Another apprehension for the anti communist powers was the situation escalating in Greece. Although a general election was held in 1946 restoring the King to the throne, the increasing strength of the communist forces in northern Greece became a great concern to not only the Greek government but also to Britain and later the United States. The Greek government claimed that the communist guerrilla fighters known as ELAS were receiving assistance from three countries all closely linked to the Soviet Union, Albania, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia. Some traditionalist’s argue that this was a direct result of Stalin’s foreign policy aimed at the expansion of communism. However it was later proven that ELAS was only receiving limited support from Stalin, who seemed to have retained some respect for the spheres of interest agreed upon at the Yalta Conference in 1945. But the United States and its allies viewed this as organized Soviet pressure.
Similarly the situation in Turkey, it is argued further proved Stalin’s expansionist policies. After the Second World War Stalin attempted to include Turkey in its sphere of influence by making several demands for control of several Turkish districts lying on the Turkish – Soviet border. While this may be seen to some extent in defensive terms, the Soviet Unions demand for Turkey’s severance of ties with Britain, its insistence for Turkey to lease its naval and land bases to the Soviet Union and its failure to accept a compromise proposal contradicts this, particularly as it would have given Stalin extensive control of the Black Sea and the Mediterranean. During this period many traditionalists feared that “if Greece should fall… it would only be a matter of time until Turkey and Iran fell also” (J. Spanier, 1990:35) many believed that Stalin’s foreign policy was no longer dominated by fears of security but instead by communist domination. Due to these particular events the United States implemented particular policies in order to prevent both Greece and Turkey falling to communist forces. The policy known as the Truman Doctrine implemented in 1947 by Harry Truman offered the two Nation’s economic support after Britain was no longer able to sustain its support. The implementation of the Truman doctrine is substantial evidence that the western powers and hence traditionalist writers saw communism as a realistic threat, and further viewed Stalin as a supporting player in the events occurring.
In contrast to the traditionalist view, revisionist theorists argue that Stalin’s Soviet foreign policy after 1945 was predominantly motivated by security interests. They argue that Stalin was not interested in global communist expansion but rather wanted to create a protective barrier around the Soviet Union. Due to this revisionist writers have tended to down play the Soviet Unions movements in the Mediterranean regions and particularly Greece arguing that Stalin lacked enthusiasm for other communist leaders not directly related to the Soviet Unions sphere of influence. The communist ideology lies on the belief that through the uprising of the proletariat / working class it is inevitable that the world would eventually become communist. Therefore revisionists argue there was no need for Stalin to implement expansionist policies in either the Mediterranean or elsewhere not directly related to the Soviet Unions direct security interests.
In addition it can further be argued that after the Second World War the Soviet Union was in no position to cause tensions with either the United States or Britain. It had only narrowly escaped defeat in World War Two and its “enormous human and material loses meant that by 1945 it was near economic ruin” (M. McCauley, The Origins of the Cold War p13) When compared to the United States which had un-doubtfully thrived during the war and obtained a monopoly on atomic weapons, the Soviet Union was in no position to challenge their authority. Under Stalin revisionists argue the Soviet Union had primarily focused on rebuilding its devastated economy and paid little attention to world revolutionary goals. Due to these reasons the only expansionist policies which were undertaken after 1945 were predominantly motivated by security interests and not communist ideology.
After the Second World War Stalin undertook specific foreign policy goals to assure that the Soviet Union would not be again attacked as it had been numerous times in its history. Poland it was argued was of major importance to Stalin, it was seen as a buffer zone between the Soviet Union and Germany. Furthermore it was made evident that if the West would attack, it would un-doubtfully invade through Poland. After Germanys surrender and the Potsdam Conference in 1945 a Polish – Soviet frontier was established and the Soviet Union acquired considerable amounts of Polish territory. As further developments occurred and communist strengths continued to grow in the Polish government the United States and its allies began to oppose Stalin’s intervention. However when a new communist government supported by Stalin was implemented it was quickly accepted by the western powers even though the United States and its allies accused Stalin of breeching the Yalta agreement and accused the elections of being manipulated to suit the Soviet Unions needs. Revisionists argue that this clearly demonstrates that the expansionism occurring in Poland was predominantly defensive as Poland was of strategic geographic importance to the Soviet Union.
Likewise revisionists argue that Romania was also very important in regards to Stalin’s security interests. The Soviet Unions relationship with Romania did not begin on good terms, when in 1941 Romania entered the Second World War by attacking the Soviet Union and although a peace agreement was signed in 1944 tensions remained rife. From 1945 onwards the Soviet Union exerted considerable influence on Romania and in 1945 a new government approved by Stalin was formed. Although traditionalists accuse Stalin was staging undemocratic elections, revisionists deny this and further argue that Romania was of key importance to the Soviet Union. In addition after official pledges by the Romanian government that free elections would be held, the United States and Great Britain recognized the government on February 5 1946. This further strengthens the revisionist argument that Stalin was not primarily motivated by expansionist policies and that the recognition of the Romanian government by the West may prove that democratic elections took place.
Finally the Soviet Union enjoyed more support in Bulgaria then in Romania and Poland. The aftermath of the Bolshevik revolution had a great impact on the government and the ruling style in Bulgaria. During the Second World War Bulgaria had initially allied with the German’s however when the Soviet Union formally declared war on Bulgaria the Bulgarian government subsequently asked the Soviet Union for an armistice which was rapidly agreed to, and under the protection of Soviet forces a government subservient to the Soviet Union was immediately established. Furthermore in the post 1945 period Bulgaria willingly became a soviet satellite and became a member of both the council for mutual economic assistance and the Warsaw pact which gave Bulgaria generous amounts of aid to help develop a regime and Bulgaria’s economy. Many revisionist writers argue that communist expansionist policies did not occur in Bulgaria and instead the close relationship which resulted after the Second World War came about simply through circumstance.
Similarly to traditionalists arguing Stalin’s foreign policy was motivated by expansionist policies, revisionists too argue that the foreign policy of the United States was motivated by similar means. Although not driven by communism, revisionist writers argue that the United States also implemented expansionist policies both for economic and ideological purposes. Many portray the United States as being motivated by spreading western ideologies and way of life, “America was gods own country, with a duty to proclaim her values to others. Everyone wanted democracy and free trade, or at least would have wanted them if they could have expressed their wishes” (G Lundstad, 1999:37). Economic considerations, too, influenced the United States foreign policy as the constant fear of a recession after the Second World War was continually present. Both revisionist writers and economists believed that if exports were increased and raw materials common in many European states could be more readily available, such a down fall may be avoided. Therefore expansionism in Europe seemed important in deterring a recession and allowed the United States greater access to international markets. Furthermore “the Soviet leadership, from this revisionist viewpoint, could not tolerate such a threat to its security interests in Eastern Europe, particularly as American trade and investment were frequently accompanied by militant anti communism”. (M. McCauley, 1983:13).
In conclusion there is much disagreement and contradiction in relation to Stalin’s Soviet foreign policy after 1945 particularly between traditionalist and revisionist theorists. Traditionalists argued that Stalin’s policies were predominantly motivated by communist expansionism and although particular documents tended to prove this, there is also great evidence that much of his foreign policy was actually grounded on security interests and fears. When discussing particular events in history it is difficult to obtain a completely unbiased view and although some arguments may offer more substantial evidence it is difficult to disregard all other factors which may have also been present.