To What Extent was Cavour dedicated to the unification of Italy

Furthermore, the reliability of Hearder’s evidence can be questioned. Hearder’s viewpoint appears limited, due to the sheer number of books he has written on Cavour and unification, showing his blatant focus on his role in the formation of Italy. It can therefore be argued that Hearder might be favourable in his views towards Cavour and his actions, concentrating on his dedication to the unification of Italy despite the strong evidence to suggest otherwise. Thus, the evidence provided by Hearder should not be the basis for the argument that proposes that Cavour was dedicated to the unification of Italy.

Nevertheless, once Cavour had the camaraderie of Napoleon III and Lord Palmerston he made full use of its advantages. At the Congress of Paris in1856, Cavour was able to “negotiate on equal terms with the Great Powers”, as Stiles states, and “succeeded in raising the issue of Italy”. Consequently, Napoleon III and Cavour met at Plombières. It was here that the idea of war with Austria was discussed and eventually agreed. Therefore, it can be argued that Cavour, through use of his political skill, raised the idea of Italian unification amongst the major European powers and thus was dedicated to the process. Finally, historians use Cavour’s resignation after the Treaty of Villafranca (in which peace was declared without a Piedmontese representative apparent) to strengthen their argument. Cavour felt that Napoleon III had betrayed the Italian cause and therefore resigned in order to show his discontent.  Thus, Stiles’ and Duggan’s interpretations of Cavour’s foreign policy can be used along with Mack Smith’s and Hearder’s to strengthen the argument that Cavour was dedicated to the unification of Italy.

Whilst agreeing that to some extent Cavour was dedicated to the unification of Italy, Mack Smith states, “Cavour should perhaps be called a patriot rather than a nationalist. In his own way he was like them an idealist, but he was far more pragmatic and empirical in his approach to the national problem. Whereas the radicals argued from the theory to the facts, he began with the facts and was ready to fight for national unification only when the facts seemed to justify it [after Garibaldi’s successful expedition to the South in 1860], only when the forces for unification seemed to be sufficient and to have enough of their own”. This therefore shows that it can be strongly argued that Cavour was not interested (and therefore not dedicated) to the unification of Italy until 1860 when the idea was forced upon him.

Despite the evidence that suggests Cavour was dedicated to the unification of Italy, there is a stronger argument that most historians focus on contradicting the preceding evidence. Giuseppe Mazzini, whilst taking a backseat in the later stages, was a prominent figure in the early phases of the ‘Risorgimento’. ‘Young Italy’, founded in 1831, had a significant impact on the political development of Italy. Its founder, Mazzini, believed that people should live in “an independent nation of free men and equals”. It was together with his protégée, Garibaldi, that the ‘Italian Question’ became an international affair. Cavour’s open condemnation of Mazzinian principals, to many, suggests that Cavour was not dedicated to the unification of Italy. It is clear to see that Cavour and Mazzini differed significantly on points of principle. Cavour believed that revolutionary action, promoted by Mazzini to unify Italy, would be detrimental to Piedmont’s position; firstly, unification with the backward South would ruin Piedmont’s reputation as a powerful state and secondly, a revolution would upset Piedmont’s political stability. Thus, Cavour’s hatred of Mazzinian views shows his lack of dedication to unification. Mack Smith states, “Cavour used to tell people that Mazzini ought to be arrested and executed without pity”. As a result, Cavour was willing to side with Austria in order to see that a number of Mazzinians were imprisoned. This can therefore be used to suggest that Cavour was willing to go to any extent in order to stop Mazzini and his followers, which subsequently implies that he was uncommitted to unification.

Furthermore, Mack Smith states, “the Mazzinians said that they wanted national unity far more than they wanted a republic”, showing that they were willing to compromise. “Cavour on the contrary said that he would refuse an alliance with them even if it meant Italy remained divided”, which displays his stubbornness. Hence, it can be argued that Cavour was not dedicated to the unification of Italy.

Overall, Dennis Mack Smith appears to give a balanced argument. He both emphasises Cavour’s dedication to the unification of Italy and considers evidence that suggests otherwise. However, Mack Smith’s support should be considered with a critical approach, as he has written a number of books on Cavour’s life including his biography. It is not surprising that other historians such as Collier regard Mack Smith’s judgements as “generous”. They argue that Mack Smith, especially within his biography, places emphasis on Cavour’s positive role in unification rather than his failings. Therefore, whilst references towards Mack Smith’s viewpoints should not be ignored, it can be argued that there may be elements of bias within them, discrediting them as a basis for the overall line of reasoning.

Historians, also often use Cavour’s poor relationship with Garibaldi as evidence to support the idea that Cavour was not dedicated to the unification of Italy. Giuseppe Garibaldi came into contact with Mazzini in 1833 after he joined ‘Young Italy’. For a while, he was the most widely known figure in the world and a national hero; Garibaldi was charismatic and dedicated to the cause of Italian unification. Tension arose between the two figureheads after the ceding of Nice and Savoy to France in the summer months of 1860 (Nice being Garibaldi’s birthplace). Nice and Savoy had been used as a bargaining tool to secure the support of France in the war against Austria. “Cavour seemed to prefer the less immediately attractive but apparently more realistic idea of a gradually expanding Piedmont – if necessary, sacrificing ‘national territory’ in the process”. This confirmed Garibaldi’s own suspicion that Cavour was not dedicated to unification, as by giving away Italian states a totally unified Italy could never be achieved.

Furthermore, Cavour’s reaction to Garibaldi’s expedition to unite the South in 1860 is used to support the argument that Cavour was uncommitted to unification. Although Cavour was limited by both public opinion and political paralysis, he still tried to stop the expedition. “He dared not oppose Garibaldi openly, since Piedmontese public opinion was enthusiastic about the expedition [therefore]… Cavour did his best to thwart Garibaldi and the Thousand covertly”. It was important that Cavour was seen to support Garibaldi but he had to make sure his “vision rather than Garibaldi’s or Mazzini’s was assured”. Cavour confiscated the expedition’s weapons, ordered his navy to arrest the expedition ‘at all costs’ and asked France to stop Garibaldi crossing the straights of Messina in his bid to unify Italy. In private letters he said how little he approved of Garibaldi’s foolish venture. Cavour “tried to make the king think that Garibaldi was using the royal name for a purpose which has nothing whatever to do with the monarchy”. Collier argues, “Cavour’s actions in 1860 were not of a man with a desire to unify Italy” – instead he was more interested in taking control over the actions of the protagonists. After Garibaldi’s success in the South it was clear that Cavour had to annex the South quickly to regain control over the situation; Darby goes far enough to state, “we can see that Cavour was in effect forced into unifying Italy just to stop Garibaldi” and argues that “it was a desperate gamble to preserve an enlarged Piedmont”. Thus, although Cavour is regarded as one of the ‘Founding Fathers’ of Italy, it can be strongly argued that Cavour was forced into unification and that Cavour’s covert operation in order to stop union with the South demonstrates Cavour’s lack of dedication to the unification of Italy.

Other historians, who whilst agreeing that Cavour was not dedicated to the Italian unification, argue that Cavour’s intentions were to simply further Piedmont as a state and create a Northern Kingdom of Italy rather than creating an Italian nation. The economist Pantaleoni calculated that the north of Italy held 48% of the national wealth compared to the mere 27% held by the Southern states. This was mainly due to their superiority in industry, the result of a larger resource base. Owing to their wealth, the North thrived and its people benefited from finer standards of living.  This led to a North-South divide – the South saw the North as pretentious and the North regarded the South as backwards and imprudent. One school of thought is that Cavour only wanted to further Piedmont and was not interested in a united Italy. “Cavour seemed to prefer the…more realistic idea of a gradually expanding Piedmontese territory”. Mack Smith shows how Cavour’s “feelings for the rest of Italy were not strong” and instead spoke of a “Piedmontese nation”. Duggan also suggests that Cavour was more interested in the furthering of Piedmont rather than creating a united Italy. Duggan states that Cavour’s goal was “not so much the unification as the independence of Italy and the aggrandisement of Piedmont”. Mack Smith further supports this thesis when he states, “Cavour was glad to accept the idea of a federal [Papal] state” (the Papal State naturally the most influential within Italy) “because he felt that it would permit Piedmont to dominate the rest of the peninsula”. Therefore, it is clear to see that there is significant evidence to suggest that Cavour was more interested in furthering Piedmont as a state rather than creating a united Italy.

However, some historians such as Parmar, whilst agreeing to some extent that Cavour was only interested in the furthering of Piedmont as a state, also feel that “to create a totally unified Italy, a strong state was needed to lead it, namely Piedmont”. Therefore, Cavour’s wish to further Piedmont can be seen as the first step towards the unification of Italy.

Nevertheless, Mack Smith distinctly shows that whilst Cavour believed that “Italy in the distant future may become an independent nation, his own plans were for a Kingdom of Northern Italy”. Darby also maintains that Cavour was dedicated to a Northern Kingdom rather than the unification of Italy when he states, “In 1848 Cavour speculated about a new Kingdom of Northern Italy, he felt that a single federated state [that is, a totally unified Italy] was something rather distant”. This can be seen to prove that Cavour was only interested in the creation of a Northern Kingdom of Italy and only became interested in the idea of a unified Italy when the process was almost complete. Mack Smith further strengthens this argument when he states, “Cavour’s feelings for the rest of Italy were not strong”. Combined with the fact that it was only after Garibaldi’s unexpected success in the South that Cavour, on October 16 1860, spoke to the Senate in favour of annexing Southern and Central Italy, historians suggest that Cavour was only really interested in the creation of a Northern Kingdom of Italy, led by the state of Piedmont.

Cavour’s denunciative attitude towards the Southern states of Italy can also be used by historians to support the argument that Cavour was more interested in creating a Northern Kingdom of Italy than unification. Cavour knew little if anything at all about the South. He demonstrated the fact that “traditional autonomist feelings and inter-communal rivalries were still strong”. He had travelled only as far South as Tuscany and had no intentions of going any lower. Cavour’s desire to create a Northern Kingdom of Italy can be seen in his reaction to Garibaldi’s expedition to the South. The expedition had taken place despite Cavour’s clear objection to the idea. “Cavour therefore did all he could, to prevent Garibaldi from setting out for Sicily”. Thus, Cavour’s rebellious approach to Garibaldi’s mission demonstrates his wish to reject the Southern states. Hence, the preceding evidence displays Cavour’s belief that unification with the South would be futile and that only a conglomerate of the Northern states would flourish.

In conclusion, it is clear to see that historians collectively seem to be confused with what Cavour desired first and foremost; the furthering of Piedmont as a state, the creation of a Northern Kingdom of Italy, or total unification. There are arguments suggesting that he was and was not dedicated to unification. Many believe that through his wish to create an Italy free from foreign influence, displayed within his journal ‘Il Risorgimento’, and his close relationship with France and Britain, Cavour revealed his desire for a united Italian Kingdom. However, the strongest argument remains; Cavour’s poor relationship with Italian nationalists and his willingness to overlook the South in order to create a Northern Kingdom demonstrate Cavour’s lack of dedication to the creation of Italy. He appeared only to shine to the idea of total unification once Garibaldi had succeeded in his expedition to the South and when public opinion seemed to be one of excitement towards the unification of Italy. From the quality of evidence and the general acceptance that Cavour was uncommitted to the creation of Italy we can conclude that Cavour was in fact not dedicated to total unification throughout the period 1848-61.

Word Count = 2,954

---

Bibliography

Books

1. Italian Unification 1820-71, Martin Collier (Heinemann, 2003)
2. The Unification of Italy, Graham Darby (Pearson Education Limited, 2001)
3. A Concise History of Italy, Christopher Duggan (Cambridge University Press, 1994)
4. Cavour, Harry Hearder (Longman, 1994)
5. Italy in the Age of the Risorgimento 1790-1870, Harry Hearder (Longman, 1983)
6. Cavour, Dennis Mack Smith (Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1985)
7. Cavour & Garibaldi 1860, Dennis Mack Smith (Cambridge University Press, 1954)
8. Italy, Dennis Mack Smith (University of Michigan Press, 1959)
9. The Unification of Italy 1815-1870, Andrina Stiles (Hodder & Stoughton, 2001)

Internet Resources

10. , Siddhartha Parmar (2003)

---