Therefore, without the war, a grand backing for the anti-war Lenin and his Bolsheviks may not have occurred in Russia.
The broken state of the Russian economy, which was partly caused by the Great War, was a major factor of the Bolshevik revolution. The Tsar’s decision to join the war took millions of men away from the farms and trains, causing food shortages and rising prices for those living in the cities. Output for food processing and textiles, which together were the two biggest industrial branches in Russia, respectively fell 22% and 18% from 1913 to 1916. Moreover, state resources began pouring into the production of weapons, gunpowder, and explosives, rather than in the much-needed backwards Russian infrastructure. In Russia as a whole, at least one third of those who were employed at 1914 had left the jobs by 1917, either to join the war, work in the production of weapons, or simply be unemployed like many. The growing shortages of necessary resources and labour militancy in Petrograd resulted in more sympathy for revolutionary zealots, particularly, the Bolsheviks and other groups advocating for vast economic and political change. Many workers were heralded at the possibility of a stable job with a positive work environment and protective rights for the workers. Consequently, the war gave birth to the large economic instability within Russia, which had pushed the need for a revolution to repair the worsening conditions.
A manifestation of the workers’ discontent with the regime would be the general strikes, riots, and rallies that had taken place near the end of the Tsar’s reign and all throughout the Provisional Government’s rule. The strikes had been taking place for reasons mentioned earlier, such as the lack of essential resources, workers’ rights, and resistance to the war, which had no benefit to the Russian people. It is evident that the World War triggered these strikes in Petrograd, due to the vast cuts in the largest industrial branches. One of the most prominent of which was the July 1st 1917 general strike, organized by the Bolsheviks, in which 500,000 workers and soldiers rallied in Petrograd, calling for the end of the war and power to the Soviets. These strikes faced much resistance, but were largely uncontrollable and frequent. Trotsky, a prominent Bolshevik revolutionary and Marxist theorist said “It would be no exaggeration to say that Petrograd achieved the February Revolution. The rest of the country adhered to it.”
Therefore, the war had put the economy in a position where instability, and eventually revolution, became imminent.
The downturn of the war was a major factor that had, in part, caused the Bolshevik revolution. There are several points to be considered. First and foremost, Tsar Nicholas II took personal command of the army. The Tsar remained at the front, and left the Empress and his ministers in charge of domestic affairs. The Russian army placed much attention on the comfort of the Tsar during the war, insofar as building a railroad track directly to one of his palaces. Because of his role in assuming command of the army, he was ultimately blamed for the military’s defeats, as he did not contribute much to the war effort. This angered military officials, whereas even right wing powerful elements within Russia had grown to dislike the Tsar – a mutiny within the military, as well as the food riots mentioned earlier, made up the key reasons for the abdication of Nicholas II. Although he attempted to thrust the opposing rioters using the army and police, the desperate call for reinforcements in Petrograd were being unanswered. General Khabalov of the Russian military had said, “I have at my disposal in the Admiralty building four companies of the Guard, five squadrons of cavalry and Cossacks, and two batteries; the rest of the troops have gone over to the revolutionists, or by agreement with them are remaining neutral. Soldiers are wandering through the towns singly or in bands disarming officers… the whole city is in the hands of the revolutionists”. Many of the soldiers had, therefore, joined in anti-tsarist riots in disapproval of his actions, forcing the Provisional Government to come into place. If no war had been taken place, such mutinies involving hundreds of thousands of soldiers would not have happened.
Another prime example of the military’s instability was the coup attempted by Russian army’s commander-in-chief, General Kornilov in 1917. Kornilov was politically right wing, and “in an attempt to restore order and resist the German counter-offensive”, most of the other generals had aligned themselves with him in the failed overthrow of the Provisional Government. Although Kerensky initially supported Kornilov, Kerensky ordered his arrest, resulting in the failure of the coup. This caused pestering consequences; namely, the generals felt betrayed by Kerensky for Kornilov’s arrest, therefore losing full support of the conservatives in the military. The left wing and moderate elements had also lost their trust in Kerensky, because he had initially supported Kornilov’s plans to disband the soldiers’ revolutionary committees within the military. If it had not been for the German counterattack during the war, this mutiny may not have taken place, and therefore more support for the government, from the military and elsewhere, would have been rational.
From a strategic dimension, the amount of resources lost in the war had initially pushed the domestic dismay in Russia to take place. The Russian army was badly trained, poorly equipped, and was struggling to keep up with other European armies of the time. Christopher Eger, who has been a historical military analyst for over twenty years, wrote “The army was made up mainly of conscripted illiterate peasants lead by a very small (compared to other European forces) officer corps and an even smaller cadre of professional non-commissioned officers”. . Lieutenant General Nicholas Golovine calculated 1,300,000 men were killed in action; 4,200,000 wounded, of whom 350,000 later died; and 2,400,000 taken prisoner. The human and strategic losses at Tannenberg and the Masurian lakes were similarly tragic. Russia was thereby strained greatly due to the war, with millions of casualties. The strikes, mutinies, and economic problems were largely factors caused by the increasingly fatal direction during the war.
Finally, the Marxist revolutionary zeal, and Marxism as a whole, was mobilized due to the nature of the war. Marxist ideology sees itself as the next evolutionary step after capitalism, asserting that a class conflict would eventually arise out of a capitalist society – this would eventually lead to the dictatorship of the proletariat. Since Lenin saw capitalism as a global system of imperialism and oppression of the third world, he and the Bolsheviks believed that the revolution must start in the third world, and later be dependent on the workers of the first world when resources grew thin. G.D.H. Cole wrote, “…the Bolsheviks knew that proletarian revolution was bound to occur; and in I9I7 they felt tolerably sure that it would occur soon, for the war itself, which they regarded as an outcome of imperialist rivalries, appeared to be hastening the downfall of capitalism and maturing the Western proletariat for its historic tasks.” At the time of the revolution, the Marxist-Leninists had seen this period in history as a pivotal one, due to the circumstances surrounding the war. The imperialist rivalries during the World War became an excellent pretext to sow the seeds of revolution. Without the war, there would be no guarantee that the Marxist would recognize that particular moment in history as the opportune time to revolt, as Marxist ideology would not have permitted one.
In conclusion, Lenin’s movement, the failing economy, and Russian revolutionary zeal due to the failures of the military and its leadership, were largely mobilized by the Great War. Without it, the Bolshevik revolution would be highly unlikely to have happened. The social, economic, political, and ideological factors outlined and referenced in this paper stand as a clear testament to this fact. Although the war was not the sole reason for the Bolshevik revolution, as it had motivations and agitations prior to it, a revolution would have not been triggered without the large scale affects caused by the war. The ousting of the tsarist regime, till today, is very relevant, as it had forever left its stamp on the twentieth century and beyond. The Bolshevik revolution is one that will continue to be studied throughout the academic field of contemporary European history, and rightfully so.
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