Cánovas idolised the variation of political and economic beliefs within the British political parties, and endeavoured to create a system of government based on their model. He saw their ability for power to “change hands […] without military involvement”- a major concern for Cánovas and a common sight in nineteenth century Spain – and after nearly a century of political volatility and many civil wars, Spain needed something new.
His way of maintaining a stable political system, under threat from military, Catholic and Carlist power bases and resolving the relative ‘backwardness’ of Spain at the time was to introduce a scheme known as the ‘Turno Pacífico’ (The Peaceful Turn). The Turno was a plan whereby power in government was alternated between the Partido Conservador – led by Cánovas himself – and the Partido Liberal – led by Práxedes Mateo Sagasta during the restoration, and established by the elections of January 1876. The king would choose the government that the party bosses and caciques had agreed upon beforehand, and would then complete the encasillado, which was essentially a rigged election that ensured victory for said chosen party and allowed power to be handed over peacefully – putting an end to long military interventionism. These elections were characterised by “wholesale fraud. Electoral rolls were falsified; electors bribed […] beaten up, impersonated or arrested; polling stations shut early […] and ballot boxes lost or stuffed”
This united the so called dynastic parties that were seen as ‘heirs’ of the
mid-century moderates and reformists – blamed for most of the subsequent problems – with the moderates alongside Cánovas and the progressives with Sagasta –aiming to make sure that no sector of the bourgeoisie felt isolated – and all other parties excluded from the prospect of electoral success. The party leaders in Madrid would appoint local governors or mayors in small towns and villages, granting them enormous powers, guaranteeing that the ‘political clientilism’ – Caciquismo – would be as efficient and as far reaching as possible, once the electorate had become too large to simply fabricate election results. The word ‘cacique’ is Indian in origin and was used by the conquistadores to describe Indian tribal leaders or governors; who were retained as hereditary rulers by the Spanish to carry out the roles of judges and to do their bidding by proxy. The Spanish caciques wielded vast powers and negotiated the proportion of the seats they would either gain or lose with the following government – normally between a third and a quarter of the seats for the opposition – and were in charge of controlling their district’s votes in return for favours from Madrid. In this way the government was able to secure the parliamentary majority but with these local bosses “being the bedrock of the entire scheme, these men could not be ignored.”
The ‘Turno Pacífico’ can be seen to have been the best or at the very least the only means by which political stability could have been achieved, given the socio-political circumstances at the time. Cánovas’ overriding fear had always been, according to Charles Esdaile “that the establishment would once again implode in the style of 1854 and 1868” and his ‘arrangement’ did indeed permit the government to operate without an incessant fear of insurgency or military intervention.
One of the restoration settlements’ “unquestionable achievements was to create a more relaxed climate, not just in political but also in social and cultural terms.” This, it appears was indeed a triumph of sorts for Cánovas – he gave the impression of having pulled Spain out of the militarist rut that it was in, and although utterly duplicitous and almost despotic restored some faith in the central political system of Madrid being capable of managing the wildly diverse nation competently through compromise. This spirit of compromise was shown by Cánovas over the status of the Catholic Church (at the time a very polemical issue) whereby he drafted the 1867 Constitution to make Catholicism the official state religion, but still permitted the practice of other faiths.
On the other side of the argument is that of the negative effects with which the Turno ‘regime’ can be associated, one that is undeniably more compelling than the benefits it seems. The government, politics and the political processes which Cánovas advocated were in fact an immense charade. The supposed move to democratisation and increased political freedoms which were woven into his reformist manifesto were completely undermined by the fact that he excluded any forces of power which fell outside of his narrow political sphere, and the only sort of democracy that existed was based on favours to the caciques and other politicians in exchange for despicable and autocratic approaches to securing votes and keeping ‘order’. Left-wingers, extreme right-wingers, the Labour movement, nationalists and regionalists alike were all completely alienated from the process and had no real voice.
With the king’s position as head of state entrenched in the Constitution – of which Cánovas was a primary author – and therefore in his ‘back pocket’, he was able to limit the suffrage of the entire working class, destroying the process of democracy every step of the way and wielding corruption as his main tool of power.
The stark fact of the matter is that his model parties who ran the country did not “bear any real resemblance to their British namesakes” as instead of holding values even slightly associated to the ideologies; such as political expression, the labour force and economics, they “remained mere cliques of politicians, concerned with no interest except their own.” Utterly corrupt and shamefully open about it, a particularly powerful representation of the cacique’s character is brought to mind from Christopher Ross, when he states “in some areas a single local boss might even serve both parties at once” which stirs up a certain disgust for the ease with which the system was able to function and even to exist at all.
To conclude therefore, it is clear to most that this period of political puppetry had a detrimental effect on the image of Spain as a modern European power, its economy and kept it wildly behind its European neighbours in terms of development and industrialisation.
The legacy of the ‘Turno’, had survived the death of king Alfonso XII in 1885 but by the end of his wife (Maria Christina of Austria)’s regency the blows began to reign in, and by 1890, when opposition towards Cánovas’ corrupt system united – ironically from within his own Conservative party, led by the most reactionary right-winger Francisco Silvela . In the end he paid the ultimate price for his policies of repression, murdered by an Italian anarchist called Michele Angiolillo, and one may have like to think that he would have turned in his grave had he witnessed the subsequent collapse of state political stability and the fall of the monarchy – everything he had been credited with accomplishing, dismantled.
All in all therefore, it is reasonably clear that Cánovas’ actions were not justified and his basic rationale was hypocritical and unclear, which meant that he could do what he did with politics at both local and national levels, reducing the parties to nothing resembling his stated ideal and inducing a pestilent political paralysis. Conservatives and Liberals merged together and in effect forgot all about what it meant to belong to a particular political party and pursued their own ends in order to further their own self-gratification and status. The bourgeoisie was left wanting but with no means to voice concern. The only defence was to take up a clientilist position within a party in which they would only last by turning against the very ideals of democracy and fair representation which would want to defend. In effect, there was no chance, until it all collapsed.
Bibliography
Álvarez Junco, J., & Shubert, A. (2000). Spanish history since 1808. London: Arnold.
Esdaile, C. J. (2000). Spain in the liberal age. From constitution to civil war, 1808-1939. Oxford: Blackwell.
Ross, C. J. (2002). Spain, 1812-1996. Modern history for modern languages. London: Arnold.
Shubert, A. (1990). A social history of modern Spain. London: Routledge.
Ross, Christopher J., (2002) Spain, 1812-1996. Modern history for modern languages p.30
Ross, Christopher J., (2002) Spain, 1812-1996. Modern history for modern languages p.29
Esdaile, Charles J., (2000). Spain in the liberal age. From constitution to civil war, 1808-1939 p.149
Esdaile, Charles J., (2000). Spain in the liberal age. From constitution to civil war, 1808-1939 p.148
Ross, Christopher J., (2002) Spain, 1812-1996. Modern history for modern languages p.30
Ross, Christopher J., (2002) Spain, 1812-1996. Modern history for modern languages p.33