In addition to its outdated economy, the USSR also faced a problem in that its ideological supremacy had been seriously challenged and undermined. The propaganda on the economic and moral superiority of Marxist-Leninism over capitalism lost its legitimacy, with many Soviets concluding that they had been misled. The emphasis on foreign affairs and the USSR’s place on the world stage had left many impoverished citizens too as a consequence of the Stalinist idea that the Soviets had to surpass America militarily. That said, some improvements in productivity were made at the beginning of Gorbachev’s rule.
Upon gaining power Gorbachev began to change the direction of the Soviet economy and foreign policy was subordinated to domestic needs, rather than trying to maintain the prestige of the USSR at all costs. Despite the outdated nature of the economy, industrial output increased by 5.6% in the first 6 months of 1986, compared to 1985 and labour productivity also rose by 5.2%. Similar improvements were made through a reduction in the number of deaths and injuries through industrial accidents and the infant mortality figures were much reduced compared with their high point of 1974.
As early as April 1985, Gorbachev began to voice his concerns about the lack of transparency within the Soviet system. He blamed the lack of accountability of the State, claiming that it was too centralised and believed that those in the higher echelons of Soviet society were guilty of ignoring and failing to understand the chronic problems facing Russia at the time. In order to rectify the problems prevalent in Soviet society, Gorbachev believed that the party had “to speak with the people in the language of truth”. Gorbachev sought to loosen the constraints on the media in order to achieve a more transparent and legitimate system of governance and thus embarked on his policy of ‘glasnost’.
In order to achieve this radical transparency of the system Gorbachev (like many of his predecessors) removed his political rivals, replacing them with a younger team of leaders. This ensured that his ideas would not be used against him and meant that he was more able to bring about the aforementioned reforms. Gorbachev also sought to offer the Soviet people the liberties it lacked under its former leaders. In February 1986 he made his speech at the party’s 27th congress saying “Communists…want the truth, always and under all circumstances…Government should not be the privilege of a narrow circle of professionals”.
One problem with Gorbachev’s ideas regarding openness and transparency within the Soviet system was his inability to foresee that once given a degree of freedom, people would demand more. Gorbachev believed that by allowing the press to report on the failings of the Soviet Union, this would encourage individuals to have more faith in the system and in it’s legitimacy. This is perhaps the greatest criticism to be levelled against Gorbachev. Many historians and political commentators agree that Gorbachev’s biggest failure was his inability to manage and plan his ideas so that they could be implemented through successful polices. Having no clear plan as to where his ideas were going, Communism deviated from its ‘planned’ roots, and hastened the regime’s downfall.
Another factor in Communism’s demise, which Gorbachev failed to anticipate, was the level of attack that the regime suffered from the ‘desensitised’, liberalised press. The relaxation of constraints on information available to the public resulted in a series of debates over the failing of the Soviet economy. With more information available concerning the weak state of the economy, debate raged as to whether the USSR should return to a system of the ‘New Economic Policy’ or NEP that characterised the 1920s. These debates influenced the satellite countries of the Soviet Union, as many were already looking towards the West and the greater levels of prosperity they might attain through employing capitalism and the utilisation of a market economy.
The other main area that Gorbachev highlighted was the need to restructure and reform the economy, moving closer towards a more ‘mixed’ economy that encompassed the benefits of a market economy, with the checks and regulation of a state planned economy. This was illustrated through one of Gorbachev’s greatest and most ambitious ideas, the policy of ‘perestroika’, initiated in 1987. The radical changing and restructuring of the system was, as mentioned, Gorbachev’s primary aim. He sought to achieve this through pushing the conservative hardliners, who put him in power, ever closer to liberal reform. However, he encountered serious resistance. Due to the fact that there were large, mainly conservative, parts of the Party that Gorbachev did not have on his side, his task of making Communism more viable became increasingly difficult. To these groups Gorbachev appeared too liberal and to people such as Boris Yeltsin Gorbachev’s reforms were seen as moving too slowly.
Perestroika was initially developed to get the sluggish Soviet economy moving again, through avenues that had not been explored since the days of the NEP. The idea of a mixed economy was a laudable and logical conclusion following the failure of the completely state controlled system. It was perhaps the most obvious solution to solving the USSR’s economic problems as it provided incentives for entrepreneurial spirit within a socialist framework, whilst at the same time encouraging Western financial backing. The West would be unlikely to invest in a state controlled system, so by adopting a mixed system, Gorbachev made Eastern investment more palatable to the West.
While a logical conclusion to some, perestroika proved more difficult to deliver than originally intended. The ‘old guard’ were not onboard with these new liberal ideas and Gorbachev had to seek support for his policies from out with the Party. Ultimately, it was the public that Gorbachev turned to in order to help speed up his economic reforms and the democratisation of the USSR. An example of this was at the Central Committee in January 1987 where Gorbachev stated: “members of the Central Committee have spoken in favour…in further democratising the life of the party and society as a whole”. As Ronald Suny comments, this was completely disingenuous and the reason Gorbachev said it was because the meeting was being televised and he hoped to rally the people around to his cause.
All of these factors had a huge impact on the legitimacy of Communism in Eastern Europe and, as mentioned, Gorbachev’s politics of compromise eventually led to him having to choose what to do with the Satellite countries of Eastern Europe.
The policies of glasnost and perestroika were first introduced in the USSR, but had a profound impact on these countries. People in Eastern Europe were inspired to take up these ideas for themselves and, unlike the limited sovereignty imposed on them under Brezhnev, Gorbachev’s plan of ‘New Thinking’ enabled them to choose whether or not they wanted to be part of the Soviet Empire or become autonomous states. This was taken up with particular enthusiasm due to the fact that many of the Eastern European regimes were seen as lacking in legitimacy and popularity, such as the government in Poland.
This was a shrewd move by Gorbachev as it enabled him to alleviate the strain on the Soviet economy without losing face on the international stage. In reality it was a huge success for East-West relations and Gorbachev’s plan was realised, with the West looking on the Soviet Union much more favourably because they allowed the East European countries the chance to choose their own fate. With most of these countries costing the Soviet Union more than they were contributing, it made economic sense to cut ties with these states and in doing so they would be likely to benefit from more Western investment.
Furthermore, in the age of intercontinental nuclear missiles, the idea of Eastern Europe as a ‘buffer’ for the Soviet’s lost its value and was counterproductive as it made the Soviet’s look like an expansionist regime. Therefore, with the huge costs involved in maintaining Eastern Europe, and the growing deficit at home, Gorbachev opted not to intervene in Eastern Europe, if that was what they wished. Gorbachev believed that if the Eastern European chose to break away from the Soviets, their economies could aid the reform of the Soviet economy.
However, the conservative old guard were extremely disgruntled by the relinquishing of power and control over Eastern Europe. This further exacerbated their view that Gorbachev had betrayed the Communist ideal they had fought so hard to achieve.
In 1989 the key to the collapse of Eastern Europe, was that unlike the events of Hungary in 1956 or Czechoslovakia in 1968, the people of Eastern Europe knew the Soviet’s would not intervene through the use of force. More importantly, now the impetus came from within, starting with a ‘revolution from above’ which spread into the national consciousness and led to an increased sense of nationalism for East Europeans and a willingness to assume control of their own fate.
As this nationalist spirit grew, Eastern Europe began to unravel from Gorbachev’s grasp with Lithuania and Estonia declaring themselves sovereign republics, placing their own national laws above those of the Soviet’s in May of 1989. Latvia followed suit on August the 23rd 1989, confirming the Soviet Union as having lost its stranglehold over Eastern Europe. The policies of glasnost and perestroika that once began in Russia had spread to Eastern Europe with unexpected enthusiasm. It appears that this was not part of Gorbachev’s plan for the consolidation and economic improvement of the Soviet Union and that he was merely reacting to conditions within Eastern Europe, rather than purposively and consciously shaping them. Gorbachev’s gamble to bring about positive political and economic change, within a Soviet framework, was unsuccessful in that while he had various ideas for what he wanted to do, he lacked the cohesion and direction to achieve these plans. As one conservative put it, perestroika was “an airplane that has taken off without knowing if there is a landing strip at its destination”.
In conclusion, through his determination to reinvent Communism in the USSR without considering the consequences, Gorbachev sparked a change in Russia that had a chain reaction; awakening the national conscious of it’s Eastern European satellites. Although he inherited a failing economy and tried to restructure it in a manner previously unheard of, Gorbachev made the fatal mistake of encouraging both economic and political change at the same time. Under these circumstances the natives of Eastern Europe were given a voice and the means to protest at a time of economic hardship, thus challenging and threatening the socio-economic and political status quo at the time and leading to greater discontent. Consequently, though the countries of Eastern Europe were subject to both harsh economic conditions and unpopular dictators, ultimately it was Gorbachev’s ill-thought-out ideas and unrealistic plans that signalled the end of Communism in Eastern Europe and latterly the downfall of the Soviet Union.
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