Ostpolitik was also affected and the idea of German unification revived by Gorbachev’s policies of ‘glasnost’ (openness) and ‘perestroika’ (restructuring). Many interpreted theses policies as evidence of a change of heart on the part of the Soviet Union and a willingness to perhaps release its grip on some of satellite states, however this was not Gorbachev’s intention. His policies were intended to strengthen the USSR, not to weaken it, however they had, in reality, the opposite effect. Those who favoured the idea of unification were also encouraged by the attempts of independence movements in other Soviet states, such as Poland and Czechoslovakia.
The emphasis on Ostpolitik diminished in the 1980s, however, it is not true to say that it was abandoned. The relationship between East and West Germany had been irreversibly altered by the advent of Ostpolitik, and the foundations for German unity laid.
Towards Unity
Gorbachev’s reforms in the Soviet Union gave rise to demands for change within the GDR. However, it quickly became clear that this was one time the GDR would not be following in the path of the Soviet Union. Politburo member Kurt Hager clearly outlined this in an interview published in West German magazine Stern in March 1987 as he declared ‘…If your neighbour repapered his flat would you feel bound to repaper your flat too?…’ Despite warnings that ‘…life punishes those who come too late…’ the SED refused to modernise and continued to clamp down on any dissidents. This decision was meant to ensure the survival of the regime, however it backfired, and eventually led instead to the regimes collapse.
According to Ketternecker it was in Hungary that ‘…the fuse was finally ignited…’ After years of preventing would-be East German emigrants from making their way to West Germany via its border with Austria, the Hungarian authorities began to allow them to cross on the 2nd May 1989. On the 11th September this became official policy. Still, few believed that German unification would be on the political agenda any time soon. For a short while the situation was diffused with those unhappy with the regime fleeing to West Germany. However, demonstrations for political freedom and a lifting of travel restrictions soon began in Leipzig, Dresden and Berlin until protesters began to dismantle the Berlin wall ‘…the most ugly edifice in the world…’
When the Wall came down on 9th November 1989, it signalled the beginning of a new division for the East Germans who became divided between those who wanted to flee and those who wanted to stay and reform. Despite Kohl’s later claim that to the contrary, there remained a number in both East and West who believed that unification was neither possible nor desirable. Christa Wolf, Stefan Heym and others published an appeal on 26th November calling for the GDR to become a democratic socialist alternative to the Federal Republic rather than just being swallowed up by it. However, their appeal went unheeded by the masses who had, by then stopped chanting ‘We are the people’ and had begun to chant ‘We are one people’ instead. Years of pent up frustration were unleashed as the two Germanies rushed towards unification. Less than a year later, their goal was achieved.
Attitudes and Strategies of the Four Powers
The first unification of Germany took place in 1871 and had been the result of conflict (with France) and as such, it seemed to some that a unified Germany was inherently dangerous. War had emanated twice from German lands in the course of the twentieth century and Bismarck’s claim that the German state was one built upon ‘blood and iron’ seemed particularly apt. The post-war settlements, although heavily criticised at the time, had come to be accepted over the course of the Cold War, and many nations became anxious when the possibility of a united Germany moved on to the international agenda in 1989. The countries of the EC felt particularly threatened by a single German state. Up until 1989, the four large member states which were almost equal in size, with between fifty and sixty million inhabitants (Britain, France, West Germany and Italy) If Germany was to be reunified as a member of the EC it would be far larger than any other state in the community, with a population of almost eighty million, not to mention a combined economy which would be the fourth largest in the world, ahead of both Britain and France. Understandably then both these nations were wary of any move towards unification, which could potentially jeopardise their standing within Europe and the wider world. For the first time in the course of the Cold War conflict the position of Britain and France was at odds with that of the United States, further contributing to an atmosphere of uncertainty.
The USA
The USA had supported the idea of a united Germany since 1949, when the two Germanies were constitutionally enshrined. In the decades that followed, America and her World War II allies, Britain and France, were vociferous in their criticism of the division of Germany. However, unlike Britain and France, whose condemnation of the situation amounted to little more than lip-service, the United States stayed true to its aim of eventually reunifying Germany as a single state. This fact did not go unnoticed by the German leaders who a decade after unification bestowed honorary citizenship on George Bush who, according to Kohl ‘…always supported the right of self determination for the people on the other side of the Iron Curtain…did not hesitate and stood out among those who gave us the courage to follow the path to unity and supported us to the best of your ability…’ He continued to praise Bush as he went on ‘…Few American presidents have concerned themselves so intensively with Europe with such a large measure of understanding as you, dear George Bush…’
For the USA, the reunification of Germany as part of the western world would be their final Cold War victory, a symbol of capitalisms triumph over communism. As a result it was eager to facilitate the fusion of East and West into a single state. Bush and his administration affirmed their position unequivocally in a speech delivered in Mainz (FRG) on 31st May 1989 when he stated ‘…The Cold War began with the division of Europe. It can only end when Europe is whole…democracy’s journey east is not easy…’ In the same speech he attempts to quell any fears that Britain and France may have by declaring that ‘…there cannot be a common European home until all within it are free to roam from room to room…’ This provides a clear indication that whilst the United States was coming to terms with the idea of a united Germany other countries were not entirely convinced.
However it is important not to overestimate the level of American support for German reunification. Although James Baker (US Secretary of State) claimed that ‘…The United States and NATO have stood for unification for forty years and we will not waver from that goal…’ and the USA can be seen as the nation most supportive of the idea of reunification, some opposition remained. Fears increased and were voiced in the more right-wing media circles as the Berlin Wall was being dismantled that NATO would be dissolved leaving no adequate substitute in its place.
Part of the reason for the comparatively unique attitude of the United States was that unlike its allies in Europe, it did not fear a newly enlarged German nation which would, after all still only be the size of the American state of Montana.
In 1989, the United States shared the commonly held view that German unification was not an issue of immediate importance. Even when it became clear that the issue was moving on to the political agenda Bush failed to anticipate the speed of events as he pronounced ‘…it takes time…’ however he did acknowledge a certain inevitability ‘…he [Krenz] can’t turn the clock back…the change is too inexorable…’ Once the move towards unification began fears surfaced that Kohl was pushing events to move too quickly. The US became anxious that the rapid pace of change in East Germany could destabilise the country and ‘…undercut the move towards democracy…’ As a result, Bush articulated four principles according to which unification should be achieved. These were
- That the principle of self-determination be respected
- That it occur as part of a broader process of European integration which included NATO and the EC
- That it be gradual and peaceful and regard the interests of other Europeans
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That it should occur with respect for the inviolability of borders as stated in the Helsinki Final Act
These conditions were intended not only to direct what course unification would take, but also to allay the fears of both the American public and the countries of Europe.
At the end of World War One, the United States had retreated from European politics and had experienced the consequences of its actions. At the end of World War Two its approach was somewhat different. It took an active role in the post-war settlement negotiations at Tehran, Yalta and Potsdam and remained involved in European affairs through its association with the FRG and also through NATO. As a result it took an active role in the German unification process more so than Britain and France whose roles were less significant.
The USSR
Soviet fears of a united Germany have been well documented both before and after unification. There is a wealth of source material that can be cited to support the argument that the USSR was almost entirely opposed to unification both in official circles but also in the wider population. As a result it is almost always seen as the nation most hostile to the idea of German unity. However, this is not strictly true. Certainly the USSR did not look favourably upon a united Germany, but in this respect it was not alone, for the governments of both Britain and France had their reservations about unification when it became a real possibility.
The USSR was ultimately responsible for the division of Germany and of Berlin for failing to join its zone of occupation with those of the USA, Great Britain and France when they merged in 1949. There are two possible explanations for the Soviet Union’s reluctance to relinquish its zone of occupation. The first, which prevailed during the height of the Cold War, is that the Soviet Union was looking to expand the Communist Empire over the entire European continent and beyond and saw the occupation of Germany as a starting point for a worldwide communist revolution as well as a matter of national prestige. Another explanation is that the USSR suffered so much suffering during the course of World War II that its occupation was a necessary way of preventing similar atrocities from occurring by providing a ‘buffer-zone’ against invasion from the West. Gorbachev appears to subscribe to this belief as he claims that the fear of a united Germany felt by Soviet people was ‘…understandable both historically and psychologically…’ However, he denies the USSR was in any way responsible for the division of Germany as he declared in an article published in Pravda in February 1990 that ‘…Even after the emergence of the two German states, the Soviet Government, together with the German Democratic Republic continued to uphold the principle of German unity..’ He goes on to blame the Western powers instead ‘…On March 10th 1952, the Soviet Government put forward a plan for the unification of Germany into a single democratic and neutral state. The West rejected that proposal…’
The Russian authorities feared that reunification would result in a resurgence of German nationalism. This was a double cause for concern for the Soviets who were afraid that German nationalism would produce not only militaristic expansionist tendencies which would threaten the border with Russia, but also that it would provide impetus to independence movements in other satellite states, such as Czechoslovakia and the Baltic nations of Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia. They also feared that the loss of the GDR from the communist empire would lose them vital power and prestige similar to the experience of Britain after surrendering her colonies. The Soviet Union was not unique in its hostility to unification; however it differed from nations such as Britain and France in one vital respect. Unlike the other nations that were opposed to unification, the USSR was in a better position to obstruct any developments. The pre-condition set by America and the other Western powers that the unified Germany should form part of NATO and thus placed firmly in the Western camp, seemed for a time to rule out any possibility of reunification. Eventually, the USSR was persuaded to renounce any claim upon East Germany as a result of international pressure, the realisation that the collapse of the regime in the GDR was imminent and other incentives, such as the ‘special food sale’ which provided the Soviet Union with more than 100,000 tonnes of meat; 20,000 tonnes of butter; 15,000 tonnes of milk powder; and 5,000 tonnes of cheese at a ‘friendship price’ , subsidised by 220 million Deutschmarks from the Federal budget.
While it cannot be disputed that the USA was instrumental in the process of unification, it must also be recognised that without the support or at least the co-operation of the Soviet Union the route the two Germanies followed in their quest for unity would have been far more laborious.
Great Britain
Surprisingly the British response to the prospect of a united Germany was far closer to that of the Soviet Union, rather than its traditional ally, the United States. Thatcher was hostile to the idea of a single German state and believed that the move towards unification should be incremental, especially if the newly unified state was to become a member of NATO. The British government consistently urged Germany not to rush towards unification. In an attempt to slow down the rapid pace Thatcher even advised Gorbachev against moving too quickly towards unification, arguing that a rush to German unity would threaten both his position and also security within Europe. However despite her efforts, events gained a momentum that made unification inevitable.
The British government and large parts of the British media saw in German unification a threat to its national sovereignty. It was predicted that European integration would accelerate leading to ‘…British subordination to the Germans…’ In addition fears began to circulate of a possible French-German axis in the European Community (EC), with Britain effectively sidelined.
German unification also threatened to weaken NATO, the primary link between the USA and Britain, increasing British fears of isolation. Such a reaction appeared to be justified as Bush spoke of the relationship between America and Germany as one of ‘partners in leadership’ at a NATO summit in May 1989, which was to be reinvoked as a ‘new Atlanticism’ at the next summit, that December. In order to mollify Thatcher and allay any British fears the Americans declared that ‘…our relationship with Britain is extraordinarily special and will remain so…’ during the Four Power Talks in Berlin on December 1989.
Like the USSR and France, Britain had experienced great destruction at the hands of the Germans in both World Wars and, as a result was wary of a reunified, remilitarised German state. Inflammatory remarks were published in many areas of the British press that were unashamedly anti-German. In an article published in the Times, for example, the Irish politician and journalist Conor Cruise O’Brien encouraged readers to be wary of a so-called ‘Fourth Reich’ One of Thatcher’s closest aides, Nicholas Ridley described in the London-based Spectator the move towards unification as a ‘…German racket designed to take over the whole of Europe…’ and compared Kohl to Hitler.
By 1990, both Thatcher’s government and the British public had begun to resign themselves to the idea of a united Germany when it became clear that the regime in the GDR was close to collapse. However due to their previous reticence, their role in the process was often little more than advisory.
France
The French shared many of the fears held by both the Soviets and the British and was also initially opposed to the idea of German unity, although this was never admitted in public. Despite his reservations, as well as those of his government and the people of France, President Francois Mitterand stated that he was ‘…not afraid of reunification…’ adding that ‘…unification is a historical compulsion…’ President of the European Commission Jacques Delors, himself a Frenchman, also voiced his approval as he declared ‘…unification is a globally positive phenomenon…’, In spite of these statements, France felt threatened in much the same way as Britain and the Soviet Union. French fears of German invasion were well entrenched after the experience of two World Wars fought on its country’s soil.
For France, the main worry was how the issue of German unification would affect the process of European integration. French elites had come to believe that the division of Germany had enhanced the part played by France in European affairs. Many felt that unification, by ending the division of Germany, would alter the balance of power in Europe with France being forced to take a more marginal role. It was also felt that the issue of reunification would complicate the priority of moving ahead with integration.
There was a marked difference between the role of Britain and France played in the immediate aftermath of World War II and in the resolution of the German Question in 1989/90. Rather than playing a decisive part in the 2 + 4 Talks, the French and British were seen as observers rather than actual participants.
Alternatives to Unification
By the end of 1989 it had become clear that the regime in the GDR was nearing collapse. The idea of a reunified Germany, however still faced great opposition. As a result, various other alternatives were proposed.
Two Sovereign States
It was initially proposed that Germany should remain divided, this time into two sovereign states based on the Western idea of liberal democracy. Both would be free and open and there would be no restriction on travel between them. This was initially desired by Britain and France in particular due to their fear of an enlarged German state as well as many people within the German states themselves. However, this idea was quickly ruled out both by the USA and also the FRG, due to the large numbers of immigrants who would enter the Federal Republic destabilising the entire region.
Confederation
The idea of a German confederation was for a while the most favourable, however it was soon ruled out due to being unworkable. If a confederation was to be formed of the FRG and GDR, it would be unstable due to the huge inequalities between them. In such an arrangement, West Germany would always dominate, fuelling discontent. In addition, East Germany would require repeated cash injections, which threatened to cripple the federal economy as well as being unsustainable in the long run.
Unity
This was initially considered the most impossible and least desirable option for the future of Germany. However it rapidly became clear that this was the only choice if Germany was to survive. The question was now not if unification would take place but when.
The Legacy of Division
The Treaty of Unification was signed on 31st September 1990 after months of 2+4 Talks. The Treaty came into effect on the 3rd October, formally consigning the GDR to history. However, whilst reunification was a political triumph it was an economic disaster.
Economic Problems
Prior to reunification the government of the Federal Republic developed a feasibility plan to determine whether or not reunifying Germany was an economic possibility. A temporary tax was to be paid by the West Germans to fund the modernisation of East Germany. However, the FRGs estimates proved overly optimistic and the temporary tax had to be extended many times, with still no sign of recovery in the East.
Part of the problem was that there was no historical precedent to the events in Germany. Never before had a capitalist and socialist state joined as one. In addition, there was great disparity between the economies of the two German states, which seemed to be insurmountable. The government of the Federal Republic had also not anticipated the scale of the modernisation that was required in East Germany. Roads and railways had to be virtually rebuilt due to the years of neglect they had suffered under communism. Many factories had to be shut down for safety reasons. Housing was also in an incredibly poor state of repair. There were also energy shortages that followed the closure of many power stations that were deemed unsafe. These factors all contributed to an inadequate infrastructure which deterred potential foreign investors. The cost of production in East Germany was far higher than in the West, and as a result, West German firms found it easier and cheaper to serve their new East German market by expanding production in western facilities. One outcome of this was the deep and precipitous slump which the former GDR entered immediately after unification. In light of these facts, it is not surprising that the eastern areas suffered extremely high levels of unemployment which continue today.
In contrast to this recession, the economy of the former FRG experienced a small boom. However this was relatively short-lived as the Federal Republic had to shoulder most of the financial burden for rebuilding Germany with only limited outside aid. While it might have escaped much of the economic difficulties which the East experienced in its transition from communism to capitalism, it was unable to avoid the social repercussions that unification caused.
Social Problems
Social conditions for both East (‘Ossis’) and West Germans (‘Wessis’) have declined dramatically since the reunification of Germany. Whilst the East Germans appreciate their newly-found political freedom, and rising standard of living, they continue to express dissatisfaction at being treated as ‘second-class citizens’ The GDR acceded to the federal system in almost every respect, and, as a result its citizens often feel that they have little say in the running of the country. Unemployment is far higher in East Germany than it was under communism, leading some to reminisce upon their days living under the GDR when most people had at least some form of work. This discontent is manifested by an alarming rise in the extreme right in the former soviet-style republic.
The West is facing a crisis due to overcrowding. The influx of East Germans has exacerbated a pre-existing housing shortage and increased levels of unemployment. Loose immigration laws have led to a flood of refugees (ethnic Germans from Poland, the Soviet Union, Romania and elsewhere as well as asylum seekers from all over the world) which are adding to the problem.
Conversely the problem in east Germany is one of underpopulation. Reunification has resulted in a mass exodus with the population shrinking by more than a million. Young, well-educated people in particular are moving to find employment in the West leaving behind an ageing population and a so-called ‘brain drain’ For many Germans who dreamt of a united Germany, the reality has been something of a disappointment. Territorial, political and economic division was overcome in just over a year. Unfortunately for Germany social unification is far more difficult to achieve.
East Germany Today
- Lowest population density
- Most rural/agricultural
- Sharpest division between town and country
- Most poverty – lower wages, higher unemployment than in the West
- Most crime
- Lower standard of living
- Less social participation than in the West – fewer people participate in leisure activities such as clubs and sports; fewer people participate in politics, and fewer people attend Church
WORD COUNT: 5092
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