Total War is as much a myth as total victory or total defeat - Discuss

        Another aspect of Warfare which provides evidence for the view that the concept of Total War is a myth is the counterargument that wars may not begin as ‘total,’ but overtime, as a conflict escalates can become ‘total.’ When reflecting over the duration of a battle, it can sometimes be observed that the commitment to the battle and factors that may begin to affect those back home often present unexpected consequences, this meaning ‘Total War’ has come about via a natural progression. However the example of World War One which evolves from a calm beginning, (with low expectations in August 1914 that it would even last till Christmas) still shows how true ‘Total War’ does not exist. Although there was the involvement of the civilian, it was restricted to the role of a soldier, in a limited geographical area. Strachan (2000, p. 348) states ‘the static fighting on the Western front, however awful, protected the civilian population from direct physical attack.’ This quote supports known factual evidence of where the trenches were situated and disproves any claim that World War One is a sound example of ‘Total War.’ Trench warfare was confined to France apart from a fragment in Messines, Belgium created by the British. In World War One, trenches were where the bulk of the fighting took place, when restricted to small, isolated areas this means geographically World War One had very little impact on those back home for many of the participating countries. Strachan (2000 p. 361) also suggests that ‘the clash of ideas’ are the only true claim World War One has to being a ‘Total War’ and yet the resulting war aims of gaining land were not the original motives for the war beginning in the first place, making this a weak argument at best to support claims of the existence of ‘Total War’ between 1800-2000.

        Asymmetry is another argument that can sustain the claim that Total War is a myth. When looking at this, the 1965-1973 war between Vietnam and America is a critical example of how varied warfare can be between two opposing sides and yet still the definition of ‘Total War’ fails to be achieved. Although this was perhaps a more imaginative and varied war due to the failure of superior military force on the battlefield and Guerrilla Warfare used by the ‘Viet Cong,’ it again was limited geographically. The whole of the war was fought in Vietnam, this made the impact on American citizens minimal, meaning the war had no impact on the day to day lives of one of the opposing sides, there was also little impact on the American economy and therefore there are no grounds to justify this as a ‘Total War.’          

        Although if using the view that ‘Total War’ is the ambition to annihilate the enemy in the most ruthless way possible it could possibly be argued that the Vietnamese War does fulfil this. Wiest (2009, p. 18) discusses how ‘For the North Vietnamese the coming war would be a total war calling for national sacrifice and the use of every tactic possible to achieve victory.’ The Viet Cong used the Soviet AK-47 rifle which was considered the best weapon of the war, the TET Offensive is often regarded the most successful tactic of the war, this does therefore provide evidence that the Viet Cong were thinking through what they were doing and were aware of the levels of ruthlessness they were using. The communists were willing to do their best to outsmart and destroy their enemy fulfilling one of the ways in which Chickering et al (2000 p.55) discuss ‘Total War’ with it being defined as ‘the importance of the intensions of the perpetrators to destroy a specific group of people’ which is the approach with more of a genocide slant to the meaning of ‘Total War.’ However this still cannot provide a sound argument that the concept of ‘Total War’ does exist as although Vietnam was immersed in this war, America was not.

        Strachan (2000, p. 363) claims ‘The Second World War was the nearest the world has come to total war because the ideas of total war and means of modern war were simultaneously deployed.’ A speech made by Goebbels in 1943 helps to identify this shift as he avoided any mention of modern warfare and stuck to speaking about the humble roots of the country, knowing that to stir a reaction he needed to tug on the heartstrings of Germany by referring to nationalist ideas and traditionalist values. Goebbels (Speech, 18/02/1943) can be quoted as saying ‘Both as a movement and as a nation, we have always been at our best when we needed fanatic, determined wills to overcome and eliminate danger, or a strength of character sufficient to overcome every obstacle, or bitter determination to reach our goal, or an iron heart capable of withstanding every internal and external battle. So it will be today.’ Goebbels is not letting the birth of Modern Warfare have an influence; he is not interested in weapons or technology, but securing his people into the ideology that they must be retained in. Black (2006 p. 161) discusses also what a crucial part ideologies play in Warfare, ‘the treatment of civilians... owes much to the role of ideology in conflict.’

         This shows how as time passed during the 19th and 20th centuries the questionable concept of ‘Total War’ and ‘Total Victory’ was becoming less crucial. This century saw the introduction of other elements into Warfare such as politics and warfare entangling in ways not previously seen. Not only in World War Two with varying ideologies but also in the Cold War with the student riots and protests that occurred back in America and then the democratic and communist rivalry specifically in the Vietnam War. War was becoming less about combat and brutality, which was now a side effect. War was developing into a grand plan, a larger picture and the greater good which in the instance of Goebbels was keeping the Nazi ideology and community reinforced within Germany, creating unity out of chaos. This shift in styles and nature of warfare is strong evidence to support the claim that ‘Total War’ is a myth as the concept can’t even attempt to be applied when the combat is not the crux of the War.

        When considering that the concept of ‘Total War’ has simply been confused with the evolution of Modern Warfare, Strachan (2000, p. 351) points out ‘total war is more likely to be exercised by the less modern state... the more advanced state will engage in a war that is certainly modern but possibly not total.’ An example that can be used from the 19th century to support this claim is the American Civil War. This for America was the birth of a new kind of Warfare which, in a way was not to be repeated but was to lead the way in a moderate, inbetween type of Warfare. The casulties of 622,000 who died during the civil war is higher than the death tolls combined of American Soldiers in World War One and Two. This demonstrates that in the 19th century brutality was still occurring, however this in no way can qualify it as Total War’ as there are so many other elements of the definition it cannot fulfill.

        An American Civil War example of the takeover of Modern Warfare is the contrast between the North and the South.  The North channelled energy, time and money into mobilisation and development and in the long run this paid off as the style of Modern Warfare and gaing the upper hand in War due to resources and economic invest was quickly becoming the deciding factor in the outcome of War. Boemeke et al (1999 p. 14) support that modern warfare required a change in how war operated drawing attention to the fact ‘the prolongation of combat required a general mobilisation of economy and society’ which was what the North of America recognised needed to be done to succeed. Boemeke and Chickering also mention how the American Civil War is probably the first true example of the use and success of the new ‘Modern Warfare’ and how it ‘laid the groundwork for Wars that were to replicate the dynamics of the American Civil War, but to dwarf it in scale.’ The dated and inaccurate concept of ‘Total War’ was finally being replaced with a more accurate take.

        A later example of true ’Modern Warfare’ occurring, which helps to demonstrate that the claims made by Boemeke et al regarding the scale of war was an accurate prediction, is that which occurred in World War Two. The technological contrast between  Japan and America also provides support for Strachan’s earlier quote. America, a country that had been through industrialisation by this point devoted only 15% of its armies to the conflict in the East and dwarfed Japan with the transport and weapon deveolpement, let alone the quantity of these with the Japanese weapons dating to as far back as 1905. For Japan this was an experience of Modern Warfare as they were industrially backward and the war was a great committment whereas Strachan reiterates 2000 p. 351) ’The United States could fight a limited war in the pacific precisely because it was modernised.’ Modern Warfare was quickly becoming the key element in 20th century Warfare and replacing any remaining ideas of ’Total Warfare.’

The newer concept of ’Modern War’ seems to be the strongest explanation as to how the concept of ’Total War’ can be put forward. It seems there has been confussion in the Historical community between these two concepts and that as a result they have merged making it difficult to distinguish one from the other. However it seems the concept of ’Total War’ is more an ideal some wish existed as a way to really emphasise if a War has been particularly brutal or if it did have rather a large influence over a nation. Unfortunantely, with such a long list of criteria, true ’Total Warfare’ is an unachieveable goal as there are always some forms of limitation.

        In the process of this essay however the introduction to the concept of ‘Modern Warfare’ seems to perhaps be the ultimate resolution. This concept has foundations, strong examples and makes logical sense in simply how like everything else war has grown and taken a different route from that which it used to. Face to face brutal combat like that at in the Napoleonic Wars has mostly faded and war (or the threat of war) as Strachan correctly identified now hinges on what technology and which weapons a country has under wraps which will grant an advantage. This development came rather swiftly but yet in comparison to the empty argument of ‘Total War’ seems a logical explanation and is justification that the concept of ‘Total War’ is perhaps not a myth, but more of a misunderstanding.