To what extent was the breakdown of the Soviet-American "Grand Alliance" 1946-1948 the inevitable result of a fundamental clash of interests over the future of Europe?

University Degree Historical and Philosophical studies

Z0373054 The American Half-Century: Jim Callanan 20/02/2008

To what extent was the breakdown of the Soviet-American “Grand Alliance” 1946-1948 the inevitable result of a fundamental clash of interests over the future of Europe?

Insecurity and vulnerability were two characteristics which dominated foreign policy in the post-war era, triggering a spiralling deterioration in US-Soviet relations. This nature of insecurity was rooted in the Second World War where beneath the surface of the Grand Alliance, tensions were rife.

It is easy to look at the post-war years in retrospect but it is important when analysing foreign policy in this era to think how the events which arose would have appeared to the US and Soviets at the time and in order to gain a full understanding, one must examine the limits and constraints on the options they had by incorporating both domestic and international factors into the equation.

Underlying tensions throughout the war may have provided the framework for declining cooperation between the powers but in essence it was the constant drive for security in the post war years which provided the bones of contention which ultimately led to the breakdown in US-Soviet relations. It was primarily in Europe where the two superpowers chose to assert their interests in order to protect their borders from future threats.

In 1945 numerous states suffered defeat and there was an obvious shift in the balance of power in favour of the US and the Soviet Union. In understanding international relations it is important to understand the domestic situation of these two superpowers following the defeat of Fascism.

The US emerged from the war economically and militarily superior to any other power and moreover held a monopoly over atomic weapons. The US wanted to retain the Grand Alliance and avoid spheres of influence in Europe but at the same time achieve a beneficial peace settlement which would in the long-term improve the US economy. For the US reverting back to isolationism was an inconceivable concept in the post war world. Economic factors were, in the initial post war period, the driving force behind US foreign policy in an attempt to re-instate their security. The US wanted self-determination in Europe and free elections in order to maintain their open markets and ultimately their ‘open door’ policy. The USSR on the other hand had taken the brunt of the fighting from Germany and had suffered over 20 million deaths, in addition her industrial base was weak and the war effort had created a visible impact on the Soviet economy. Nevertheless the USSR was in a favourable position to negotiate beneficial settlements in Europe at the end of the war. Revisionists claim that the USSR took a defensive position in the aftermath of victory and envisaged the creation of a buffer zone in Eastern Europe to prevent future threats to Soviet frontiers. The fundamental aim for the USSR was the establishment of friendly governments but moreover there was the underlying issue with Stalin’s insistence on equating security with territory.’

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The Yalta Conference in February 1945 confirmed opposing interests, especially on issues involving Europe. Stalin already fostered suspicions due to Anglo-American decisions to delay a second front in Europe. Consequently the Soviets were left to fight off the Germans suffering severe losses. To account for these losses Stalin was keen to impose reparation payments in an attempt to cripple the German economy and reap the rewards to rebuild the Soviet economy. The future administration of Germany was also discussed at great length yet little was resolved as the US was rigorously opposed to reparations. Issues which provoked the most tension included the future of Poland and the decision to establish free elections throughout Europe. The Conference seemed to be a success in allied diplomacy, yet things changed when Stalin appeared unresponsive to western demands. Firstly Stalin took advantage of his concessions in Poland and established a pro-Soviet government by inviting non-communist leaders to Moscow and arresting them. Stalin did have reason behind his motives however as Poland had been used as a base for three offensives and consequently a friendly government was of vital importance.

This may have been perceived in the US as an expansionist movement in an effort to spread communism, it must be noted that Stalin was not as aggressive as most the US perceived. The relationship between perception, reality and misunderstanding played a key role in deteriorating relationships. Threat perceptions were often over-estimated and conflicting ideologies added a complex dynamic to foreign policy decisions. Stalin however was not solely responsible for the shift to the left in European politics, communist groups were flourishing in both Italy and France and this worried the US, they saw encroaching communist ideologies spreading into their sphere of influence posing a serious threat to America’s open markets.

Distrust was a prime feature amongst the Big Three especially over issues concerning the future of Germany. The USSR feared a resurgent Germany; as a result they were keen to create a buffer zone in Eastern Europe. The US on the other hand wanted self determination throughout Europe with free elections. They saw this as vital for the European economy and in turn beneficial for their own. Europe was America’s biggest trading bloc and consequently the European economy was of prime importance in their open market policy.

A divided Germany was seen as the best means of pleasing the Big Three yet there were two main problems. Firstly there was a worry of a resurgent powerful Germany which would potentially pose a threat to future stability, on the other hand there was a worry that totalitarian regimes could materialize if Germany was left weak. The US wanted to promote self-sufficiency in Germany, moreover McCauley stated that ‘Germany had been the linchpin of the European Economy; thus it was vital to nurse it back to economic health.’ In comparison the Soviets were keen to impose high reparation payments in an attempt to cripple the German economy to prevent it from becoming a future threat and moreover to help rebuild the Soviet Union. The US was not keen on accepting the reparation payments as they believed that then Germany would become a charge on the American tax payer. These claims did not however allay Soviet suspicions and fears of the incorporation of Germany into the US capitalist system.

Even dividing the country into zones was not a smooth process and did not represent an equal balance of power. Circumstances fell in favour of the West who incorporated 60% of Germany’s pre-war industrial base.

Revisionists argue that the US antagonized the Soviets by suspending all reparation shipments from the American zone in May 1946, and in July the US made the decision to combine their zone with Britain to increase their sphere of influence as a western bloc. Yet these actions were not entirely offensive and Truman merely wanted to aid the German economy and believed that in order to receive Stalin’s co-operation he had little choice but to assert this hard line approach. The part of Britain also played a fundamental role in allied relations; Britain arguably lost patience with the Soviets before the Americans, and in many ways encouraged the US to participate more in European affairs. In March 1946 Churchill delivered his Iron Curtain speech which emphasised the growing Soviet threat to the establishment of peace in post-war Europe. It was not just Britain who felt a need for US intervention in European affairs. Gaddis noted ‘had a credible Soviet threat not presented itself, then these countries would not have been seeking the expansion of US power in the first place.’

Stalin was feared more as a dictator as he did not have to answer to the media, or any state department. When Truman entered US politics however his hard-line policies were heavily influenced by Congress. Truman knew little about foreign affairs yet his initial aim was to follow Roosevelt’s policy of cooperation with the Soviet Union. Truman was not interested in establishing spheres of influence and getting drawn in to a game of power politics as this would not placate the electorate at home. His initial involvement in Europe was due to two main reasons, firstly British distrust of the USSR, and secondly he believed that his open market policy in Europe was in danger from communist takeover.

These anxieties were confirmed in Kennon’s Long Telegram in February 1946. Kennon discounted notions of Soviet insecurity and instead concluded in the summer of 1946 that; ‘security is probably their basic motive … but they are so anxious suspicious about it that the objective results are much the same as if the motives were aggression, indefinite expansion.’ Kennon outlined the nature of the Soviet threat and their potential capabilities of encroaching on the capitalist world. The Long Telegram played a large part in influencing the hard-line approach which Truman adopted in the subsequent months and led to the policy of containment, an approach which would contain the supposedly expansionist movements of the USSR. The US became increasingly accepting of Kennon’s warning when Soviet forces refused to withdraw from Iran which posed a threat to oil supplies in the West. In addition communist influences spreading throughout Turkey and Greece did not appease US concerns. Yet again in careful examination although the US viewed these events as aggressive expansionism, in reality the Soviets were merely remaining in Iran to gain the same concessions which Britain had been entitled too. Considering that the Soviets had faced the brunt of the conflict in the war, equality was not falling in their favour and subsequently they had to assert their own security measures in an attempt to rebuild their economy.

The Long Telegram was echoed in Churchill’s ‘Iron Curtain’ Speech in March 1946. The lines of the Cold War had now been drawn and there was an evident shift towards power politics in the global arena.

The crisis in Greece was arguably the principle issue which cemented US involvement in Europe. The US inaccurately believed that Soviets were extending their sphere of influence by secretly supplying the communist forces. This underlines the extent of US insecurity, Stalin in fact had spoken to Yugoslavia in an attempt to prevent the communist insurgence. In February Britain ended aid to anti-communist groups there and called for the US to fill the gap or else risk communist takeover in the country. The US stepped in which demonstrates their shifting ideological worries.

The Cold War between East and West was arguably set in stone following the Truman Doctrine in March 1947. His speech was prompted by the crisis in Greece. Truman worried about the ‘bandwagon effect’ with regards to communism and stated that communist ideologies must be contained. In a belief that the roots of communism evolved from poverty, Truman became attracted to the idea of economic reconstruction for political self-interest.

In June 1947 preparations for the Marshall Plan were unveiled. The plan aimed at providing economic aid to Europe, its rejection by the Soviets was anticipated. The USSR saw it as a capitalist venture and refused any Eastern European country to take part. From Stalin’s point of view, the US was attempting to consolidate their economic and political influence in Western Europe. Revisionists have interoperated this move as an offensive policy to alienate the USSR, this is unconvincing. Marshall Aid was more a response to the Soviets spreading ideology impinging on the Western world.

Revisionists such as Leffler argue that Truman assumed global responsibilities in Europe in order to retain her economic and strategic supremacy. He demonstrates that the US perhaps played a more provocative role than traditional Orthodox positions suggest yet Gaddis a post-revisionist sees US involvement in Europe more as an attempt to re-establish the balance of power. The breakdown in US-Soviet relations was prompted by a spiral of distrust as measures to improve security conflicted with the security anxieties of their adversaries. In the post war era neither power was as aggressive as the other believed, Ann Lane argues that Soviet capabilities both military and domestic were vastly overestimated by western policy makers. The materialization of the atomic bomb may have altered various dynamics in Foreign Policy, yet Truman’s game of atomic diplomacy left the Soviets unmoved, they had no real fear in that respect and their anxieties were directed primarily towards events in Europe. In essence it was non-cooperation and rooted ideological differences between the US and USSR over the future of Europe which led to a serious clash of interests leading in turn to a complete collapse in relations. As relations worsened the contest for hegemony took on a new meaning as the two superpowers began the struggle for world domination.

Bibliography

Gaddis, John, Lewis, 1972 The United States and the Origins of the Cold War, 1941-1947,

Columbia.

Gaddis, John, Lewis, 1987 The Long Peace: Inquiries into the History of the Cold War, Oxford

University Press

Larres, K. and Lane, A. 2001 The Cold War: The Essential Readings, Blackwell.

Leffler, M. 1994 Origins of the Cold War: An International History

McAllistor, James, 2002 No Exit: America and the German Problem, 1943-1954 Cornell

University Press.

McCauley, Martin, 1995, The Origins of the Cold War, 1941-1949 London.

Senarclens, P., 1995 From Yalta to the Iron Curtain: The Great Powers and the Origins of the

Cold War, Berg Publishers Ltd.

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Gaddis, John, Lewis, Dividing the World, p. 50, in Larres, Karl and Lane, Ann, 2001 The Cold War: The Essential Readings, Blackwell.

McCauley, Martin, 1995, The Origins of the Cold War, 1941-1949, p. 82.

MccGwire, Michael, National Security and Soviet Foreign Policy, p. 69 in Leffler, M. 1994 Origins of the Cold War: An International History.

MccGwire, Michael, National Security and Soviet Foreign Policy, p. 69 in Leffler, M. 1994 Origins of the Cold War: An International History

Gaddis, John Lewis, 1987 The Long Peace: Inquiries into the History of the Cold War, Oxford University Press p.46.

Kennon paper, 1946, Draft of Information Policy on Relations with Russia, in Gaddis, John Lewis, 1987 The Long Peace: Inquiries into the History of the Cold War, Oxford University Press p.39.

Leffler, Melvyn, National Security and US Foreign Policy, p. 15, in Leffler, M. 1994 Origins of the Cold War: An International History

Lane, Ann, Introduction: The Cold War as History, p. 13 in Larres, K. and Lane, A. 2001 The Cold War: The Essential Readings, Blackwell.