and weaknesses of each position.
Analysis
Determinism, Libertarianism or Compatibilism – how do we choose from one over the other? Are we really free or not? Commonsense tells us that things just don’t happen purely by chance; hence everything must have a cause. Yet what are the consequences of a deterministic point of view? The main strength of this view is its adherence to the principle of parsimony. In a deterministic perspective, if we discover the cause of an action, it nullifies the purpose of freedom. So for instance, I felt a pain rush through my body. Consequently, I say “ouch!” A friend asks me what’s wrong and I couldn’t answer why, for I wasn’t sure. But contemporary neuroscience tells us that initial pain is caused by “more rapidly conducting A-fibers, whereas the more aversive pain is caused by slowly conducting C-fibers” (Nestler, Hyman and Malenka 276). If we had an explanation for everything, and all things being equal, then it would seem less complex altogether. As Ockham’s razor states, the simplest explanation is the best explanation.
On the other hand, a deterministic perspective does have its own perils, why? “Since determinism is true, and since freewill is incompatible with determinism, then no persons are ultimately responsible or blameworthy of their actions” (Kane 291). If I am never responsible for my actions, then I can do anything, legal or illegal, and it would not be my fault. Moreover, the main claim of determinism leads to an infinite regress, i.e. “whatever happens is determined by prior events, which are again determined by prior events, and so on” (Sie 2).
So perhaps the libertarian is correct in saying that we do have free will. What does this entail? Well, a major advantage of this view is that since we are free, we are entirely responsible for our actions. So in this case, we do have control over our actions and the choices we make. Our present circumstance is a result of the choice we make in life; we obtain life and liberty without any form of intervention. However, a libertarian world would only look good if its citizens were all responsible. What then becomes of the people who are not responsible? What happens to that of young children who still seeks for guidance from elders? The weakness of libertarianism is that it ignores our inevitable human nature. It is a fact that people do make bad choices in life. And it wouldn’t be a problem, for as long as we learn from it. A libertarian position asserts that we all are free to do what we want for as long as we do not interfere with the lives of others. But don’t you think that in one way or another, we may affect the lives of others because of the bad choices we make? In other words, too much freedom may also share the same disadvantage with determinism, i.e. chaos. Order has to be instilled at one point to draw the line. Now what about compatibilism?
A compatibilist view seems to be, at least for me, the mot plausible position among all three. I will explain why through the following example: I was about to head home from school one afternoon. When I was about to ride the bus, my friends asked me if I wanted a lift home. I thought it would be more fun to ride with them than in a school bus so I chose to ride with them instead. I knew that my house was not on the way, but since they were willing to drop me off, I guess it wasn’t too much of a bother for them. We were on the freeway, about to make a turn, when another car swerved passed us and crashed right next to us just when we were about to turn as well. We were all rushed to the nearest hospital. The last thing I remember was hearing an ambulance. When I woke up, I was in a hospital bed, with my parents by my side. They were so glad that I was fine. I asked them how my friends were doing, and unfortunately, my friend that was driving the car did not make it alive. Now, considering the aforementioned series of events, was her death my fault?
A determinist would answer me that it is not my fault, since I had no control over what transpired. It was an effect of a prior event that could not have been done otherwise. A libertarian on the other hand would answer me that it is my fault since I made a choice of riding with my friend, when I could have chosen the bus since I knew it was out of the way. Thus, all things being equal, I ought to be responsible for her death. However, a compatibilist would answer me by saying that yes, the series of events that transpired was beyond my control. So the death of my friend was not my fault for I couldn’t have done anything to prevent it from happening. However, the very act of choosing is what I have control over. So my act of choosing to ride with my friend instead of the bus is a free act. But the act of getting into an accident was not. Therefore, the death of my friend is not my fault, for the cause of the accident was beyond my control. What does this tell us about compatibilism?
The strength of this view is that it gives us enough responsibility to act on our own will and it also gives us a sufficient limitation not to act upon it. Events that happen in the past, more so, before we were born ought not to be our responsibility. Similarly, events that happen in the present that is beyond our capacity to do otherwise ought not to be our responsibility as well. What we have control over is our own choices. My friend could have cautioned to turn left much earlier so that no car could have swerved our way. Or maybe, the driver of the other car was drunk and thus could not control the wheel very well.
Perhaps what makes compatibilism difficult to understand is that we’ve been preconditioned to perceive freedom and determinism as incompatible and thus, inconceivable? As Vihvelin concludes, “to show that freewill and determinism are compatible we must describe a world at which there is free will and determinism. I have just now – in the preceding sentence – described it. That is all the positive argument the compatibilist can give or can be expected to give for her position” (318). Indeed, this is why I believe that compatibilism is the most practical among all three. Do you agree?
Works Cited
Feinberg, Joel and Russ Shafer-Landau. Reason and Responsibility. Belmont, CA: Thomson Wadsworth, 2008. Print.
Chisholm, Roderick M. “Human Freedom and The Self”. Reason and Responsibility. Ed. Joel Feinberg and Russ Shafer-Landau. Belmont, CA: Thomson Wadsworth, 2008. Print.
Ginet, Carl. “Freedom, Responsibility and Agency”. Free Will. Ed. Robert Kane. Oxford, UK: Blackwell Publishing, 2002. Print.
Greetham, Bryan. Philosophy. New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006. Print.
Holbach, Paul. “The Illusion of Free Will”. Reason and Responsibility. Ed. Joel Feinberg and Russ Shafer-Landau. Belmont, CA: Thomson Wadsworth, 2008. Print.
Kane, Robert. “Incompatibilism.” Contemporary Debates in Metaphysics. Ed. Theodore Sider, John Hawthorne and Dean Zimmerman. Oxford, UK: Blackwell Publishing, 2008. Print.
McKenna, Michael. “Compatibilism”. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Ed. Edward Zalta. (2008) : n. pag. Web. 24 Feb 2011.
Nestler, Eric J., Steven E. Hyman and Robert C. Malenka. Molecular Neuropharmacology: A Foundation for Clinical Neuroscience. New York, NY: McGraw Hill, 2009. Print.
Sie, Maureen. Justifying Blame: Why Free Will Matters and Why It Does Not. New York, NY: Value Inquiry Book Series. Print.
Vihvelin, Kadri. “Compatibilism, Incompatibilism, and Impossibilism.” Contemporary Debates in Metaphysics. Ed. Theodore Sider, John Hawthorne and Dean Zimmerman. Oxford, UK: Blackwell Publishing, 2008. Print.
