By the late 1940s, American foreign policy had taken a more aggressive stance towards the Soviet Union. The “Long Telegram” of 1946 was a report from the US divisions of Russian Affairs to the US Government which concluded that the USSR was an expansionist state that would never co-operate with the USA. It is here that the policy of containment was founded in the USA. Similarly, the Truman Doctrine (1947) declared that it would support any country that could demonstrate that it was in danger of a communist threat. This ideology shaped American foreign policy for the next two decades.
In the same way, Soviet ideology was also quite hostile towards the USA. For example, when the USA exploded the atomic bomb in 1945, the US refused to share this technology with its Soviet ally. Stalin interpreted the refusal to share nuclear technology as a demonstration of American power to a weakened USSR. In the same way, Stalin showed his attitudes towards US foreign policy during the Berlin Airlift (1948). The Soviet military government in Berlin began a land blockade of the allied areas of the city by refusing to permit American and British supply trains to pass through the zone. It appeared that Stalin's main objective was to force the western allies to leave West Berlin, who were prospering as a result of the Marshall Plan, this showing his intent to devalue America.
This hostility between the two sides inevitably caused them to clash when Khrushchev placed strategic, intermediate-range offensive missiles in the island of Cuba, just 90 miles off the coast of Florida. It is interesting to note exactly how the two leaders responded to the situation. Both sides were aware of the implications of MAD- Mutually Assured Destruction. This meant that if one side struck, the other would retaliate, causing the destruction of both sides. In short: Whoever shoots first, dies second. This paved the way for many of the actions taken by the leaders during the Cuban Missile Crisis, as they were reluctant to make a move that could potentially cause their self-destruction.
The behaviour of the two leaders is significant in the actual probability of a nuclear war starting. According to his memoirs, Khrushchev “had no desire to start a war.” Rather, his aim was to “keep America from invading Cuba.” Claiming, “Any idiot could have started a war,” He thought that by placing soviet missiles on Cuba, he would balance the threat of the American missiles in Turkey, as well as giving Castro the protection he needed. Kennedy’s response was to warn Khrushchev that he would prevent the installation of these missiles by “whatever means might be necessary.” However, Kennedy was aware from the pictures from the American spy planes flying over Cuba that the ICBM and IRBMs which were being installed had a range of over 1000 miles and could reach most major American cities.
As pointed out by Secretary of State, Dean Rusk, “We’re eyeball to eyeball, and I think the other fellow just blinked.” This introduced the concept of brinkmanship, with most of the watching world convinced that a nuclear war was a stark possibility. However, what both the leaders said and did in public was a contrast to their private conversations and negotiations. Khrushchev and Kennedy had communicated by letters many times and the revelations have been very enlightening. In a televised address, Kennedy proclaimed that any nuclear missile attack from Cuba would be responded to accordingly. However, through the course of the Cuban Missile Crisis, Khrushchev sent letters to Kennedy implicitly stating that he would remove the missiles from Cuba, only if Kennedy removed those from Turkey. After careful scrutiny with EXCOMM, Kennedy decided upon a dual strategy. Firstly, a formal letter was sent to Khrushchev accepting the terms of Khrushchev’s initial letter (i.e. a US non-invasion would be guaranteed in exchange for certifiable departure of US nuclear missiles from Turkey). Secondly, private assurances were made to Khrushchev that the USA would take out the missiles but that secrecy had to be maintained. It would not be made public, nor could NATO allies be aware of it, as it would be considered a concession to blackmail. It is only 20 years later, following the release of previously classified documents from the NSA (National Security Archive) and other such sources that it came to light and these letters were made public. It should be remembered that Kennedy did not want to have resort to force because he realised the consequences that it would bring, and so requested Soviet assistance to maintain this. Similarly, it provided Khrushchev with a reason to remove the Soviet missiles, as well as minimising the emotional cost that the withdrawal would cause Khrushchev.
To some historians, the Cuban Missile Crisis was nothing but a carefully conceived game of Brinkmanship. According to historians like David Detzer, “The Kremlin’s purpose was essentially political…all they needed to do was give the appearance of nuclear capability...it seemed at least possible that the Russians were bluffing.” This is highlighted by the behaviour of Kennedy and EXCOMM towards the threat. Some see Kennedy’s approach not as an “intuitive response,” but as a “highly calibrated dissection of alternatives, as worked out by a skilled group of advisors.” This suggests that in this game of Brinkmanship, perhaps Kennedy was not as willing to go as far as Khrushchev. On the other side of the spectrum, it has also been considered that Khrushchev’s attitude towards the Cuban Missile Crisis was nothing but a random method. W. Taubman believes that Khrushchev had not thought things through and had “badly misjudged the US response, having to improvise madly when he was found out” and that he was lucky that the crisis ended as safely as it did.
In conclusion, The Cuban missile crisis, although a significant part of US-Soviet relations does not necessarily mean that it bought the world to the brink of nuclear war. It can be considered a defining moment of the Cold war, as the Cold War brought the USA and USSR to the brink of a “hot” war, but never quite made it. In the same way, the Cuban missile crisis epitomises this- they came close to starting a nuclear war but neither side actually risked an escalation. Both sides carefully masterminded this confrontation in order to avoid the realities that a nuclear war would bring and to reinforce their status as the “great superpower.” By the 1950’s both Eisenhower and Khrushchev adamantly promoted a policy of “peaceful co-existence,” through which the aim was to avoid nuclear confrontation at all costs. Although publicly it may have appeared as though they were willing to start a nuclear war, the reality was different. Kennedy in particular was persistent that under no circumstances should Cuba be bombed, preferring to favour naval blockades. Khrushchev advocated “peaceful co-existence,” swiftly removing the missiles from Cuba when Kennedy agreed to move those from Turkey. In addition, the nuclear technology at that time meant that even if Kennedy or Khrushchev had given orders to deploy a nuclear missile, fail-safe features in the warning and launch systems meant that the probability of actual progression into a nuclear was relatively small. It is important to bear in mind that neither side wished to risk the consequences of chronic radiation poisoning, or the knowledge that once a nuclear war had been started, any place on earth could be wiped out within a matter of minutes, nor the cost and manpower needed. It should also be remembered that to a certain extent, the Cuban Missile Crisis also aided the prevention of nuclear wars in the future. The establishment of the Hotline between Moscow and the White House can be seen an admission by both sides that they had come too close a nuclear war and that some sort of prevention would be required. The Cuban Missile Crisis also encouraged the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty in 1963 and so could be seen as a step closer to prevention of nuclear war, rather than a step closer towards it.
David Detzer, “The Brink: The Cuban Missile Crisis”, 1980
James Nathan, “Anatomy of the Cuban Missile Crisis,” 2001
W. Taubman, “Khrushchev- the man and his era”, 2003